A. K. LAXMESHWAR, J. ( 1 ) THE above Regular Second Appeal is directed against the Judgment and Decree made on 28-1-1978, in R. A. No. 10/1976, on the file of the Principal Civil Judge, setting aside the Judgment and Decree made on 13-11-1975, in O. S. 65/1972, on the file of the munsiff, Ramanagaram. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are : that the plaintiff filed a suit for directing the 1st defendant to pay mesne profits from the date of the suit upto the date of delivery of possession in addition to giving him possession. The suit schedule house and shops belonged to one Puttaswamigowda son of Puttaswami gowda. The plaintiff is the daughter-in-law of the said late Puttaswami gowda and wife of m. P. Somanna, who is deceased. The plaintiff and her deceased daughter Chandramma executed a release deed dated 20. 6. 1959, wherein, the suit schedule property along with other properties were taken by the plaintiff and her minor daughter in lieu of their share in the family properties. The suit schedule property was mortgaged with possession by late Putttaswami gowda in favour of one late Ranganna, the father of the first defendant under a registered mortgage deed dated 15. 12. 1930, for a sum of Rs. 2,000/ -. The time stipulated under the said mortgage deed was 8 years. The said Ranganna, since deceased and his only son the 1st defendant in this case received a sum of Rs. 1,000/- on 1-2-1954, from late M. P. Puttaswami gowda and in pursuance thereof, the 1st defendant executed a receipt in favour of Puttas-wamigowda on the same day. Therefore, the amount payable under the mortgage deed dated 15-12-1930, is only Rs. 1,000/- and the plaintiff deposited the said balance of rs. 1,000/- in the Court at the time of filing the suit. The plaintiff had issued a notice to the 1st defendant asking for redemption of that mortgage. The defendant had sent a reply pretending not knowing anything and by simply stating that he has not understood the notice. Defendants 2 to 4 are impleaded in this suit as they are residing in various portions of the schedule property. As against this, 1st defendant filed his written statement interalia denying all the allegations made against him. The defendant had sent a reply pretending not knowing anything and by simply stating that he has not understood the notice. Defendants 2 to 4 are impleaded in this suit as they are residing in various portions of the schedule property. As against this, 1st defendant filed his written statement interalia denying all the allegations made against him. He has specifically contended that when there is a receipt on 1-2-1954, regarding the payment of money and other recitals are there. According to the said receipt, the mortgage was redeemed in respect of property bearing No. 1025. Therefore, there was no any mortgage right over that property. He ought to have filed a suit for possession of that property, but the same is barred by limitation as the 1st defendant has enjoyed the property hostile to the real owner and uninterruptedly for more than 12 years. Therefore, the suit is barred by time and he prayed for dismissal of the suit as it is misconceived and not maintainable. ( 3 ) THE learned Munsiff on the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the plaint schedule property belonged to puttaswamy Gowda ? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that she is the daughter-in-law of the abovesaid puttaswamy Gowda ? 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that she became the owner of the plaint schedule property in lieu of her share and her daughter Chandramma's share as alleged ? 4. Whether the plaintiff proves that the plaint schedule property was mortgaged by the deceased Puttaswamy gowda in favour of the 1st defendant's father under a registered mortgage deed with possession ? 5. Whether the plaintiff proves that on 1. 2. 1954 the first defendant received rs, 1,000/- from the deceased Puttaswamy gowda and executed a receipt ? 6. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 7. Whether the defendants prove that the plaintiff has no right in the suit property ? 8. Whether the defendants prove that the receipt dated 1. 2. 1954 is a connected one ? 9. Whether the defendants prove that the suit is not properly valued ? 10. Whether the defendant No. 1 proves that he perfected the title to the suit property by adverse possession ? 11. To what reliefs ? 8. Whether the defendants prove that the receipt dated 1. 2. 1954 is a connected one ? 9. Whether the defendants prove that the suit is not properly valued ? 10. Whether the defendant No. 1 proves that he perfected the title to the suit property by adverse possession ? 11. To what reliefs ? ( 4 ) THE learned Munsiff answered all the issues as under : issue No. 1 : In negative issue No. 2 : In positive issue No. 3 and 4 : In negative then the learned Judge answers Issue no. 5 as doesnot arise for consideration. The learned Judge answers Issue Nos. 6 and 7 in positive. Issue No. 8 : The learned Judge says does not arise for consideration; issues No. 9 and 10 in the negative. ( 5 ) AFTER hearing both the parties and after appreciating the oral evidence and examining documents produced by the parties, the learned Munsiff dismissed the suit. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the said Judgment and Decree passed by the learned munsiff filed R. A. No. 10/1976, before the principal Civil Judge, Bangalore District, bangalore. The learned Civil Judge, after hearing both the parties allowed the appeal and decreed the suit with some modifications. ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved by the Judgment and decree of the Principal Civil Judge, 1st defendant filed the above appeal challenging the Judgment and Decree passed by the principal Civil Judge. ( 7 ) AT the time of admission, this court raised the following questions of law : 1. Whether the Court below was right in holding that the suit is not barred by limitation ? 2. Whether the Court below was right in holding that Exhibit P-3 is admissible for collateral purposes for proving payment of Rs. 1,000/- ? ( 8 ) MR. V. Tarakaram, appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the date of payment is taken as 1-2-1954, they have released the property bearing No. 1025, since that date. Therefore, the 1st defendant at sometime was in possession of property bearing No. 1025, hostile to the real owner and he has perfected his title by adverse possession, besides, the suit cannot be filed for the possession of the said property after 12 years, as it is barred by time. Further, the learned Counsel Mr. Tarakaram submits that the suit is misconceived. The document ex. Further, the learned Counsel Mr. Tarakaram submits that the suit is misconceived. The document ex. P3 shows that the property was released, therefore, he cannot file a suit for redemption of that property. At the most, he would have filed it for possession of other property, therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed as it is misconceived. The learned Counsel for the respondent -1 also submitted that it is a document that has come into existence on 1-2-1954, it does not speak of only the payment, it speaks of payment also, the total amount of mortgage deed is Rs. 2,000/- and it is a usufructuary mortgage. When rs. 2,000/- are paid, he has enjoyed the property in lieu of interest to his money, which may be equal to that of income derived from the property in those days. When Rs. 1,000/- is paid, some relief proportionate to that he should get, that is, release of the property. It is specifically said that property bearing No. 1025 is released, therefore, it amounts to modification of the original deed of 1930. If it is so, it has to be registered, when it is not registered, it cannot be read as evidence as per the provisions of section 17 (1) of the Registration Act. Mentioning of release of the property is considered as the direction to be acted upon, it is to be taken as a modification of the previous deed. When that becomes the position in law, nothing can be read and no advantage can be taken from that document. The learned Counsel very fairly submitted that it is not a question of money only of Rs. 1,000/-, but, it is a technicality of law that was created there, it must go to his advantage and the whole suit must be dismissed, because the document which has to be relied upon is only Ex. P-3. If that is taken out of evidence, nothing remains to be decided. In this case, the learned Counsel for the appellant says that the limitation of 60 years is reduced to 30 years and also 7 years are to be added from the date of the commencement of the new limitation Act, 1954, nothing further can be done in that respect. The learned Counsel for the respondent -1's contention that the limitation is still there, because the old Act gave 60 years. The learned Counsel for the respondent -1's contention that the limitation is still there, because the old Act gave 60 years. I do not agree with that proposition of law, when the amendment to the limitation Act has come into force. In this case, even the suit was not pending, but the suit was filed in 1972. Then, we have to take into consideration the change in law that came into being in 1954, therfore, the new limitation Act, which gives limitation as 30 years has to be made applicable under Section 30 of the Limitation act, 1954, Now, in view of the submissions made by the learned Counsel Mr. Tarakarm, one more question of law arises, how Ex. P-3 is to be read, where it is a document that gives rights to the parties and it amounts to modification of the original mortgage deed of 1930. Now all the questions of law that arise in this appeal depend upon the decision of question of Law No. 2, which reads thus :"whether the Court below was right in holding that Ex. P-3 is admissible for collateral purposes for proving payment of rs. 1,000/-?"whether it is admissible in evidence for finding out whether the conditions altered in the document amount to modification or variation or alterations of the original mortgage deed of 1930. Mr. Tarakaram submits that when the mortgagor pays money due on the mortgage, in whole or in part, he is carrying out the terms of the bond and is not making any alteration in it and even though the fact of payment may limit or extinguish the mortgagee's interest that is only because, the bond is working itself out by the force of its own terms and not by reason of some new agreement which seeks to modify it or limit or extinguish the interest which it creates. A simple test in this : See whether the mortgagee can, on the face of the subsequent agreement, enforce the terms of his bond, if he cannot, then it is plain that the subsequent undertaking has effected a modification,and if that has the effect of limiting or extinguishing the mortgagee's interest it is at once hit entirely by Section 17 (1) (b) or Section 92 proviso 4. But, when there is a mere payment of money, that is done under the terms of the bond, for a contract of mortgate postulates that the mortgagor should repay the money borrowed and that when he does so the mortgagee's interest in the property shall be limited to the extent of the repayment or, when all is repaid, be wholly extinguished nor, of course, does a payment have to be made by a written or registered instrument, or even evidenced by someone. The Registration Act draws a distinction between a document which by force of its terms effects the extinguishment or purports to do so and one which merely evidence an external fact which brings about the result. Therefore the learned Counsel submits that if payment is made, in lieu of the payment, certain alterations of the original bond are to be made, they are dependent on each other, they cannot be separated as the payment is not independent. On payment, some relief is to be given that amounts to alteration of original document. Therefore, the subsequent document in law needs registration. If it is not registered, it cannot be read as evidence as per Section 17 (1) of the Registration Act. Thus, the whole document is schewed from evidence. As against this, Mr. Krishnaiah submits that the nomenclature of the document as therefore, on that nomenclature, he makes it clear at the very outset on looking at the face of the document without going into the recitals in it, it can be said that it is only a receipt for having received the money, but if it is styled as certain other things are there. By mere mentioning there the other words such as release of property bearing No. 1025 and certain other things that are mentioned, they cannot be the directions or alterations to the original document. Therefore, it is not a document that has come into existence to give right to the plaintiff to get the mortgage redeemed nor it reduces the liability of the defendant in any manner. Only the amount is received nothing more is done thereafter. It is in the evidence of the plaintiff that defendant continued in possession of the property evenafter that fatal date, therefore, he submits that the defendant-1, cannot take any assistance from the recitals made in this receipt, but the fact remains that Rs. 1,000/- is paid. Only the amount is received nothing more is done thereafter. It is in the evidence of the plaintiff that defendant continued in possession of the property evenafter that fatal date, therefore, he submits that the defendant-1, cannot take any assistance from the recitals made in this receipt, but the fact remains that Rs. 1,000/- is paid. It is really strange. The parties never thought of the technicalities and necessities of laws while making payment. It makes me to think that it is a usufructuary mortgage in respect of two properties when Rs. 2,000/- were paid. When Rs. 1,000/- was repaid, proportionately liabilities must be decreased. Whether mere document on a revenue stamp can give a right to modify terms in a registered mortgage deed. The learned counsel for the Appellant also relies upon the Supreme Court decision reported in a. I. R. 1952 Supreme Court Page 153, kashinath Bhaskar Datar v Bhaskar Vishweshwar :"assume that the mortgagor repaid the whole of the interest at the altered rate and the whole of the principal, would those repayment by themselves effect an extinguishment of the mortgage ? Clearly not, because unless the subsequent agreement is called in aid, more would be due under the terms of the bond on account of the higher rate of interest. It is evident then that it is the agreement which limits the mortgagee's interest and serves to extinguish the mortgage and not mere payment at the reduced rate. "on this observation of their Lordships, Mr. Krishnaiah submits that their Lordships have clearly raised a question and clearly answered the same. The altered rate of interest and the whole of the principal, would those repayments by themselves effect an extinguishment of the mortgage, clearly not, because unless the subsequent agreement is called in aid, more would be due under the terms of the bond on account of the higher rate of interest, so also in the present case he says that an amount of Rs. 1,000/- is paid and other terms such as releasing of the property bearing No. 1025 and other things themselves cannot give a right to the plaintiff nor limits the rights of the defendant, but that will have to be called in aid to the main document, then only, the right will accrue to the plaintiff and the liabilities will be limited of the defendant only after it is called in aid. The learned Counsel Mr. Tarakaram relied upon other number of decisions, which I quote below: a. I. R. 1933 Calcutta High Court Page 198, in Asanuddin Mandal v Asmatulla. Their lordships have observed thus :"the result therefore is that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court must be set aside and the case sent back to it in order that it may rehear the appeal after excluding from evidence the receipt in question which was admitted by him at the appellate stage. It will be open to the subordinate Judge to decide the matter on such oral evidence as to payment which the respondent might offer and on such evidence as has already been tendered as also on such further evidence which the lower appellate court may take in the exercise of its powers under O. 41, R. 27, Civil P. C. The sub-ordinate Judge will rehear the appeal in the light of these observations. "relying upon this decision, the learned counsel Mr. Tarakaram submits that the 1st appellate Judge did not adhered to this aspect of the case properly, particularly, to say definitely on Ex. P. 3. Therefore, in his opinion, he says that it requires rehearing in the light of argument advanced and also in the light of the directions given by this Court to the 1st Appellate Judge to rehear it. Therefore, it is his argumental submission that it may be remanded to the 1st Appellate judge to reconsider with the argument advanced by the counsel here and also with certain directions to it. