JUDGMENT : B.S. Kapadia, J. The petitioner who is the detenu has filed the present petition against the impugned order of detention passed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City, on 9-1-1988, on his being satisfied with respect to the present detenu Manjurhusein Ahmedhusen, resident of Baukhari Muhallah Dariapur, Ahmedabad, that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of Ahmedabad City, it is necessary to make an order directing that he be detained. The petitioner was served with the order of detention as also the grounds of detention after he was taken to the Ahmedabad Central Prison on the same day, i.e. 9-3-1988. 2. On persual of the grounds of detention it appears that there are as many as 13 cases filed against him from 1985 to 1988 under the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act. Two cases are of 1985, five cases are of 1986, six cases are of 1987 and two cases are of 1988. Out of the said cases some are pending in the court while others are pending for investigation. In each of the said case country liquor was seized from the petitioner's possession. In some cases the quantity of the country liquor seized was 16 ltrs., in some cases 47 ltrs., in some cases 151 ltrs., in some cases 116 ltrs. and in some cases 210 ltrs. In addition to this the statements of six witnesses have been recorded. The statements of witnesses No. 5 and 6 were recorded on 1-3-1988 and 3-3-1988. The witness No. 5 was threatened by the detenu on the allegation that the said witness was a police agent and by saying this the detenu brought out mathra (razor) and when the said witness started running away the people of the road also ran helter-skelter. Therefore, there was traffic jam and an atmosphere of terror was created. The incident relating to the witness No. 6 took place on 3-3-1988 at 11-00 a. m. near Ghandan Talavadi, Dariapur. When he was passing that area, the petitioner demanded money for purchasing liquor and an refusal by the witness to pa him the amount he (petitioner) became angry and he took away Rs. The incident relating to the witness No. 6 took place on 3-3-1988 at 11-00 a. m. near Ghandan Talavadi, Dariapur. When he was passing that area, the petitioner demanded money for purchasing liquor and an refusal by the witness to pa him the amount he (petitioner) became angry and he took away Rs. 500/- from him and during the scuffle other persons have also gathered and the detenu assaulted the said witness with open knife when he was trying to run away. Due to the said incident there was an atmosphere of terror. Considering all these circumstances and on finding truth in the statements made by the witnesses the detaining authority has stated in the grounds that he is not giving the names and addresses of the witnesses as per their request and finding truth in their apprehension. The detaining authority has also considered the alternative less drastic remedies and specifically mentioned about taking of bond under Section 93 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, externment under Section 57C of the Bombay Police Act, prosecution under ordinary law so also the petitioner being released on bail, but according to the detaining authority all the remedies under the ordinary law were not sufficient and/or adequate to immediately stopping the detenu from continuing his aforesaid activities and therefore, as there was no other alternative left the order of detention came to be passed. 3. In the petition various grounds have been raised challenging the validity and legality of the said order, but Mr. 3. In the petition various grounds have been raised challenging the validity and legality of the said order, but Mr. H. L. Patel, learned Advocate for the petitioner has pressed before us the following grounds : (1) That the petitioner is illiterate and the grounds of detention were not read over to him and therefore, he was not communicated the grounds and was not given opportunity to make representation at the earliest as required under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India ; (2) That the alternative remedy of externment under Section 568 of the Bombay Police Act has not been considered by the detaining authority and therefore, the order has been passed mechanically without applying mind on that point ; (3) That copies of the documents which arc supplied to the detenu in support of the grounds of detention as also the ground of detention are not legible ; (4) That the detaining authority himself has not considered that it would be against the public interest to disclose the names and addresses of the witnesses and therefore, non-disclosure of the names and addresses of the witnesses has also resulted in depriving the petitioner an opportunity of making adequate representation against the impugned order. 4. So far as the first ground is concerned, the petitioner has raised the same in para-4 of the petition. According to him, he is illiterate and he has not studied any language. He does not know how to read and write any language. According to him he was not informed that he was arrested in pursuance of the impugned detention order and that he was not informed about the grounds of detention. He has further stated that he was not read over and explained the contents of the grounds of detention and therefore, his fundamental right of the grounds being communicated and earlier opportunity of making representation granted under the Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is violated. 