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1988 DIGILAW 201 (BOM)

Sukhdev Wedu Patil v. Nasik Zilla Sahakari Soot Girni Ltd. & others

1988-07-04

C.S.DHARMADHIKARI, V.S.KOTWAL

body1988
JUDGMENT - V.S. KOTWAL, J.:---[The following paras of the judgement are ordered to be reported by His Lordship]. 10. This leads us to consider the construction of the relevant rules. As observed at the threshold the first respondent Society is the specified society within the meaning of section 73-G of the said Act. Chapter 11-A of the said Act has been made applicable to such societies. In respect of the election to such societies specific Rules as indicated herein above are framed and therefore the election in question is governed by these. Rules Rule 60 is the relevant one under the said set up which relates to the recount of votes. It prescribes that after completion of the counting, the Returning Officer shall record in the result sheet in From XI, the total number of votes polled by each candidate and announce the same. A proviso is carved out having regard to a contingency of equality of votes when the fate of the candidate is decided by lots with which however we are not concerned in this proceeding. Sub-clause (2) prescribes that after such announcement that has been made that the candidate or the election agent may apply in writing to the Returning Officer for a recount of all or any of the ballot papers already counted stating the grounds on which he demands such recount. After the receipt of such application it becomes the obligation of the Returning Officer to consider the same as reflected in sub-clause (3) onwards which further stipulates that the Returning Officer on application of mind shall decide the matter and has an option either to reject it or to allow it and even in the second category he has a further option of either allowing it in part or in entirely meaning thereby that he can reject outright the prayer or recount or grant the prayer for recount whole-sale or grant the recount only partially regarding some booths only. If either of latter two decision is taken then the process of recount of the said poll starts. It is after the said process is over as contemplated by sub-clause (5) that the provisions of sub-clause (6) come into play when the total number of votes polled by each candidate even after, there count has to be announced and the necessary sheet in From XI is to be filled. It is after the said process is over as contemplated by sub-clause (5) that the provisions of sub-clause (6) come into play when the total number of votes polled by each candidate even after, there count has to be announced and the necessary sheet in From XI is to be filled. Thus sub-clause (1) and sub-clause (5) stand on the same platform the former at the initial counting while the latter being after the recount and sub-clause (6) further indicates that no application for recount shall be entertained thereafter. Under Rule 61 thereafter the Returning Officer has to declare the candidate to whom the highest number of valid votes has been given as having been elected and certify the return of the election From XI and XII. 11. This arrangement, the pattern and the structure of all these sub-clauses of Rule 60 make the position manifestly clear as to when a recount can be validity asked for. Both the authorities below were obviously in error in holding that recount could have been asked for after the partial counting regarding votes of nine booths was over which was obviously not sanctioned by these provisions. Sub-clause (1) of Rule 60 makes it abundantly clear that after the completion of the counting that the total number of votes are to be mentioned in the concerned sheet and the same is to be announced thereafter. This is the first pointer in favour of the logical construction of these provisions. The second pointer is reflected in sub-clause (2) which specifically stipulates that a recount can be demanded only after such announcement has been made. Sub-clause (6) is the third pointer which makes it further clear that the total number of votes so counted after recount are again to be mentioned in the sheet and the further Clause and Rule 61 then make it clear that it is thereafter that the Returning Officer has to declare such candidate as elected who has secured maximum number of votes. It is apparent that the counting of the votes is the continuous process which has to start and continue till the end and it is only thereafter that the number of votes can be entered into the sheet in From XI. It is apparent that the counting of the votes is the continuous process which has to start and continue till the end and it is only thereafter that the number of votes can be entered into the sheet in From XI. Upto that stage there is only announcement of votes but there is no announcement of the candidate being declared as elected and this last stage comes into operation only after all the votes are counted. Sub-clause (2) makes it further clear that it is only after such announcement as stipulated under sub-clause (1) that a recount can be made. Thus, therefore, is a further painter to suggest the point of time when the recount can be demanded and the announcement contemplated under sub-clause (1) is obviously after all the counting is over and the votes are mentioned in the sheet in From XI. This is also further indicated by the proviso carved out by sub-clause (1) that it is only after all the counting is over that the situation may arise about the equality of votes when the lots are required to be drawn and which contingency could not arise when the counting was in the mid-stream. 12. Having regard to this structure of the entire Rule we clear in our opinion that a demand for recount can be made not in a piecemeal manner in the sense not after the counting is in mis-stream and is only partially complete but it can be so made only after the counting qua all the booths is over when the votes are entered into the sheets and obviously before the election results are declared qua the successful candidate. It is on this premises when the facts are scrutinised it becomes manifest that the third respondent was in error and so also the Commissioner in construing this provision to mean that the petitioner could have asked for a recount after the voting qua the nine booths was over and before the counting of votes regarding the four booths had started. For the reasons already assigned the petitioner could have formulated and extended such a demand only after the counting of votes of all the 13 booths was over and then announced as prescribed under sub-clause (1) of Rule 60. For the reasons already assigned the petitioner could have formulated and extended such a demand only after the counting of votes of all the 13 booths was over and then announced as prescribed under sub-clause (1) of Rule 60. That is precisely what the petitioner did in the instant case inasmuch as before the results could get finality though after the counting of votes in all the booths was over that he gave an application and asked for recount of votes of all the 13 booths. Therefore, on the legal premises also the petitioner stands on an equally sound footing. Thus when these two categories are read in a composite manner it becomes manifestly clear that the petitioner had an occasion to which the Returning Officer himself found at least partial justification to give an application for a recount of the votes regarding all the 13 booths and this he could do only after the entire counting was over. That is precisely what he did though his application was mis-construed and was wrongly rejected at least inpart firstly because it was erroneously felt that recount could have been asked for after the counting of nine booths was over and secondly the denial was equally erroneous on the ground that there was no necessity of recount qua these nine booths because the petitioner was leading. Rule discharged. -----