CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) IN the group of writ petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India, the interesting question about the extent and ambit of the jurisdiction and power of the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal exercising the jurisdiction and power under Section 11a as well as Sections 7, 7a and 15 of the Industrial Disputes act. to interfere with the order imposing the punishment by the employer- management, arise for consideration. The moot questions for consideration are: (1) what is the extent and ambit of jurisdiction of Labour Court/ Industrial tribunal to interfere in finding by the employer-management regarding misconduct of workman; (2) Whether the jurisdiction and powers of the Labour court/ Industrial Tribunal under Section 11a of the Industrial Disputes Act to interfere with the order imposing punishment is confirmed to only the punishment of discharge or dismissal or also extend to the punishments other than the said punishments; (3) If not, whether the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal can interfere with the punishment other than that of the discharge or dismissal passed by the management under the provisions of Sections 7, 7a and 15 of the Industrial dispute Act. If yes. (4) what is the extent of the jurisdiction and power of Labour court/ Industrial Tribunal and under what circumstances the order of such punishment can be interfered with? ( 2 ) THE antagonistic views are asserted by the management-employer and the workmen while some of the interveners have chosen the middle course. The assertion by the management is that, after the insertion of Section 11a. I. D. Act, the Labour Court Industrial Tribunal can interfere with the order of sentence of discharge and dismissal only and not in any other form of punishment and it cannot substitute or award the other punishment than the one imposed by the management and, if at all the circumstances justify the interference, it can only refer the dispute back to the management for decision. On the other hand, the view asserted on behalf of the workmen is that the Labour Court/ industrial Tribunal can interfere with the order of punishment if at all the order is not legal and proper and can impose the punishment which it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. On the other hand, the view asserted on behalf of the workmen is that the Labour Court/ industrial Tribunal can interfere with the order of punishment if at all the order is not legal and proper and can impose the punishment which it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. The middle course asserted by some of the interveners is that the Labour Court/ industrial Tribunal can exercise the jurisdiction and interfere with the order of punishment of dismissal or discharge under Section 11a, Industrial Disputes act and can award lesser punishment in view of the said punishment considering the circumstances of the case and so far as the other punishments are concerned, the Labour Court/ Tribunal can interfere only if the punishment is oppressive and disproportionate. These rival contentions are required to be considered in view of the relevant provisions of the Industrial disputes Act specially Sections 7, 7a, 11a and 15, Schedules 2 arid 3 of the Act, and the Standing Orders and the catena of judgments of the Supreme Court and other courts prior to the insertion of section 11a in the statute on December 15, 1971 and after that. With a view to appreciating the rival contentions, facts of each matter may be considered in short. ( 3 ) IN nine out of 10 Special Civil applications, the petitioner is the Gujarat state Road Transport Corporation and out of the nine, in six petitions the workmen are bus conductors and in other three the workmen are a driver, a mechanic and a watchman. In one Special civil Application, the petitioner is the gujarat Industrial Development corporation and the workman is the junior Clerk-Cashier. In all the matters the awards interfering with the punishment other than that of the discharge or dismissal are challenged. ( 4 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 327 of 1985: The respondent-conductor of the bus collected the fare of Rs. 1. 50 from one lady passenger and issued the ticket for Re. 0. 75 only, which misconduct was found by the checking party. In an inquiry, the misconduct was held to have been established and the respondent was dismissed from service, but in appeal, the appellate Authority set aside the dismissal and reinstated the respondent in service with the penalty of placing him at the lowest stage in the time scale without back wages. In an inquiry, the misconduct was held to have been established and the respondent was dismissed from service, but in appeal, the appellate Authority set aside the dismissal and reinstated the respondent in service with the penalty of placing him at the lowest stage in the time scale without back wages. In the Reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the legality and propriety of the inquiry was not challenged and the Industrial tribunal held that the proper and legal inquiry was held. The Industrial Tribunal considering the observations of the appellate authority, which was also satisfied that the respondent was negligent and no mala fide intention was established, was of the view that the punishment awarded by the Corporation should be interfered with observing that"ends of justice would be met instead of punishing the workman by putting him on the minimum of the pay scale, he may be punished by witholding his increment for the year without permanent effect"and, accordingly interfered with the order of punishment and awarded the punishment of withholding the increment for one year without permanent effect and directed to pay the back wages. Special Civil Application No. 4225 of 1986 : The respondent was driver and while proceeding with the bus on 8-2-1977 on the Nethdwara-Ahmedabad routes, dashed it with one Ramji Munglaji, who succumbed to the injuries and, ultimately, the prosecution resulted in acquittal as the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the respondent. In the departmental proceeding, the respondent was dismissed from the service, but the Appellate authority set aside with the lowest time-scale and the interim period from the dale of the dismissal till the date of the reinstatement was treated as leave without wages. In a Reference (IT) No. 462 of 1980, the Industrial Tribunal observing that "no damage was caused to the bus and no evidence was adduced to show that any inconvenience was caused to the public, however, the respondent was guilty of negligence which resulted into the death of the shepherd and some of his goats and for such negligence, the punishment of placing the resopondent in the lowest stage of time-scale is too harsh" interfered with the order of punishment and awarded the punishment of withholding two increments of two years with permanent effect. The difference of the pay was directed to be paid to the respondent No. 2. The difference of the pay was directed to be paid to the respondent No. 2. Special Civil Application No. 4470 of 1986 : The respondent was serving as a Mechanic. On April 10, 1977, he was not on duty at S. T. Depot, Rajkot division, but unauthorisedly took charge of the bus and drove it in reverse and collided it with the diesel oil pump of the depot, which resulted in loss and damage to the Corporation to the extent of Rs. 2377/ -. In an inquiry, it was held that the respondent was guilty of misconduct inasmuch as he had used unauthorisedly the bus of the Corporation even though he was not authorised to drive it and because of his negligence, the loss was caused to the Corporation. The respondent was directed to pay that amount by 47 monthly instalments. In a Reference (IT) No. 120 of 1984 under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot upheld the legality of the inquiry and the misconduct of the respondent, but observing that the entire amount of the damage being excessive and harsh, interfered with the order and reduced it to Rs. 500/ -. The industrial Tribunal observed that, "in such circumstances, I do not find it reasonable to recover a large amount of rs. 2377/- from the defaulter by way of damages. Looking from all angles, if an amount of Rs. 500/- by way of demages is recovered from the defaulter than also, the principles of natural justice would be maintained". Special Civil Application No. 5815 of 1986 : The respondent, a conductor, while proceeding with the bus from Sayla to botad, did not issue tickets to certain passengers. The allegations against the respondent-conductor were that he had collected Rs. 3 from some passengers travelling from Sayla to Botad, but had not issued the tickets; to two passengers travelling from Sayla to Paliad the tickets were not issued and the fare was also not collected; to two passengers travelling from Sayla to Sudakhada, the tickets were not issued and the fare was also not collected, and to seven passengers travelling from Sayla to Thoriyali the fare was collected and the tickets were not issued and all these misconducts were detected during the checking, which was carried out at a distance of 7 to 8 kms. from Sayla. from Sayla. In the departmental inquiry, the competent authority finding the respondent guilty of road booking but not dishonest conduct, awarded the punishment of reducing ,the respondent by four stages in the scale of pay. In a reference (IT) No. 174 of 1984, the industrial Tribunal, Rajkot held that the mala fide intention of the delinquent workman in not issuing the tickets to the passengers was not clearly proved, but on the basis of the evidence, it revealed that the respondent No. 2 was doing road booking even though the bus was a local bus and such road booking was not permissible and, therefore, the default committed by the respondent was without the ingredients of dishonesty. In view of the Tribunal, considering the gravity of the default, the punishment awarded was harsh and excessive and should be reduced appropriately. The tribunal then observed "according to me, if he will be placed one stage back without permanent effect, then the punishment is reasonable for that offence". The tribunal, accordingly, directed to place the respondent-conductor to one stage back in pay without permanent effect. Special Civil Application No. 4735 of 1977 : The respondent-conductor was on duty on the bus plying between Sanand and Malasan on August 5, 1981 and when the checking took place, he was found with unpunched tickets in his hands and even though he had collected fare from 14 passengers, he had not issued tickets and it was also found that the way bill was corrected. In a departmental inquiry, he was dismissed from service, but the appellate Authority set aside the dismissal and awarded the punishment of reducing to the minimum scale of pay and the intervening period was directed to be treated as leave without pay. In a reference under Section 10 of the industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial tribunal observed that the respondent was negligent of wrong punching but had not misappropriated the amount. About the punishment, the Tribunal observed that the respondent had put in service of eight years and reducing to the minimum of the scale would entail the perpetual loss of eight increments. In the view of the Tribunal "the ends of justice would be met if instead of putting him in the minimum of scale on reinstatement, he is punished by withholding his increments by two years without permanent effect". In the view of the Tribunal "the ends of justice would be met if instead of putting him in the minimum of scale on reinstatement, he is punished by withholding his increments by two years without permanent effect". The Tribunal, accordingly, reduced the punishment and directed to pay the difference. Special Civil Application No. 5207 of 1987 : The respondent-conductor was on duty on the bus plying between Modasa and Ramos, and during checking at bayad, it was found that he had collected the amount of Rs. 11. 