5. On this point the detaining authority has filed his affidavit-in-reply wherein it is pointed out that P. I. Shri S. R. Champavat served the order of detention and committal order upon the petitioner that at the time of service of the detention order P. I. Shri Champavat explained the detenu the contents of the orders in Gujarati language. 5. On this point the detaining authority has filed his affidavit-in-reply wherein it is pointed out that P. I. Shri S. R. Champavat served the order of detention and committal order upon the petitioner that at the time of service of the detention order P. I. Shri Champavat explained the detenu the contents of the orders in Gujarati language. He has further stated that the petitioner understands Gujarati language and therefore, understanding was given in Gujarati by the said P. I. an 9-3-1988 at 10.30 a.m. and that after understanding the contents of the order and receiving the same in original he has put his thumb impression on the office copy of the order in the presence of the said P. I. It is further pointed out in the said affidavit-in-reply that first Jamadar Shri K. A. Kadia, P.C.B., Ahmedabad, served the grounds of detention along with the other relevant material on the petitioner in Ahmedabad Central Prison at Sabarmati on 1-3-1988 in the presence of the Jailor, and that he explained the contents of the grounds of detention and other documents to the petitioner in Gujarati language, and having understood the contents of the grounds of detention and other documents the petitioner has put his thumb impression below the endorsement on the office copy of the grounds of detention which was attested by the Jailor, Detenu Branch, Ahmedabad Central Prison Sabarmti. It is further submitted that the petitioner was therefore, afforded an earliest opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention without making any delay. 6. It may be further noted that in support of what is stated in the affidavit filed by the detaining authority on this point Shri Champavat, P. I. has also filed his affidavit. Shri K. A. Kadia, First Grade Jamadar has also filed affidavit on this point, stating that after having been understood the contents of the grounds of detention and other documents, the detenu has put his thumb impression below the endorsement made in the copy of the grounds of detention. 7. There is nothing on record controverting the statements made by the authority supported by the affidavits of P. I. and Jamadar. On the contrary there is supporting contemporary document in the nature of endorsement with the left hand thumb-impression of the detenu duly attested by the Jailor, Detenu Branch of Ahmedabad, Central Prison. 7. There is nothing on record controverting the statements made by the authority supported by the affidavits of P. I. and Jamadar. On the contrary there is supporting contemporary document in the nature of endorsement with the left hand thumb-impression of the detenu duly attested by the Jailor, Detenu Branch of Ahmedabad, Central Prison. On perusal of the said endorsement it is clear that the petitioner is illiterate but he understands Gujarati language and he has fully understood the contents of the grounds of detention and in token thereof he has put his fully thumb impression. Endorsement to the effect that the substance of the order is explained to the petitioner in Gujarati language which he has understood fully and in token thereof he has put his thumb impression, is also made on the copy of the impugned detention order. In that view of the matter there is enough evidence to show that the substance of the impugned order of detention as well as the ground of detention were explained to the detenu in Gujarati language. Hence we do not find any substance in this contention raised by Mr. Patel on behalf of the petitioner. 8. The next contention raised by Mr. Patel on behalf of the petitioner is that though there is specific mention about considering the alternative less drastic remedies like bond under Section 93 of the Bombay Prohibition-Act, proceedings under Section 57C of the Bombay Police Act, prosecution under ordinary law and bail order, there is no specific mention about applying mind by the detaining authority on the point of externment proceedings under Section 568 of the Bombay Police Act and therefore, there is non-application of mind to that less drastic remedy and the order is passed mechanically. 9. It may be mentioned that in the grounds of detention there is no specific mention about proceedings under Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act. However, in the last lines of the grounds of detention on page 18 while considering the alternative remedies the detaining authority has mentioned as under: VERNACULAR MATTER In affidavit-in-reply the detaining authority has stated that externment proceedings were also considered by him and he was of the view that they were not adequate to keep the petitioner out of harm's way. 10. On this point Mr. 10. On this point Mr. H.L. Patel, learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramveer Jat v. State of U. P. AIR 1987 SC 63 . The said case was under the National Security Act and order of detention in the said case was passed on the sole ground that the detenu along with other persons jointly committed murder of the complainant's brother, namely, Atmaram by firing at him in broad day light near the clinic of Lakahminarayan Gupta with the object of getting the land vacated by him. On that solitary ground the order of detention was passed. However, in the counter-affidavit filed by the District Magistrate, several circumstances were set out to suggest that the petitioner-detenu was habitually indulging in criminal activity and some instance have also been set out by the District Magistrate in the counter affidavit. In the said case the Supreme Court has observed that none of these circumstances finds a place in the grounds of detention. The Supreme Court thereafter observed that it is well settled that the detaining authority cannot by an affidavit filed in the Court supplement what is-stated in the grounds of detention or add to it and on that ground Supreme Court allowed the petition. 