S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) A Division Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (S. B. Majmudar and B. S. Kapadia JJ ) by an order dated January 1988 referred the following question for decision of a larger bench:"whether Rule 13 (xi) of the Gujarat Conditions of Detention (PASA) Order 1985 as it stood at the relevant time to the extent to which it provided interview to the detenu by a legal practitioner subject to the permission of the State Government was unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it violated Arts. 14 21 and 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. "accordingly papers of this matter were placed before the learned Chief Justice for making reference to the larger bench. This matter has now been placed before us for resolving the aforesaid question. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the contours of controversy centering round the aforesaid question it will be necessary to have a quick glance at a few introductory facts leading to this reference. ( 3 ) INTRODUCTORY facts: The petitioner who is the detenu under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 1985 (hereinafter referred to as PASA) has challenged the order of his detention dated 1-7-1987 passed by the Commissioner of Police Baroda city on diverse grounds. By an amendment granted to the petition at para 18a he has challenged the vires of Rule 13 sub-clause (xi) of the Gujarat Conditions of Detention (PASA) Order 1985 The said sub-clause which existed at the relevant time read as under:" (XI) In addition to the interviews permissible under the preceding provisions of this clause a detenu may if he so desires with the permission of the Government be allowed to have only one interview with a legal practitioner or any other person of his choice and at his cost for the purpose of drafting a representation against the order of detention. Such interview shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Clause as regards place duration and conditions of the interviews and the proceedings shall be strictly confined to the object for which the interview is granted. Such interview shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Clause as regards place duration and conditions of the interviews and the proceedings shall be strictly confined to the object for which the interview is granted. " (Underlining ours) it may be mentioned at this stage that by a Government circular dated 26/11/1987 the said sub-clause has now been amended and the then existing provision regarding grant of interview to the detenu with legal Adviser or legal Practitioner has been liberalized. The relevant provision of the said circular reads as under:"under the existing provision of sub-clauses (ix) and (xi) of Rule 13 of the Gujarat Conditions of Detention (PASA) Order 1985 a detenu is allowed interview with the legal Adviser/legal Practitioner with the permission of the State Government. Government is pleased to direct that a detenu under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 1985 may be granted interview with his legal adviser/legal practitioner at any reasonable hour during the day aftertaking the appointment from the Superintendent of Jail where the detenu is lodged. This interview should be granted for the purpose enumerated in sub-clauses (ix) and (xi) of Rule 13 of the Gujarat Conditions of Detention (PASA) Order 1985 Prior permission of the State Government or the detaining authority is not necessary for granting interview with the legal Adviser/legal Practitioner. The Jail authorities should grant such interviews without avoidable delay "despite this development the challenge to the vires of the then existing sub-clause (xi) of Rule 13 has been pressed in service by the learned Advocate for the petitioner for the simple reason that the order of detention has been passed prior to 26-11-1987 and according to him the detenu was not permitted by the jailor to consult his Advocate for the purpose of drafting representation on account of the provision of the then existing sub-clause (xi) of Rule 13 and that his Advocate was told to get permission of the State Government before he could get interview with the detenu for that purpose and that has affected the detenus right of effectively representing against the detention order at least for the purpose of getting it revoked. That is how this question survives for consideration in the present reference. ( 4 ) THIS petition earlier reached final hearing before the aforesaid Division Bench. That is how this question survives for consideration in the present reference. ( 4 ) THIS petition earlier reached final hearing before the aforesaid Division Bench. Before the Division Bench it was contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the provision regarding obtaining of permission of the State Government before granting interview with legal Adviser/practitioner to the detenu as mentioned in the then sub-clause (xi) of Rule 13 was violative of the Constitutional right guaranteed to the detenu under Arts. 14 21 and 22 (5) of the Constitution; while on the other hand the learned Advocate General who appeared for the respondents submitted that the detenu under the Preventive Detention Laws has no such right. During the course of arguments before the Division Bench three judgments of the Supreme Court were pressed in service by the respective parties. They are: (I) Francis Coralie v Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746 ; (II) A. K. Roy v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 710 ; (III) Devji Vallabhbhai v. Administrator Goa Daman and Diu AIR 1982 SC 1029 . The Division Bench referred the aforesaid question for decision of a larger bench looking to the importance of the question raised for consideration. ( 5 ) STATUTORY settings: It would be necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions at the outset as it is in the background of these provisions that this question will have to be decided. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 3 of PASA empowers the State Government to make an order directing that a person be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenace of public order. Under sub-section (2) of the said Section an authorised officer under the circumstance as mentioned in the 6aid provision can also pass such an order. Section 5 of the PASA provides that every person in respect of whom a detention order has been made shall be liable (a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions including conditions as to maintenance discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as the Government may be general or special order specify. Section 5 of the PASA provides that every person in respect of whom a detention order has been made shall be liable (a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions including conditions as to maintenance discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as the Government may be general or special order specify. In exercise of the said power the State of Gujarat made the Gujarat Conditions of Detention (PASA) Order 1985 on 29/05/1985 We are concerned with Rule 13 of the said Order which deals with interviews to be granted to the PASA detenu. It would be necessary to extract the whole of this Rule 13 with its sub-clauses running from (x) to (xi ). "13 (I ). No detenu shall permitted to have an interview (A)WITH any person other than a Police Officer or relatives except with the written order of the Government in the Home Department and (B) with a Police Officer or family members and relatives except with the written order of the Superintendent of Jail in which the security prisoner is detained under an order made under Sec. 5 of the Act. (II) A detenu may he allowed only two interviews per month with family members and relatives under paragraph (b) of sub-clause (i ). (III) Not more than three visitors shall be allowed to remain present simultaneously at any one interview except in the case of family members and relatives when the number may be increased to five. (IV) Applications for interview (A) from persons other than a Police Officer or family members and relatives shall be made to the Government in the Home Department and (B) from a Police Officer or family members and relatives shall be made to the Superintendent of Jail referred to in paragraph (b) of sub-clause (i) in form A appended to this order; (V) The Superintendent of the Commissioner shall appoint the time place and of each interview and shall not ordinarily allow in any interview to continue for more than half an hour with family member and relative. The duration of an interview with a lawyer when permitted may however extend upto one hour. The duration of an interview with a lawyer when permitted may however extend upto one hour. (VI) Every interview shall take place in the presence and within the bearing of an officer attached to the place of detention or a Police Officer who may terminate it at any time if in his opinion the conversation is detrimental to the public interest or safety. (VII) After the interview is over or terminated. the Officer present at the interview shall warn both the detenu and the visitor that future interviews are liable to be prohibited if the visitor indulges in any publicity on behalf of the detenu. (VIII) Government may for special reasons permit additional interviews in excess of the number permissible under sub-clause (2 ). (IX) In addition to the interviews permissible under the preceding provisions of this clause a detenu may with the permission of the State Government be allowed only one interview with legal advisers in connection with any Court matter against him. All such interviews shall take place on the premises in which the detenu is confined and shall be subject to such conditions and restrictions as the Commissioner or the Superintendent may consider necessary to ensure security and prevent the passing of unauthorised communications unconnected with the case relating to which the interview is granted. (X) In addition to the interviews permissible under the preceding provisions of this clause a detenu who wishes to stand as a candidate for any election to Parliament or State Legislature shall be allowed bi-weekly interviews with his election agent up to the date fixed for taking the poll and the Government may allow any additional interviews to the detenu with his election agent for the purposes of his candidature at