Kewal Chand Mimani v. State of West Bengal — 1988 DIGILAW 206 (CAL)

Judgment : This writ application is directed against an order of requisition passed under section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Acquisition & Requisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the said 'Act"). This application was moved before me on 25.11.87 at my residence at 6 A.M. as considering its urgency it was assigned to me by the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice, Thereafter the matter was placed for hearing on the same date at 2 P. M. in my Court Room. Interim order granted in the morning was allowed to continue and the contentions of the writ petitioner as well as the State Respondents were noted regarding taking over of possession of the property in question. 2. The writ petitioner moved this application under special circumstances of the case and the application drafted hurriedly did not contain all the points nor it was duly sworn in. Leave was granted to file a supplementary affidavit disclosing all the facts and was also directed to file the verified application duly sworn in the Court which was complied with. 3. The case as made out by the writ petitioner is that the writ petitioner is one of the 32 lessees in respect of the properties in dispute being 1, Strand Road, Howrah, commonly known as 'Mimani Mangla Hat'. The lease is to expire on the expiry of the year 1988. That in the early hours of 21st November, 1987 a devastating fire broke out in the disputed property and the whole of Mimani Mangla Hat was reduced to assess. On 24th November, 1987 at about 7-25 P.M., Mr. Gopidas Mimani, an authorised agent of the writ petitioner was served with the impugned notice, which is annexure "A" to the writ petition. The impugned notice states: That whereas in my opinion it is necessary for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto viz., for providing employment opportunity by setting up a commercial complex to requisition the lands described in the schedule overleaf : And whereas the Governor has by notification No. 2060001A dated 3.12.63 published in the Calcutta Gezettee Extra Ordinary of 26.12.63 at page 2578 authorised me to exercise the power conferred by sub-section (1) of section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act II of 1948). 4. 4. Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by subsection (1) of section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Act, 1948 read with the authority so vested in me as aforesaid, I do hereby requisition the lands mentioned in the schedule overleaf and make the following further orders : 1. Possession of the land as described in schedule will be taken over by Surveyor Valuer and Sub-assistant-Engineer, (Ex-officio) Sri Pradip Kundu attached to my office on and from 25.11.87 at 7 A.M. 2. Sri Pradip Kundu will next hand over possession of the said land to Ex-Engineer, Howrah Municipal Corporation or his representative. 3. The land may be used by the said authority in the manner as appeared to be necessary or expedient in connection with the said requisition. A plan of the land may be inspected in the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Howrah Improvement Trust, Howrah at 19, G.T. Road, South, Howrah, 4th Floor. Sd/- S. K. Sen Addl. Dist. Magistrate, Howrah. Copy of Kewal Chand Mimani owner/tenant of the land described in the schedule. 5. Schedule of the land overleaf is 1, Strand Road, Howrah, entire premises 8 bighas, 10 cottahs and 12 chittaks 9 sq. ft. 6. The writ petitioners have challenged this notice on various grounds. One of them is that in the form prescribed drawing up the order under section 3(1) of the Act the A.D.M., Howrah failed to strike out all the alternative purpose resulting in non-application of mind. It will appear that the purposes which were not struck out are for the purposes of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto. Thereafter specific purpose has been named being providing employment opportunity by setting up a commercial complex. Mr. Mukherjee learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners submitted that there is no integral connection between the purposes named and the objects specified. According to him maintaining supplies and services has no direct bearing with providing employment opportunity by setting up a commercial complex. Accordingly, it is evident that the authority concerned who exercised powers under Section 3(1) of the Act has failed to apply his mind. According to him maintaining supplies and services has no direct bearing with providing employment opportunity by setting up a commercial complex. Accordingly, it is evident that the authority concerned who exercised powers under Section 3(1) of the Act has failed to apply his mind. It will appear from the impugned order that the purposes for increasing employment opportunity for the people by establishing commercial estate and industrial estate in different areas was struck out. But ultimately the purpose has been named being providing employment opportunity by setting up a commercial complex. On a reading of the notification there cannot be any doubt that the purpose for requisition was for providing employment opportunity by setting up a commercial complex. I agree with Mr. Mukherjee that the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community has little direct bearing on providing employment opportunities. But that is not enough to indicate non-application of mind. There cannot be any difficulty on the writ petitioner in understanding the purpose for which the impugned requisition was made. The only difference between the struck out portion for increasing employment opportunity and the purpose named as providing employment opportunity does have any impact in understanding the real purpose for which the requisition was made. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee relied on a decision (1) Pramatha Nath Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal reported in 70 CWN 503. The Court held that it was evident that the printed form which was signed by the Collector reproduce all the alternative purposes for which the relevant statute enabled an order to be made and the Collector did not considered it necessary to determine much of these alternatives was applicable to the case before him. From reading of the impugned order in its entirely nobody can ascertain whether the requisition is being ordered for the purpose of drainage, irregation, road-construction or transport. It is, therefore, clear that the Collector did not apply his mind while issuing the impugned order. This decision in my view has no application on the facts of this case. In this case I have already indicated that all the alternatives excepting one was struck out and the specific purpose was clearly named. Therefore, this decision is of no help to Mr. Mukherjee. 