11. In the present case as stated earlier, the grounds of detention are already stated in the earlier part of the grounds of detention namely, there are 13 cases filed against the petitioner and six witnesses have given statements and there is no question of any addition or supplementing thereto. Hence the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court will not apply to this case. 12. The point raised before us is altogether a different one as to whether the detaining authority has without applying its mind passed the order mechanically. Therefore, we have to see also whether there is anything on record to find out as whether the detaining authority has applied its mind to less drastic remedies. If the detaining authority has elaborated something what is stated in the grounds of detention, it cannot be supplementing or additing to the grounds of detention, and it is clarifying as to how he has applied his mind. Therefore, in our view the said judgment cited by Mr. Patel would not be applicable to the present case. If the detaining authority has elaborated something what is stated in the grounds of detention, it cannot be supplementing or additing to the grounds of detention, and it is clarifying as to how he has applied his mind. Therefore, in our view the said judgment cited by Mr. Patel would not be applicable to the present case. In the present case as quoted earlier in the last two lines of the grounds of detention on page, 18 it is clearly mentioned that after considering various less drastic alternative remedies, namely, taking of bonds, order of externment, prosecution under ordinary law, etc., as there was no other alternatives left the order of detention come to be passed. 13. Similar point was raised in the case of Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. S.D. Gujarat and Another, AIR 1901 SC 1191. The point raised by Mr. Jeth-malani in the said case was that the detaining authority has filed to consider the question whether the prosecution under ordinary criminal in law would not suffer to prevent the detenu from indulging in the alleged activities and whether preventive detention was necessary in the circumstances of the case. In the said case it was pointed out that the detaining authority had filed affidavit-in-reply wherein it was stated as under : "Having regard to the nature of the activities in which the detenu was engaged and after having applied my mind very carefully to all the facts and circumstances of the case and the material placed before me, I arrived at the subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain Shri Jahaubar Moulana for preventing him from engaging in transporting smuggled goods. The adjudication of the case under the Customs Act and prosecution of the detenu are entirely on a different footing. I say that the detention order was passed by me with due care and after careful consideration of all the materials placed before me." Taking into consideration the above counter-affidavit the Supreme Court has observed as under : "The deponent may not have stated in express words that when he made the order of detention he also considered the question whether a prosecution under the ordinary criminal law would not meet the situation and would not be sufficient to prevent Sahaubar Moulana from engaging himself in the objectionable activities. But a reading of the entire counter-affidavit makes it clear that in the opinion of the detained authority prosecution or no presentation, the only effective way of preventing Jahaubur Moulana from engaging himself in objectionable activities has to detain him." In that view of the matter contention was rejected by the Supreme Court. 14. Similar contention was also raised in the case of Vijay Kumar v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1988 SC 934 wherein the point that was raised by Mr. Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant was that the detaining authority was obliged to consider before passing the order of detention that the detenu was already in detention on a charge under Section 135 of the Customs Act, but there is no indication in the order of detention that such consideration was made or that the detaining authority was aware that the appellant was already under contention. It was, therefore, submitted that as there has been non-application of mind by the detaining authority as to the said fact of detention, the order of detention is illegal and invalid. While considering this argument the Supreme Court has observed that the question whether or not a particular offence, for which the detenu has been detained, in a bailable or non-bailable offence done not have any bearing on the question of passing an order of detention. Even though an offence is a non-bailable one, an accused may be enlarged on bail. What is to be considered by the Court is whether an order of detention can be against a person who is already in detention or in jail will have to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. After considering the case law on the point in para-16 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has observed as under : "All that has been urged on behalf of the-appellant is that there has been non-application of mind by the detaining authority of the fact of detention of the appellant. We are, however, unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant that there has been non-application of mind by the detaining authority, besides being aware of the fact that the appellant was already in detention, has taken into consideration the relevant facts before passing the impugned order of detention under the act, which is apparent from the grounds of detention. In the circumstances the contention that the impugned order of detention should be struck down on the ground of non-application of mind by the detaining authority is rejected." 15. From the above authorities of the Supreme Court it is clear that the detaining authority should be aware of the fact of detention and after considering the fact of detention the order of detention should have been passed. Similarly while passing the detention order the detaining authority must have considered the prosecution or other alternative remedies before arriving at the subjective satisfaction on the point of necessity for passing the order of detention. It is not always necessary to have so mentioned in the grounds in details. It can be ascertained from the affidavit-in-reply filed by the detaining authority also. When the detaining authority clearly states about his considering all alternative remedies and when further states that the only alternative remedy left was to pass order of detention against the petitioner, it means that the detaining authority was not only aware of the alternative remedies but he did consider them before arriving at the subjective satisfaction on the point of necessity of passing the order of detention. 16. Reverting to the facts of the present case it may be mentioned that in the grounds of detention it is clearly mentioned about consideration of alternative less drastic remedies like taking of bond under the Bombay Prohibition Act, externment proceedings under the Bombay Police act as also prosecutions under ordinary criminal law and after considering all the alternative remedies ultimately in the grounds of detention it is mentioned that there was no other alternative, but to pass the order of detention against the present petitioner and accordingly, it was passed. 17. In the affidavit-in-reply which is filed by the detaining authority it is clearly mentioned that he was satisfied that other alternative remedies under the ordinary law were insufficient to the petitioner-detenu from carrying on his prejudicial activities disturbing the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority has specifically denied that he has not applied mind to the less drastic measures. It is specifically mentioned that while passing the impugned order of contention he has fully considered the alternative remedies available under the ordinary law of land. The detaining authority has specifically denied that he has not applied mind to the less drastic measures. It is specifically mentioned that while passing the impugned order of contention he has fully considered the alternative remedies available under the ordinary law of land. Dealing with the remedy of externment proceedings it is mentioned that externment proceedings under the Bombay Police Act was also considered as an alternative step and less drastic remedy. However, he was of the view that the externment proceedings was likely to take long time in finalising the same and the externee can prefer an appeal and obtain stay of the order of externment and he can continue to indulge objectionable activities all throughout. He was, therefore, of the view that taking externment proceedings against the present petitioner was not adequate to keep him out of harm's way. Thus, looking to the affidavit-in-reply filed by the detaining authority on the point as to how he has considered about the externment proceeding before arriving at the conclusion on the point of necessity of passing the detention order against the present petitioner, it cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to less drastic remedy of externment under Section 568 of the Bombay Police Act. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of L.M.S. Ummu Saleema (supra) the deponent may not have stated in express words that when he made the order of detention he also considered the question whether a prosecution under the ordinary criminal law would not meet the situation and would not be sufficient to prevent the detenu from engaging himself in the objectionable activities. There should be reading of the entire counter-affidavit. In the present case reading of the counter-affidavit of the detaining authority along with the grounds of detention would clearly indicate that in the opinion of the detaining authority the externment proceeding was not effective and/or sufficient and the only alternative way of immediately preventing the present petitioner-detenu from engaging himself in objecdonable activities was to detain him. In that view of the matter we do not find any merit in this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 18. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the copies of the documents which are supplied to the petitioner are illegible. 19. In that view of the matter we do not find any merit in this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 18. The next contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the copies of the documents which are supplied to the petitioner are illegible. 19. We have also gone through the copies supplied of the documents which are supplied to the detenu and though there would be little difficulty in reading some of the pages, it cannot he said that they were not legible. In that view of the matter we do not agree with the contention regarding illegible copies of documents supplied to the detenu. 