the election. (XI) It is already extracted earlier. "as already mentioned earlier sub-clause (ix) and (xi) of Rule 13 were amended by Government circular dated 25/11/1987 In the present proceedings we are concerned with unamended sub-clauses (ix) and (xi) of Rule 13 of PASA Order that were holding the field prior to to 26 Legality of the then existing sub-clause (xi) of Rule 13 is brought in challenge before us by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on diverse grounds. ( 6 ) RIVAL contentions: Mr. ( 6 ) RIVAL contentions: Mr. Patel for the petitioner vehemently submitted placing strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Frarnciss case (supra) that identical provision in the Conditions of Detention Order issued by the Delhi Administration in exercises of the powers under Secs. 3 and 5 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 was struck down by the Supreme Court in that decision on the ground that the provision for obtaining previous permission of the District Magistrate before granting interviews to the COFEPOSA detenu with his legal Adviser was arbitrary unfair and unjust and hence ultra vires Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Mr. Patel therefore submitted that following that decision we must strike down the obnoxious condition underlined by us in sub-clause (xi) of Rule 13 viz. with the permission of the Government as the same is violative of the Constitutional rights of PASA detenu under Arts. 14 21 and 22 (5) of the Constitution. On the other hand the learned Advocate General for the respondents contended that the said condition is neither unjust nor unfair nor unreasonable end that in view of the express provision of Art. 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution the detenu has no Constitutional right of consulting his Advocate for being defended by him and consequently there is no question of the impugned provision in the Rule being declared unjust or unreasonable from any view point. It was further contended that this question is squarely covered against the petitioner by two later decisions or larger benches of the Supreme Court in A. K. Roys case and Devjis case (supra ). It was contended that both these decisions of larger benches had considered Franciss case (supra) and having done so they have declared the law which is clearly in conflict with what was ruled in Franciss case (supra) and therefore we are bound by these later decisions of larger benches and consequently the referred question must be answered in the negative. ( 7 ) DISCUSSION on the point: The aforesaid rival contentions clearly bring in sharp focus the nature of controversy between the parties centering round the referred question. ( 7 ) DISCUSSION on the point: The aforesaid rival contentions clearly bring in sharp focus the nature of controversy between the parties centering round the referred question. If Franciss case (supra) has clearly ruled on the point and if that decision can be harmoniously reconciled with the larger bench later decisions in A. K. Roys case and Devjis case (supra) then she petitioner is entitled to succeed. But if on the other hand there is no such clear ratio in the Franciss case (supra) and if larger bench later decisions of the Supreme Court having considered Franciss case (supra) have taken a contrary view on the point then we will be bound by the later decision of the Supreme Court under Art. 141 of the Constitution and we must repel the challenge to the vires of the sub-clause (xi) of Rule 13. ( 8 ) IT becomes therefore necessary for us to clearly examine the aforesaid three decisions of the Supreme Court and to cull out their correct ratio. But before we proceed to do so. We must remind ourselves of the settled legal position in connection with the guidelines which should inform the Court E h is entrusted with the task of culling out the ratio of the decisions of a Court especially decisions of the Supreme Court. In the Full Bench decision of the Court in Special Criminal Application Nos. 240 and 554 of 1987 decided by majority on 29/01/1988 [hitesh Bhanuprasad Soni v. Union of India and Ors. 1988 (1) GLR 525 and 756 (FB)] this very question was considered by the majority. On this aspect there was no dissent from the third learned Judge R. J Shah J. R. C. Mankad J. speaking for majority made the following pertinent observations at pages 39 to 41 of the judgment ( 1988 (1) GLR 525 756 at page No. 543-544 para 24) while considering the question as to what was correct ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate Aligarh AIR 1981 SC 2166 :"it is a settled principle that it is not everything paid by she Supreme Court in its judgment which is binding as law declared by the Supreme COUrt. What is considered binding to all the Courts is radio decidendi of the decision which is to be gathered from the statements of principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts of the case decided by the Supreme Court (vide Calico Mills v Union of India 1983 (1) XXIV (1) GLR 1) In Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 1384 at pages 1390 and 1391 Sen J. speaking for the Supreme Court his observed as under:"according to the well settled thereby of precedents every decision contains three basis ingredients : (I) findings of material facts direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (II) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (III) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above. For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies ingredient No (iii) is the material element in the decision for it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However for the purposes of the doctrine of precedents ingredient No. (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This indeed is the ratio decidendi. (5) It is not everything said by Judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. " (Emphasis added)AS observed in Calico Mills v. Union of India (supra) the Supreme Court has also uttered a warning to the effect that the greatest possible care must be taken to relate the observations of a Judge to the precise issue before him and confine such observations even though expressed in broad terms in the general compass of the questions before him (vide Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 530 and A D. M. Jabalpur v. S Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207 at page 1378 ). It is therefore evident that the decision of the Supreme Court is only an authority for what is actually decides and the observations made in the judgment should be restricted to the context in which they are made after relating the observations to the precise issue before the Court taking care to interpret the observations in the context of the question before the Court even though the same as expressed in broad terms. "in this connection we may also profitably refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of S. P. Gupta and Others v. President of India and Others AIR 1982 SC 149 popularly known as Judges Transfer case the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Bhagwati J. (as he then was) considered this very question at para 61 of the report. The following pertinent observations were made therein:"it is elementary that what is binding on the Court in a subsequent case is not the conclusion arrived at in a previous decision but the ratio of that decision for it is the ratio which binds as a precedent and not the conclusion. " ( 9 ) IN the case of P. A. Shah v. State of Gujarat AIR 1986 SC 468 another Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court while considering the scope and ambit of Art. 141 of the Constitution laid down in para 26 as under:"before embarkirg upon the examination of these decisions we should bear in mind that what is under consideration is not a statute or a legislation but a decision of the Court. A decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the Court while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. Hence while applying the decision to a later case the court which is dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the previous decision. A decision often takes its colour from the question involved in the case is in which it is rendered. The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. A decision often takes its colour from the question involved in the case is in which it is rendered. The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. " ( 10 ) IN the light of the aforesaid settled legal position we would now proceed to deal with the aforesaid three decisions of the Supreme Court with a view to finding out as to what are the exact ratio of these decisions and what has been ruled by the Supreme Court therein Supreme Court decision is Frncise case (Supra): So far as this decision is concerned we must at the outset try to ascertain the question which cropped up for consideration of the two learned Judges of the Supreme Court who constituted the bench of the Supreme Court which decided this case. P. N. Bhagwati and Fazal Ali JJ. (as they then were) had to consider the case of a COFEPOSA detenu Francis Coralie Mullin who had earlier unsuccessfully challenged under Art. 32 of the Constitution the order of her detention dated 23-11-1979 issued under Sec. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. Thereafter while undergoing detention she had experienced difficulties in having interview with her Lawyer and the members of her family including her daughter aged about five years and her sister who was looking after the daughter. These relatives were given interviews once a month While her Advocate who was to defend her in some criminal proceedings which were pending against the detenu for attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country found it difficult to contact the detenu in Jail where she was lodged during her detention as it was necessary for her Lawyer with a view to obtaining interview with her to apply for previous permission of the District Magistrate Delhi for the same and the interview could take place only in the presence of the Customs Officer. It was felt by the petitioner that this procedure for obtaining interview caused considerable hardship and inconvenience to her. It is in these circumstances that the detenu filed the petition therefore the Supreme Court challenging the vires of Clauses 3 and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention laid down by the delhi Administration under an order dated 23-8-1975 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec. 5 of the COFEPOSA Act. It is in these circumstances that the detenu filed the petition therefore the Supreme Court challenging the vires of Clauses 3 and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention laid down by the delhi Administration under an order dated 23-8-1975 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec. 5 of the COFEPOSA Act. So far as interview with the legal Adviser was concerned the impugned provision provided that Subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate Delhi as under: (I) Interview with legal Adviser Interview with the legal Adviser in connection with defence of a detenu in a criminal case or in regard to writ petitions and the like may be allowed by prior appointment in the presence of an Officer of Customs/central Excise/enforcement to be nominated by the Local Collector of Customs/central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsors the case for detention. It is not necessary for us to mention the Rule regarding interview with family members as we are not concerned with such provision It becomes therefore clear that so far as interview with legal Adviser/ legal Practitioner was concerned the impugned provision of the Delhi Rule was challenged in the light of the grievance of the detenu that she found it difficult to consult her Advocate for the purpose of defending her in pending criminal case. It was not the grievance of the detenu in Franciss case that there was any Rule which prohibited consultation with the Advocate for drafting representation or in any case restricted such right and that such restriction whittled down her right of representation under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution or was otherwise violative of Constitutional provisions of Arts. 14 and 21. In short the question which is posed for our consideration was never posed for consideration of the Supreme Court in the said case. Still however there are certain observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision which have been vehemently f upon by Mr. Patel in support of his contention for challenging the impugned provision of the Rule. The observations on which strong reliance has been placed are found at paras 9 to 11 of the report. It becomes therefore necessary to quote these observations in extenso at this stage:"9. Patel in support of his contention for challenging the impugned provision of the Rule. The observations on which strong reliance has been placed are found at paras 9 to 11 of the report. It becomes therefore necessary to quote these observations in extenso at this stage:"9. Now obviously when an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility of interviews with relatives and friends twice in a week under Rule 559a and a convicted prisoner is permitted to have interviews with his relative and friends once in a week under Rule 550 it is difficult to understand how sub-clause (ii) of Clause 3 (b) of the Conditions of Detention order which restricts the interview only to one in a month in case of a detenu can possibly be regarded as reasonable and non-arbitrary particularly when a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an undertrial prisoner or a convict and as held by the Court in Sammpath Prakash s ease (1969 Cr. LJ 1555) (supra) restrictions placed on a detenu must consistent with the effectiveness of detention be minimal. We would therefore unhesitatingly hold sub-clause (ii) of Clause 3 (b) to be violative of Arts. 14 and 21 insofar as it permits only one interview in a month to a detenu We are of the view that a detenu must be permitted to have at least two interviews in a week with relatives and friends and it should be possible for a relative or friend to have interview with the detenu at any reasonable hour on obtaining permission from the Superintendent of the Jail and it should not be necessary to seek the permission of the District Magistrate Delhi as the latter procedure would be cumbrous and unnecessary from the point of view of security and hence unreasonable. We would go so far as to say that even independently of Rules 550 and 559a vie would regard the present norm of two interviews in a week for prisoners as furnishing a criterion of what we would consider reasonable and non-arbitrary. We would go so far as to say that even independently of Rules 550 and 559a vie would regard the present norm of two interviews in a week for prisoners as furnishing a criterion of what we would consider reasonable and non-arbitrary. 10 The same reasoning must also result in invalidation of sub-clause (i) of Clause 3 (b) of the Conditions of Detention Order which prescribes that a detenu can have interview with a legal Adviser only after obtaining prior permission of the District Magistrate Delhi and the interview has to take place in the presence of an Officer of Customs/central Excise/enforcement to be nominated by the Local Collector of Customs/central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who has sponsored the case for detention. The right of a detenu to consult a legal Adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence in a criminal proceeding but also for securing release from preventive detention or filing a writ petition or prosecuting any claim or proceeding Civil or Criminal is obviously included in the right to live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of the detenu be interfered with except in accordance with reasonable fair and just procedure established by a valid law. A prison regulation may therefore regulate the right of a detenu to have interview with a legal Adviser in a manner which is reasonable fair and just but it cannot prescribe an arbitrary or unreasonable procedure for regulating such an interview and if it does so it would be violative or Arts. 14 and 21. Now in the present case the legal Adviser can have interview with a detenu only by prior appointment after obtaining permission of the District Magistrate Delhi. This would obviously cause great hardship and an inconvenience because the legal Adviser would have to apply to the District Magistrate Delhi well in advance and then also the time fixed by the District Magistrate Delhi may rot be suitable to the legal Adviser who would ordinarily be a busy Practitioner and in that event from a practical point of view the right to consult a legal Adviser would be rendered illusory. Moreover the interview must take place in the presence of an Officer of Customs/central Excise/ Enforcement to be nominated by the Local Collector of Customs/central Excise Deputy Director of enforcement who has sponsored the detention and this too would seem to be an unreasonable procedural requirement because in order to secure the presence of such Officer at the interview the District Magistrate Delhi would have to fix the time for the interview in consultation with the Collector of Customs/central Excise or the Deputy Director of Enforcement and it may become difficult to synchronise the time which suits the legal Adviser with the same convenient to the concerned Officer and further more if the nominated Officer does not for any reason attend at the appointed time as seems to have happened on quite a few occasions in the case of the petitioner the interview cannot be held at all and the legal Adviser would have to go back without meeting the detenu and the entire procedure for applying for an appointment to the District Magistrate Delhi would have to be gone through once again. We may point out that no satisfactory explanation has been given on behalf of the respondents disclosing the rational: of this requirement. " ( 11 ) WE are therefore of the view that sub-clause (i) of Clause 3 (b) regulating the right of a detenu to have interview with a legal Adviser of his choice is violative of Arts. 4 and 21 and must be held to be unconstitutional and void. We think that it would be quite reasonable if a detenu were to be entitled to have interview with his legal Adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appointment front the Superintendent of the Jail which appointment should be given by the Superintendent without any avoidable delay We may add that the interview need not necessarily take place in the presence of a nominated officer of Customs/central Excise/enforcement but if the presence of such officer can be conveniently secured at the time of the interview without involving any postponement of the interview then such officer and if his presence cannot be so secured then any other Jail Officer may if thought necessary watch the interview but not so as to be within hearing distance of the detenu and the legal Adviser. " ( 12 ) NOW these observations will have to be read in the light of the short question posed for consideration of the Supreme Court to the effect-whether the detenu had a constitutional right of consulting her Advocate for being defended in pending criminal case and whether the impugned provision of the Delhi Rule violated the said right. While deciding that question wider observations are no doubt made laying down the right of a detenu to consult a legal Adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence in a criminal proceeding but also for securing release from preventive detention or filing a writ petition or prosecuting any claim or proceeding Civil or Criminal which is obviously included in the right to live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of the detenu be interfered with except in accordance with reasonable fair and just procedure established by a valid law and that a prison regulation may regulate the right of a detenu to have interview with a legal Adviser in a manner which is reasonable fair and just but it cannot prescribe an arbitrary or unreasonable procedure for regulating such an interview and if it does so it would be violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution These observations however will have to be read in the light of the actual question which was posed for consideration in Franciss case (supra ). Once these observations are read in that light it becomes obvious that however wide they may be they would be clearly obiter as Franciss case was never concerned with the question whether the detenu has a Constitutional right to consult her Advocate for the purpose for drafting representation to be submitted to the detaining authority Dr. consideration as required by Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. ( 13 ) IT has to be appreciated that as mentioned in para 1 of the report in Franciss case the question of vires of Rule 3 (1) (b) was raised amongst others on the ground that the detenu was given only one interview with the Advocate and insistence for the presence of a Custom Officer at the said interview amounted to uareasonable restriction and was therefore violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. In connection with this submission a clear concession was given by the other side as mentioned in para 2 of the report. In that view of the matter no other question remained for consideration in connection with the aforesaid contention. So far as challenge to the vires of the Rule on the contenting regarding condition of prior permission of the District Magistrate for the interview with the Advocate was concerned that was no doubt examined in the case and the said condition was held to be unreasonable and that by Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. But the question whether such consultation was necessary for drafting the representation was not directly in issue for consideration and therefore that extent decision on this point also is clearly obiter. ( 14 ) THE aforesaid view of ours gots further fortified by a decision of three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Devjis case (supra) which after having considered Franciss case (supra) made the following observations on the correct scope of the ratio of the said decision in para 14 of the report while considering the question posed for their consideration as to whether the detenu had any Constitutional right to be represented by an Advocate in support of the representation before the detaining authority:" Now if the representation has to be a written representation there is no question of hearing any one much less a lawyer. Reliance was however. replaced on Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administration Union Territory of Delhi 1981 (2) SCR 516 : ( AIR 1981 SC 746 ). In that case the detenu challenged the validity of Clause 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of the Condition of Detention laid down by the Jail administration under an order dated 23/08/1915 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec. 5 of the COFEPOSA. The relevant condition was as under:3 The conditions of detention in respect of classification and interviews shall be as under: (B) Interviews: subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate Delhi as under: (I ). The relevant condition was as under:3 The conditions of detention in respect of classification and interviews shall be as under: (B) Interviews: subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate Delhi as under: (I ). Interview with legal Adviser: Interview with legal Adviser in connection with defence of a detenu in a Criminal case or in regard to writ petitions and the like may be allowed by prior appointment in the presence of an Officer of Customs/central Excise/enforcement to be nominated by the Local Collector of Customs/central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsors the case for detention. (II) Interview with family members:a monthly interview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of wife children or parent of the detenu. . . . . . . . . . The contention was that the condition in Clause 3 (b) (ii) which restricts the interview to only one in a month in case of a detenu is unreasonable and arbitrary when contrasted with an undertrial prisoner who was entitled to the facility of interviews with friends and relatives twice in a week ar:d even though a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an undertrial prisoner or a convict the limitation of interview to one in a month is utterly arbitrary. This contention found favour with the Court on the ground that restrictions placed on a detenu must consistent with the effectiveness of detention be minimal (See: Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir 1969 (3) SCR 574 : ( AIR 1969 SC 1153 ). Proceeding further this Court held that sub-clause (i) of Clause 3b) which prescribes that the detenu can have an interview with a legal Adviser of his choice with prior permission of District Magistrate and the interview; has to take place in the presence of a Customs/central Excise/enforcement Officer nominated by the Local Collector of Customs/central Excise/deputy Director of Enforcement was reasonable and hence invalid. Now this judgment is not an authority for the proposition that a detenu as a matter of right is entitled to make his representation by an oral hearing before the detaining authority under Art. 22 (5) The right to consult a lawyer was granted by the conditions of detention prescribed under Sec 5. Now this judgment is not an authority for the proposition that a detenu as a matter of right is entitled to make his representation by an oral hearing before the detaining authority under Art. 22 (5) The right to consult a lawyer was granted by the conditions of detention prescribed under Sec 5. This right was not spelt out as an incident of Art. 21 and what has been found invalid is the presence of officers at the interview and the number of interviews Therefore Francis Coralie Mullins case is Dot an authority for the proposition and frankly can not he be one for the purpose of spelling out a right to be represented by a lawyer while making representation before the detaining authority. Even though there are some observations which may imply such a right they would he completely obiter for the obvious reason that a right was conferred by the Conditions of Detention and not for the first time a right was being spelt out by the expanded horizons of right to life and liberty as enshrined in Art. 21. The attempt to rend or imply something in Art. 21 which is positively reflected by Art. 22 (5) could be contrary to and canon on construction because it is well settled that what is explicitly reflected cannot be brought in by the back door or implication It was not necessary to spell out these rights in the facts of that case for the obvious reason that the right was conferred by the Conditions of Detention. One need not go in search of some such right implicit in Art. 21 by a process of interpretation when it was expressly granted in the Conditions of Detention under the Act. Therefore with respect the decision in Mullins case cannot help the petitioner to spelt out a right to the represented by a lawyer before the detaining authority. (Emphasis supplied) in view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the nature of decision in Franciss case (supra) it has to be held that the observations contained in Franciss case (supra) were of obiter nature insofar as they decided about the detenus right to consult his Advocate for the purpose of drafting representation for challenging the detention order ( 15 ) HOWEVER Mr. H. L. Patel for the petitioner was right when he contended that even obiter observations of the Supreme Court are binding on this Court. In this connection the learned Advocate General for the respondents on the other hand submitted that there are two later decisions of the Supreme Court in A. K. Roys case and Devjis case (supra ). That both the judgments are of larger benches and they have taken a contrary view and consequently as compared to obiter in franciss case (supra) we must follow and we would be bound by the decisions of larger benches of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two later cases. It is therefore time for us to turn to the consideration of these two later decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 16 ) SUPREME Court decision in A. K. Roys case: in this case the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was concerned amongst others with the question as to whether the detenu under Preventive Detention Law had a Constitutional right to be represented by an Advocate of his choice before the Advisory Board. While considering that question the Constitution Bench relied upon the provisions of Art. 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution and held that such a detenu has no Constitutional right of either consulting Advocate of his choice or being represented by his Advocate and on that basis the contention of the detenu was repelled and it was held by the Constitution Bench that the detenu had no right to be represented lay an Advocate of his choice before the Advisory Board. It is therefore obvious that the question which is posed for our consideration viz. whether the detenu has a Constitutional right to consult Advocate of his choice for preparation of this representation against the detention order did not directly arise for consideration before the bench of the Supreme Court in A. K. Roys case (supra ). The observations made by the Constitution Bench in this connection in some of the paras of the report to which we will refer to hereafter cannot be said to be ratio of the decision of the Constitution Bench on the point and they will also remain in the realm of obiter dicta. The observations made by the Constitution Bench in this connection in some of the paras of the report to which we will refer to hereafter cannot be said to be ratio of the decision of the Constitution Bench on the point and they will also remain in the realm of obiter dicta. This Constitution bench also had occasion to refer to Franciss case (Supra) and in connection with that case in para 93 of the report the following observations were made:" In Francis Coralie Mullin ( AIR 1981 SC 746 ) the petitioner while in detention wanted to have an interview with her lawyer which was rendered almost impossible by reason of she stringent provisions of Clause 3 (b) (i) of the Conditions of Detention formulated by the Delhi Administration. In a petition filed in this Court to challenge the aforesaid clause inter alia it was held by this Court that the clause was void since it violated Arts. 14 and 21 by its discriminatory nature and unreasonableness. The Court directed that the detenu should be permitted to have an interview with her legal Adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking an appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail and that the interview need not necessarily take place in the presence of an officer of the Customs or Central Excise Department. The Court also directed that the Officer concerned may watch the interview but not so as to be