A. Raghuvir, C. J.-The above Letters Patent Appeal relates to two parcels of land, Dag No. 1399 and Patta No. 1008 of Tokowbari Part of Gauhati Town, Panbari Mouza, one measures 4 Kathas 16 Lechas and another parcel of land measures 3 Lechas. The two parcels of land were owned by Kunja Behari Banerjee who died in 1941. The executors appointed by the deceased laid suit against the instant defendants or their predecessor-in-interest being Title Suit No. 8 of 1951 which was compromised on July 22, 1953. A day earlier to the compromise of the suit a lease deed or renewal of lease deed was executed on July 21, 1953 by the tenant which is marked as Ext. 1. Eight years later the lessor terminated the tenancy by notice on March 1, 1961. When the tenant did not deliver posse­ssion of the land the instant suit was bid for possession of the land and for arrears of rent. The tenants contested the suit, inter-alia, on the ground that notice of termination was not proper. Besides they are protected under section 5 of the Assam Non Agricultural Urban Areas Ten­ancy Act, 1955, -Act XII of 1955 (the Act) and cannot be evicted from the demised land. Appropriate issues were framed by the trial Court covering inter-alia the questions whether there was a mis-joinder of parties, whether the instant appellants plaintiffs had any title as the land belonged to Kunja Behari Banerjee, whether as legatees of the deceased Banerjee did title vest in them and whether any rent was due by the tenant. The trial Court considered the evidence and dismissed the suit. The first appellate Court confirmed the decree. A Single Judge of this Court dismissed the Second Appeal. Now in the Letters Patent Appeal the only question raised is as to applicability of section 5 of the Act XII of 1955. Therefore it is not necessary to set out the details of findings recorded by the lower Courts. The second question argued relates to the incidents of statutory tenant : Whether in law the rights of a statutory tenant are hirable by the successors of the tenant. We may take up the first question. Therefore it is not necessary to set out the details of findings recorded by the lower Courts. The second question argued relates to the incidents of statutory tenant : Whether in law the rights of a statutory tenant are hirable by the successors of the tenant. We may take up the first question. In the instant case as a fact it is found the tenants constructed a building over the land and in the calendar year 1956 the building over the suit land was renovated or reconstructed over the Bhita (Basement; and walls, and roofs were re-constructed and floor was renovated. The counsel for the appellants argued in the event of a house is reconstructed as in the instant case the tenant has done, the tenant is not protected under section 5 of the Act and relied upon a case in AIR 1962 Punjab 204 (Sadhu Singh vs. Dist. Board, Gurdaspur) as to the import of expression "reconstruction" which was cited before the learned Single Judge in the Second Appeal and added two more decisions to which cases reference will be made anon. Before we take up the case at the out-set we may mention one aspect of the controversy which was argued on behalf of the appellants touching as to the status of the tenant earlier to the execution of Ext. 1 before July 22, 1953. The appellants attempted to show that the status of the instant tenant was that of an encroacher or trespasser before the execution of Ext. 1 (July 22, 1955). Therefore in the context of that status the pro­tection under section 5 it is argued is not available to the tenant. This plea was advanced in the trial Court thereafter the plea was abando­ned by the lessor in the Court of the first appeal and was not argued before the learned Single Judge of this Court in the Second Appeal. We cannot therefore permit the lessor to revive an argument aband­oned and not argued in the two Courts. Besides the plea raised is not a pure question of law therefore we informed the counsel for the lessor that it is not open for the lessor to advance such a plea to revive an abandoned plea in a Letters Patent Appeal. Thus, we are left with the question as to the applicability of section 5 of the Act. Section 5 reads as under : "5. Thus, we are left with the question as to the applicability of section 5 of the Act. Section 5 reads as under : "5. Protection from eviction- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any contract or in any law for the time being in force - (a) where under the terms of a contract entered into between a landlord and his tenant whether before or after commencement of this Act, a tenant is entitled to build, and has in pursuance of such terms actually built within the period of five years from the date of such contract, a permanent structure on the land of the tenancy for residential or business purposes, or where a tenant not being so entitled to build, has actually built any such structure on the land of the tenancy for any of the purposes aforesaid with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landlord, the tenant shall not be ejected by the landlord from the tenancy except on the ground of non payment of rent : Provided that where a tenant having built a permanent structure within the period specified above and for any of the purposes mentioned therein, renews the tenancy on expiration of the original contract he shall always be deemed to have built such permanent structure within the period of five years from the