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel Mr. Tarakaram also relies upon another decision of the madras High Court reported in A. I. R. 1941 madras in Srinivasa Ayyangar v Akayya naidu and others. He refers to the head-note in the decision, which reads as under :"there is obviously a distinction between a receipt of money and a relinquishment of a claim by a creditor. When a receipt does not purport to extenguish a mortgage deed but merely operates to do so, it may be admissible in evidence without registration on account of Section 17 (2) (xi ). But when a document is not a receirpt of money but a portion of the mortgage money, the same does not fall under Section 17 (2) (xi) and consequently is inadmissible in evidence when not registered under Section 17 (l) (b ). But when a document is not a receirpt of money but a portion of the mortgage money, the same does not fall under Section 17 (2) (xi) and consequently is inadmissible in evidence when not registered under Section 17 (l) (b ). "reiving upon this decision, the learned counsel for the Appellant submits that this is not a simple receipt for having received the money, further it relinquishes some rights that has specifically released one property, therefore, this requires registration and without registration, it cannot be read as evidence. This aspect is lost sight of by the 1st Appellate Judge,' who now should be asked to do it. ( 10 ) THE another decision in AIR 1982 noc 262 (Allahabad) was also relied upon by the learned Counsel Mr. Tarakaram. The limitation Act, Sections 18, 30 (a), Art. 61 (a) - suit for redemption of mortgage and possession - Limitation , - applicability of section 30 (a) - effect of acknowledgment. Section 30 (a) is in the nature of saving clause and nothing could be added to or subtracted from the statutory period of seven years prescribed by way of a saving from the operation of the other provisions of the Act. This has also not been considered by the 1st Appellate Judge. The learned Counsel Mr. Tarakaram submits that Ex. P. 3, is not a document, which can be read as evidence, because, it has released one property. Therefore, it is essentially a release deed modifying the original one, therefore, unless it is registered, it cannot be made admissible in evidence for any purpose. It is no doubt true that in ex. P. 3, it is recited that one of the mortgaged item bearing property No. 1025 has been released. The document cannot be a release deed as it has released one mortgaged property, which has not been registered. The question arises for consideration whether that document can be used to prove or disprove the payment of 1/3rd guntas towards the mortgage amount. It is well settled if a document is not admissible in evidence to prove the transaction of payment for want of registration, it can be used for withdrawal purpose, such as proving an admission of relevant fact. Here Mr. Krishniah says that Court can consider only the fact of payment of money and not other contents in toto. It is well settled if a document is not admissible in evidence to prove the transaction of payment for want of registration, it can be used for withdrawal purpose, such as proving an admission of relevant fact. Here Mr. Krishniah says that Court can consider only the fact of payment of money and not other contents in toto. He says that a document though it contains some terms it can only be used as an evidence. The defendant-1 continues to be in possession of the property since then, therefore, it is clear that it is not a document that has existed to give right to him or to limit the liabilities of the defendant-1. In Punjab High Court case, rendered in case of Hazura singh v Jaggar singh, reported in A. I. R. 1965 Punjab 479. In that case, the entire mortgage money was paid and the possession of the property was given back to the mortgagor. It was compulsorily registrable. A receipt for payment of money due under mortgage does not purport to extinguish the mortgage, is not registrable. The question that would arise for consideration is whether a receipt which evidences payment of the amount what is actually payable under the mortgage deed extinguishes the mortgage. In Kashinath bhaskar Datar v Bhaskar Vishweshwar reported in A. I. R. 1952 Supreme Court page 153, it is made clear that there is a difference between a receipt and a remission or a release. A receipt is not the payment, nor does the document in such a case serve to extinguish the mortgage or limit the liability. It is the payment of the money which does that and the receipt does no more than evidence the fact. Not so a release. The extinguishment or diminution or liability is in that event affected by the agreement itself and not by something external to it. If the agreement is oral, it is hit by proviso 4 to