with in the hearing distance of the detenu and the legal Adviser. This decision has to bearing on the point which arises before us since the limited question which was involved in that case was whether the procedure prescribed by Clause (3) governing the interviews which a detenu may have with his legal Adviser was reasonable. The Court was not called upon to consider the question as regards the right or a detenu to be represented by a legal Practitioner before the Advisory Board. We would. however like to say that by this judgment we are neither affirming nor disapproving of the decision in Francis Coralie Mullin to the effect that the detenu has a right to consult a lawyer of his choice for the purpose of preparing his representation advising him as to how he should defend himself before the Advisory Board and preparing and filing a habeas corpus petition or other proceedings for securing his release. " ( 17 ) IN view of what is stated by the Constitution Bench in A. K. Roys case (supra) in connection with Franciss case (supra) it becomes clear that the Constitution Bench left the said case as it was and did not expressly or by necessary implication over-rule the same. There are wide observations in Franciss case (supra) to the effect that detenu has right to consult a lawyer of his choice for the purpose of preparing representation which as seen earlier were of obiter nature and remained untouched by the ratio in A. K. Roys case (supra ). Still however the said judgment contained on the scheme of Arts. 14 21 and 22 of the Constitution read in the light of Art. 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution certain pertinent observations in other parts of the report which clearly go to indicate that the Constitution Bench was of the view that the detenu will not have a Constitution right to consult his Advocate even for the purpose of drafting a representation. In fact the said observations cannot stand conjointly with the observations to the contrary in Franciss case which we have extracted earlier and observations in Franciss care clearly appear to be in conflict with the observations of the Constitution bench in the expected hereinafter paras. Hence it can easily be seen that obiter observations in A. K. Roys case (supra) as made by the Constitution Bench ate in conflict with obiter observations in Franciss case (supra) so far as question of detenus Constitutional right to consult Advocate of his choice for the purpose of drafting representation is concerned. These relevant observations though obiter in nature as found in A. K. Roys case (supra) are as under:"on a combined reading of Clauses (1) and (3) b) of Art. 27 it is clear that the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of ones choice which is conferred by Clause (1 ). is denied by Clause (3) (b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention Thus according to the express intendment of the Constitution itself no person who is detained under any law which provides for preventive detention can claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice. or to be defended by him. is denied by Clause (3) (b) to a person who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention Thus according to the express intendment of the Constitution itself no person who is detained under any law which provides for preventive detention can claim the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice. or to be defended by him. In view of this it seems to us difficult to hold by the application of abstract general principles or on a prior considerations that the detenu has the right of being represented by a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. Since the Constitution as originally enacted itself contemplates that such a right should not be made available to a detenu it cannot be said that the denial of the said right is unfair unjust or unreasonable It is indeed true to say after the decision in the Bank Nationalisation case (AIR 1970 SC 664) that though the subject of preventive detention is specifically dealt with in Art. 22 the requirements of Art. 21 have nevertheless to be satisfied. It is therefore necessary that the procedure prescribed by law for the proceedings before the Advisory Boards must be fair just and reasonable But then the Constitution itself has provided a yardstick for the application of that standards through the medium of the provisions contained in Art. 22 (3) (b ). However much we would have liked to held otherwise. we experience serious difficulty in taking the view that the procedure of the Advisory Boards in which the detenu is denied the right of legal representation is unfair unjust or unreasonable. If Art 22 were silent on the question of the right of legal representation it could haze been possible indeed right and proper to hold that the detenu cannot be denied the right of legal representation in the proceedings before the Advisory Beards. It is unfortunate that Courts have been deprived of that choice by the express language of Art. 2) (3) (b) re2d with Art. 22 (1 ). It is unfortunate that Courts have been deprived of that choice by the express language of Art. 2) (3) (b) re2d with Art. 22 (1 ). It is contended by Shri Jethmalani that the provision contained in Clause (3) (b) of Art. 22 is limited to the right which is specifically conferred by Clause (1) of Article and therefore if the right to legal representation is available to the detenu apart from the provisions of Art. 22 (1) that tight cannot be denied to him by reason of the exclusionary provisions contained in Art. 22 (3 (b ). counsel says that the right of legal representation arises out of the provisions of Arts. 19 21 and 22 (5) and therefore nothing said in Art. 22 (3) (b) can affect that right. In a sense we have already answered the contention because what that contention implies is that the denial of the of legal representation to the detenu in the proceedings before the Advisory Board is an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) on the right conferred by that Article. If the yardstick of reasoning is provided by Art. 22 (3) which is as much a part of the Constitution as originally enacted as Arts. 19 21 and 22 (5) in would be difficult to hold that the denial of the particular right introduces an element of unfairness unjustness or unreasonableness in the procedure of the Advisory Boards. It would be stretching the language of Arts. 19 and 21 a little too far to hold that what is regarded as reasonable by Art. 22 (3) (b) must b: regarded a unreasonable within the meaning of those Articles. For illustrating this point We may take the example of a law which provides that an enemy alien need not be produced before a Magistrate within twenty four hours of his arrest or detention in custody. If the right of production before the Magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest is expressly denied to the enemy alien by Art. 22 (3) (a) it would be impossible to hold that the said right is never the it is available to him by reason of the provisions contained in Art. 21. If the right of production before the Magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest is expressly denied to the enemy alien by Art. 22 (3) (a) it would be impossible to hold that the said right is never the it is available to him by reason of the provisions contained in Art. 21. The reason is that the answer to the question whether the procedure established by law for depriving an enemy alien of his personal liberty is fair or just is provided by the Constitution itself through the provisions of Art. 22 (3) (a ). What that provision considers fair just and reasonable cannot for the purposes of Art. 21 be regarded as unfair unjust or unreasonable. To read the right of legal representation in Art. 22 (5) is straining the language that Article. Clause (5) confers upon the detenu the right to be informed to the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That right has undoubtedly to be effective but it does not carry with it the right to be represented by a legal Practitioner before the Advisory Board merely because by Sec. 10 of the National Security act the representation made by the detenu is required to be to the Advisory Board for its consideration. If anything the effect of Sec. 11 (4) of the Act which conforms to Art. 22 (3) (b) is that the detenu cannot appear before the Advisory Board through a legal Practitioner. The written representation of the detenu does not have to be expatiated upon by a legal Petitioner. " (Emphasis supplied) it is in the light of the aforesaid observations on the constitutional scheme of relevant Articles that the Constitution Bench ultimately reached its conclusion in para 94 of the report to the effect that the detenu has no right to appear through a legal Practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. It becomes at code clear when the aforesaid pertinent observations of the Constitution Bench in A. K. Roys case (supra) the Constitutional right of detenu to consult Advocate of his choice are kept in view that they are clearly in conflict with the observations in Francis case (supra) and the observations in both these cases cannot be harmoniously reconciled and they cut across each other. ( 18 ) THAT takes us to consideration of the last relevant decision of the Supreme Court in Devjis case (supra ). Discussion on three-member bench decision of the Supreme Court in Devjls case (supra ). In this case three-member bench of the Supreme Court consisting of D. A. Desai A. P. Sen and Baharaul Islam JJ. (as they then were) speaking through Baharul Ismal J. considered the question whether the detenu detained under the COFEPOSA had a right to be represented before detaining authority by an Advocate of his choice in support of his representation challenging the detention order. This question was clearly answered against the detenu in the aforesaid decision placing reliance on the decision in A. K. Roys case (supra) and especially in the light of Art. 