20. The last contention raised by Mr. Patel on behalf of the petitioner is that no names and addresses of the witnesses have been given to the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner did not have adequate and appropriate opportunity to make representation against the impugned order of detention. 21. In the grounds of detention the detaining authority has stated that the witness have told him that on account of fear about the detenu their names and addresses should not be disclosed and that the detaining authority has made an inquiry to find out real truth in the statements as well as apprehension disclaiming made by various witnesses and he found them to be correct and accordingly, the names and addresses of the witnesses have not been disclosed under Sections 9(2) of the PASA Act, but the facts mentioned in the said statements were disclosed in the grounds of detention. 22. Mr. H. L. Patel further submits that in this case the detaining authority himself has to consider as to whether it is against public interest to disclose the names and addresses of the witnesses and further the detaining authority has to decide what material particular should be withheld and has also to come to the conclusion with regard to the public interest bona fide and not arbitrarily and capriciously. He has further submitted that after the affidavit of the authority disclosing the grounds of reasons of detention the detaining authority could have reasonably satisfied that the disclosure of names and addresses of the witnesses was not in public interest, and on this point Mr. Patel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bai Amina reported in XXII GLR 1186. 23. However Mr. Patel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bai Amina reported in XXII GLR 1186. 23. However Mr. R. R. Tripathi, learned A. G. P. submits that the correctness of the held decision is doubted in Special Criminal Application No, 479/86 in the case of Chandulal N. Patel and in the case of Rajesh Gopalbhai (Cr. L. R. Guj. 1987 p. 638 and on this point the matter has been referred to the Larger Bench. 24. Accordingly, all other points raised on behalf of the petitioner-detenu have been rejected by us, the matter only on the last point is referred to Larger Bench. Hence the papers of this ease be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice with a request to place them before the Larger Bench to decide the last point raised in this matter. 25. After we have dictated the judgment an the point, raised before us and after the matter was ordered to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for placing it before the Larger Bench for deciding the last point as similar matter was already referred the Larger Bench in Special Criminal Application No. 479 of 1986, Mr. Barajia, learned Advocate for the petitioner replacing Mr. H.L. Patel and has filed an amendment application for adding ground-10(A) in the petition. However, Mr. Barajia specifically stated that he does not press the point of not supplying the names and addresses of the witnesses as the detaining authority has not supplied the same in the interest of public under Section 9(2) of the PASA Act. In that view of the matter it is not necessary now to refer the matter to Larger Bench as the said point is not pressed by Mr. Barajia. The judgment which we have dictated in this matter on 26-9-88 was not signed by us and therefore, we allowed the said amendment application and placed the matter for further hearing before us. 26. Mr. Barajia submitted that the detaining authority has arrived at the subjective satisfaction on the basis of F. I. Rs. in the prohibition cases, Panchnamas and identification memos (Chehra Nishan Patrak). 26. Mr. Barajia submitted that the detaining authority has arrived at the subjective satisfaction on the basis of F. I. Rs. in the prohibition cases, Panchnamas and identification memos (Chehra Nishan Patrak). He has further submitted that the detaining authority has conveniently failed to supply copies of the Panchnamas which have been relied upon and referred to by him and that non-supply of copies of Panchnamas has vitiated the detention order and therefore, it must be quashed and set aside. 27. It is no doubt true that in the grounds of detention it is clearly stated that there arc as many as 13 prohibition cases filed against him and it is also mentioned that on reading the F.I.R.S Panchamas and identification memos it was clear that the petitioner as a bootlegger doing illegal business in country liquor. It may also be mentioned that in all the F. I. R.s referred to in the grounds of detention there is mention about the quantity of country liquor seized from the possession of the petitioner. Therefore, basic facts are possession and storage of country liquor in huge quantity by the petitioner and dealing in the same by the petitioner. Therefore, F. I. R. is a basic document on the basis of which the detaining authority has arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner was a bootlegger. 28. However, it may also be mentioned that these Panchanamas no doubt give details as to how the aforesaid quantity of country liquor in each case was seized, but that is with regard to details and therefore, in our opinion it is the nature of subsidiary fact. Undoubtedly, it is clear that after receiving the basic material no request was made to the detaining authority by the detenu for applying the copies of the Panchnamas as well as identification memos. It is clearly held in the case of Hasmukh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 23 as under: "While the expression 'grounds' in Article 22(5) and for that matter, in Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA, includes not only conclusions of fact but also all the 'basic facts' on which those conclusions are founded they are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars of the basic facts. The distinction between 'basic facts' which are essential factual constituents of the grounds and their further particulars or subsidiary details is important. The distinction between 'basic facts' which are essential factual constituents of the grounds and their further particulars or subsidiary details is important. While the 'basic facts' being integral part of the 'grounds' must, according to Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA be communicated to the detenu, as soon as may be, after the detention, ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 15 days from the date of detention, further particulars of those grounds in compliance with the second constitutional imperative spelled out from Article 22(5) in AIR 1975 SC 558 are required to be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be practicable, with reasonable expedition. If the grounds communicated are elaborate and contain all the 'basic facts' but are not comprehensive enough to cover all the details or particulars of the 'basic facts', such particulars, also must be supplied to the detenu, if asked for by him, with reasonable expedition, within a reasonable time." This judgment of the Supreme Court has also been followed by this Court in the case reported in XXVI GLR page, 971. 29. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court we have to see as to whether grounds supplied to the detenu were elaborate, full and contained all the basic facts. On reading the copies of the F.l.R.s supplied to the petitioner it is clear that the grounds supplied to the detenu were elaborate, full and contained all basic facts. However, together with grounds further particulars as subsidiary facts contained in Panchnama have not been supplied to the detenu. But in the present case the petitioner has not made any demand for the copies of the Panchnamas and therefore, the petitioner cannot make grievance that he was deprived of an opportunity of making proper representation against the order of detention. 30. Mr. But in the present case the petitioner has not made any demand for the copies of the Panchnamas and therefore, the petitioner cannot make grievance that he was deprived of an opportunity of making proper representation against the order of detention. 30. Mr. Barajia has in this connection placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Noormohmad Ismail Shaikh v. Commissioner of Police, Vadodara and others, XXIX GLR 356 wherein the order of detention was inter alia challenged on the ground that the copies of the externment order -dated April 3, 1983 and the judgment and order dated August 21, 1985 passed by this Court quashing and setting aside the earlier detention order passed under the relevant provisions of the Act, have not been supplied to the detenu and this has resulted in infraction of the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. In the said case it is also inter alia observed that "there may be cases in which mere reference to certain documents might have been made and those documents may not be forming part of the basis of the detention order. In some cases it may be possible for the detaining authority to make out a case that though the documents are referred to in the grounds of detention, they are not required to be supplied to the detenu." After making these observations in the facts and circumstances of the case it was held that it cannot be said that the documents referred to and relied upon by the detaining authority while framing the grounds of detention were inconsequential or not material and accordingly allowed the said petition. Looking to the facts of the present case the said Judgment in the case of Noormohmad Ismail Shaikh would not be useful. 31. Mr. Barajia has also cited the judgment of this court in the case of Ganga Ramchand Bharvani v. Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra & Ors. 1980 Criminal Law Reporter (SC) BC page, 610 wherein in para-17 it is observed as under : "Nothing less than all the basic facts and materials which influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu. This is the ratio of decision in Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and others to which one of us (Sarkaria, J.) was party................... This is the ratio of decision in Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and others to which one of us (Sarkaria, J.) was party................... The mere fact that the grounds of detention served on the detenu are elaborate, does not absolve the detaining authority from its constitutional responsibility to supply all the basic facts and materials relied upon in the grounds to the detenu." It may be mentioned that in the said case in the grounds of detention only the substance of the statement was given while the detenu had asked for copies of the full text of those statements and it was submitted that without supplying the full text of the statements the petitioner in the said case could not make an effective representation and the Supreme Court found merit in that submission. In view of the facts of that case it has a question with regard to basis facts and not with regard to subsidiary fact and therefore, the said decision is also in line of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hasmukh ( AIR 1981 SC 28 ). In that view of the matter we do not find any substance in the contention raised by Mr. Barajia. 