date of the renewed contract : Provided further that a person having a right, title and interest over a permanent structure by what ever made of acquisi­tion he may have taken the tenancy from the landlord of the land wherein the said structure stands, shall not be ejected except on the ground of non-payment of rent. (b) Where a tenant has effected improvements on the land of the tenancy under the terms whereof he is not entitled to effect such improvements, the tenant shall not be ejected by the landlord from the land of the tenancy unless compensation for reasonable improvement has been paid to the tenant, (2) No tenant shall be ejected by his landlord from the land of the tenancy except in execution of a decree for ejectment passed by a competent civil Court. (3) No decree for ejectment passed on the ground of non-pay­ment of rent shall be executed within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree and if the tenant pays into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree the entire amount payable under the decree within the aforesaid period, the Court shall record the decree as satisfied." The above section 5 was the subject of numerous decisions including two Full Bench decisions of this Court wherein all the 14 sections of the Act XII of 1955 were considered. It was stated before the Act (in the first Full Bench case) the relationship between the lessor and tenant was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and Contract Act. The general principles of law governing landlord and tenant determined the disputes between the lessor and lessee. There existed another Act the Sylhet Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1947 (Assam Act X of 1947) which was enforced prior to the partition of India. After the partition of India the Act X of 1947 was extended to Karimganj Sub-division ( now Karimganj District) of Cachar District by the Adaptation Order of 1950. Finally the Act X of 1947 was repealed. By the instant Act XII of 1955 a tenant is defined under section 3(g) to cover three categories of tenants, (1) a person who holds land under another person who is liable to pay rent for that land to that another person ; (?) a person who derives his title from a tenant ; and (3) a person who continues in possession of any land after termination of his tenancy in respect of that land. In the second Full Bench case (1982) 1 GLR 736 (Kamakhya Prasad Barua) as to section 5 of the Act at page 745 it is observed : '•This section gives the protective umbrella to the tenant from ejectment by the landlord from the tenancy except on the ground of non-payment of rent provided the tenant has constructed within a period of five years of the lease, a permanent structure on the land of tenancy for residential or business purposes. The emphasis of this section is that once the tenant has constructed the permanent structure on the land of the tenancy for residential or business purpose within five years from the date of the lease, he acquires a right not to be evicted. In other words, on a bare reading of section 5 it is found that a tenant who under the terms of the contract entered into between him and his landlord whether before or after the commencement of this Act, is entitled to build and has actually built in pursuance of that contract within five years from the date of that contract a permanent structure on the land of the tenancy for residential or business purposes, shall not be ejected by the landlord except on the ground of non-payment of rent. Again, a tenant although not entitled to build under the contract, has actually built permanent structure on the land of the tenancy for residential or business purposes with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landlord, shall not be ejected by the landlord except on the ground of non-payment of rent. Even with regard to the non-payment of rent under section 5 (3\ a decree for ejectment passed on the ground of non-payment cannot be executed within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree and the tenant pays in the Court the decretal amount within the aforesaid period, the decree will stand satisfied". The scope and ambit of section 5 was thus adumbrated to infer if a building is contracted after the lease such a tenant is not to evicted from the land except for failure to pay the rent. In the first Full Bench decision ALR (1973) 15 (Bireswar Banerjee and Ors. vs. Sudhir Ranjan Bose and Ors) in para 10 (page 21) conflict­ing decisions of this Court were reconsidered and in considering the coflict this Court observed- 'Section 5 has to be interpreted in a way so as not to destroy the already vested rights of tenants conferred under the Act. The legislature, in a welfare legislation like the present, cannot be intended to give something by the right hand to take it away by the left. Such an interpretation of section 5 is not possible unless the Court takes the words of the Act in their shell sans soul. The legislature, in a welfare legislation like the present, cannot be intended to give something by the right hand to take it away by the left. Such an interpretation of section 5 is not possible unless the Court takes the words of the Act in their shell sans soul. It is clear, protection under section 5 is available notwithstanding any provision of contract or of law. The decision is Chimanlal's case (supra) does not take count of the definition clause of 'tenant in section 3(g) which has a prima place in the Act