7. Next point canvassed by Mr. This decision in my view has no application on the facts of this case. In this case I have already indicated that all the alternatives excepting one was struck out and the specific purpose was clearly named. Therefore, this decision is of no help to Mr. Mukherjee. 7. Next point canvassed by Mr. Mukherjee in relation to that notice is that the para 1 of the said order will show that one Sri Pradip Kundu, Surveryor Valuer was authorised to take over possession on and from 25.11.87 at 7 A.M. The writ petitioners' case in this regard as disclosed in the Supplementary Affidavit is that after obtaining an order of injunction from this Court granted at 6 A.M. on 25.11.87 the learned Advocate on record Mr. B.K. Jain addressed a letter to Respondent Nos. 1 & 2. The said letter along with a plain copy of the order passed by the Court was taken to Howrah Hat by the petitioner representative one Ranjit Kumar Banik along with an Advocate Subrata Kumar Sinha at 6-45 A.M. on 25.11.87. Officers of the respondents arrived at 8 A.M. and the letter was handed over to them. They accepted the letter but refused to grant receipt on the plea that neither Respondent No.1 nor Respondent No.2 was present. In this regard the case of the Stale Respondents is that is said Pradip Kundu became sick and as such in his place one Murari Mohan Basu, Surveyor and Valuer was assigned to take possession of the land in question. Sri Basu at about 7 A.M. on 25th November, 1987 took possession of the land in question and at the same time handed over possession to Sri A. Bhattacharjee, Executive Engineer, Howrah Municipal Corporation. It was also stated that as there was various apprehension of breach of peace police posting was made and no one was allowed to enter into the said place. It was denied that any order possed by this Court was handed over to the officers who had been to the disputed property for taking over possession. Mr. Mukherjee has contended that since Sri Pradip Kundu was authorised by the A.D.M., Howrah to take over possession it is only Sri Pradip Kundu who can do so. No order was passed at least communicated to the writ petitioner stating that Sri M. M. Basu will take over possession instead of Mr. Kundu. Mr. Mukherjee has contended that since Sri Pradip Kundu was authorised by the A.D.M., Howrah to take over possession it is only Sri Pradip Kundu who can do so. No order was passed at least communicated to the writ petitioner stating that Sri M. M. Basu will take over possession instead of Mr. Kundu. Accordingly, it is submitted that the alleged taking over of possession by Sri Basu is not in terms of the order of requisition and therefore, cannot be held to be proper taking over of possession in accordance with law and in terms of the order passed by A.D.M., Howrah. Section 3(1) authorises the requisitioning authority to make such further orders as appeared to it to be necessary or expedient in connection with the requisition. The learned Advocate-General as well as the learned Counsel S. Gupta appearing for Howrah Municipal Corporation submitted that this particular clause authorises the authorities concerned to make any order or further orders in connection with the requisitioning. A.D.M. was accordingly authorised by law to appoint Sri Basu to take over possession instead of Sri Kundu. In doing so there has been no violation of law. Mr. Mukherjee on the other had contends that subsection (2) of section 3 provides that an order under sub-section (1) shall be served on the owner. Even if the order was amended in accordance with law it is required to be served on the writ petitioner, since the admitted position is that no such order has been served on the writ petitioner, Mr. Basu could not take over possession of the property. On a reading of sect ion 3(1) it is evident that the requisitioning authority has power to make further orders as it may appear necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning. The order of' requisition is one and the further orders in connection with the requisitioning are different orders and that will also appear from the order itself. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that order of requisition was not served on them. Their case is that the follow up order, viz., that Sri Pradip Kundu will take over possession was allegedly changed but that was not intimated to them rendering the services of the entire order bad in law. Since the order of requisition was served and only that part of the order which was subsequently changed authorising Mr. Their case is that the follow up order, viz., that Sri Pradip Kundu will take over possession was allegedly changed but that was not intimated to them rendering the services of the entire order bad in law. Since the order of requisition was served and only that part of the order which was subsequently changed authorising Mr. Basu to take over possession in stead of Mr. Kundu did not in any way prejudice the writ petitioners. Only for the reason that there has been some breach which did not cause any prejudice to the writ petitioner, the Writ Court may not intervene only on the ground of such technical lapse. 