32. However, the case may be considered from other angle also. In the present case there are as many as 13 cases filed against the petitioner out of which the cases at Sr. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8, i. e. in all five cases are pending in the court. When that is so, the investigating officer must have already served the petitioner with all the investigation papers at the time of filing the charge-sheet. In that view of the matter as held by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to herein below, no complaint-on the ground of violation of the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India in respect of these cases can be made. 33. In the case of Wali Uddin Ahmad v. The District Magistrate, AIR 1931 SC 2166 the Supreme Court has in para, 19 observed as under ; "Much stress was, however, laid on the fact that the detenu had not been furnished with the copies of the first information reports in the criminal case in which he was convicted and in the three other criminal cases pending against him. It is said that the failure to furnish these documents vitiates the impugned order of detention. The contention appears to be misconceived. Under sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Criminal P. C., 1973 the detenu had already been supplied with all the documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution relied in the criminal case in which he was convicted as well as on which the prosecution propose to rely in the three Criminal cases pending against him. There was, therefore, no need to supply the copies of the first information reports referred to in the grounds of detention over again and no grievance can be made that the detenu was deprived of the right of making a representation at the earliest opportunity due to non-supply of these documents. The contention that the constitutional safeguards under Article 22(5) read with Section 8 of the Act were not complied with due to non-supply of documents or failure to supply the documents in a language with which the detenu was conversant must, therefore, fail." In that view of the matter also out of 13 cases in 5 cases copies of the documents including Panchnamas must have been supplied to the petitioner and no statement has been made on behalf of the detenu though pointedly asked with regard to the supply of copies of the documents relating to the cases which are pending in the trial court. In that view of the matter out of 13 cases in 5 cases there is no violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Wasi Uddin Ahmed. 34. The matter may be examined from yet another angle. As disclosed in the grounds of detention there were 13 criminal cases under the Bombay Prohibition Act against the detenu. His activities as a bootlegger are, therefore, storing and selling country liquor. While carrying on this activity he also involved in certain incidents narrated by six different witnesses whose statements have been referred to in the grounds of detention. In above view of the matter each activity of the detenu is a ground on the basis of which the order of detention should have been passed by the detaining authority. While carrying on this activity he also involved in certain incidents narrated by six different witnesses whose statements have been referred to in the grounds of detention. In above view of the matter each activity of the detenu is a ground on the basis of which the order of detention should have been passed by the detaining authority. In view of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act when an order of detention under Section 3 has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention is deemed to have been made separately on each ground and such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is/are vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or invalid for any other reason whatsoever. In view of the aforesaid provisions of Section 6 of the Act and order of detention is passed on different prohibition cases and another activities, then each activity is to be treated as a separate ground for passing the order of detention. This deeming fiction has to be carried to its fullest logical extent. If in connection with one of the grounds the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India are violated, inasmuch as in respect of that particular ground the petitioners has not been provided adequate opportunity of making representation, the order can be sustained if it is shown that in respect of other grounds the detenu had been afforded opportunity of making representation against of detention. 35. In the case of East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1957) A. C. P. 109, it is observed by Privy Council as follows : "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have followed from or accompanied it.... The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inavitable corollaries of that state of affairs." The aforesaid decision has been approvingly followed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Pandu-rang Vinayak, A.I.R., 1952, SC 244. The Supreme Court observed to the effect that : "When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth was not done, the court entitled and bound to ascertain for what purpose and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion." 36. In view of this settled legal position, the deeming fiction as regards the invalidity of certain grounds (in the instant case assumed to be so with respect to the criminal cases in which the copies of panchnamas have not been supplied to the petitioner-detenu) has to be carried to its fullest logical extent. As