Section 92, Evidence Act, for it "rescinds" or "modifies" the contract or mortgage. If it is in writing, it is hit by section 17 (l) (b), Registration Act, for in that, case the writing itself "limits" or "extinguishes" the liability under the mortgage. The document Ex. P3 is to be considered in lieu of the principles laid down. If it is in writing, it is hit by section 17 (l) (b), Registration Act, for in that, case the writing itself "limits" or "extinguishes" the liability under the mortgage. The document Ex. P3 is to be considered in lieu of the principles laid down. "it draws a distinction between a document which, by the force of its terms, effects the extinguishment, or purports to do so, and one which merely evidences as external fact which brings about that result. "in Chiman Lal v Amarchand (A. I. R. 1965 rajasthan 3), it has been made clear that :"in other words a payment made in discharge of the obligation created by the mortgage deed in accordance with its tenor is a payment made in satisfaction of the mortgage and does not in any way extinguish the mortgage. But if the obligation under the deed is discharged, not according to its tenor but by a fresh act of will of the mortgagee in the absence of which it would not be so discharged, then it involves a variation in the terms of the mortgage. which is not permissible except by a registered deed and this sort of discharge is tantamount to extinction of the mortgage. "thus, it is clear that Ex. P-3, the receipt merely evidences the payment of money which is actually due under the mortgage deed the receipt does not extinguish the mortgage and it is not registrable. Mr. Krishniah, learned Counsel for the respondent, therefore, says it does not by mere mention in the receipt extinguishes any rights of the plaintiff and diminishes any liabilities of the defendant. But, it will be called in aid to the main mortgage deed, therefore, by itself it is not a document, which can be acted upon, anyhow, their Lordships have made this position very clear in para-12 of the decision reported in A. I. R. 1952 at Page 153, which mr. Krishniah, reiterates for the sake of convenience. I reproduce the same as under :"assume that the mortgagor repaid the whole of the interest at the altered rate and the whole of the principal, would those repayments by themselves effect an extinguishment of the mortgage? Clearly not. "therefore, their Lordships have given a positive answer in this respect. Krishniah, reiterates for the sake of convenience. I reproduce the same as under :"assume that the mortgagor repaid the whole of the interest at the altered rate and the whole of the principal, would those repayments by themselves effect an extinguishment of the mortgage? Clearly not. "therefore, their Lordships have given a positive answer in this respect. In the instant case, that the mention of those recitals themselves do not create any rights and they themselves are not rights are not sufficient to give right to the plaintiff, or to diminish the liabilities of the defendants, but their lordships have said unless the subsequent agreement is called in aid, more would be due under the terms of the bond. The learned Counsel Mr. Krishnaiah, further submits that this is a document which at the most can be called in aid to alter the terms of the document by another agreement in respect of the old document of 1930. Thus, this Ex. P. 3, cannot be considered at all as a document, which has come into being to modify the terms of the document. In view of the above decision, I agree with the argument advanced by Mr. Krishniah, but as regards the argument advanced by Mr. Tarakaram, it is clear that his argument holds water if a document that comes into existence limiting or modifying or altering the terms of previous document, it must be registered. I have no quarrel with that proposition. Consequently, if this document is to be read as evidence that should be registered under Section 17 (2) of the registration Act. That proposition of law also I have no quarrel, but what is the bone of contention in this case is whether Ex. P. 3 can be called as a document that has come into existence to alter or modify the whole terms of mortgage deed of 1930, when I have held that Ex. P. 3, cannot be classified as that. The learned Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore , has also held that, that document can be used only for the purpose of payment, if necessary, and other recitals in the said document cannot be considered as terms that modify the terms of the old document by themselves, they will have to be called in aid. Therefore, I agree with his finding in this respect. The other argument advanced by mr. Therefore, I agree with his finding in this respect. The other argument advanced by mr. Tarakaram, in view of some of the points not considered by the Principal Civil Judge, bangalore- the 1st Appellate Court here the matter may be remanded to the 1st appellate Court to reconsider the whole thing in the light of the argument advanced by him. I think when this Court has come to the conclusion as above, I will have to reject his request. As regards Ex. P. 3, I agree with the argument advanced by Mr. Krishnaiah. The judgment and decree passed by the Principal civil Judge, Bangalore is liable to be sustained. ( 11 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed and the Judgment and decree of the 1st Appellate court is confirmed. No costs. --- *** --- .