70 ps. from the passengers, but did not issue the tickets and misappropriated that amount. He was also guilty of not issuing tickets to some other passengers. In a departmental inquiry, the Competent Authority passed the order for dismissal and that order was upheld in the appeal, but in Second appeal, the dismissal was set aside and he was directed to be reinstated in service, but was awarded the punishment of putting him on the minimum of the pay scale. In spite of the fact that various defaults were committed by the respondent in past, he was reinstated in service and utmost sympathy was shown to him. In reference (I. T.) No. 803 1984, the Industrial Tribunal further reduced the penalty, directing to withhold the increment for three years with permanent effect. The Tribunal noted that the respondent in reply to the charge had admitted the default and the charges are proved at the inquiry. The Tribunal observed that the respondent-workman had put in the service of fifteen years at the relevant time and placing him at the minimum scale of pay would cause much economic loss. The Tribunal also considered that the respondent had lost the wages of the intervening period. In the view of the Tribunal the punishment being very harsh "the ends of justice would be met if instead of putting him in minimum of scale, he is punished by withholding his increments of three years with permanent effect". Special Civil Application No. 822 of 1988: The respondent, a conductor, while on duty on April 20, 1988, had collected fare from three passengers travelling between Gondal and Movaiya without issuing tickets and had also not issued tickets to two other passengers travelling from Gondal to Movaiya and the way bill was closed. It was the local bus wherein the road booking was prohibited. It was the local bus wherein the road booking was prohibited. These acts of misconduct were detected by the checking party. In a regular departmental inquiry, the misconduct was proved and the respondent was placed in the pay-scale at the initial salary. In appeal, the order of punishment was modified and three stages in the pay-scale were reduced. In Reference (I. T.) No. 402 of 1984, under Section 10 of the Industrial disputes Act, the Industrial Tribunal, rajkot reduced the penalty by directing to withhold the increment for one year without permanent effect. The Tribunal held that the misconduct and dishonesty were proved but observed "dishonesty is dishonesty but it relates to such a small amount that the punishment which has been imposed on the said conductor of s. T. bus is not a rich person. I am of the view that even if issue of career is not considered, such economic loss would be unbearable by him and, therefore, should be considered sympathetically. I feel that if one increment for one year is stopped without permanent effect, the said punishment would be proper. " special Civil Application No. 1359 of 1988 : The respondent, a watchman at karjan Depot of the Baroda Division attended the duty at 11. 00 p. m. instead of 10,00 p. m. and tried to show that he had attended the duty at 10. 00 p. m. and when asked to explain that conduct, he refused to reply in writing to the vigilance officer, and misbehaved and abused him. The behaviour of the respondent being unbecoming of the employee of the corporation, the departmental inquiry was held and was found guilty of the misconduct and he was dismissed from service with effect from November 15, 1979. In an appeal, the Appellate authority altered the punishment and directed to reinstate the respondent in service with effect from September 14, 1981 and reduced the pay of the respondent to the initial pay-scale. In reference (IT) No. 43 of 1983 (New No. 387 of 1984) under Section 10, Industrial disputes Act, the Industrial Tribunal, baroda interfered with the punishment order and directed to pay 75 per cent of the back wages and instead of placing the respondent to initial pay-scale, directed withholding two increments with future effect. In reference (IT) No. 43 of 1983 (New No. 387 of 1984) under Section 10, Industrial disputes Act, the Industrial Tribunal, baroda interfered with the punishment order and directed to pay 75 per cent of the back wages and instead of placing the respondent to initial pay-scale, directed withholding two increments with future effect. The Tribunal observed that the inquiry was validly and legally held and the respondent committed the act of misconduct by committing the breach of clauses 26, 27 and 29 of Schedule a and clause 29 of Schedule b of the regulations. It also transpires that the legality and validity of the inquiry was not challenged and the only point urged was the severity of the punishment. In view of the Tribunal, the penally of not awarding the salary for the period from november 15, 1979 to October 15, 1981, i. e. for the period of one year and ten months and penalty of reducing the pay-scale at the initial stage were harsh and oppressive as the respondent had put in the service of about 12 years and the punishment should be reasonable. The tribunal, accordingly, reduced the punishment as stated above. Special Civil Application No. 2337 of 1988 : The respondebt-conductor was on duty on bus plying between Bhatia and porbandar on July 14, 1978 and collected the fare from three passengers travelling from Bhatia to Kalyanpur, but had not issued the tickets to three passengers travelling from Naranpur to Paneli, to fourteen passengers travelling from bakodi to Kalyanpur and had collected the fare from one passenger travelling from Bakodi to Kalyanpur but had not issued the ticket. In a regular departmental inquiry, the Competent authority holding the misconduct proved, with a view to giving opportunity to improve, awarded a punishment of reducing to the initial pay-scale for three years. In a Reference (IT) No. 168 of 1984 (Old No. 463 of 1980 - Ahmedabad) the Industrial Tribunal reduced the punishment to stoppage of increment without permanent effect. The inquiry was for five specific charges as in all 29 passengers were not issued tickets. The Tribunal observed that, even if the benefit of doubt is given to the respondent, at least two charges were very clearly proved against him. The inquiry was for five specific charges as in all 29 passengers were not issued tickets. The Tribunal observed that, even if the benefit of doubt is given to the respondent, at least two charges were very clearly proved against him. The tribunal then considered about the quantum of the punishment awarded and observed that the respondent was in service from January 3, 1975 and the order of punishment was passed on august 22, 1978, and by placing at the initial pay-scale, the respondent would loss the benefit of increments and, therefore, the punishment awarded should be reduced. The Tribunal, accordingly, interfered white agreeing that two charges about not issuing the tickets in spite of collecting the fare were proved and reduced the punishment to withholding the increment for one year without permanent effect. Special Civil Application No. 3544 of 1988 : The respondent, an employee of the Gujarat Industrial Development corporation, was the Junior clerk-cum-Cashier at the relevant time and was in possession and custody of the cheque book. On November 22,1974, the respondent informed the Superior officers that one cheque was missing from the cheque book, which was in possession and custody of the respondent workman. The concerned bank was informed of the missing cheque, but the bank replied that the signatures of executive Engineer and the Senior Clerk were forged and an amount of Rs. 74. 500/- was withdrawn on November 1, 1974 by encashing the cheque. The criminal prosecution was lodged immediately and the respondent-workman was suspended from service on January 28, 1975. The respondent was arrested by the Police and ultimately, was charge-sheeted, but the court acquitted him and the acquittal appeal filed on November 20, 1976 was also dismissed by the High Court on november 9, 1978. Meanwhile, a regular departmental inquiry was instituted against the respondent-workman by charge-sheet dated January 17, 1976, alleging that the respondent failed to maintain the proper custody and possession of the cheque book and acted in a grossly negligent and inefficient manner, which ultimately resulted into the loss of Rs. 74. 500/ -. The allegation against the respondent was also that even though sufficient amount was available in the bank account for the disburesment of the salary of the staff of the petitioner-Corporation, the respondent obtained the cheque of Rs. 74. 500/ -. The allegation against the respondent was also that even though sufficient amount was available in the bank account for the disburesment of the salary of the staff of the petitioner-Corporation, the respondent obtained the cheque of Rs. l,00,000/- from the Head Office and deposited in the bank and by that, he tried to suppress the fact of the withdrawal of Rs. 74,500/- by the forged cheque. Further imputation of the charge was that even though respondent was directed by the superior officers to tally the account of the Corporation with the bank, he did not do it. In the departmental inquiry, the Competent authority, by the order dated December 30, 1978, directed to stop two increments of the respondent-workman with future effect and the period of suspension of the respondent was to be treated as the suspension period by granting 50 per cent of the salary. The appeal preferred under the provisions of the Gujarat Industrial development Corporation (Staff regulations), 1963 was dismissed by the appellate Authority on June 19, 1980. In a Reference (IT) No. 491 of 1982 under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial Tribunal while upholding the legality and validity of the inquiry proceedings and also upholding the misconduct of the respondent that he was guilty of dereliction in the duty as he did not tally the account with the bank even though he was directed to do it and also did not preserve properly the cheque book which was in his possession, considered the adequacy of the punishmenl and observed that the respondent was suspended on January 28, 1975 and after that, he was charge-sheeted on January 17, 1976 -and the order of punishment was passed on december 30, 1978, and he was kept under suspension from January 20, 1975 to December 30, 1980. In the view of the Tribunal, the delay was caused in finalising the departmental inquiry by the inquiry Officer. In the view of the tribunal the suspension order should have been withdrawn on acquittal of the respondent of the criminal charges and confirmation of the acquittal by the High court. In the view of the Tribunal, the delay was caused in finalising the departmental inquiry by the inquiry Officer. In the view of the tribunal the suspension order should have been withdrawn on acquittal of the respondent of the criminal charges and confirmation of the acquittal by the High court. It was also noted by the Tribunal that the respondent was suspended as the Criminal complaint was filed against him and at that time, the departmental inquiry was not started and in the suspension order, it was -specifically stated that the respondent was suspended till the result of the criminal case or till further order. The suspension order was held to be legal and proper, but the tribunal noted that only two charges in the departmental inquiry were proved against the respondent and he was acquitted in the criminal proceedings. In the view of the Tribunal, the Corporation was not caused any damage because of the negligence of the respondent and, therefore, the punishment of not giving the full salary to the respondent was excessive and unreasonable. The tribunal, accordingly, directed to pay the full salary during the suspension period and withheld two increments without furture effect. ( 5 ) IN all the cases, the inquiry held by the employer is accepted to be legal,valid and not defective and no evidence was led before the Labour Court/ Tribunal about the legality and validity of the order. The Labour Court/ Tribunal, therefore, was not exercising the managerial power even for the purpose of imposing the punishment. For the purpose of convenience, in the course of the judgment, the Tribunal only will be referred even though we are considering the powers and jurisdiction of the Labour court and the Tribunal. 