8. Mr. Mukherjee then urged that the said Sri P. Kundu was next authorised to hand over possession of the said land to Executive Engineer, Howrah Municipal Corporation or his representative was in excess of the authority vested in A.D.M., Howrah who issued the order, Mr. Mukherjee contended relying on section 4 of the Act that it is only the State Government who may use or deal with such lands for any of the purposes referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3. Accordingly, he submitted that it is only the State Government who may use or deal with such lands. No such authority has been given to A. D.M. Howrah Referring to sub-section (1A) of section 3 Mr. Mukherjee contended that the power of A.D.M. is limited to those which are vested in him in the said sub-section. Sub-section (1A) provides that a Collector of a District or an Addl. District Magistrate or the First L. A. Collector Calcutta when authorise by the State Government in this behalf may exercise within his jurisdiction the powers conferred by sub-section (I). The learned Adv. General as well as learned Counsel Mr. Gupta contended that order of making over possession to Howrah Municipality is an order passed by the Collector as a follow up order in connection with the requisitioning which is vested in him under sub-section (1). I have already indicated that sub-section (1) provides' for making such further order as may appear necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning. Gupta contended that order of making over possession to Howrah Municipality is an order passed by the Collector as a follow up order in connection with the requisitioning which is vested in him under sub-section (1). I have already indicated that sub-section (1) provides' for making such further order as may appear necessary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning. As the A.D.M. is competent to pass an order for making over possession he is also competent to make over further order for handing over the same possession to any other person on whom the responsibility of achieving the purpose of requisition has been imposed. Moreover, in this case the decision of the State Government directing the Collector to make over possession of the land to the Executive Engineer, Howrah Municipal Corporation was shown to me. It was submitted that this order was communicated to the Collector but the Collector has done by passing further order under section 3(1) is the same order which the State Government has passed. Accordingly, in passing such an order the A.D.M. did not lack in jurisdiction. Considering the submission made by the learned Advocates appearing for both the parties I do not find good reasons to hold that the A.D.M acted without jurisdiction in directing delivery of possession to the Executive Engineer, Howrah Municipal Corporation who according to State authorities was put in charge for achieving the purposes, of this requisition. I will seperately consider hereinafter if Howrah Municipal Corporation can be authorised to carry out the purposes of this requisition. 9. In this connection, it may be mentioned that in the decision (2) S. N. Nandi & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in AIR 1971 SC 961 . The Full Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the vires and validity of West Bengal Act II of 1948, West Bengal Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Act. The Court observed that it is true that there is no express provision to make a representation against an order of requisition but there is no bar to a representation being made after an order is served under section 3(2) of the Act. The Court observed that it is true that there is no express provision to make a representation against an order of requisition but there is no bar to a representation being made after an order is served under section 3(2) of the Act. If the representation raises a point which override the public purpose it would be favourably considered by the State Government or other Governmental Authorities as the case may be Lack of provision in the said Act for prior notice before an order of requisition is passed was not considered to be a ground touching on the validity of the Act. It naturally follows that purpose of notice under section 3(2) of the Act is to acquaint the persons affected by the order that the property is being requisitioned for a purpose specified in the order and there are certain other follow up directions calling on them to comply with the same. On receipt of such notice they can make a representation for consideration by the State Government or other Governmental Authorities that the order of requisition overrides the public purpose. In this case the service of notice under section 3(2) of the Act on the writ petitioner has not been denied. By the said notice he was called on to deliver possession to one Pradip Kundu, Sub-Assistant Engineer on a date and time specified. On receipt of the notice the writ petitioner was also authorised in view of this decision to make a representation pointing out that the order served on him overrides the public purpose. On receipt of the said notice the writ petitioner does not appear to have made any representation. He has come up with this application challenging the said impugned order. The purpose of service of notice under section 3(2) could have been taken advantage of by the writ petitioner. It may be noted in this connection that this order was passed in an abnormal situation. The whole of the Mimani Mangla Hat was completely destroyed. It is admitted case of both the parties that this place is an important centre for transacting wholesale business in ready garments. Its operation affects the market throughout Eastern India and involves the interest of several lakhs of people directly or indirectly. The whole of the Mimani Mangla Hat was completely destroyed. It is admitted case of both the parties that this place is an important centre for transacting wholesale business in ready garments. Its operation affects the market throughout Eastern India and involves the interest of several lakhs of people directly or indirectly. It was also incumbent by the Government to see that the persons employed directly or indirectly in the said market is not affected in any manner. In this background the State Government decided to first requisition and then acquired the property for building a commercial complex so that it can provide employment opportunities. Accordingly, this order was passed. It may be noted that the writ petitioner does not challenge that the purpose for which the impugned order in passed is not a purpose covered by the Act. They only urge that the order has not been passed in the manner it ought to have been done. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate urged that in the writ petition they have alleged that they wrote a letter to the Chief Minister, Government of West Bengal undertaking with them intend to operate the said Howrah Hat and none of the lessees in the said Hat will be evicted from there. In their affidavit-in-reply the State Respondents stated that they are not aware of any such letter. The said affidavit was sworn in by A.D.M. Howrah. Mr. Mukherjee contended that since that is the only affidavit filed by the State, it can be said that the receipt of the said letter has not been denied. Accordingly, there could be no purpose which can be advanced by requisiting the property. There was no question of affecting any employment opportunity arising out of this Hat. Accordingly, they contends that the order was passed without applying the minds on the surrounding circumstances as well as by taking notice of the letter written by the writ petitioner to the Hon'ble Chief Minister of the State. This contention of Mr. Mukherjee even if accepted will not preclude the State from requisitioning and acquiring the property if it feels that the purpose wm be achieved by such order of requisition and acquisition, only became the purpose is being served by private citizens the State is not excluded for taking steps for achieving the purpose through the State or its agencies. Mukherjee even if accepted will not preclude the State from requisitioning and acquiring the property if it feels that the purpose wm be achieved by such order of requisition and acquisition, only became the purpose is being served by private citizens the State is not excluded for taking steps for achieving the purpose through the State or its agencies. Accordingly, under these circumstances, in my view, the consideration should be how far the writ petitioner has been adversely affected by service of a notice which according to him is not in strict compliance with the provisions of the Act. Mr. Mukherjee relying on a decision (3) Narbada Prasad v. Chhaganlal & Ors. reported in AIR 1969 SC 394 contended that law requiring a particular thing to be done in certain manner it must be done in that manner or not at all. Other modes of compliance are excluded. These observations were made in connection with matter involving representation of the People Act, 1951. The Court held that in that case there was no compliance with the provisions of section 33(5) of the representation of the People Act and there was no power in the Court to dispense with this requirement. On this finding the observations noted above was made by the Court. In the instant case it cannot be said that notice under section 3(2) was not served on the writ petition or that the order was not drawn up in compliance with the law. If there is some breach here and there and which does not affect or prejudice the writ petitioner, the writ Court being a Court of equity need not interfere in such cases. 10. The next contention made by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the writ petitioner is that the Howrah Municipal Corporation cannot be authorised to carry out the purposes of requisition. In making his submissions Mr. Mukherjee has led me through the provisions of the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. He has submitted that nowhere in the Act any power to provide employment opportunity has been given to the Howrah Municipal Corporation. The said Corporation being a creature of the statute must confine itself within those which has been specifically given to it by the Act creating such Corporation. In support of this contention Mr. He has submitted that nowhere in the Act any power to provide employment opportunity has been given to the Howrah Municipal Corporation. The said Corporation being a creature of the statute must confine itself within those which has been specifically given to it by the Act creating such Corporation. In support of this contention Mr. Mukherjee has relied on two English decisions viz., (4) London County Council v The Attorney General, 1902 SC 165 and (5) Attorney General v. Fulhan Corporation, 1921 Ch 440 in which it was held these bodies being statutory bodies has the power of a common law Corporation. It cannot exceed its power by undertaking any other business not sanctioned by the law. He has also relied on a decision of this Court reported in (6) Manjruddin Bepari v The Chairman of Municipal Commissioner, Dacca, Vol. LXIII ILR Cal 295. B. C. Mitter, J. as His Lordship then was observed that it is a fundamen1al principle of Jaw that a natural person has the capacity to do all lawful things unless his capacity has been curtailed by some rule of law. It is equally fundamental principle that in the case of Statutory Corporation it is just the other way. Corporation has no power to do anything unless those powers are conferred on it by the statute which creates it. This decision was relied on by this Court in the decision (7) Scotts (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Corporation of Calcutta reported in 79 CWN 883. On this basis Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the ADM issuing the notice cannot make over the property to the Howrah Municipal Corporation which has anything to do for providing employment opportunity. Mr. Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the Howrah Municipal Corp0ration submitted that even though the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 does not specifically provide for providing employment but it provides for establishment and running of Municipal Markets. Re further contended that though the power of creating opportunity has not been specifically given by the Howrah Municipal Act this power of creating employment opportunity rest with the Howrah Municipal Corporation in view of the definition of State in Art. 12 read with Art. 36 of the Constitution of India. In Part IV of the Constitution containing directive principles of the Stale Policy the Howrah Municipal Corporation is also a State. In Part IV of the Constitution containing directive principles of the Stale Policy the Howrah Municipal Corporation is also a State. Art. 39 provides that the State shall in particular directs its policy towards securing : That the citizens men and women equally have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Accordingly, Mr. Gupta contended that Howrah Municipal Corporation being a State within the meaning of Art. 36 can direct its policy for securing the object referred to above. It will not debar to Howrah Municipal Corporation to take such steps only because such power has not been conferred on it by the statute by which it was created. The contention made by Mr. Gupta is not acceptable to me and the Art. 12 read with Art. 36 of the Constitution of India provides is that a Statutory Corporation is a State within the meaning of the Chapter dealing with the directive principles of State policy. The definition does not authorise a Municipal Corporation which is a State within the