provided in Section 6 of the Act the order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each ground. Therefore it is to be assumed that there are several orders of detention equal to the number of grounds of detention. If the order -is invalid on account of infraction of provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India because in relation to certain grounds of detention documents have not been furnished to the detenu, then the order of detention based on that particular ground (be it remembered that by the deeming fiction -several orders of detention were passed on each such grounds separately), and therefore that particular order of detention only would be covered within the scope of phrase "Invalid for any other reasons whatsoever". Pursuing the logic further out of 13 or 15 orders of detention, 7 or 8 orders of detention would be bad because in respect of these orders of detention the documents relied upon for passing the order have not been furnished to the detenu, but the remaining orders of detention (again carrying the same logic further), which in this case would be at least 5 if not more, would be valid notwithstanding the infraction of Article 22(5) in respect of the orders of detention for which documents referred to in the grounds of detention have not been furnished to the detenu. There is no reason why this logic should not be extended to the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India also. On the contrary, not to do so would amount to nullifying the provisions of Section 6. 37. Similar view is taken by a Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Smt. Manjulaben Radial Navik v. State and Another, 24(2) GLR 1509. It was a case under COFEPOSA. In that case order of detention was passed on two grounds. The Government had confirmed the order of detention only on one ground. Therefore it was contended that the State Government was required to confirm the detention order as a whole and it cannot confirm the detention order on one ground only. This contention was not accepted by the Court by resorting to the provisions of Section 5(A) of COFEPASA is in pari materia with Section 6 of PASA. While deciding this question the Division Bench has also adverted to the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by Division Bench of this High Court in its aforesaid decision. 38. If the provisions of Section 6 of the Act are not invoked and not interpreted in the aforesaid manner we would be doing violence to the language and would not be carrying out the legislative mandate contained in the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. The legislative mandate is to imagine certain state of affairs and then proceed further to apply the logic as if the imaginary state of affairs exist. The legislature docs not permit to leave things half-way. The inexorable logic of imaginary fact situation must follow as if the imaginary state of affair existed continuously. The legislative mandate is to imagine certain state of affairs and then proceed further to apply the logic as if the imaginary state of affairs exist. The legislature docs not permit to leave things half-way. The inexorable logic of imaginary fact situation must follow as if the imaginary state of affair existed continuously. If one of the grounds of detention is invalid for whatsoever reason, in respect of that ground (and for that reason by deeming fiction in respect of that particular order of detention) it would be futile to invoke the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and may that all other orders of detention would be bad. This would be clear only if we do not forget the imaginary fact situation. There is not one order of detention. In this imaginary fact situation, there are several orders of detention. Legality and validity of each of the order has to be judged separately. If it is held that because one order of detention is bad on account of infraction of provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and therefore all orders of detention should be bad, the entire scheme contained in Section 6 of the Act would become meaningless and the object behind enacting the provisions of Section 6 would be frustrated. 39. Article 22(5) gives a mandate of communicating the grounds on which the order has been made, so as to enable the detenu to make representation against the order of detention. In Article 22(5) the mandate is for providing opportunity making representation against order and not against detention. While the legal fiction is that the detention order which has been made on two or more grounds shall be deemed to have been made separately on each ground. Therefore in such cases there are several orders of detention. In the present case there cannot be valid complaint of not complying with Article 22(5) of the Constitution with regard to five cases in which copies of documents relied on by the prosecution are supplied to the petitioner and that the statements of six witnesses are also supplied to him. When that is so, we do not find any merit in the argument that the order of detention is vitiated on account of non-supply of copies of panchnamas and/or identification memos to the petitioner for the remaining eight cases filed against him. 40. When that is so, we do not find any merit in the argument that the order of detention is vitiated on account of non-supply of copies of panchnamas and/or identification memos to the petitioner for the remaining eight cases filed against him. 40. Accordingly, we do not find any substance in any of the points raised before us and therefore the petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged. Petition discharged.