foreruning the provisions under section 5 and the construction we have put on section 5 is chiefly on the terms of that section read with section 3(g) of the Act." The plea raised in the instant case by the lessor is when the building is contracted or renovated in 19 "6 the tenant is not entitled to protection under section 5 of the Act. The learned Single Judge rejected the contention in the judgment under appeal. Adverting to the cases referred, it is seen in AIR 1962 Punjab 204 (Sadhu Singh vs. Dist. Board, Gurdaspur) the issue considered was whether a recons­truction of a building amounted to construction. In that case it was held no inflexible rules cam be laid down to determine when a reconstructed building can be said to be constructed building. The suffix 're' was held to mean 'again' and it was held construction and reconstruction depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Webster's New World Dictionary was referred wherein (1) the act or process of constructing, (2) the way in which something is constructed ; manner or method of building, (3) something constructed ; structure ; building and the Dictionary also give meaning to pile up, build, to put together systematically, build frame, or devise. Finally it was held additions, improvements or alterations may amount to construction yet it cannot be said with any reasonableness that they would amount to construction of a building and added-"any partial construction in such part would not be construction of a building, but where the entire part is pulled down and rebuilt it would certainly be construction …" In AIR 1979 Madras 50 (K. Krishnan vs. Munisamy) the Rent Contro­ller held a new building erected was not established. The appellate autho­rity differed on facts and found that the plan produced by the landlord did not envisages demolition of the building on the other hand it was only a change of the roof of the building. The landlord, it was held, must establish that he was going to demolish the building and erect a new building on the site. That has not been done in this case. The facts were considered from the perspective of section 14 of the special enactment of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960. In AIR 1979 Rajasthan 35 ( M/s Deepchand & Sons vs. Mohan Das and another) the case related to what is termed a big shop which was converted in four smaller but separate shops by raising partition walls and putting shutters on each such smaller shop, One of the four shops was let out to the tenant. This was considered as new construction for the purpose of the Act and held "it is the admitted case of the parties that the shop, which was let out to the tenant was not in existence earlier as such shop and, thus, it must be held to be a newly constructed shop. It is an entirely different thing that the said shop was carved out of a bigger shop, which might have been in existence even earlier. "Further in each case it was held as a question of fact whether the building which has not been let out, is newly cons­tructed or not but in case an existing building is rebuilt, the reconstruc­tion may amount to construction. If the essential character of the building remains to be the same then, in spite cf structural changes made therein, reconstruction may not amount to a fresh construction. "But if the nature of the building is changed, then such a recons­truction may amount to a new construction. If the essential character of the building remains to be the same then, in spite cf structural changes made therein, reconstruction may not amount to a fresh construction. "But if the nature of the building is changed, then such a recons­truction may amount to a new construction. It may not be necessary in each case that the old building should be entirely pulled down and a new building be constructed from a scratch in place thereof, but if some of the old existing walls are made use of while reconstructing the premises and what comes into existence after such reconstruction or construction are new premises, then such premises may be held to be new construction ..." These cases were cited by the learned counsel for the lessor to support the contention that when a house is demolished and re-cons­tructed the protection under section 5 of the Act cannot be availed of by the tenants. We have earlier referred to the Full Bench decisions which covered the interpretation of section 5 and in those two Full Bench decisions the legislative history of the section was elucidated. The Courts below held there existed a building which was demolished and on the same basement new walls are raised and a roof was laid, the floor was renovated even in such a case we have no difficulty in holding the protection under section 5 is available to the tenant. The second question raised as to the heritability right of a statutory tenant is no more res-integra. We may refer to (1985) 2 SCC 683 (Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar and others) where it has been held there is no difference as to the incidents of statutory tenants and contractual tenancy. In both the case the rights of a tenant are heritable. The learned counsel referred in this regard to AIR 1979 SC 1121 (Vithal Dattntraya Kulkarani vs. Smt. Shamram Powar). We would have dealt the question in more details but the issue is no more res-integra in view of Gian Devi's case. This Letters Patent Appeal for the aforesaid reasons fails and is dismissed. No costs. S. K. Homchaudhuri, J.-I agree.