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution. In para 11 of the report one of the twine questions posed for consideration was reproduced as under:"whether the detenu has a right to appear before the detaining authority through a lawyer. "while answering this question the Constitutional scheme was examined by the judgment in the light of the statutory provisions of Sec. 8 of the COFEPOSA and also in the light of the Constitutional Bench decision in A. R. Roys case (supra) Paras 85 86 87 88 and 94 of the report in A. K Roys case (supra) were reproduced with approval in Devjis case (supra) and were followed and thereafter the following pertinent observations were made in paras 13 and 14 of the report as under:"arts. 22 (1) and (2) confer fundamental right of protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. Sub-Art. (1) enjoins a duty on the person arresting any person to inform the person arrested as soon as may be of the grounds for such arrest before detaining him in custody and such detained person shall not be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal Practitioner of his choice. Sub-Art. (2) enjoins a duty on the person arresting and detaining any one to produce him before the nearest Magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the Magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a Magistrate. These two fundamental rights namely right to be informed of the grounds of detention at the time of arrest and the right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice and any detention beyond the period of 24 hours plus the time taken in the journey unless authorised by a Magistrate to be illegal would have also been available to any one detained under the preventive detention laws but for sub-Art. (3 ). Sub-Art. (3) provides that nothing in Clauses (1) and (2) shall apply (a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. As a necessary corollary any law providing for preventive detention would not be an constitution even if it contravenes Art. 22 (1) (2 ). In other words a person detained under a law providing for preventive detention cannot claim as a matter of institutional right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of his choice. Nor can be insist upon being produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest. SECTION 8 of the COFEPOSA shows as noticed above that a person against whom an order of detention has been made under the Act shall not be entitled to appear by any legal Practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory board. Assuming that the right to make a representation and the corresponding obligation cast on the detaining authority to consider the representation expeditiously is not a matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board and that both are independent stages. it cannot be said that the refusal of the Administrator to hear the Advocate of the detenu while considering the representation would be denial of common law right of the detenu to be represented by an agent. Article 22 (5) which has provided a safeguard in the matter of preventive detention confers the right on the detenu and simultaneously casts an obligation on the detaining authority as soon as may be after the arrest to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made and to afford the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. Representation is to be made by the detenu. Detenu is a person who is already deprived of his liberty. Representation is to be made by the detenu. Detenu is a person who is already deprived of his liberty. Giving the ordinary connotation to the expression earliest opportunity of making a representation as set out in sub-Art. (5) would only imply that the person can send his written representation through the Jail authorities. It would be open to him to send it by any other communicating media but the opportunity to make a representation does not comprehend an oral hearing. If it does the detenu will have to be taken from the Jail where he is detained to the detaining authority which in a given situation may not even be feasible and the delay in transit may be counter productive to the earliest opportunity to be afforded to make a representation It is therefore implicit in sub-Art. 4s of Art. 22 that the representation has to be a written representation communicated through the Jail authorities or through any other mode which the detenu things fit of adopting but the detaining authority is under no obligation to grant any oral hearing at the time of considering the representation. "the aforesaid observations in Devjis case (supra) leave no room for doubt that three learned Judges of the Supreme Court have in terms held that the detenu has no Constitutional right of being represented by an Advocate of his choice in support of his representation and while holding as aforesaid have placed reliance on Art. 22 (3) (b) of the Constitution read with Art. 21 thereof and held that the detenu has no Constitutional right of either consulting his Advocate or being represented by him in support of the representation before the detaining authority Implicit in the aforesaid decision is the further penultimate decision that the detenu has no right to consult Advocate of his choice for preparation of representation when it is held that even he has no ultimate right of getting the said representation supported by the Advocate of his choice before the detaining authority. This is a clear ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Devjis case. ( 19 ) IN this connection Mr. This is a clear ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Devjis case. ( 19 ) IN this connection Mr. Patel for the petitioner submitted that even the aforesaid observations in Devjis case are obiter in nature and they do not reflect the ratio of the Supreme Court decision on the question whether the detenu as a right to consult his Advocate for preparation of the representation as it did not directly arise for consideration of the Supreme Court in Devjis case. It is not possible to agree with this contention. It is obvious that the bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court was directly concerned in Devjis case with the question whether the detenu has right of representation through his Advocate before the detaining authority in support of his written representation. It is obvious that oral representation by Advocate usually cannot be possible without consulting the detenu. The Supreme Court in Devjis case no doubt was not directly concerned with the question whether the detenu has twine rights of consulting Advocate for drafting the representation and then supporting the same through Advocates arguments before the detaining authority. But it was certainly directly concerned with the question whether the detenu had right of being represented through an Advocate before the detaining authority in support of his written representation. That was a wider question and it necessarily implied the consideration of the penultimate and smaller question as to whether the detenu can consult Advocate of his choice in preparing the representation. Consequently consideration of the wider question necessarily raised for the consideration of the Supreme Court this smaller question or penultimate question. We agree with the learned Advocate General that consideration of the question whether the detenu can get services of his Advocate for supporting the representation involved the implied consideration of the smaller question whether the detenu can consult his Advocate for the purpose of drafting representtation which he ultimately wants to get supported by oral arguments of his Advocate before the detaining authority. Both these aspects have been considered by three Judges bench and it has been clearly ruled in para 13 of the report that the detenu has neither of these two rights. These observations therefore cannot be held to be mere obiter so far as the question of consulting Advocate for the purpose of drawing representation is concerned. Both these aspects have been considered by three Judges bench and it has been clearly ruled in para 13 of the report that the detenu has neither of these two rights. These observations therefore cannot be held to be mere obiter so far as the question of consulting Advocate for the purpose of drawing representation is concerned. The Supreme Court has in terms held rejecting the wider question that the detenu has no right to be represented by an Advocate in support of the representation before the detaining authority. For deciding this wider question the Supreme Court had to consider of necessity the most implicit question which was in the nature of first step as to whether he had right to consult Advocate for drafting the representation Both these questions must be considered to be intertwined and interconnected and it cannot be said that the question posed for our consideration was not at all germane or relevant for the decision of the Supreme Court in Devjis case (supra) and that the decision of the Supreme Court on this point was redundant or uncalled for answering the question which directly arose for decision in Devjis case. ( 20 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in Devjis case (supra) must therefore be considered to be an authority for the proposition that the detenu has neither Constitutional right to consult Advocate of his choice for preparing his representation against the detention order nor has he such right to get it supported by being represented by Advocate of his choice before the detaining authority. This in our view is the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Devjis case (supra ). If that is so result is obvious. Observations in Franciss case of two member judgment of the Supreme Court about detenus right to consult Advocate for drafting representation get superseded by the direct contrary ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court on the point in Devjis case (supra) which was decided by a larger bench of the Supreme Court. If that is so result is obvious. Observations in Franciss case of two member judgment of the Supreme Court about detenus right to consult Advocate for drafting representation get superseded by the direct contrary ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court on the point in Devjis case (supra) which was decided by a larger bench of the Supreme Court. It is true that in para 14 of the report in Devjis case Franciss case has been distinguished and its observations are held to be obiter but a conjoint reading of para 13 and earlier part of para 14 of the report in Devjis case leaves no room for doubt that ratio of the decision in that case is directly in conflict with obiter observations in Franciss case (supra) and the decision in Franciss case (supra) on this point has been impliedly overruled by the direct contrary ratio of the decision of three member larger bench in Devjis case (supra ). . ( 21 ) EVEN assuming that we are wrong on our aforesaid conclusion on Devjis case and it is held that even Devjis case contains only obiter observations on the question even then contrary obiter observations in Devjis case which is judgment of a larger bench and obiter parallel contrary observations of the Constitution Bench in A. K. Roys case have to be followed by us being obiter observations of larger benches as compared to obiter observations of smaller member bench of two learned Judges in Franciss case. Even on that ground we have to followed later decisions of the Supreme Court as compared to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Franciss case (supra ). Even on that ground we have to followed later decisions of the Supreme Court as compared to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Franciss case (supra ). It is now well settled that if there are conflicting decisions of different benches of the Supreme Court then the High Court is bound to follow decisions of larger member benches of later decisions of the Supreme Court (See: Gujarat Housing Board v. Nagjibhai [ 1985 (2) ] 26 (2) GLR 1190 and Matrulal v. Radha Lal AIR 1974 SC 1596 ) If there is a conflict in the ratio of the decisions of different benches of the Supreme Court and the High Court is required to follow later decisions of the Supreme Court and that too of larger benches taking a contrary view a fortiori and on the parity of reasoning if they are conflicting obiter observations of different benches of the Supreme Court which are all binding to the High Court under Art. 141 of the Constitution obiter of larger benches and later benches have to be followed by the High Court as compared to obiter of earlier smaller member bench expressing a contrary view. Even on that ground we are bound to follow the contrary observations as found in the Constitution Bench decisions in A. K. Roys case and three member bench decision in Devjis case (supra ). ( 22 ) WE may now take stock of the situation. The impugned Rule 13 imposing condition of obtaining prior permission of the State Government for granting interview of legal Practitioner to the detenu for drafting the representation cannot be held to be hit by Art. 14 or 21 of Constitution as unreasonable and a rbitrary from any stand point. Following the decisions of the Constitution Bench in A. K. Roys case and three member bench decision in Devjis case (supra) it must be held that when the Constitution has itself provided a yardstick for application of standard of justness fairness reasonableness enshrined in Art. 21 through enactment of provision contained in Art. 22 (3) (b) it cannot be said that what the Constitution in express terms prohibits under Art. 22 (3) (b) must be treated to be unjust unfair or unreasonable deprivation of detenus right under Art. 21. Same reasoning must ipso facto apply to the challenge to the impuged rule on the touch-stone of Art. 14. Same reasoning must ipso facto apply to the challenge to the impuged rule on the touch-stone of Art. 14. Now remain the question of challenge to the impugned rule on the anvil of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. Even this question is squarely answered against the detenu by decisions of the Supreme Court in A. K Roys case and Devjis case (supra ). It has been in terms held therein that:"to read the right of legal representation in Art. 22 (5) is straining the language of that Article-Clause (5) confers upon the detenu the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That right has undoubtedly to be affective but it does not carry with it the right to be represented by a legal Practitioner and that it is the detenu that has to file such representation. " ( 23 ) IT is easy to visualize that the detenu has to be afforded by the detaining authority earliest opportunity of making representation against the order of detention and for that purpose he has to be supplied grounds of detention along with supporting material and all other facilities so that he can avail of the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order of detention. Legal Practitioner does not figure in the said requirement. On the contrary because of Art. 22 consultation with him is ruled out. If that is so at the stage of Art. 22 (5) consultation within cannot be brought in by back door when the Constitution itself under the scheme of preventive detention envisaged by it has ruled out this requirement. It must therefore be held that any hedging of the right of detenu to consult his Advocate for the purpose of preparation of representation does not amount to violation of any of the provisions of Art. 22 (5 ). In fact as ruled by the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court he has no such Constitutional right. However if by any statutory provision such right is given to him well and good. He shall be able to avail of that statutory right subject to the fetters imposed by the legislature or rule making authority as the case may be granting such right to the detenu. However if by any statutory provision such right is given to him well and good. He shall be able to avail of that statutory right subject to the fetters imposed by the legislature or rule making authority as the case may be granting such right to the detenu. It also cannot be said that hedging of this right by subjecting it to the previous permission of the State Government is in any way arbitrary unreasonable or unjust as discussed earlier. Even that apart it is interesting to note that on the scheme of relevant Rule 13 and its sub-paras it becomes at once clear that there is no fetter on the right of the detenus Advocate to ask for any number of interviews with the detenu after following the procedure laid down by Rules (13) (1) (i) and (iv) (a ). What clause (xi) provides is for additional interview which should be granted to the detenu if he so desires with the permission of the Government to enable him to consult his legal Practitioner for drafting his representation. This is an additional right which is for the benefit of the detenu and mere provision of getting permission of the State Government in that connection cannot be said to be unreasonable from any angle. It is also interesting to note that there is no provision in the Rule 13 or other Rules laying down guidelines for the State Government indicating the circumstances in which such application can be rejected save and except in Rules 13 (vi) and (vii ). We are not concerned with such contingencies in the present case so far as condition of clause (xi) of Rule 13 is concerned as the latter deals with requirement of obtaining previous permission for taking solitary interview with the Advocate at the request of the detenu for drafting representation. It is therefore easy to visualize that in normal and ordinary circumstances such application for permission when made would obviously be granted as a matter of course. Only in exceptional cases such permission may be rejected and that too it has to be done on the basis of certain relevant reasons which can be pointed out to the Court as and when rejection of such permission is challenged on the ground of being arbitrary and unreasonable. Only in exceptional cases such permission may be rejected and that too it has to be done on the basis of certain relevant reasons which can be pointed out to the Court as and when rejection of such permission is challenged on the ground of being arbitrary and unreasonable. Leaving aside such exceptional cases scheme of the Rules suggests that applying for permission of the State Govt. for being allowed interview with legal Practitioner under clause (xi) is a mere formality and a routine procedural provision. The learned Advocate General for the State submitted to us that such permissions when asked for were normally granted and therefore the apprehension of the detenu that such application would be rejected arbitrarily is uncalled for. In any case such provision for asking permission of the State Govt. for such interview cannot be treated by itself as unreasonable from any yardstick particularly when it is not violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution. The provision cannot be found fault with. However if any action under the provision on the facts of a given case if found to be arbitrary or illegal that can certainly be struck down. But in that case action would be bad and not section or provision. We do not find anything arbitrary or illegal per se in the said provision for seeking permission of the Government before being granted additional interview with the legal Adviser for the purpose of drafting representation. Even subsequent amendment to clauses (iv) and (xi) clearly brings out the intention of the Rule making authority that it never wanted to lay down any insurmountable fetters on the statutory right of the detenu in getting such facility and it had treated it as a mere formality and what was implicit before was made explicit by the Government resolution of 26-11-1987. ( 24 ) MR. Patel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the impugned rule is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 inasmuch as detenus under National Security Act who are also dangerous persons have been given absolute right to consult Advocate of their choice subject to permission only of the Jailor and that only PASA detenus are discriminated against. It is not possible to agree with this contention. It is not possible to agree with this contention. The scheme of National Security Act and other Preventive Detention Laws are different in nature as compared to the scheme of PASA so far as persons to be detained thereunder are concerned. Under NSA one who disturbs public order can be detained being a dangerous person. Under PASA apart from dangerous persons bootleggers property grabbers drug offenders and immoral traffic offenders also can be detained if their activities are covered by the deeming fiction regarding disturbance of public order as laid down under the Act apart from actual disturbance of public order as per the settled legal connotation of that phrase. In any case PASA detenus have been treated to be a class by themselves under the impugned rule. We cannot decide the constitutionality of the impugned rule by comparing it with the scheme of other Rules governing detention of detenus kept in incarceration under different Acts. So far as the scheme of the present Rules is concerned we do not find it to be