meaning of that Chapter to do something which it has not been authorised to do. The Municipal Corporation is a body corporate only in relation to the matters which has been specifically assigned to it by the statute which creates it. The definition of Art. 12 does not confer it with powers in respect of which does not vest by the Act creating it. It being a creature of the statute can only function within the limits prescribed for it by the statute itself. Art. 12 does not enlarge the scope of its activity. It is not disputed that the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act does not authorise the Howrah Municipal Corporation to undertake measures for providing employment opportunities. The Act proposed to be achieved by the said Howrah Municipal Corporation by the state is clearly beyond the competence of the Howrah Municipal Corporation. But it will appear that Howrah Municipal Corporation is competent to under section 195 to own, purchase or take on lease any land or building for the purpose of establishing municipal market or slaughter house or stock-yard or improving in existing municipal market, slaughter house or stock-yard and make provisions for their maintenance. Accordingly, there is no doubt that it may own, purchase or take on lease any land for the purpose of constructive and running of a municipal market. Accordingly, there is no doubt that it may own, purchase or take on lease any land for the purpose of constructive and running of a municipal market. Construction and running of the market in question is not accordingly beyond the competence of Howrah Municipal Corporation. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the purpose for which the requisition was made as is evident from the notice served under section 3 (2) is for providing employment opportunity by setting up a commercial complex. So the object is providing employment opportunity setting up of a commercial complex is the means to achieve that object. Accordingly, even if the Howrah Municipal Corporation is competent to set up a commercial complex, it cannot be said that the object for which the requisition was made is being fulfilled by setting up a commercial complex as the object which is sought to be achieved by setting up a commercial complex is not within the competence of the Howrah Municipal Corporation to achieve. The purpose of acquisition is not an establishment of a commercial complex but providing employment opportunity is the object. It will appear that if a commercial complex is set up employment opportunity automatically flows out of it. The authorities concerned who passed the order of requisition considered providing employment opportunity as the object for which the requisition is being made, and the authority also consider that this can be achieved by setting up of a commercial complex. What has been done by handing over the requisitioned property to Howrah Municipal Corporation for setting up a commercial complex is to achieve the means which will ultimately result in providing employment Howrah Municipal Corporation is only sought to set up the commercial complex. It has no concern with providing employment opportunity. State Government considers setting up of such commercial complex will provide employment opportunity, There is no doubt that if a commercial complex is set up it will result in providing employment opportunity. In this view, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that by handing over possession of the land to Howrah Municipal Corporation the authorities requisitioning the land has not applied its mind that the Howrah Municipal Corporation is not competent to achieve the objects of requisition. 11. The next contention of Mr. In this view, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that by handing over possession of the land to Howrah Municipal Corporation the authorities requisitioning the land has not applied its mind that the Howrah Municipal Corporation is not competent to achieve the objects of requisition. 11. The next contention of Mr. Mukherjee raised is that the Howrah Municipal Corporation has not taken any decision of its own in terms of the provisions of the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act to set up a commercial complex. That being the position the authorities who requisitioned the land cannot ask the Corporation to set up a commercial complex on the land requisitioned by it. Howrah Municipal Corporation in their affidavit-in-opposition has stated that they wanted to set up a commercial complex on the lands on which Howrah Mimani Mangla Hat was being held. But no such decision taken by the Corporation itself was produced before the Court. Mr. Mukherjee contended that Mayor of Howrah Municipal Corporation cannot himself take up a decision of setting up a commercial complex. Referring to section 23(5) on which Mr. Gupta, learned Counsel placed. his reliance, submitted that the said statement only authorises the Mayor direct execution of any work which is considered by him to be executed immediately but the Mayor is required to report the same to the Corporation or Mayor in Council. Mr. Mukherjee sought to emphasize that this power only concerns execution of any work it does not authorise him to take a decision of setting up a commercial complex in respect of which no decision was arrived at by the Corporation itself. Referring to the provisions of the Budget Mr. Mukherjee submitted that no provision for setting up a commercial complex was made in the Corporation's Budget. Relying on sections 55 & 56 of the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act it was submitted that the Municipal fund has to be maintained in the 4 accounts named in sub-section (2) of section 55. Section 56 of the Act provides that the moneys credited from time to time to the Municipal fund shall be applied for payment of all sums charges and costs necessary for carrying out the purpose of the Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder for payment of all sums payable out of the Municipal fund under any other enactment for the time being in force. Mr. Mr. Mukherjee contended that since in the Budget no provisions for setting up a commercial complex was made, the Municipal fund cannot be applied for that purpose. Even if the Mayor of the Corporation has agreed to it, it is beyond his competence. I need not enter into this aspect of the matter. It will appear that the authorities have requisitioned the