Judgment Ramnandan Prasad, J. 1. The prayer of the petitioners in the present application is for quashing the order dated 1-6-1987 passed by the Special Judge E.C. Act, Jamshedpur, in J. C. 2 Case No. 8/87 whereby cognizance of the offence under Section 7 of the E. C. Act has been taken against the petitioners. Further prayer is that the entire criminal proceedings of the aforesaid case may be quashed. 2. The petitioners are Honorary Secretary and Salesman, respectively of the Jawaharnagar Consumer Co-operative Stores, situated in Mango, within Jamshedpur town and this is said to be a fair price shop. On 1-6-1987 opposite party No. 2 namely the Marketing Officer, Jamshedpur, filed the petition of complaint against the petitioners alleging therein that in course of inspection by him on 15-3-1987 some discrepancy in stock of sugar was detected (the allegation is that on actual verification one quintal 39 kgs and 599 grams of sugar were found short) for which there was no satisfactory explanation. It is further alleged in the petition of complaint that although he was directed, the petitioners failed to produce before the inspecting officer on subsequent dates the stock and sale register and the cash memo of the shop in-question. The complaint was filed with the prayer that the petitioners had committed an offence under the E. C. Act and action may be taken against the petitioners. The learned Special Judge took cognizance on the same date as already mentioned above. 3. The learned lawyer for the petitioners has submitted that the taking of cognizance by the Special Judge is not in accordance with the Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.12-AA of the E. C. Act. This clause, as it was originally enacted, in the E. C. Amendment Act (Act 18/81) reads as follows : A special court may, upon a perusal of the police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. 4. There was an amendment of this clause by the E. C. Act, 1986 (Act 42 of 1986) which came into force on 9th September, 1986. 4. There was an amendment of this clause by the E. C. Act, 1986 (Act 42 of 1986) which came into force on 9th September, 1986. After the said amendment Clause (e) reads as follows: A special court may, upon a perusal of the police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act or upon a complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorise in this behalf by the Government concerned, take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. 5. It appears that the Marketing Officer who is opposite party No. 2 in the case, was noticed and the offence note shows that the notice was duly served on him. He has not, however, appeared in the case or filed any counter affidavit in respect of the allegations made in the present application In paragraph 33 of this application the petitioners have clearly stated that the complaint was filed by the opposite party No. 2 without any authorisation by the State Government and, therefore, the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance in the case. Obviously there is no denial of this allegation by the opposite parties and, therefore, it has to be accepted that the Marketing Officer was not duly authorised to file complaint in this case as required by the provisions of Clause (e) of Sec.12-AA (1) of the E. C. Act. 6. Mr. Gopal Choudhury who is appearing on behalf of the opposite parties, has submitted that although there is no counter affidavit by any of the opposite parties by way of instruction he has received statements of facts from the office of opposite party No. 2 and it has been mentioned therein that in view of the authorisation under Clause 30 of the Bihar Trade Article (Licences Unification) Order, 4984, the Marketing Officer is duly empowered to make inspection, search, seizure etc., and as such there is no legal lacuna in filing complaint by him. Clause 30 of the aforesaid Unification Order no doubt gives power to several officers including the Marketing Officer and Assistant Marketing Officer in respect of entry, search etc. of any premises in respect of which there is reason to believe that an offence has been committed. Clause 30 of the aforesaid Unification Order no doubt gives power to several officers including the Marketing Officer and Assistant Marketing Officer in respect of entry, search etc. of any premises in respect of which there is reason to believe that an offence has been committed. This clause, however, does not at all show that the officers mentioned therein have also been authorised to file a complaint in respect of offence under Section 7 of the E. C. Act as envisaged under Clause (e) of Sec.12-AA (1) of the E. C. Act. The learned State counsel has frankly conceded that Clause 30 of the Unification Order does not contain any provision which can be deemed to authorise the officers named therein to be competent to file a complaint. It is thus clear that the opposite party has failed to show that there was the necessary authorisation by the State Government to the complainant which could enable him to file the petition of complaint as contemplated under Clause (e) of Section i2-AA (1) of the E. C. Act. 7. The learned lawyer for the petitioners contended that filing of a complaint by a person who is not duly authorised is not a valid complaint in law and no prosecution can be launched or continued on the basis of such complaint. For this purpose he has placed reliance on several cases in which it has been held that if the complaint is not by a duly authorised person it is bad in law. In this context I may refer to only a few rulings. In case of Chaman Modi V/s. The State, reported in 1975 BBCJ page 668, it was held by an Hon ble Single Judge of this Court that since the complaint for prosecution under Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 which was find by the B. D. O.) was not proved to be by a duly authorised person, it was bad in law and the conviction was set aside. In the case of Md. In the case of Md. Kurshid Anwar V/s. The State, reported in 1984 BBCJ Page 183, It was held that the prosecution of the petitioner on the basis of a police report in respect of an offence under Sec. 51 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 (Act No. 53/72) was unsustainable in law as the cognizance could be taken only upon a complaint by a duly authorised person as provided under Sec. 55 of the said Act. Likewise it has been held by the Supreme Court in A. K. Roy V/s. State of Punjab -- , that the prosecution of the applicant for an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was bad in law as the complaint had not been filed by the person who has been duly authorised to do so under Sec.20 (1) of the Act. It appears that the Government of Punjab, in exercise of its rule making powers under Sec.24 (2) read with Sec.20 (1) of the Act had framed the rules and under Rule 3 it bad authorised the Food (Health Authority) to institute prosecution for offences under the Act. In that case, however, the prosecution was instituted not by the Food (Health Authority) but by the Food Inspector. Their Lordships held that there could not be sub-delegation of the power which the State Government had delegated to the Food (Health Authority) under Rule 3 and as such the prosecution of the appellant (of that case) on the basis of a report of the Food Inspector was bad in law. While dealing with the question. Their Lordships observed as follows: Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. The intention of the legislature in enacting Sec.20 (1) was to confer a power on the authorities specified therein which power had to be exercised in the manner provided and not otherwise. In my opinion, the aforesaid rulings fully support the contention put forward in this application by the petitioners. 8 In view of the above discussions, I find that the Marketing Officer was not a duly authorised person for filing complaint as required under Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.12-AA of the E. C. Act. In my opinion, the aforesaid rulings fully support the contention put forward in this application by the petitioners. 8 In view of the above discussions, I find that the Marketing Officer was not a duly authorised person for filing complaint as required under Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.12-AA of the E. C. Act. As such the complaint filed by him cannot be regarded as a valid complaint in the eye of law on the basis of which cognizance could be taken and prosecution continued against the petitioners. I, therefore, quash the order of cognizance dated 1-6-87 as well as the entire criminal proceeding of JC-2 case No. 8/87 pending against the petitioners. The application thus stands allowed.