8. As the antagonistic contentions are advanced and asserted and the various judgments are referred to support the views, we shall set Out in short the contentions by the Advocates representing the management, the workmen and the Advdeates appearing to assist the Court. 8. As the antagonistic contentions are advanced and asserted and the various judgments are referred to support the views, we shall set Out in short the contentions by the Advocates representing the management, the workmen and the Advdeates appearing to assist the Court. Shri S. N. Shelat, shri K. N. Raval and Shri B. R. Parikh appearing for the management, and Shri b. R. Parikh appearing as an intervenor submitted that the disciplinary matters including the domestic inquiry and ultimate punishment for the misconduct are managerial functions required to be performed for the purpose of discipline in the industry and, therefore, should be allowed to be exercised without limitation and Tribunal can interfere with the inquiry or the punishment order only in certain limited circumstances and not otherwise. In case the inquiry is held defective or not legal and valid, the management should be given a chance to lead advance to establish it, if the management requests for that, but in that case, the Tribunal should accept the quantum of the punishment imposed by the management. If the Tribunal is inclined to interfere with the order of punishment, it should not reduce the punishment except the punishment of discharge or dismissal under Section 11 A, industrial Disputes Act, but after quashing the order of punishment, the tribunal should refer it back to the management for imposing the punishment as that is only the managerial function and riot that of the Tribunal. Even if the entire order including the finding of the misconduct and the punishment are set aside for the reasons like victimisation and unfair Labour practice, the matter should be remanded to the management for fresh inquiry and taking the decision for the punishment. In marginal cases where two views are possible, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to interfere either with the inquiry or with the order of punishment. If the order of punishment is quashed and the matter is sent back to the management for taking the proper decision, the management considering the circumstances, can impose the proper and adequate punishment and exercise the managerial powers inherently vested in it within the managerial area and that will also discipline the workman. If the inquiry is set aside on grounds of victimisation or unlawful labour practice and case is remanded, it would discipline the management which would realise that such practice will not ultimately be advantageous to management. If the inquiry is set aside on grounds of victimisation or unlawful labour practice and case is remanded, it would discipline the management which would realise that such practice will not ultimately be advantageous to management. In the view of the learned Counsel, the industrial adjudication is mostly for the purpose of maintaining industrial peace and increasing production and, therefore, the tribunal are vested with the jurisdiction and power in respect of the wages, service conditions, etc. , but that does not necessarily vest jurisdiction to interfere with the departmental inquiry or the quantum of punishment casually or as if the Tribunal is exercising the appellate jurisdiction. As such, the Tribunal has no power or jurisdiction to substitute or to impose the lesser penalty except in cases of punishment of discharge or dismissal and should refer back to the management for taking proper decision for punishment. The learned Counsel appearing for the management, referring to the provisions of Section 11a, industrial Disputes Act, asserted that the legislature was conscious of the judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court when provisions of Section 11 A, industrial Disputes Act were inserted in the statute-book by the Industrial Dispute (Amendment) Act, 1971 (Act No. 45 of 1971) with effect from December 15, 1971 and even then vested the jurisdiction under Section 11a in the Tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment discharging or dismissimg the workman if at all not justified and directing the reinstatement of the workman on certain terms and conditions or even awarding the lesser punishment in lieu of the discharge or dismissal, but the Legislature did not confer any such power or jurisdiction in the Tribunal in case of the other kinds of punishment. In the submission of the learned Counsel, the legislature has purposely and intentionally not vested such power and jurisdiction in the Tribunal as the legislature was conscious of the managerial right to award the punishment to the workmen. The learned Counsel, therefore, asserted that except in the order of discharge or dismissal, the tribunal has no jurisdiction or power to interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the management. The learned counsel tried to seek support from the various judgment of the Supreme Court, which we shall refer at the later stage. 7. The learned Counsel, therefore, asserted that except in the order of discharge or dismissal, the tribunal has no jurisdiction or power to interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the management. The learned counsel tried to seek support from the various judgment of the Supreme Court, which we shall refer at the later stage. 7. Shri H. K. Rathod and Shri A. K. Clarke, learned Advocates appearing for the wokrmen, and Shri P. C. Master and d S. Vasawada, learned Advocates appearing as intervenors have canvassed that the powers and jurisdiction of the tribunal are wide to interfere with the inquiry in certain circumstances and to substitute any punishment if it is not just and proper in the circumstances of the case. It is asserted that what is important is the exercise of the power by the tribunal and not the existence of the powers, as, according to that, such powers do exist and are vested in the Tribunal by the statute. According to them, the industrial Disputes Act and such Labour laws are enacted to maintain the harmonious relation and industrial peace and the Tribunals with a view to fulfilling the objective, should exercise the jurisdiction and power vested in it. For the purpose of fulfilling the objective, the tribunal should grant the appropriate relief. In their view, the power to adjudicate includes the power to adjudicate the entire disputes, including the nature and the quantum of the punishment and can substitute or award the lesser punishment considering the circumstances of the case. It is submitted that the Tribunal can interfere with the inquiry and the order of punishment in several circumstances, viz. (1) want of good faith, (2) victimisation or unfair labour practice, (3) management quality of basic order or violation of principles of natural justice, (4) finding completely baseless, perverse, capricious, arbitrary or false, (5) discriminatory, (6) act not amounting to misconduct under the standing Orders or violating the Standing orders in holding the inquiry, and (7) not legal and proper. The assertion is that the previous views that the Tribunal can interfere with the orders of punishment only if it is grossly disproportionate, oppressive or excessive are now changed and that very intention is reflected by the Legislature in enacting section 11 A, Industrial Disputes Act, which vests the jurisdiction in the tribunal to interfere with the order of sentence in certain circumstances. It is submitted that, even though Section 11 A, industrial Disputes Act vests jurisdiction and power in the Tribunal with respect to the punishment of discharge or dismissal and to substitute the lesser punishment, that should also be considered as a guideline for substituting or awarding the lesser punishment in case the other kind of punishment is imposed by the management, In view of the learned advocates, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute to consider the legality and propriety of the order by itself empowers the Tribunal to interfere, substitute or to impose the lesser punishment considering the circumstances of the case and that is practically the wider jurisdiction as if the tribunal is exercising the appellate powers. 8. Shri V. B. Patel, learned Counsel appearing amicus curie submitted that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal spring from the reference made to it under section 10, Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, it has to confine to the reference and should not travel beyond it. The Industrial Disputes Act being a special statute conferring the powers with regard to the specific subjects enumerated in the schedule and the relevant provisions of the Act, the Tribunal has to confine itself to the jurisdiction vested in it under the statute and the law laid down by the binding judicial pronouncements and should not travel beyond it. The question of granting the relief, therefore, should be confined to the relevant parameters. The Industrial law has well laid down the limits of the powers of the Tribunals in regard to the disciplinary actions. In the submission of shri Patel, the basic change in the jurisdiction is made by incorporating section 11 A, Industrial Disputes Act so far as it relates to the punishment of discharge or dismissal and the Legislature advisedly has not made provision for other nature of punishments maintaining the original position regarding the restricted jurisdiction or the power of the Tribunal to interfere with the order of other kinds of punishment. Shri Patel, therefore, sought to strike the balance between the two extreme views, as discussed above, canvassed by the learned Advocates. 9. Shri Patel, therefore, sought to strike the balance between the two extreme views, as discussed above, canvassed by the learned Advocates. 