land and has made it over to the Howrah Municipal Corporation for setting up a commercial complex. If Howrah Municipal Corporation is competent to set up a commercial complex is a matter for the Corporation to decide. Even if I assume that on the date on which the land was made over to the Howrah Municipal Corporation for setting up the commercial complex, the Corporation did not arrive at a decision for setting up such a commercial complex. There cannot be any bar if they take such a decision in accordance with law even after the land has been made over to them whether the Mayor has made any breach of the law by making payment of money towards the acquisition of the land under requisition is also a question to be taken up and determined in accordance with law by the Howrah Municipal Corporation itself. Accordingly, by making up the plea that the Howrah Municipal Corporation had no plan for setting up a commercial complex the order of requisition cannot be held to be bad in law for that matter. 12. The next point pressed by Mr. Mukherjee is that the State cannot make an order of requisition for the purposes of any other persons or body corporate. Mr. Mukherjee in this regard drew my attention to the Law Commission Reports, 1958. The Law Commission observed in paragraph 18 that we are of the view that power of requisitioning the property of a private owner is an extra ordinary power and can justifiably be invoked only when an emergency arises. In paragraph 34 it also observed that power of requisitioning can be exercised under the law as it n0W stands only for the purposes of the Union and in most of the States for the purposes of the State. There is no power of requisition the land for the benefit of the Company or other persons or authorities as in the case of acquisition of land. There is no power of requisition the land for the benefit of the Company or other persons or authorities as in the case of acquisition of land. I do not see any reason to enlarge the power and extend it to such cases. These are only observations of the Law Commission. It may also be desirable to enact legislation confined to the limits desired by the Law Commission in its said report but these observations have no force of law. I have to decide the question by analysing the provisions of the Act I am dealing with. In a decision (8) Dr. Nilkamal Beg Boruah & Anr. v. The State reported in 1986 CWN 1046. A Division Bench of this Court observed that in a case arising out of the provisions of this Act in paragraph 20 as follows : "Another ground of attack of the appellant to the validity of the impugned order is that the provisions of the Act do not permit the State Government to requisition any land for a company which in the instant case is the Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. under section 3(1) subject to the proviso thereto any land can be requisitioned by the State Government, inter alia, for purposes mentioned in the said section. The question is not as to whose instance the requisition is made but whether the requisition is made for any of the purposes mentioned in section 3(1) of the Act. In my opinion as soon as it is found that any land is requisitioned for any of the aforesaid purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Act the order of requisition will be quite legal and valid. Even though the requisition has been made at the instance of a company or a Corporation. In a welfare State it is the duty of the Government to see that the aforesaid purpose are served and carried out in the interest of community. It is not possible for the Government to carry out all these purposes by itself and it has to take the help of some organisations like companies and Corporations. If it is held that the State Government cannot acquire the land for effecting any of the purposes through a company and it is not possible for the State Government to do it itself the interest of the community will be seriously prejudiced. If it is held that the State Government cannot acquire the land for effecting any of the purposes through a company and it is not possible for the State Government to do it itself the interest of the community will be seriously prejudiced. I do not think that we should be so technical in interpreting the act in a manner that would jeopardise the welfare of the people." The observations noted above comprehensively the answers• the question raised by Mr. Mukherjee. In this case the objects for which the requisition is made was determined by the authority under section 3. The object was to provide employment opportunity by setting up a commercial complex. That the object is within the scope of section 3 of the Act has not been challenged. If the object is within the scope of the Act no question can be raised for whom or at whose instance the impugned requisition is made. It automatically follows that in such cases the State Government would be competent to achieve those objects through any other body corporate or a company. In the instant case the object is sought to be achieved by setting up a commercial complex by Howrah Municipal Corporation. Such an step does not appear to be beyond the scope of the Act concerned. 13. Me. Mukherjee also submitted that section 41 of the Act lays down that where any land has been requisitioned under section 3 of the State Government may use or deal with such land for any of the purposes referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3 as may appear to it to be expedient. Mr. Mukherjee placed stress on the expression that the State Govt. may use or deal with such land. He contended that the law itself provides that it is the State Govt. and in which the State Govt. and none else may use or deal with such land. In view of Beg Boruah's case referred to earlier, I cannot accept the contention made by Mr. Mukherjee. After requisition for achieving the objects for which the land in question is being requisitioned the State Government is free to take steps for its use for the purposes and deal with the came for the same purpose as it may appear to it to be expedient. Mukherjee. After requisition for achieving the objects for which the land in question is being requisitioned the State Government is free to take steps for its use for the purposes and deal with the came for the same purpose as it may appear to it to be expedient. For achieving the purposes the State Government is free to use and deal with the land according to the expediency of the situation. Such power includes the power to achieve the object through any agency, person or body corporate. 