This revision under Rule 34 of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in Nagalapd read , with section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is by the State Bank of India which has felt aggrieved at the order dated 17.9.87 passed by the Additional Deputy Commiss­ioner (Judicial), Dimapur, hereinafter the ADC, making the ad-interim order of injunction absolute and restraining the petitioner from giving effect to the Circular No. 23 of 1984. The dispute between the parties is related to grant of special area allowance @ 33 ^% of the substantive salary which was made available to all categories of staff <jf the Bank with effect from 1.1.1965 vide letter dated February 27,1965 issued on behalf of the Deputy Secretary and Treasurer of the State Bank of India to the Agent of the State Bank of India, Dimapur, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition of the principal opposite party. The special pay of 33 4-% °f the substantive salary has been sought to be reduced to 10% with a minimum of Rs.75/-and a maximum of Rs. 150/-per month vide agreement reached between opposite party No. 3 Indian Banks' Associ­ation, representing 58 Banks on one hand and opposite party No. 4 National Confederation of Bank Employees and opposite party No. 5 All India Bank Employees' Association on the other. Pursuant to the agreement which was entered into on 8,9.83, the circular was issued by the petitioner on 22nd February, 1984 implementing the terms of the agreement. Opposite party No. 1, the State Bank of India Staff Association, North Eastern Circle, Dimapur, filed a suit challenging the validity of the agreement and the aforesaid circular issued pursuant to the agreement. In the suit, the prayer for injunction was also made which was initially granted exparte and was subsequently made absolute after hearing the parties. It is this order which has .been assailed in this application. 2. In the suit, the prayer for injunction was also made which was initially granted exparte and was subsequently made absolute after hearing the parties. It is this order which has .been assailed in this application. 2. In challenging the validity of the impugned order of injunction Shri Sarma has advanced four submissions : (1) the suit itself was not maintainable as the civil Court's jurisdiction in the matter was barred and so injunction could not have been granted; (2) the grant of injunction was bad in law inasmuch as the same violated section 38 (3) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for no irreparable loss would have been caused to the members of the plaintiff -Association if injunction would not have been granted ; (3) the plaintiff Association having had an equally efficacious remedy, the grant of injunction was in violation of section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act; and (4) the Court at Dimapur could not have, in any case, issued order of injunction restraining the petitioner from giving effect to the agreement and the circular in the territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram which are also sought to be covered by the injunction as granted by the learned ADC. 3. Let us examine the submissions seriatim. In assailing the juriesdiction of the civil Court, Shri Sarma has placed strong reliance on the well-known case of Premier Automobiles, AIR 1975 SC 2238 . The discussion on the subject was summed up hi para 23 of this judgment wherein four principles were culled out in this regard. These are s "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." It strongly contended by Shri Sarma that the present dispute is out and out an industrial dispute inasmuch as it is related to enforce­ment of a right and/or obligation created by the Industrial Dis­putes Act and so the only remedy available to the suitor was to get an adjudication under the aforesaid Act. Shri Goswami, learned Advocate General, Assam, appearing for the principal opposite party has, however, submitted that the dispute in the present case has no origin in an agreement inasmuch as the same is founded on the aforesaid letter of the Bank. It is, therefore, contended that the facts of the present case are different from those which presented themselves in Premier Automobiles (supra) where the source of the right was the agreement entered into from time to time under section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As the source of the right has flown in the present from the aforesaid letter of the Bank, so as presently, advised, I am. of the view that the present cannot be said to be one in which the right or the obligation was created under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and I am therefore not satisfied about the ouster of the jurisdiction of the ADC, Dimapur. In this connection, it may be mentioned that Sri Sarma also referred to Krishna vs. East India Distillery, AIR 1964 Madras 81, which was subsequently approved in para 26 by the Supreme Court in Premier Automobile's case in which it was held that if the cause of action relates to any agreement, civil Court's jurisdiction would be barred. As already stated, I am of the view that the rights of the members of the plaintiff-Association had flown not from any agreement dis­played before the Court but from the aforesaid letter of the "petitioner which had granted special allowance @ 33 \ % to all categories of staff of the Bank. 4. As already stated, I am of the view that the rights of the members of the plaintiff-Association had flown not from any agreement dis­played before the Court but from the aforesaid letter of the "petitioner which had granted special allowance @ 33 \ % to all categories of staff of the Bank. 4. On the question of the injunction as ordered by the learned trial Court, being violative of section 38(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, the contention of the learned Advocate General is that the question relating to irreparable loss cannot be decided in abstract. According to him no hard and fast formula can be laid down in this regard as the answer to this question depends upon who the people are, in what area they are, residing and what allowance or salary they are getting. If a sizeable section of salary is taken away, it may be difficult for people of fixed income group to make both ends meet and to such class of people payment of money after a long lapse of time may not be a suitable com­pensation for the hardship they and the members of their family suffer in the mean time. As in the present case special allowance was one third of the pay, I am of the view that non-granting of the same to this class of people at this stage may even cause such loss which may not be repaired in terms of money by paying the same after a decade or so, I would, therefore, hold that section 38(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act did not bar the granting of injunction. 5. In so far as violation of section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act is concerned, the submission -of Shri Sarma is that by approach­ing the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, the principal opposite party could have got the releif prayed for. As to this, the reply of the learned Advocate General is that it is not known to him whether there is any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal in the State of Nagaland. As to this, the reply of the learned Advocate General is that it is not known to him whether there is any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal in the State of Nagaland. It is also submitted thit as the approach to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal is not a matter of right but depends upon the reference being made by the Government, the remedy available at the hands of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal cannot be regarded as equally efficacious It is also submitted by the learned counsel that it is doubtful if the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal could have granted interim relief as has been ordered by the learned ADC. I find sufficient source in the submissions of the learned Advocate General and I accept the. same. 6. In so far as the extra-territorial aspect of the order is con­cerned, namely, extension of the injunction to the members of the plaintiff Association residing in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram, I would like to state that if opposite party No. 1 represents such people and if the petitioner is made to carry out the order of the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, I do not think if this extra territorial aspect could have stood in the way of the ADC in asking the petitioner in not implementing the agreement and the follow up circular relating to the members serving in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. In this connection, I would tike to refer to Article 261(3) of the Constitution which has stated that any order passed by civil Court in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of execution anywhere within that territory according to law. I would therefore hold that the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner didnot commit any error of jurisdiction in preventing the petitioner from implementing the terms of the agreement relating to .employees in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. 7. After having said sc, one aspect of the, matter is clear that the interest of the Bank has also to be protected. I would therefore hold that the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner didnot commit any error of jurisdiction in preventing the petitioner from implementing the terms of the agreement relating to .employees in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. 7. After having said sc, one aspect of the, matter is clear that the interest of the Bank has also to be protected. It has been submitted by Shri Sarma that subsequent to the passing of the order of injunction by the learned trial Court some employees of the Bank have retired/resigned and it has cause a problem to the Bank to realise the special compensatory allowance paid to them and it would be difficult to do so even if the suit were to be dismissed ultimately To protect the interest of the Bank it may be stated that before paying special compensatory allowance to the employees concerned an undertaking shall be taken from them that if they were to lose ultimately in the suit, the excess amount paid to them shall be realisable from their future salary and terminal benefits. This apart it would also be conductive to the interest of justice if a direction is given to the learned trial Court to dispose of the suit expeditiously which was filed in 1984. I would therefore direct the trial Court to try the case most expeditiously and dispose of the within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the record It is made clear that the observations made above would not prejudice the case of any of the parties in the trial of the suit. 8. The petition is disposed of accordingly.