9. The main thrust of the rival contentions should be broadly considered as under : (1) The right of the management to hold domestic inquiry and to decide the nature and quantum of the punishment, and the extent of the powers and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with such managerial right prior to the insertion of Section 11 A, Industrial disputes Act, by Amending Act No. 45 of 1971. (2) The effect and the impact of Section 11 A, Industrial Disputes Act on the managerial right to decide the nature and the quantum of the punishment and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with such managerial right for punishment of discharge or dismissal. (3) Whether the provisions of Section 11 A, Industrial Disputes Act confer wider jurisdiction on the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal. (4) The extent, ambit and limitation on managerial right, if such right to hold inquiry and decide the quantum and nature of punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal is not affected by provisions of Section 11 A, Industries disputes Act. 10. For the purpose of appreciating the rival contentions, we should consider the statutory provisions, as according to the learned Advocates, the insertion of section 11a in statute is the landmark in imposing restriction on the managerial right. The maintenance of the industrial peace is one of the prime requisites of the industrial progress. With that object in view and for the purpose of making provision for the investigation and settlement of the Industries disputes, the industrial Disputes Act (Act No. 14 of 1947) is enacted and amended by 31 amending Acts. Any dispute or difference between the employer and the workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of the employment or conditions of labour of any person, is an Industrial Dispute as defined in clause (K), Section 2, Industrial disputes Act. The Labour Courts and tribunals are constituted for adjudication of the Industrial Dispute relating to the matters specified in 2nd Schedule or 2nd and 3rd Schedules respectively and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. The Labour Courts and tribunals are constituted for adjudication of the Industrial Dispute relating to the matters specified in 2nd Schedule or 2nd and 3rd Schedules respectively and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. The existing or apprehended industrial dispute can be referred under Section 10, industrial Disputes Act by the appropriate government to the Labour Court or the industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, for adjudication. The Labour Court or the Tribunal has to follow the procedure as provided in Section 11 of the Act. Section 11a empowers the Labour Court or Tribunal to give relief in case of the discharge or dismissal of the workman. The Labour Court or the Tribunal to which the Industrial dispute has been referred has to submit the award to the appropriate Government as provided in section 15 of the Act. The matters within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court are specified in 2nd Schedule and the matters which are wihtin the jurisdiction of the tribunal are specified in 2nd Schedule and 3rd Schedule of the Act. The Labour court or the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing Orders and also the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute regarding the discharge or dismissal of the workman including the reinstatement or grant of relief to the workman wrongfully dismissed. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 provide for the Model Standing Orders and the matters for which the provision can be made in the Model Standing Orders are specified in the Schedule of the Act. So far as Gujarat is concerned, the Bombay industrial Employment (Standing Orders) rules, 1959 duly modified are applicable. The Schedule I in the Rules provides for the Standing Orders. Order 24 of the schedule of the Rules enumerates the acts and omissions on the part of the workman, which amount to misconduct. Order 25 provides for various punishments, viz. warning and censoring, fine, suspension, withholding, of the increment or promotion, reduction to the lower post or lower stage, discharge and dismissal, and also provides for the procedure for holding the inquiry. Order 25 provides for various punishments, viz. warning and censoring, fine, suspension, withholding, of the increment or promotion, reduction to the lower post or lower stage, discharge and dismissal, and also provides for the procedure for holding the inquiry. Sub-clause (c) of Clause (5) of Order 24 specifically provides that, if on conclusion of the inquiry or as the case may be, of the proceedings on a criminal charge, the workman has been found guilty of the charges framed against him and it is considered after giving the workman concerned, a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty propossed, that an order of dismissal or discharge or suspension or fine or stoppage of annual increment or reduction in rank would meet the ends of justice, the employer shall pass an order accordingly. The right of the employer to inflict such punishment for the misconduct considering the circumstances and the fact that such punishment would meet the ends of justice is statutorily reconized by this provision. Clause (6) of Order 25 specifically provides that,"in awarding punishment under this Standing Order, the Manager shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist". Order 26 provides for the punishment or warning or censuring for certain minor acts of misconduct or delinquency. ( 6 ) NINE out of ten writ petitions are relating to the employees of the Gujarat state Road Transport Corporation, who are governed by the Discipline and Appeal procedure for the Gujarat State Road transport Corporation Employees, framed under the provisions of Regulation 80 of the Gujarat State Transport employees Service Regulations. The acts of,. misconduct are specified in Schedule a of the procedure and Schedule b provides for minor lapses and delinquencies. Clause 6-B of the procedure provided that "without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force any employee who is found to be guilty of any of the acts of misconduct laid down in schedule a of this procedure may be liable to any one of the punishments indicated in clause 7, according to the gravity of the case, and the punishment will depend not only on the case under review, but also on his past record. " Clause 7 of the procedure provides the punishment for minor lapses and delinquencies, and acts of misconduct which are practically similar to the punishments specified in the Model Standing Orders referred to above. It also provides that "the following punishments may be awarded for good and sufficient reasons, including breaches of any rules of conduct, or for committing any of the offences mentioned in the schedules, according to the gravity of each case. (Please refer table on p. 371.) it is, therefore, apparent that the gravity of the case, past record and the good and sufficient reasons are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the nature and the quantum of the punishment. ( 7 ) AS discussed above, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is specified in Section 7 and Schedule 2 and that of the Tribunal is specified, in Section 7a and Schedules 2 and 3, Industrial Disputes Act. Section 11a is inserted in the Industrial Disputes act by Amending Act No. 45 of 1971 with effect from December 15, 1971, vesting the jurisdiction in the Labour Court and the tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment of discharge or dismissal, as the circumstances of the case may class of Misconduct Punishment minor lapsesand (a) Warning, delinquencies (b) Reprimand. (c) Fine upto 1/15 of the pay. (d) Recovery from pay of whole or part of pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by proved negligence or breach of order if within Rs. 50/ -. Acts of misconduct , (a) Recovery from, pay of the whole or part or pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by proved negligence or breach of orders if exceeding Rs. 50/ -. (b) Withholding increment for specific period. (c) Stoppage of increment with cumulative effect. (d) Stoppage of promotion. (e) Suspension. (f) Reduction to a lower post or to lower pay. (g) Termination of services. (h) Removal, (i) Discharge. (j) Dismissal. require. The jurisdiction and power of the Tribunal was not unlimited to interfere with the order of the management inflicting the punishment for the misconduct including the punishment for the discharge and dismissal. Though the managerial right to impose the discipline said hold the domestic inquiry to inflict the punishment was recognized, and to some extent was protected, even then that right was never considered to be unabridged or unlimited. We will just consider the law on the point. Though the managerial right to impose the discipline said hold the domestic inquiry to inflict the punishment was recognized, and to some extent was protected, even then that right was never considered to be unabridged or unlimited. We will just consider the law on the point. Prior to the insertion of Section 11a in the statute book, the guiding principles on the powers of the management to award punishment of discharge or dismissal or any other nature of punishment were practically same even though the reported judgment of the Supreme Court are mostly relating to the punishment of discharge or dismissal; In Western India Automobiles association v. The Industrizal Tribunal, bombay and Others, A. I. R. 1949 Federal couit 111, retied on by Shri Clarke, learned Advocate for the workmen, the facts were that the dispute arose between the Western India Automobile Association and Its Workmen and the question about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain that dispute, arose for consideration. It was held by the Single judge of the Bombay High Court that the Tribunal had jurisdiction, but the reinstatement of the dismissed employee was outside the scope of the Act. Both the sides preferred appeals and the division Bench dismissed the appeal preferred by the Association on the point of jurisdiction and allowed the appeal by the State as it was of the view that it was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to order the reinstatement. The Division bench held that the dispute as to the reinstatement of the dismissed employee was an industrial dispute between the employer and the employee within the meaning of the Act and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it. Before the Federal Court, the same points were agitated. Upholding the judgment of the division Bench of the Bombay High court, Their Lordships in terms observed that all that is required is that the ex-employee should be restored to his previous position so far as capacity, status and emoluments are concerned and there is nothing extraordinary in such restoration being ordered when considered necessary in the interests of peaceful settlement of industrial disputes. Adjudication does not mean adjudication according to the strict law of master and servant. Adjudication does not mean adjudication according to the strict law of master and servant. The award of the Tribunal may contain provisions for settlement of dispute which no Court could order if it was bound by ordinary law, but the tribunal is not fettered in any way by these limitations. Their Lordships extracted with approval the passage from labour Disputes and Collective bargaining, Volume I, by Ludwig Teller that the industrial arbitration may involve the extension of an existing agreement or the making of new one or in general the creation of the new obligation or modification of old ones, while commercial arbitration generally concerns itself with interpretation of existing obligations and disputes relating to existing agreements. In their lordships opinion, that is the true statement about the functioning of the industrial Tribunals in Labour Disputes. Even in 1949, Their Lordships expressed the view that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is