JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - Plaintiff is the Appellant against an affirming judgment in a suit for declaration of title confirmation of possession, or in the alternative for recovery of possession and for injunction. 2. The disputed land measures Ac. 0.30 decimals described in Schedule-B of the plaint. According to the plaint case out of 590. decimals appertaining to plot No. 345 the Plaintiff a registered society got a registered lease on 20-1-1972 (Ext. 3) from the Government in respect of Ac.0.30 decimals and possession of the same was duly delivered to the Plaintiff. The Defendants who are alleged to have taken lease of the rest of the land from the Irrigation Department interfered with the Plaintiff's possession and hence the suit .was filed. 3. The Defendants in their written statement denied the allegations made in the plaint and asserted that they were in possession of the disputed land notwithstanding the expiry of the lease in their favour by the Irrigation Department and further they had perfected title by adverse possession. 4. On these pleadings, the learned Munsif framed six issues and recorded the following findings: (i) As per the approved principles, necessary sanction was obtained from the Revenue Department of Government and the Collector signed the lease on behalf of the Governor. (ii) The lease granted in favour of the Plaintiff by the Collector under Ext. 3 is valid and it cannot be said that the map (Ext. 1) is not a part of the deed (Ext. 3). (iii) The Plaintiff acquired title to the leasehold land. (iv) Defendants are in possession of the disputed land but have not acquired title by adverse possession. (v) The Secretary of the Plaintiff-Society had no valid authority to file the suit and hence the suit is not maintainable. Thus though the learned Munsif, found title with the Plaintiff yet he dismissed, the suit on the ground of maintainability an a' finding that the Secretary had no authority to file the suit. 5. On appeal, the lower appellate court recorded the following findings: (a) Ext. 3 describes the lease-hold with reference to the northern and southern boundaries but eastern and western boundaries have not been stated in the Schedule and so a reference to the attached map to the deed (Ex. 3) becomes necessary to find out the identity. (b) Ext. 5. On appeal, the lower appellate court recorded the following findings: (a) Ext. 3 describes the lease-hold with reference to the northern and southern boundaries but eastern and western boundaries have not been stated in the Schedule and so a reference to the attached map to the deed (Ex. 3) becomes necessary to find out the identity. (b) Ext. 1 produced by the Plaintiff and urged by the Plaintiff to be a part and parcel of Ext. 3 was not treated to be so by the registering authority and is not a part and parcel of Ext. 3. (c) The Plaintiff's case that it was given possession of the disputed trapizium shaped land under the lease (Ext. 3) has not been proved. (d) Defendants are in possession of the land. (e) Clause 15 of the Articles of Association only authorises the Secretary to represent the Sangh and safeguard the interests but does not specifically provide that the Secretary can file a suit. So the suit would not be maintainable. (f) The Plaintiff failed to prove title in respect of the said trapizium shaped land. Thus the lower appellate Court not only confirmed the conclusion of the trial Court on the question of maintainability of the suit but also disagreeing with the trial Court held that the Plaintiff bad failed to prove its title in respect of the disputed land and accordingly dismissed the appeal. One other important fact to be noted here is that at the dose of the arguments before the lower appellate Court, the Plaintiff having failed in its attempt to establish that Ext. 1 formed a part and parcel of Ext. 3 filed an application that the certified copy of the lease deed obtained from the Sub-Registrar's office might be marked as an additional evidence which would establish the title of the Plaintiff. The lower appellate Court however has rejected the Plaintiff's prayer to that effect. 6. Mr. Patra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff Appellant contends that the conclusion of both the Courts below that the suit is not maintainable being filed by the Secretary of the Society is untenable in law and must be rejected. In advancing the aforesaid argument he places reliance on Clause 15 of the Articles of Association (Ext. 6. Mr. Patra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff Appellant contends that the conclusion of both the Courts below that the suit is not maintainable being filed by the Secretary of the Society is untenable in law and must be rejected. In advancing the aforesaid argument he places reliance on Clause 15 of the Articles of Association (Ext. 9) wherein it has been specifically provided that the Secretary will represent the Sangh in all revenue civil and criminal Courts of law as wen as in Government Offices to guard the interests of the Sangh in general. According to Mr. Patra, this clause must be liberally construed and on being so construed would indicate that the Secretary had the necessary authority to file the suit in question to safeguard the interests of the Sangh. It is true, as has been held by the two Courts below that there has been no specific rule authorising the Secretary to file the suit in question. But in the context of the provision contained in Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, and since the Secretary has not filed the suit to augment his own interest but in the interests of the sangh, I think there is sufficient force in the contention of the learned Counsel and Clause 15 must be held to be wide enough to confer authority on the Secretary to do such act which would be in the interests of the Sangh. In that view of the matter the conclusion of the Courts below that the suit is not maintainable having been filed by the Secretary cannot be sustained. The said conclusion can also be arrived at by construing Section 6 of the Societies registration Act, Proviso to Section 6 clearly stipulates that it shall competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society to sue the President or Chairman, or Principal Secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the Governing Body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the Defendant. This provision came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Janata Rangamancha, through its Secretary Prafulla Kumar Sastri and Anr. v. Shushil Chandra Palit and Anr. This provision came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Janata Rangamancha, through its Secretary Prafulla Kumar Sastri and Anr. v. Shushil Chandra Palit and Anr. 1972 (2) C. W.R.H 99, and it was held that where no particular person was named under the rules or regulation of the society to represent the society then in terms of the proviso the Secretary could adequately represent the Society the ratio of the aforesaid case will apply with full force whether the Society is sued or is suing. On this ground also the suit tiled by the Secretary cannot be held to be not maintainable in as much as there is no dispute that the suit has been filed in the present case by the Sangh through its Secretary Consequently the conclusion of the two Courts below on the question of maintainability of the suit is set aside and it is held that the suit as laid is maintainable. 