Order The Provident Fund Inspector, Madurai IV Division who had filed 18 Complaints, before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Madurai as C.C. Nos. 159 to 164 of 1984, 467 to 472 of 1984 and 775 to 780 of 1984 for offences under Ss.14(1-A), 14-A and 14-AAA of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (Act 19 of 1952 ) and the Employees Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 and in which the learned Magistrate ordered postponement of the trial on the ground that the first respondent textile Mills, has been declared by a notification to be a Relief Undertaking under S.3 of the Tamil Nadu Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1969 (Tamil Nadu Act 21 of 1969 ) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and that during the currency of that notification, the above criminal proceedings are to be kept in abeyance, invokes the inherent powers of this Court under S.482, Crl. P.C. for a direction to the learned Magistrate to proceed with the trial according to law. 2. Facts briefly are: The petitioner has filed the above Complaints on the averments that, respondents 1 to 8 are the directors and the ninth respondent is the Manager of the first respondent Textile Mills and that between August, 1982 and January, 1984, the respondents, as employers, had collected provident fund contributions from their workers and had failed to deposit the same as required under the Act and had also failed to contribute their share of the employees’ provident fund and had also failed to pay the administrative charges and in addition, had previously been convicted for similar offences in S.T.C. 638 to 650 of 1978. 3. During trial P.W.1 and D.W.1 were examined, written arguments had also been submitted. On behalf of the respondent, it had been contended that the notification, dated 21st February, 1983 issued under S.3. of the Act, declaring the first respondent as a relief undertaking, placed a moratorium on criminal prosecutions for failure to discharge financial obligations and the present prosecutions, being for non-payment and non-remittance of provident fund dues, could neither be instituted or continued, during the period, when the undertaking had the benefit of the Act. Accepting the above contentions of the respondents, the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order, stopping the trial and directing postponement of all further proceedings. Accepting the above contentions of the respondents, the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order, stopping the trial and directing postponement of all further proceedings. Challenging the correctness of the decision the petitioner has filed the present applications seeking a direction to the trial court, to proceed further with the trial. 4. Thiru v. Vibhishanan, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that though the first respondent has been declared to be a relief undertaking under the Act, by notification No. 1, dated 28th November, 1984, which has been periodically extended, notification No. II issued under S.4 of the Act, does not have the effect of suspending criminal prosecution for offence committed by the Company or by its officers. The notification neither precludes launching of such prosecutions nor stays them. 5. Per contra, Thiru A. Chidambaram learned counsel for respondents 1 to 7 and 9, contended that, since the Act is primarily intended to give temporary relief to sick industries and enforcement of fiscal liabilities during the relief period is suspended, these prosecutions which have the indirect effect of Compelling the undertaking, to make the defaulted payments, should also be deemed to be kept in abeyance, during the period when the undertakings is given the protection of the Act. 6. Messrs. Aiyar and Dolia, learned counsel for the 8th respondent was only a nominee director and is not responsible to the Company or the conduct of the business as contemplated under S.14A of the Provident Funds Act, that in the subsequent prosecutions the petitioner himself had refrained from arraying the 8th respondent as an accused and that therefore, this court should quash the proceedings, in so far as it related to the 8th respondent. 7. The question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution pending against the petitioners are liable to be stayed, by virtue of the notification issued under the Act? 8. 7. The question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution pending against the petitioners are liable to be stayed, by virtue of the notification issued under the Act? 8. The relevant provisions of the Act, is extracted, for ready reference: “S.3 Declaration of relief undertaking: The Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the public interest, with a view to enabling the continued running or restarting of a State Industrial undertaking as a measure of preventing, or of providing relief against unemployment, declare, by notification, that the State Industrial undertaking shall, with effect on and from such date and for such period as may be specified in the notification, be a relief undertaking. Provided that the period so specified shall not, in the first instance, exceed one year, but may, by a like notification, be extended from time to time by any period not exceeding one year at any time, so however that no notification issued under this section shall in any case remain in force for more than eight years in the aggregate. 4. Application of certain enactments, contracts, agreements etc., to relief undertaking: The Government may, if satisfied, that it is necessary or expedient so to do for the purposes specified in S.3, direct, by notification: (a) that in relation to any relief undertaking all or any of the enactments specified in the Schedule shall not apply or shall apply with such adaptations, whether by way of modifications, addition or omission, as may be specified in such notification; or (b) that all or any of the contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force, to which any relief undertaking is a party or which may be applicable to any relief undertaking, immediately before the date with effect on and from which the relief undertaking was declared a relief undertaking, shall be suspended in operation or that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligations, and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date shall be suspended or be enforceable, with such modifications and in such manner as may be specified in such notification.” 9. The notification issued under the Act, with reference to the first respondent, is as follows: “In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (a) and (b) of S.4 of the Tamil Nadu Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1969 (Tamil Nadu Act 21 of 1969) the Government of Tamil Nadu hereby directs that in relation to the relief undertaking, namely, the Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd., Pasumalai, Madurai; (a) The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act IV of 1947), shall apply with the mission of Chap.V-A and S.33C. (b) All contracts, assurances orproperty, agreements settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force, to which the said relief undertaking is a party, or which may be applicable to the said relief undertaking, immediately before the 8th September, 1984, shall be suspended, in operation and that all the rights, privileges, obligations and the liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date, shall suspended with effect from the said date. Provided that, nothing in this notification shall apply to contracts, assurances, of property and agreements entered into by the said relief undertaking with Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation, any Bank of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board.' 10. I shall first discuss I.C. Parekh v. v. M. Bhatt I.C. Parekh v. v. M. Bhatt A.I.R.1974 S.C.1183, where the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation under the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958. The directors and managers of Rajnagar Spinning and Weaving Manufacturing Co. Ltd, which had been declared as a relief undertaking under the Bombay Act, faced prosecution under Paragraph 76(a) of the Employees Provident Funds Scheme, 1952, for failure to pay the contribution to the provident fund of the employees. A similar contention, that a moratorium on criminal prosecution, was declared under the Notification was rejected by the Supreme Court The Complaint had been filed only against the directors and managers of the Company. The Court held, that the protection that is offered is only to the obligations and liabilities of the Industrial undertakings and not of its directors, managers and other officers. The Court held, that the protection that is offered is only to the obligations and liabilities of the Industrial undertakings and not of its directors, managers and other officers. The Court felt that normally it is only causes connected with defaults on the part of the directors and other officers, that bring about a circumstance, for, declaring the industry as a relief undertaking and to declare a moratorium on legal actions against person, whose activities have necessitated the issuance of a notification in the interest of unemployment relief, is to give such persons, the benefit of their own wrong. The Supreme Court also found that the obligations to pay provident funds contributions within the fixed time, was that of the directors and others in charge and if they had committed default in paying the amount, they were liable to be prosecuted under Paragraph 76(a) of the Scheme and such a personal liability did not fall within the scope of the notification issued under the Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958. The Court finally observed- “If they have incurred such obligations or liabilities, as distinct from the obligations or liabilities, of the undertaking, they are liable to be proceeded against for their personal act of commission and omission. The remedy in that behalf cannot be suspended, nor can a proceedings already commenced against them in their individual capacity be stayed.” 11. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decisions, viz., T.C. Parekh v. v. K. Bhatt T.C. Parekh v. v. K. Bhatt A.I.R.1974 S.C.I 183. applies with all force to the facts of the present case as well, since the language in the Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1958 and that of the Tamil Nadu Act are identical so far as these provisions are concerned. However, in the instant case, by virtue of S.14-A of the Provident Funds Act, prosecution has also been launched against the Company which is shown as the first accused in the Complaint and is the first respondent herein. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the moratorium placed under the Act extends to criminal prosecutions, for offences committed by the Company. This issue as such, did not arise for consideration in the above decision of the Supreme Court. 12. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the moratorium placed under the Act extends to criminal prosecutions, for offences committed by the Company. This issue as such, did not arise for consideration in the above decision of the Supreme Court. 12. The operation of S.4 of the Act, is restricted only to the four statutes mentioned in the Schedule to the Act They are- (1) “The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Central Act XX of 1946) (2) The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of 1947) (3) The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (Central Act XI of 1948) (4) The Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 (Madras Act XXXVI of 1947)” The Employees Provident Funds Act and the Schemes framed thereunder, do not come within the purview of the Act. The notification issued with respect to the first respondent, quoted above, shows that even in respect of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 only certain provisions are kept in abeyance. 13. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the present prosecutions, comes under Cl.(b) of the Notification. I am unable to accept the above contentions. The notification suspends the operation of all contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force, to which the said relief undertaking, is a party or which may be applicable to said relief undertaking and also suspends all rights and privileges, obligations and liabilities arising on accruing thereunder. The obligations and liabilities which do not accrue or arise under contracts, assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments are not suspended by the notification. The liability to contribute to the provident fund of the employees, to deposit amounts collected from the employees and the liability to pay administrative charges, do not arise under any contract or agreement or settlement between the employer and the employee or under any award or standing orders or other instruments. Those liabilities are created by a statute, which requires the employer to contribute his share to the provident fund of the employees under him. The employer, under the statute, is also required to collect the employees’ share of the provident fund, by deducting the same from the wages of the employees. Paragraph 38 of the Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 lays down the mode of payment of contributions. The employer, under the statute, is also required to collect the employees’ share of the provident fund, by deducting the same from the wages of the employees. Paragraph 38 of the Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 lays down the mode of payment of contributions. Under Paragraph 76 of the Scheme, any person, who is guilty of contravention or non-compliance with any of the requirements of the scheme, is liable to be punished with imprisonment, which may extend to six months or with fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. Further, S.405, I.P.C. has been amended and Explanation I has been added, which provides that the money deducted by the employer from the wages of the employees, as contribution to the employees’ share of the provident fund for being credited to the provident fund or family pension fund, shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the employer, and default in the payment of such contributions amounts to criminal breach of trust, attracting provision of S.405, I.P.C. It is, therefore, clear that the liability to contribute the employer's share of the provident fund the liability to deposit the amount already collected form the employees and the liability to pay administrative charges created by statutes, cannot be brought within sub-Cl.(b) of the notification. 14. Such an interpretation is inevitable, when we consider the object behind this special enactment When an industrial concern runs into Financial difficulties and suffers loss, and threat of winding up appears to be imminent, notification is issued under the Act to provide the undertaking with some breathing time by keeping preexisting obligations and liabilities arising out of contracts assurance of property, agreements, etc., to which the relief undertaking is a party, alive, and entering moratorium and staying such proceedings against the relief undertaking. The undertaking, tries to destabilise its finance unhindered by litigants seeking to enforce liabilities against them. This is the limited object behind the Act. It follows, that the notification cannot have the effect of staying prosecution for offences committed either by the Company or by those in charge on of responsible to the affairs of the Company. 15. The undertaking, tries to destabilise its finance unhindered by litigants seeking to enforce liabilities against them. This is the limited object behind the Act. It follows, that the notification cannot have the effect of staying prosecution for offences committed either by the Company or by those in charge on of responsible to the affairs of the Company. 15. I am also unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, that criminal prosecution for breach of any financial liability would have the effect of pressuring the relief undertaking and people connected therewith, to make the defaulted payments, thereby defeating the very purpose of the notification. In the first place, the object of a criminal prosecution even when it arises out of a breach of any financial liability, is to punish the offenders for a crime already committed by them and is not to enforce that liability. Further, subsequent payment of the defaulted amount, is no defence to the charge and will not earn the accused, an amnesty for the crimes committed. In the event of a conviction it would be relevant, while considering the punishment that has to be imposed, on the accused. It therefore follows that the notification issued in respect of the first respondent does not suspend criminal prosecution relating to non-payment of provident fund contribution already collected by them and the non-payment of the administrative charges either against the first respondent, or its officers, the other respondents. The prosecutions have to continue. 16. The contention of the learned counsel for the 8th respondent that the 8th respondent is only a nominee director and that, therefore this Court should quash the proceedings against him, cannot be gone into by this Court in these proceedings. That would be a matter for evidence before the trial Court. 17. In the result, the petitions are allowed and the orders of the learned Magistrate stopping further proceedings during the currency of the notification are set aside, the learned Magistrate shall proceed with the vitals and dispose of the cases according to law. B.S.----- Petition allowed.