not strictly confined to the rights and obligations of a master and servant or the agreements, but it is more than that and, for maintaining the industrial peace, the Tribunal can pass necessary such orders. Again in M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their workmen, A. I. R. 1958 SC 130, three judges of the Supreme Court, after considering the provisions of Sections 2 (1), 15 and the Standing Orders, while accepting the managerial right to certain extent, expressed the view that the light is not absolute and the Tribunal has limited jurisdiction to interfere with the order of punishment passed by the management in certain circumstances. As the criterion is laid down we shall extract the observations of Their Lordships, which are as follows: "undoubtedly, the management of a concern has power to direct its own internal administration and discipline; but the power is not unlimited and when a dispute arises, Industrial Tribunals have been given the power to see whether the termination of service of a workman is justified and to give appropriate relief. In cases of dismissal on misconduct, the tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. In cases of dismissal on misconduct, the tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (i) when there is a want of good faith, (ii) when there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, (iii) when the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials, the finding is completely baseless or perverse. " we have specifically extracted this paragraph as these views of the Supreme court led to the insertion of Section 11a, industrial Disputes Act. In the Chartered bank, Bombay v. The Chartered Bank employees Union and Another, AIR i960 SC 819, Their Lordships referred the judgment of Labour Appellate tribunal in Buckingham and Carnatic Co. v. Workers of the Company, 1952 Lab ac 490 (LATI) and approved the observation of the Tribunal to the effect that, if the termination of the service is colourable exercise of the power or as a result of the victimisation or unfair labour practice, the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to intervene and set aside the termination and in the case where the termination of the service is capricious, arbitrary or unnecessarily harsh on the part of the employer judging by the normal standards of reasonableness that will be cogent evidence of victimisation or unfair labour practice. Shri Shelat, learned Advocate for the management also referred Bengal bhatdee Coal Co. Ltd. v. Ram Probesh singh and Others, A. I. R, 1964 SC 486. Five Judges of the Supreme Court, while accepting the managerial right to some extent observed that there is no doubt that though in a case of proved misconduct normally the imposition of the penalty may be within the discretion of the management, but there may be cases where the punishment of dismissal for misconduct proved may be so unconscionable or so grossly out of proportion to the nature of the offence that the Tribunal may be able to draw an inference of victimisation merely from the punishment inflicted. In that case, the Tribunal held that the inquiry was proper, but set aside the order of dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of 13 workmen as it was held by the Tribunal that it was a case of victimisation. In that case, the Tribunal held that the inquiry was proper, but set aside the order of dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of 13 workmen as it was held by the Tribunal that it was a case of victimisation. Considering the facts of that matter, Their lordships of the Supreme Court observed that it could not be said to be unconscionable or grossly out of proportion to the nature of the offence. Their Lordships also did not accept the submission of victimisation and, ultimately, allowed the appeal setting aside the order of the Tribunal. It is, however, clear from the judgment that the scope and the ambit of jurisdiction of the Tribunal is widened and in case the punishment may be unconscionable or grossly- out of the proportion to the nature of the offence, that would be one of the reasons for the Tribunal to draw the inference of victimisation and set aside the order of dismissal. Anand bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Their employees, A. I. R. 1964 SC 339, is another judgment delievered by three judges of the Supreme Court reiterating practically the same position of law. Their lordships considering the provisions of section 15, Industrial Disputes Act and the Schedule, observed that, if the termination of the industrial employee services has been proceeded by a proper domestic inquiry which has been held in accordance with the rules of natural justice and the conclusions reached at the said inquiry are not perverse, the tribunal is not entitled to consider the propriety or correctness of the conclusions. If, on the other hand, in terminating the services of the employee, the management has acted maliciously or vindictively or has been actuated by a desire to punish the employee for his trade union activities, the Tribunal would be entitled to give adequate protection to the employee by ordering his reinstatement, or directing in his favour the payment of compensation; but if the inquiry has been proper and the conduct of the management in dismissing the employee is not mala fide, then the Tribunal cannot interfere with the conclusions of the inquiry officer, or with the orders passed by the management after accepting the said conclusions of the inquiry officer, or with the orders passed by the management after accepting the said conclusions. In M/s. Khardah and Co. In M/s. Khardah and Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen, A. I. R. 1964 SC 719, Their Lordships accepted the principles enunciated in M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited (supra), wherein the four tests are laid down by the Supreme Court for any one of which, the Tribunal can interfere with the managerial order. Concurring with that, their Lordships observed that the said view, accepted as the general view is that, if the inquiry is fairly held and leads to the conclusion that the charge framed against the employee is proved, the industrial Tribunal should not sit in appeal over the finding recorded at the said inquiry and should not interfere with the managements right to dismiss a workman who is found guilty of misconduct. The essential basis on which that view is found is that the inquiry conducted by the management before the domestic tribunal must be fair and just and in bringing home to the workman the charge framed against him, principles of natural justice must be observed. For the procedure and the jurisdiction and power of the Tribunal, in case the inquiry is held to be unfair, their Lordships observed that the employer can lead evidence before the tribunal and justify its action, but in such a case, the question as to whether the dismissal of the employee is justified or not would be open before the Tribunal and the Tribunal will consider the merits of the dispute and come to its own conclusion without having any regard for the view taken by the management in dismissing the employee. If the inquiry is good and the conduct of the management is not mala fide or vindictive, then of course, the Tribunal would not try to examine the merits of the findings as if it is sitting in appeal over the conclusions of the inquiry officer. In Tata oil Mills Company Ltd. v. The. Workmen, a. I. R. 1965 SC 155, the view expressed is that the findings properly recorded in domestic enquiries which are conducted fairly, cannot be re-examined by industrial adjudication unless the findings are either perverse or not supported by any evidence or some other valid reasons of that character. In Tata oil Mills Company Ltd. v. The. Workmen, a. I. R. 1965 SC 155, the view expressed is that the findings properly recorded in domestic enquiries which are conducted fairly, cannot be re-examined by industrial adjudication unless the findings are either perverse or not supported by any evidence or some other valid reasons of that character. In such a case, the fact that the finding is not accepted by the industrial Tribunal would not necessarily preclude the employer from justifying the dismissal of his employee on merits, provided, of course, he leads evidence before the Industrial Tribunal and persuades the Tribunal to accept his case. In M/s Hind Construction and engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, a. I. R. 1985 SC 917, three Judges of the Supreme Court, on referring the various judgments enunciated the principles for which the Tribunal can interfere with the finding and the quantum of punishment. Their Lordships proceeded to observe that it is now well settled law that the Tribunal is not to examine the finding or the quantum of punishment because the whole of the dispute is not really open before the tribunal as it is ordinarily before a Court of Appeal. The Tribunals powers have been stated by the Supreme Court in large number of cases and it has been ruled that the Tribunal can only interfere if the conduct of the employer shows lack of bona fides or victimisation of employee or employees or unfair labour practice. The Tribunal may in a strong case interfere with a basic error on a point of fact or a perverse finding, but it cannot substitute its own appraisal of the evidence for that of the officer conducting the domestic inquiry though it may interfere where the principles of natural justice or fair play have not been followed or where the inquiry is so perverted in its procedure as to amount to on inquiry at all. About the punishment, it has been ruled that the award of punishment for misconduct under the Standing Orders, if any, is a matter for the management to decide and if there is any justification for the punishment imposed, the Tribunal should not interfere. About the punishment, it has been ruled that the award of punishment for misconduct under the Standing Orders, if any, is a matter for the management to decide and if there is any justification for the punishment imposed, the Tribunal should not interfere. The Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe, but where the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, regard being had to the particular conduct and the past record or is such, as no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances, the Tribunal may treat the imposition of such punishment as itself showing victimisation or unfair labour practice. After the incorporation of Section 11a in Industrial Disputes Act, Supreme Court considered the effect of said Section on the managerial right and referred to many of its judgments on that point prior to 1973; in the Workmen of M/s Firestone type and Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. The Management and Others, A. I. R. 1973 SC 1227, Their Lordships were mainly concerned with the proper interpretation of Section 11 A, Industrial disputes Act, but after exhaustively referring to various decisions of the supreme Court dealing with the principles governing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal while adjudicating disputes relating to the dismissal or discharge, set out the following principles which broadly emerge from the decisions referred by their Lordships : (1) The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment are mainly management functions, but if a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see if action of the employer is justified, (2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to conduct a proper inquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The