7. Notwithstanding the aforesaid finding, it is still to be considered as to whether the Plaintiff has been able to establish its title over the disputed land so as to get the relief of declaration of title and injunction. Undoubtedly the Plaintiff bases its claim on Ext. 3 the registered lease deed executed by the Collector in favour of the Plaintiff. It is apparent from the assertion made in the very plaint itself. But unfortunately the boundary given in Ext. 3 is not sufficient to establish the identity at the land that was leased out to the Plaintiff particularly when the eastern and western boundaries have not been indicated and therefore, unless and until the sketch-map attached to the lease deed is proved Plaintiff's title in respect of the disputed trapizium shapped land abutting the Pilgrims Road cannot be said to have been established. The Plaintiff did prove a document (Ext..1) asserting that the said Ext. 1 formed a part of Ext. 3. But that document has been found by the lower appellate Court to be not a part of Ext. 3. Mr. Patra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant does not assail the said conclusion of the lower Appellant Court. Since Ext. 1 which was alleged by the Plaintiff to be a part of Ext. 3. has been found not to be a part of Ext. 3. Mr. Patra, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant does not assail the said conclusion of the lower Appellant Court. Since Ext. 1 which was alleged by the Plaintiff to be a part of Ext. 3. has been found not to be a part of Ext. 3 to establish Plaintiff's title the Plaintiff filed an application for additional evidence. In course of hearing of this case Mr. Patra, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, fairly stated that unless the Plaintiff's application for additional evidence was allowed and the document which was formed a part of Ext. 3 was brought on record the Plaintiff would not be in a position to establish if title in respect of the disputed land and therefore, the next question for consideration would be whether the lower appellate Court rightly rejected the Plaintiff's application for additional evidence. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff Appellant strenuously relies upon the decision of this Court in the case of Chunilal Ojha v. Mul Shankar Ojha and Ors. 37 (1961) C.L.T. 45 : Gopal Charan Laha and Others Vs. Daitary Nandy and Others. and contends that since interest of Justice is of paramount consideration, the lower appellate Court erred in law in rejecting the Plaintiff's application for additional evidence. A perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court would indicate that the grounds on which the application for additional evidence has been rejected cannot be said to be extraneous or illegal and on the other band must be held to be justifiable ones. The lower appellate Court has found that the Plaintiff knew from the beginning with reference to the boundary described in the lease deed that the trapizium-shaped land would not come within the lease-bold premises unless the map attached to Ext. 3 was proved Knowing that fully the Plaintiff deliberately led evidence to show that Ext. 1 is a part and parcel of Ext. 3. That having been rejected, the question of permitting the Plaintiff to prove some other document by way of additional evidence at the close of the hearing of the appeal at the appellate stage does not arise. The lower appellate Court also took into consideration the fact that the Plaintiff even if found that the sketch-map attached to Ext. 3. That having been rejected, the question of permitting the Plaintiff to prove some other document by way of additional evidence at the close of the hearing of the appeal at the appellate stage does not arise. The lower appellate Court also took into consideration the fact that the Plaintiff even if found that the sketch-map attached to Ext. 3 has been lost or is not available should have taken steps for getting the document from the office of the Sub-Registrar right from the beginning. Instead of doing that the Plaintiff pursued the litigation on a fictitious document like Ext. 1 and wanted to established that the said document (Ext. 1) formed apart of Ext. 3. Plaintiff have taken such a mala fide move and having failed there cannot be permitted to give some fresh document in evidence to prove the real document which formed a part of Ext. 3. The lower appellate Court also took into account the fact that even without the said document, the dispute between the parties can be disposed of or in other words, the fact whether the Court requires the document in question or pot and came to hold that the Court did not require the document in question. It is no doubt true that the power of a Court to permit additional evidence to be led is there even at the second appellate stage and the interest of justice it of paramount consideration. But however wide the discretion of the Court may be, the same is circumscribed in the provision contained in Rule 27 of, Order 41, CPC and in exercising that discretion, the Court will have to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case. In the facts and circumstances of the resent case and in "view of the findings of the lower appellate Court in this regard, referred to earlier. I am not in a position to come to a conclusion that there has been any error in rejecting the Plaintiff's application for adducing additional evidence and in my view, the lower appellate Court rightly rejected the said application. Consequently, the ultimate conclusion of the lower appellate Court that the Plaintiff has failed to establish its title in respect of the disputed trapizium shaped land remains unassailable and cannot be interfered with by this Court in second appeal. 8. Consequently, the ultimate conclusion of the lower appellate Court that the Plaintiff has failed to establish its title in respect of the disputed trapizium shaped land remains unassailable and cannot be interfered with by this Court in second appeal. 8. In the result I do not find any merits in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed