JUDGMENT Amal Kumar Chatterjee, J : This is an appeal against the conviction of the appellant by the learned Sessions Judge of Howrah under ss. 328/379 IPC and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for four years and one year respectively imposed upon such conviction. 2 The principal contention raised on behalf of the appellant related to a question of procedure followed by the learned Judge It appears that the accused was not represented at the time of trial by any lawyer and the learned Judge has recorded that at one stage he had engaged a senior lawyer for procuring his release on bail after commitment but be did not pray for an, legal aid for his defence. The learned Judge has further observed that as the accused did not appear to be indigent, no legal aid was given to him under 304 Cr PC. It is here that the learned advocate for the appellant has joined Issue and has argued that even though no prayer was made before the learned Judge for any legal aid, still it was Incumbent upon the Judge himself to enquire from the accused whether he wanted to be defended at the cost of the State In accordance with the provision of s. 304 Cr P C. The rest of the contention is that since this was not done the entire trial was vitiated as the accused was denied the constitutional guarantee envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution. 3. Now in order to extend legal aid to an accused at State expense under s. 304 Cr PC, two conditions have to be fulfilled the first is that the accused is not represented by a pleader and the other is that it appears to the court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a pleader. It is no doubt true that this section does not provide that defence at State cost shall not he given except on a prayer made by an accused but In order to attract this section it is absolutely essential that it must appears to the court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a pleader In the instant case the learned Judge bas not only recorded that the accused did not appear to be indigent but he has further noted that at one stage he had engaged a senior lawyer to get him released on bail after commitment. We have also examined the record for ourselves and it seems that the accused had not only engaged a lawyer after commitment but even before commitment he had engaged more than one lawyer on his behalf In such circumstances the finding of the learned Judge that it appeared to him that the accused was not an indigent person cannot be successfully assailed. Once this position is accepted there cannot be any question of engaging a lawyer for him at State cost because it is only when an accused is unable to afford representation by a lawyer on account of poverty that such indulgence can be given. 4. The learned advocate for the appellant has also made some comment on the expression "indigent" used by the leaned Judge although according to the Code, the benefit of s 304 should he given to an accused person not having "sufficient means" to engage a lawyer. We are unable to make much of this argument and suffice to say that there is no substantial difference between the two expressions at least for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of s.304 Cr. P.C. and the finding of the learned Judge cannot be interfered on this ground. 5. In order to support his contention that the learned Judge was under a mandate of enquire from the present appellant if he wished to be defended at state cost Irrespective of the question whether he made a prayer to that effect, the learned Advocate for the appellant has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Suk Das and Anr. v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh 1986 SCC (Cri) 168 In which Their Lordships quoting with approval, the earlier decision of the same court in Khatri (11) v State of Bihar (1981) 2 SCR 408 had observed that It would make a mockery of legal aid if it were to be left to a poor, ignorant and Illiterate accused to asked for free legal services. Their Lordships further reiterated the ruling In Khatri's case (Supra) that the Magistrates and Sessions Judges in the country were under an obligation to inform every accused who appeared before them and not represented by a lawyer on account of his poverty or indigence that he is entitled to free legal services at the cost of the State. Their Lordships further reiterated the ruling In Khatri's case (Supra) that the Magistrates and Sessions Judges in the country were under an obligation to inform every accused who appeared before them and not represented by a lawyer on account of his poverty or indigence that he is entitled to free legal services at the cost of the State. After careful consideration it appears to us that according to both the decisions of the Supreme Court the Magistrates and Sessions Judges in the country are under an obligation to inform every accused appearing before them unrepresented by any lawyer if he wished to get free legal services at State cost only If such an accused could not afford the services of a lawyer due to poverty or indigence. None of the rulings appear to be any authority for the broad proposition that a Judge has to ask an accused not represented by a lawyer If he wished to be defended at State's cost irrespective of the question whether he has means to hire a lawyer. The legal position is that if an accused is unable to engage a lawyer on account of poverty or Indigence, the court before whom he is brought has to tell the accused that he is entitled to be defended by a lawyer at the cost of the State even though such focused may not make on application or prayer for rendering him free legal assistance. In other words, the court must be satisfied that absence of any lawyer to defend an accused is due to lack of means of the accused and then only a duty is cast upon the court to Inform him about his right to be defended at State Cost. Applying this text to the instant case there cannot be any shade of doubt that there was nothing before the learned Judge to come to a finding that the present appellant was unable to afford legal representative for want of means In fact there were materials before the learned Judge to justify his observation that the accused did not appear to be an indigent person. Thus no irregularity much less an illegality can be found in the procedure followed by the learned judge nor can the trial be held to be vitiated on the ground under consideration. 