discriminatory or arbitrary unjust or unreasonable. In this connection we may refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sant Lal Bharti v. State of Punjab Civil Appeal No. 1637 of 1987 decided by Sabyasachi Mukharji and S Ranganathan JJ. on 1-12-1987 reported in Judgments Today 1987 SC 589. Sabyasachi Mukharji J. speaking for the Supreme Court has laid down as under while considering the scope and ambit of Art. 14 of the Constitution:"article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of One State on the ground that contrast with a law of another state on the same subject its provisions are discriminatory or different. Nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the state dealing with similar subject by a process of comparative study of the provisions of two enactments. The source of authority for the two statutes being different Art. 14 can have no application. "on a parity of reasoning it must. therefore be held that vires of Rules laying down conditions of detention under PASA cannot be decided by comparing them with the conditions of detention as framed under NSA and Art. 14 would be out of picture in such a challenge. ( 25 ) MR. "on a parity of reasoning it must. therefore be held that vires of Rules laying down conditions of detention under PASA cannot be decided by comparing them with the conditions of detention as framed under NSA and Art. 14 would be out of picture in such a challenge. ( 25 ) MR. Patel lastly submitted that the impugned clause requires prior permission of the State Government before the detenu can get an interview with an Advocate/legal Adviser and that too only one interview for preparing the representation. That if such interview was to be obtained from the Jailor himself during convenient hours it would not entail any delay but to ask the detenu to go to the State Government for obtaining such permission and then to approach the Jailor armed with such permission to get interview with his Lawyer would itself entail lose of number of days and it is the likelihood of this delay which will clearly violate Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution and even on that ground the impugned condition in the said clause must be struck down. It is not possible to agree with the said contention. It is true that detenu who may be detained in any of the Jails in Gujarat would get immediate interview with his Advocate if only Jailor had to give such permission and it would be formal in nature and instead if he has to apply through Jailor for such permission to the State Government functioning at Gandhinagar the process may entail loss of a few days. But that by itself in our opinion would not make the impugned provision violative of Art. 22 (5) or even otherwise unreasonable unjust and unfair as submitted by Mr. Patel. The reason is obvious. Under Art. 22 (5) the detenu is to be afforded an earliest opportunity of making representation against the detention order after supplying him grounds of detention. Earliest opportunity would not mean immediate opportunity without loss of even a moment. It would all depends upon the facts of each case whether opportunity afforded in a given case was earliest opportunity or not and whether Constitutional rights of the detenu under Art. 22 (5) was violated or not. Article 22 (5) does not fix any period during which grounds are to be supplied to the detenu. It would all depends upon the facts of each case whether opportunity afforded in a given case was earliest opportunity or not and whether Constitutional rights of the detenu under Art. 22 (5) was violated or not. Article 22 (5) does not fix any period during which grounds are to be supplied to the detenu. But by judicial interpretation it has been held that grounds have to be supplied at the earliest so that the detenu can be said to have been afforded earliest opportunity of making representation after considering the grounds of detention. It is axiomatic that representation can normally be made only after grounds are perused by the detenu and or his legal Adviser whoever he may be and without looking at the grounds it may not be possible for the detenu to effectively represent against his detention in most of the cases. However in this connection Sec. 9 (1) of PASA Act is worth noting It has been laid down therein that when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order the authority making the order shall as soon as may be but not later than seven days from the date of detention communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. This provision obviously is enacted to be consistent with the Constitutional rights of the detenu under Art. 22 (5 ). Still the legislature has contemplated upper limit of supplying grounds within 7 days. It is not as if that the detaining anthority armed with grounds should necessarily delay supplying the grounds to the detenu till 7 days but the grounds must be supplied at the earliest to the detenu and preferably with the order of detention itself. But if in a given case in circumstances of exceptional nature when the grounds may be bulky in nature and supporting material may be bulky in nature and preparation of number of copies may take some time when number of detenus may be involved in the same incidents or question of translation of the bulky material in language known to the detenu may take some time and in diverse other similar situations of exceptional nature actual supplying of grounds may legitimately take some time. For that purpose the Legislature has provided upper limit of 7 days. It goes without saying that grounds and supporting material must be in existence on the date of detention order but it is only supplying of copies thereof to the detenu that may take sometime because of the circumstances beyond the control of the detaining authority and to facilitate the same in such exceptional circumstances. the Legislature has given latitude to the detaining authority by providing maximum period or ceiling of 7 days within which copies of grounds and the supporting material existing at the time of detention should be made available to the detenu for his scrutiny for the purpose of preparing representation. In these circumstances even in the light of Art. 22 (5) and quite in consonance with the mandate thereof the Legislature has given that much lee way to the detaining authority. If that is so it can easily be visualized that if the detenu once detained selects his Advocate for the purpose of preparing representation and makes an application for permission to consult Advocate of his choice for that purpose as per impugned clause (xi) of Rule 13 the State Government would consider such application with the utmost expedition and would grant such permission which normally would be a mere formality in a couple of days on receipt of such application and intimation thereof could be sent by the State authorities to the concerned Jailor and to the detenu at the earliest and that would entail delay of not more than a couple of days. Time that elapses for undertaking of such exercise by the State Government cannot be said to be unreasonable from any view point. We have to treat the State authorities to be alive to the mandate of the Constitutional provision of Art. 22 (5) as well as requirement of Sec. 9 (1) of the Act. When they have to supply grounds supporting the detention order at the earliest there is no reason why they would indefinitely sit tight over the application by the detenu for permission to consult Advocate of his choice for the purpose of preparing representation in the light of the grounds supplied to him. When they have to supply grounds supporting the detention order at the earliest there is no reason why they would indefinitely sit tight over the application by the detenu for permission to consult Advocate of his choice for the purpose of preparing representation in the light of the grounds supplied to him. If supplying of grounds has to be done at the earliest there is no reason why the State Government can be apprehended to delay indefinitely or for unreasonable period the application for permission which may be removed by the detenu through Jailor for permitting him to have an interview with Advocate of his choice for the purpose of preparing representation. In our view therefore apprehension of Mr. Patel that procedure of obtaining permission of the State Government as per Rule 13 would be a dilatory procedure and would whittle down the detenus Constitutional right under Art. 22 (5) is mere imaginary than real. When the impugned provision is read in the light of Art 22 (5) and Sec. 9 (1) of the Act and once it is held that application for permission once moved will have to be decided by the State authorities at the earliest such apprehension would pale into insignificance. It is easy to visualize that if in a given case consideration of such application is unduly delayed the detenu can have legitimate right to submit before the competent authority or Court that the continued detention has become illegal on account of infraction of Art. 22 (5 ). But such grievance has to be dealt with on the facts of each case As we have already mentioned earlier action may become bad in such circumstances on the facts of such a case. But that would not make provision or section bad of necessity. Thus it is not possible to agree with the submission of Mr. Patel for the petitioner that the impugned provision is violative of Art. 22 of the Constitution. Equally it is not possible to agree with him that the said provision by itself must be treated to be unreasonable or arbitrary from any angle so as to violate Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. This contention has therefore to be repelled. ( 26 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that the impugned sub-clause of this Rule is not in violation of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution. This contention has therefore to be repelled. ( 26 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that the impugned sub-clause of this Rule is not in violation of Arts. 14 or 21 of the Constitution nor it is violative of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. The question referred to us therefore must be answered in the negative against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents. Order accordingly. Papers of this matter will now be placed before appropriate bench for proceeding further in the matter in accordance with law. Reference answered. .