14. Mr. Mukherjee then contended that no requisition and/or acquisition can be made for the purposes of a municipality under the provisions of West Bengal Act II of 1948. Referring to the provisions of Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act and Bengal Municipal Corporation Act, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that in the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act there is no provision for making acquisition of land for the purposes of the said Corporation. Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act as well as Bengal Municipal Corporation Act make such a provision. Accordingly he submitted that for the purpose of the Howrah Municipal Corporation no requisition and/or acquisition is permissible. It will appear that the provisions in the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act as well as Bengal Municipal Corporation Act speaks of a separate procedure for making acquisition for the requirements of such Corporation or Municipalities. It does not give any power to the Municipality or Corporation for making acquisition of land. As there is no provision in the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act relating to such requisition or acquisition for the purpose of the said Corporation there is no question of any violation or skipping over of a particular procedure laid down for acquisition of land for the purpose of the said Corporation. The question is if by exercise of powers under section 3 of the Act the State can requisition and thereafter acquired the properly and then make over the same to Howrah Municipal Corporation for achieving the purpose for which such land is requisitioned and/or acquired. This aspect I have already dealt with. 15. Mr. Mukherjee then argued that it does not appear that there has been any contract between the State as well as the Howrah Municipal Corporation relating to making over of the property for execution to the work fur which the property is acquired. Mr. This aspect I have already dealt with. 15. Mr. Mukherjee then argued that it does not appear that there has been any contract between the State as well as the Howrah Municipal Corporation relating to making over of the property for execution to the work fur which the property is acquired. Mr. Mukhnjee submitted that under Art. 299 of the Constitution of India all contracts made in the exercise of the execution power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President or by the Governor of the State as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise. Mr. Mukherjee in making this submission relied on a decision (9) State of West Bengal v. M/s. B. K. Mandal & Sons reported in AIR 1968 SC 779 . In this case section 175(3) of Government of India Act, 1935 was considered. The Court held that non-compliance of the aforesaid provision makes the contract invalid. Mr. Mukherjee submits that no contract between the State and the Howrah Municipal Corporation has been pleaded by the State or the Corporation. According to him since there is no such contract the land requisitioned by the State cannot be handed over to the said Corporation. Ii will appear that Art. 299 provides the manner of contract to be entered into on behalf of the Union or of a State. It does not speak of any restraint imposed on the State of the Union in dealing with the property without enterting into a formal contract. On the facts of the instant case, it is apparent that the land has not yet-vested in the State. Even if a contract is required for handing over the property to the said Corporation the time for entering into such a contract has not yet come. This argument, in my view, is pre-mature. 16. Mr. Mukherjee advanced his submission relating to the requisition and/or acquisition for the purpose of Howrah Municipal Corporation. Even if a contract is required for handing over the property to the said Corporation the time for entering into such a contract has not yet come. This argument, in my view, is pre-mature. 16. Mr. Mukherjee advanced his submission relating to the requisition and/or acquisition for the purpose of Howrah Municipal Corporation. Corporation's Authority to engage itself in a project in respect of which it has no authority or that no requisition or acquisition can be made for the purposes of a Municipal Corporation can be made advanced to indicate that the State Authorities did not exercise its power bona fide. It has only taken recourse to section 3 of the Act to achieve an ulterior object to make over the property to the Howrah Municipal Corporation. As I have already indicated white dea1ing with the points raised by Mr. Mukherjee above, I am unable to hold that the exercise of powers under the Act by the State Authorities was not bona fide. 17. Mr. Mukherjee then submitted that it is apparent that the purposes of the impugned requisition Was a permanent purpose. He submitted that if the purpose for which the requisition is made is of a permanent nature, powers of requisition cannot be exercised. In support he has relied on a decision in (10) H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 . It was a case under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. The Court held that order of requisition for public purpose if of permanent nature from the inception, order of requisition cannot be passed. The West Bengal Act II of 1948 provides for both requisition and acquisition. The object of the Act is to expedite the process of acquisition. In achieving the same the State requisitions the property and thereafter passes order under section 4(1)(a) of the Act for acquisition. At this stage there is little scope for arguing that the State is trying to achieve a permanent purpose by requisitioning the property without adhering to acquisition of the same. Moreover, the State Authorities in their affidavit-in-opposition has clearly stated that they intend to acquire the property for which some amount has been paid by the Howrah Municipal Corporation. This argument is also, in my view, pre-mature. 18. In anticipation of an argument that may be advanced by the respondents Mr. Moreover, the State Authorities in their affidavit-in-opposition has clearly stated that they intend to acquire the property for which some amount has been paid by the Howrah Municipal Corporation. This argument is also, in my view, pre-mature. 