inquiry should not be an empty formality. (3) When a proper inquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the said inquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the inquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the inquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide. (4) Even if no inquiry has been held by an employer or if the inquiry held by him is found to be defective, the tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, has to give ah opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to ihe employee to adduce evidence contra. (5) The effect of an employer not holding an inquiry is that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case. On the other hand, the issue about merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. A case of defective inquiry stands on the same footing as no inquiry. (6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justification of the action i taken only, if no inquiry has been held or after the inquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective. (7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should straightaway without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employes, once it is found that no domestic inquiry has been held or the said inquiry is found to be defective. (8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct. (9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the inquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation. (10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order of dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid compensation is, as held by this Court in The Management of Panitole Tea estate v. The Workmen, 1971-1 SSC 742- ( AIR 1971 SC 2171 ) within the judicial decision of a Labour Court or tribunal. The observations in clause (9) relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to the effect that in the case when the evidence is placed before the Tribunal for the first time, the punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is harsh or suggest victimisation is not agreed to and contrary view is expressed by the supreme Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes limited v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor sabha and Others, AIR 1980 SC 1896 , paragraph 135, in which, after referring the judgment in Imperial Tobacco company of India v. Its Workmen, A. I. R. 1962 SC 1348, it is observed that, if it is found that the inquiry was not proper, the whole case was open before the labour Court to decide for itself whether the charge of misconduct was proved and what punishment should be awarded. ( 8 ) IN East India Hotels v. Their workman, AIR 1974, SC 696, Their lordships were considering the situation prior to incorporation of Section 11a in the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman was dismissed by the management and the Industrial Tribunal reappreciated the evidence as if it was the first appellate court and set aside the dismissal. ( 8 ) IN East India Hotels v. Their workman, AIR 1974, SC 696, Their lordships were considering the situation prior to incorporation of Section 11a in the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman was dismissed by the management and the Industrial Tribunal reappreciated the evidence as if it was the first appellate court and set aside the dismissal. Reiterating the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s Firestone Tyre (supra), Their Lordships in terms observed that in the undoubted exercise of the right of the employer to take disciplinary action, and to decide upon the quantum of punishment, both of which are the part of the managerial functions, what has to be seen is whether the employer before imposing the punishment had conducted a proper inquiry in accordance with the provisions of the standing Orders, if applicable, and the principles of natural justice. When a proper inquiry has been held by the employer and the finding of misconduct has support from the evidence adduced at the said inquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified when the inquiry is unfair or the findings arrived at in the inquiry are perverse or have no basis in evidence or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide or the punishment is harsh and oppressive. Once the misconduct is proved either in the inquiry conducted by the employer or by the evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time, the punishment imposed cannot be interefered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is harsh and oppressive. In M/s Bharat iron Works v. Bhagubhai Patel and others, A. I. R. 1976 SC 98, Their lordships considered the act of victimisation and unfair labour practice. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Others, a. I. R. 1980 SC 1896, the judgment in appeal against the judgment of the Gujarat high Court, Their Lordships, V. R. Krishna Iyer and D. A. Desai, JJ. , delivering the majority judgment, referred in paragraph 135 of the judgment, the views expressed in Indian Iron and Steel co. Ltd. (supra) and concurred. , delivering the majority judgment, referred in paragraph 135 of the judgment, the views expressed in Indian Iron and Steel co. Ltd. (supra) and concurred. About the defective inquiry, it was observed that it would amount to no inquiry and in either case, the Tribunal would have jurisdiction to go into the entire matter and the employer would have to satisfy the Tribunal that on the facts, the order of dismissal or discharge was proper. If it was found that the inquiry was not proper, the whole case was open before the Labour Court to decide for itself whether the charge of misconduct was proved and what punishment should be awarded. Considering the jurisdiction of the Tribunal prior to Section 11 A, Their lordships of the Supreme Court - D. A. Desai and V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.- in Ramakant Misra v. State of U. P. and Others, A. I. R. 1982 SC 1552, observed that "as the situation then stood, courts remained powerless and had to be passive sufferers incapable to curing the injustice. Parliament stepped in and enacted Section 11a of the Industrial disputes Act". Considering the provisions of Section 11a, it is observed that, before exercising the discretion conferred under section 11a, the Court has to be satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Their lordships proceeded to observe "these words indicate that even though misconduct is proved and a penalty has to be imposed, the extreme penalty of dismissal or discharge was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case meaning thereby that the punishment was either disproportionately heavy or excessive. As stated earlier it is well recongnized principle of jurisprudence which permits penalty to be imposed for misconduct that the penalty must be commensurate with the gravity of the offence charged. " In The Manekchowk and Ahmedabad Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. I. G. Thakore, 10 G. L. R. 786, this Court, after considering the various judgments of the supreme Court, observed that this, however, does not mean that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to interfere with the order of punishment framed by the management. It is also observed "whether or not the Industrial Tribunal itself would have given the same finding and given the same punishment if the matter had come for its decision, is not material. It is also observed "whether or not the Industrial Tribunal itself would have given the same finding and given the same punishment if the matter had come for its decision, is not material. Normally the awarding of proper punishment for misconduct under the standing Orders is the function of the management, and unless there is valid justification, the Tribunal should be slow to interfere with the exercise of that function". The order of dismissal was, accordingly, unheld. ( 9 ) IN Vilhoba Maruti Chavan v. S. Taki Bilgrami, 66 Bombay Law Reporter 426 - A. I. R. 1965 (Bombay) 81, the bombay High Court was considering the scope and ambit of the powers and jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial relations Act and expressed the view that the language employed by the legislature in Section 78 does unmistakably show that the powers of the Labour Court are wider than the powers of the Court exercising the revisional jurisdiction. The fact that the power to decide the dispute regarding the propriety and legality of an order passed by an employer acting under the Standing Orders is conferred on the Labour Court would mean that the Labour Court, in the interests of justice, either confirm or set aside the order made by the employer acting under standing Orders, also on the ground of its propriety or impropriety, with a view to preventing injustice. It is observed that, however, that does not mean that the labour Court will sit as a Court of Appeal or intei fere with the finding made by the domestic tribunal merely because the labour Court may take a different view of the evidence led before the domestic tribunal. A fresh or de novo inquiry is not contemplated if the inquiry conducted by the domestic tribunal has been fair and has been in accordance with the standing Orders. It is also observed "the section, however, gives ample powers to the Labour Court to interfere with a finding or with a punishment imposed by the employer as domestic Tribunal if such an interference is called for, on the ground of its impropriety in order to avoid grave injustice occurring in a particular case. It is also observed "the section, however, gives ample powers to the Labour Court to interfere with a finding or with a punishment imposed by the employer as domestic Tribunal if such an interference is called for, on the ground of its impropriety in order to avoid grave injustice occurring in a particular case. The powers have to be given a wide construction and it is difficult to lay down hard and fast rules indicationg the circumstances in which the Labour Court should interfere with an order made under the Standing Orders by the employer. Whether or not, under the circumstances of a case, such an interference to avoid grave injustice is necessary will depend on the facts of each case. " Even the bombay High Court, while considering the power of the Labour Court under section 78 was conscious of the limitation of such Labour Tribunals while interfering with the order passed in domestic inquiry. This High Court considered the same provisions of the bombay Industrial Relations Act in ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills Company lid. v. I. G. Thakore and Another, 6 g. L. R. 259 and agreed with the Bombay high Court in case of Vithoba (supra) that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not limited to the revisional jurisdiction and expressed the view that the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour court by said Section is an original jurisdiction. In the view of the High Court, the Labour Court is not exercising the revisional jurisdiction as the domestic tribunal is not an inferior tribunal to the labour Court and the order passed by the employer is or is purported to have been passed under the Standing Orders which are made determinative of the relationship between the employer and the employee. Even though the order is passed under the Standing Orders, such an order is subject to the scrutiry of the labour Court and the employee can file the application challenging the legality and propriety of such order. It is observed, "the Labour Court in dealing with such an application does