6. Thus no irregularity much less an illegality can be found in the procedure followed by the learned judge nor can the trial be held to be vitiated on the ground under consideration. 6. Regarding the merits of the case it may be noted that the case of the prosecution was that the present appellant was friendly with a watch repairer Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) and in the afternoon on the 12th August 1977 the appellant went to his shop and as Ram Swaran Sen (P.W. 1) was about to close the shop to go home for taking meal, the appellant insisted that they might take food together in the shop itself and went out and brought some food which both of them ate. Shortly thereafter Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) become unconscious and the appellant left after stealing all the watches from the shop. Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) was discovered. In that state by a neighbouring shop keeper Mukta Ram Naskar (P.W.5) and he was removed to a hospital by some local men such as Girija Sankar Mukherjeee (P.W.6) and Sukumar Sett (P.W. 3). In the hospital Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) regained consciousness on the following morning and medial examination revealed that he was suffering from dhatura poison. Manimala (P.W. 7) a daughter of P.W.1 went to the shop which was kept under look and key at the time of removal of Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1), to the hospital, and found that all the watches were stolen. After discharge from the hospital Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) lodged an information to the concerned police station on the 17th August 1977 and in Course of Investigation one stolen watch was recovered from the appellant. 7. The evidence of Ram Swann Sen (P.W. 1) regarding arrival of the appellant in his shop and taking food together and his subsequent unconsciousness is corroborated by the testimony of his daughter Manimala (P.W. 7) when she called on him in the hospital on the following day soon after he regained consciousness Jagadish Chandra Banik (P.W.4) a neighbouring Shop keeper has also found the appellant In the shop of Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) in the afternoon of the relevant date. This also corroborates the testimony of Ram Swaran regarding arrival of the appellant in the shop In question Once this position is accepted there is absolutely no reason to reject the rest of the testimony of Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) because the appellant had admitted In his examination under s. 313 Cr PC. that he was acquainted with the appellant for a long time In such circumstances if really Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) felt sick after taking meal, the most normal conduct for the appellant would be to take step for proper treatment of Ram Swaran Son (P.W. 1) Dr. S Chatterjee (P.W. 8) Medical Officer of Howrah General Hospital has proved that Ram Swann Sen (P.W. 1) was admitted in the hospital under him and he found symptoms of dhatura poison for which necessary treatment was given. The evidence on record seem to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the appellant had administered poison to Ram Swaran Sen (P.W. 1) in the food brought by him and after Ram Swaran Sen (P.W. 1) became unconscious he removed watches from his shop out of which one was ultimately recovered from him. 8. The learned advocate for the appellant has tried to argue upon some supposed Improbabilities of the Case. Our attention has been invited to the evidence regarding recovery of the watch from the possession of the appellant. Sri Sisir Kumar Chakroborty (P.W. 12) who had Investigated the Case in part has deposed that he seized a wrist watch from the possession of the appellant at the police station on the 23rd August 1977 under a seizure list Ext. 3/1 in presence of witness including Vivekananda Das (P.W. 9). It has been urged by the learned advocate for the appellant that it was highly improbable that he would go to the police station with a stolen watch in his possession. However, it does not appear that the appellant came to the police station on his own as the testimony of Vivekananda Das (P.W.9) discloses that it was he who brought the appellant to the police station from Andal. Therefore, it cannot be successfully urged that it was improbable that the appellant would himself walk into the police station with a stolen watch with him. 9. Therefore, it cannot be successfully urged that it was improbable that the appellant would himself walk into the police station with a stolen watch with him. 9. It was also contended on behalf of the appellant that Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) was only repairer of watch and the owner who had given the alleged booty recovered from the appellant was not examined as a witness to prove that the watch really belonged to him. No doubt the owner was not examined but Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) at the time of lodging the FIR Ext. 1 had given description of some of the stolen watches one of which tallies with the watch recovered from the possession of the appellant. In this state of evidence non-examination of the owner of the watch does not touch the root of the prosecution case. 10. The learned advocate for the appellant has also pointed out certain evidence to show that even after Ram Swaran Sen (P.W.1) became unconscious the appellant remained in the shop for quite sometime and it was argued that if really he had any criminal design then certainly he would not wait for long and would try to accomplish the crime in shortest time. There is not much merit in this contention because the time necessary to complete the crime would depend upon local conditions and opportunity to remove the watches. In the circumstances the fact that the appellant remained in the shop for quite some time even after Ram Swaran Sen (P.W. 1) became unconscious need not go in favour of the appellant. 11. Considering the evidence in all its bearing. we are of the opinion and accordingly hold that the learned Judge has rightly found the appellant guilty under ss.328/379 I.P.C. and no interference is called for in this appeal. 12. The appeal is therefore, dismissed. The conviction and the sentence passed by the learned Judge are affirmed. The appellant is directed to surrender forthwith to his bail bond in default of which appropriate step shall be taken to secure his arrest and to commit him to prison. Record be sent down at once Jitnedra Nath Chaudhuri, J.: I agree Appeal dismissed; direction given.