18. In anticipation of an argument that may be advanced by the respondents Mr. Mukherjee submitted that inspite of the fact that the whole of the Howrah Market has been razed to assess by the devastating fire, his interest in the property as a lessee still subsist. In support he has relied on a decision in (11) Raja Dhruba Dev Chand v. Raja Harminder Singh & Anr. reported in AIR 1968 SC 1024 and also on (12) Gandyalla Munnuswamy v. Marugu Muniranlah, AIR 1965 AP 167 . The respondent did not raise any such objection, there is no difficulty in holding that the interest of the writ petitioner in the requisitioned property as a leasee still subsists. 19. Mr. Mukherjee referring to the order of requisition submitted that it has indicated that a plan for the land may be inspected in the Office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Howrah Improvement Trust, Howrah at 19, G. T. Road, Howrah, 4th floor. The notice of requisition was served on the writ petition at about 7-25 P. M. on 24th November, 1987 and by the said notice they were directed to deliver possession at 7 A.M. on 25.11.87. The time given for inspection was during the hours 7-25 P.M. to 7 A.M, in between 24.11.87 and 25.11.87. Mr. Mukherjee submits that the hours being at night there was no scope of inspecting the plan as the Office where it was kept closed during the night. I have already indicated that there is no provision in the Act to give a hearing to the person whose property is sought to be requisitioned. Supreme Court has held that even though the Act does not provide for any hearing before the order of requisition is passed. Any person aggrieved can make a representation before the authorities when the notice under section 3(2) is served on him and the Government is bound to consider such objection if raised. In the facts of the instant case the inspection of the plan is of little importance. The whole of the property has been requisitioned by the impugned order. Any person aggrieved can make a representation before the authorities when the notice under section 3(2) is served on him and the Government is bound to consider such objection if raised. In the facts of the instant case the inspection of the plan is of little importance. The whole of the property has been requisitioned by the impugned order. There is no scope from inspection of the plan as to which part is under order of requisition. Therefore, not providing adequate opportunity for inspection of the plan does not prejudice the writ petitioner in any manner. 20. The learned Counsel for the State of West Bengal as well as the Howrah Municipal Corporation have raised a point that the writ application is not maintainable. In making this submission they submitted that the writ petitioner is only a co-lessee along with 31 others. Other co-lessees have not been impleaded nor any authority was given to the writ petitioner to move this application on their behalf. According to Mr. Gupta learned Counsel for the Howrah Municipal Corporation unless the person who is adversely affected by the order moves the Court he is not entitled to any relief. Since only one lessee has filed this application no relief in respect of 31 other lessees can be granted in this writ petition, as no partial relief can be granted this writ application is not maintainable. It will appear that the writ petitioner has an interest in the property which has not been partitioned by metes and bound. Accordingly, his interest extends to every piece and parcel of the land. If he feels aggrieved by the order of requisition certainly a writ application at his instance is maintainable. If the writ application succeeds the question is not who else has got the relief. The question is whether the order of requisition is in accordance with law and one of the lessees has in the instant case is within his right to challenge the same. Therefore, I am unable to hold that this writ application is not maintainable. 21. In this application the owners of the land has been added as party respondents on an application filed by them. Their case is that one Pulin Chandra Dawn was the owner of the property in dispute. He died intestate on 9.4.82 leaving respondent Nos. 7 to 10. They leased out the property to one Kanailal Mimani. 21. In this application the owners of the land has been added as party respondents on an application filed by them. Their case is that one Pulin Chandra Dawn was the owner of the property in dispute. He died intestate on 9.4.82 leaving respondent Nos. 7 to 10. They leased out the property to one Kanailal Mimani. The lease is to expire on the expiry of this year. They were added as party respondents. The learned Advocate appearing for then has adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner in challenging the order of requisition. Since no new point has been raised by them, their case is not required to be considered separately. Some stall-holders were also added as party respondents. One Safiuddin Molla and 139 others claimed that they are stall-holders in the Howrah Hat and applied for being added as party respondents. The writ petitioner did not admit that all of them are stall-holders. They were added as party respondents. Howrah Mangla Hat Bastra Babasayai Samity registered under Act 26 of 1961 also filed an application for being added as a party. The application was allowed. They claimed that they represent 400 stall-holders. These stall-holders did not file any affidavit-in-opposition. Their case was that they are not concerned with the order of requisition. They appeared before the Court only to protect their interest as a stall-holder. At this stage it is not possible for this Court to decide as to who of them is a genuine stall-holder but both the writ petitioners as well as the State respondents has categorically stated that they will not deprive any of the stall-holders from their stalls. Accepting their submission, the Court expects that the interest of the stall-holders who were carrying their business at the Howrah Mangla Hat before the devastating fire will not be deprived of their stalls either by the State respondents or Howrah Municipal Corporation or the owners or lessees of the land in question as the case may be. In view of my finding, a, above, I am unable to hold that the impugned order of requisition is not in accordance with law. Accordingly, this writ application fails and stands dismissed. There will be no order as to cost.