not exercise revisional jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction, which is conferred on it by this Section is an original jurisdiction. Except that, such an application can only challenge the order on the ground of legality and propriety, there is ho limitation, such as a revisional jurisdiction would have. It is observed, "the Labour Court in dealing with such an application does not exercise revisional jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction, which is conferred on it by this Section is an original jurisdiction. Except that, such an application can only challenge the order on the ground of legality and propriety, there is ho limitation, such as a revisional jurisdiction would have. On the question as to the legality or propriety, the Labour court can and does usually record evidence that the parlies adduce which if it was revisional jurisdiction it cannot and would not record. " In a recent judgment in Ahmedabad New Textile mills v. Textile Labour Association, special Civil Application No. 5552. of 1984, decided on June 16, 1988 by the Division bench of the High Court in which one of us (A. M: Ahmadi, J.) was a party, the above referred Bombay High Court and Gujarat High Court judgments were cited in support for repelling the contention that the Labour Court while exercising jurisdiction under Sections 40 and 78, Bombay Industrial Relations Act has no power to interfere with the order of punishment. The penultimate observation was that the Labour Court is invested with wide jurisdiction to examine the propriety and legality of the employers order under the Standing orders and the order passed by the employer must be shown to be not only in conformity with law but also in conformity with justness and reasonableness. If the, order passed by the employer is so disproportionately harsh as to shock judicial conscience, the labour Court or the Industrial Court, as the case may be, would be entitled to interfere with the said order. It is, therefore, evident that the Bench also was conscious of the limited powers of the labour Court under Section 78 of the bombay Industrial Relation Act, in which the Court has powers to examine the 1992 (2) Gujarat State R. T. Corpon. v legality and propriety of the order passed by the employer. It is, therefore, evident that the Bench also was conscious of the limited powers of the labour Court under Section 78 of the bombay Industrial Relation Act, in which the Court has powers to examine the 1992 (2) Gujarat State R. T. Corpon. v legality and propriety of the order passed by the employer. ( 10 ) SHRI A. K. Clarke, learned Advocate for the workmen, while submitting that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing Orders as provided in Second schedule and Section 7 and 7a of the industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, has the wider jurisdiction to consider as to whether the order passed by the management is legally proper or just, referred the judgment 0f Supreme Court in Babulal Nagar and Others v. Shree synthetics Limited, A. I. R. 1984 SC 116a, in which Their Lordships of the Supreme court were considering the provisions of sections 61 and 66 of the M. P. Industrial relations Act. Entry (1) in Schedule 2 of the Act provided that the Labour Court may examine "the propriety or legality of an order passed of action taken by the employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders. " That order is revisable under Section 66 of the Act by the Industrial Court. Their Lordships were considering the relevent provisions of the Standing Orders relating to the penalty of dismissal or removal from the service. The meaning of expression propriety in the Oxford English dictionary is fitness; appropriateness; aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions; conformity with requirement; rule or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, etc. It is observed "if, therefore, the justice or justness in relation to the legal proceeding where evidence is led is questioned and the authority is conferred with jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the order or decision that authority will have the same jurisdiction as the original authority to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts. If any other view is taken the expression propriety would loss all significance. After referring judgments in Sarangpur Mills company Ltd (supra), Manekchowk ahmedabad Mfg. Company Ltd. (supra) and Vithoba Maruii Chavan (supra), it is observed "the power to decide propriety and legality of the order made under the Standing Orders does not confer mere revisional jurisdiction". If any other view is taken the expression propriety would loss all significance. After referring judgments in Sarangpur Mills company Ltd (supra), Manekchowk ahmedabad Mfg. Company Ltd. (supra) and Vithoba Maruii Chavan (supra), it is observed "the power to decide propriety and legality of the order made under the Standing Orders does not confer mere revisional jurisdiction". All the three judgments are referred by us and, therefore, we do not think necessary to repeat the observations. The provisions of Section 78, Bombay Industrial relations Act were being considered in the said judgments which are in pari materia to the provisions of Section 61 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial relations Act, which were being considered by the Supreme Court. Section 61, Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations act provides the power - (A) to decide - (a) dispute regarding which the application has been made to it under sub section (3) of Section 31 of the Act. Section 31 enables the employee to make an application for the relief against the order of an employer made under any of the Standing Orders. Relief against such order can be obtained by making an application under Section 61. A revision under Section 66 of the Act was provided against the order passed by the labour Court under Section 61 of the act. In the scheme of the M. P. Industrial relations Act, the application can be directly submitted to the Labour Court against the order of the management and the Labour Court is vested with the jurisdiction and power to decide such application. Even the revision is also provided against the order oi the Labour court. Section 78, Bombay Industrial relations Act, 1946 making provision for the power of the Labour Court, provides that (1) the Labour Court shall have power to - (A) decide - (a) dispute regarding - (i) the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing orders;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) industrial disputes - (i) referred to it under Section 71 or 72;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As provided in section 79, the proceedings before the labour Court commence on the application to be submitted to the Labour court. . . . . . . . . (b) industrial disputes - (i) referred to it under Section 71 or 72;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As provided in section 79, the proceedings before the labour Court commence on the application to be submitted to the Labour court. The appeal is provided against the order of the Labour Court in certain circumstances as provided in Section 84 of the Act. The decision of the Labour court deciding the propriety or legality of the order passed by the employer is appealable under Section 84 of the Act. It is clear that the Labour Court exercising the power and jurisdiction under Section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act or Section 61 of the Madhya Pradesh industrial Relations Act has jurisdiction to decide, on an application, the propriety and legality of the order and the order is appealable under Section 84 of the bombay Industrial Relations Act or revisable under Section 66 of the Madhya pradesh Industrial , Relations Act, respectively. The jurisdiction to decide such dispute is, therefore, specifically conferred on the Labour Court under the specified provisions of the Act. The jurisdiction to the Labour Court or the industrial Tribunal under the Industrial disputes Act is conferred under the relevant provisions of Sections 7, 7a and 15 respectively as discussed above, which do not confer the jurisdiction on the labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to decide the dispute on. an application by the affected party. The language employed in the said Section is not the same as that of Section 78, Bombay industrial Relations Act and no specific jurisdiction is conferred to decide such dispute on an application filed by the party. Under Section 7, Industrial disputes Act, the Labour Court can be constituted for the adjudication of the industrial disputes relating to the matter specified in Second Schedule and under section 7a, the Industrial Tribunal may be constituted for adjudication of the industrial disputes relating to the matters specified in Second and Third Schedules of the Act, and performing such other functions as may be assigned to the labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal under the Act. Section 11 provides for the procedure and power of the Labour court or the Industrial Tribunal, while section 15 imposes the duty on the Labour court or the Tribunal to decide the industrial dispute referred to it expeditiously and within the specified time. The Labour Court and the Industrial tribunal can take the congizance of the dispute only on the reference made to it by the appropriate Government under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The complaint can be filed to it under section 33a of the Act, but that provision is not much relevant for consideration. The appropriate Government may refer the industrial dispute to the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication if it is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. Sub-section (4), Section 10, Industrial disputes Act imposes the limitation on the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate those points and matters incidental thereto in an order referring the industrial dispute to them, or by subsequent order, the appropriate government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication. From the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is clear that unlike the powers of the Labour court under the Bombay Industrial tribunal has no jurisdiction to accept the application directly from the aggrieved party, but can adjudicate the dispute only on reference under Section 10, Industrial disputes Act and, in case the points are specified in the reference order, then only on those points. Under the scheme of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act or the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations act, the powers and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court are wider than the powers and jurisdiction of the Labour court or Industrial Tribunal under the industrial Disputes Act. The observations of the Supreme Court, and of the Bombay high Court and this Court in the judgments referred to above, therefore, are not decisive of the jurisdiction of the labour Court or Industrial Tribunal exercising the jurisdiction under the industrial Disputes Act. Even in the said judgments the jurisdiction of the Labour court under the relevant Acts is not considered to be absolute and it is clear that the Labour Court does not exercise jurisdiction as an appellate authority over the order by the management in domestic proceedings for misconduct. Even in the said judgments the jurisdiction of the Labour court under the relevant Acts is not considered to be absolute and it is clear that the Labour Court does not exercise jurisdiction as an appellate authority over the order by the management in domestic proceedings for misconduct. It is true that the jurisdiction is not limited to revisional jurisdiction, but it is also not the jurisdiction of an appellate authority. So far as that principle is concerned, we are also of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Industrial tribunal under the Industrial Disputes act to adjudicate on the Reference made to it for the dispute is not limited to the revisional jurisdiction, but it is certainly more than that, and at the same time, not the jurisdiction of an appellate authority. Even in case of Babulal (supra) in which the employee was dismissed and the Labour Court dismissed the application, but the industrial Court remanded the matter to the Labour Court for reconsideration. Their Lordships after considering the relevant provisions of the Act, observed that "it appears well-established that the labour Court having jurisdiction to examine the legality and propriety of the order made by the employer under the standing Orders will have jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the order which will permit it to come to a conclusion different from the one to which the employer arrived at". In case of Vithoba (supra), the observations of the Bombay high Court, which are approved by the supreme Court, it is held that the power to decide propriety and legality of the order made under the Standing Orders does not confer mere revisional jurisdiction but a wider jurisdiction which will enable the Labour Court to set aside the order of the employer depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In case of Babulal (supra), the Supreme court has not expressed the view that, while considering the legality and propriety, the Labour Court can exercise the appellate jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction and the power of the Labour court or Industrial Tribunal would have been widely conferred under the provisions of Sections 7, 7a and 15 respectively, the Legislature would never have thought it necessary to incorporate provisions of Section 11a in the statute. If the jurisdiction and the power of the Labour court or Industrial Tribunal would have been widely conferred under the provisions of Sections 7, 7a and 15 respectively, the Legislature would never have thought it necessary to incorporate provisions of Section 11a in the statute. We would also refer to previous two judgments of the Supreme Court delivered by the Larger Bench, in which the observations are that the propriety or correctness of the order cannot be considered by the Labour Court or tribunal under the I. D. Act except in certain circumstances. In Anand Bazar palrika (P) Ltd. (supra), three Judges of the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 8 that "if the termination of the industrial employees services has been preceded by a proper domestic inquiry which has been held in accordance with the rules of natural justice and the conclusions reached at the said inquiry are not perverse, the Tribunal is not entitled to consider the propriety or correctness of the conclusions. If, on the other hand, in terminating the services of the employee, the management has acted maliciously or vindictively or has been actuated by a desire to punish the employee for his trade union activities, the Tribunal would be entitled to give adequate protection to the employee by ordering his reinstatement, or directing in his favour the payment of compensation; but if the inquiry has been proper and the conduct of the management in dismissing the employee is not mala fide, then the Tribunal cannot interfere with the conclusions of the inquiry officer, or with the Orders passed by the management after accepting the said conclusions. " That view is expressed by three Judges of the Supreme Court and that judgment does not appear to have been cited before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of Babulal, which judgment is by two Judges of the supreme Court and, therefore, the view expressed in the earlier judgment stands. Similarly, three Judges of the Supreme court in M/s Hind Construction and engineering (supra), while considering the jurisdiction of the Labour Court - industrial Tribunal to interfere with the order of the management, observed "it is now well-settled law that the Tribunal is not to examine the finding or the quantum of punishment because the whole of the dispute is not really open before the Tribunal as it is ordinarily before a Court of Appeal. The Tribunals powers have been stated by this Court in large number of cases and it has been ruled that the Tribunal can only interfere if the conduct of the employer shows lack of bona fides or victimisation of the employee or unfair labour practice. The tribunal may in a strong case interfere with a basic error on a point of fact or a perverse finding, but it cannot substitute its own appraisal of the evidence for that of the officer conducting the domestic inquiry though it may interfere where the principles of natural justice or fair play have not been followed or where the inquiry is so perverted in its procedure as to amount to no inquiry at all. In respect of punishment for misconduct under the standing Orders, if any, is a matter for the management to decide and if there is any justification for the punishment imposed the Tribunal should not consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe. But where the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, regard being had to the particular conduct and the past record or is such, as no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances, the Tribunal may treat the imposition of such punishment as itself showing victimisation or unfair labour practice. " In both the judgments. Their Lordships were considering the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The jurisdiction and the powers of the labour Court are clearly set out by Their lordships in the said judgments. ( 11 ) WE shall now proceed to consider the scope and ambit of Section 11 A, industrial Disputes Act. Provisions of section 11a were incorporated as the supreme Court made certain observations, as set out above, in Indian iron and Steel Company Limited (supra ). The Supreme Court, while considering the Tribunals power to interfere with the managements decision to dismiss, discharge or terminate the services of workman, observed that in case of dismissal of misconduct, the Tribunal does not act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. The International Labour organization in its recommendation concerning termination of employment at the initiative of the employer adopted in June 1963, recommended that the worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment should be entitled to appeal against the termination, amongst others, to a natural body such as an arbitrator, a Court, an arbitration committee or a similar body and such body should be empowered to examine the reason given in the termination of employment and the other circumstances relating to the case and to render a decision on the termination. The international Labour Organization also recommended that the neutral body should be empowered to afford some other relief. As set out in the objects and the statement of the Amending Act 45 of 1971, the said reasons led to the insertion of section 11a in the statute book. Section 11 A, Industrial Disputes Act provides that where an Industrial Dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of the workman has been referred to the Labour Court, tribunal or National Tribunal, for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. The submission of learned advocates appearing for the management is that the power is confined only for the punishment of discharge or dismissal, while the submission of the learned advocatea appearing for the workman is that the intention of the Legislature was to empower or vest the jurisdiction to interfere with other kinds of punishment or to substitute one kind of punishment for another. Section 11a only empowers the Labour Court or the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment regarding the discharge or dismissal of the workman and it does not specifically refer to any other kind of punishment. Section 11a only empowers the Labour Court or the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment regarding the discharge or dismissal of the workman and it does not specifically refer to any other kind of punishment. It also empowers the Labour Court or Tribunal to interfere with the order of discharge or dismissal if it is not satisfied that such punishment was justified and in that case, it may set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct the reinstatement on such terms and conditions as it may think fit. The Labour Court or Tribunal may, in such cases, grant other relief including the lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal. As the section does not refer to other kinds of punishment, which the management is entitled to. award for certain acts of misconduct, it cannot be accepted that this Section empowers and vests jurisdiction in the Labour Court or tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment or to substitute other kinds of punishment than the one imposed by the management. The Legislature must be aware of the restricted jurisdiction and the powers of the Labour Court of the industrial Tribunal enunciated by various judgment of the Supreme Court, as discussed above, and even then did not vest the jurisdiction or empower the labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to interfere with or substitute other kinds of punishment than that of the discharge or dismissal. If at all the intention of the legislature, would have been to substitute other punishment, it would have specifically included them in Section 11a and would not have confined it to the punishment of discharge or dismissal. It also cannot be accepted that it reflects the intention of the policy of the legislature and, therefore, the said principles should also be made applicable to other kinds of punishment. If at all that would have been the policy and the legislature wanted to restrict the managerial power for other kinds of punishment, there was no reason for not making such provisions in Section 11a or in any other provisions of the Act. ( 12 ) THE provisions of Section 11a are extensively considered by the Supreme court in The Workmen of M/s Firestone tyre and Rubber Co. ( 12 ) THE provisions of Section 11a are extensively considered by the Supreme court in The Workmen of M/s Firestone tyre and Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. The Management and Others, A. I. R. 1973 SC 1127, in which the purposes and objects of incorporating Section 11a are set out. Their Lordships were considering the interpretation of Section 11a, industrial Disputes Act. After extensively discussing and setting out the law on the powers and jurisdiction of the Labour court or Industrial Tribunal dnder the industrial Disputes Act, Their Lordships considered change in the legal position effected by the incorporation of Section 11a and in terms observed that in the cases in which the employer had held the proper and valid domestic inquiry before passing of the order of punishment, the Tribunal had no power to interfere with the finding of misconduct recorded by the domestic inquiry unless the infirmity as pointed out in the case of indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (supra) existed. The conduct of the disciplinary proceeding and the punishment to be imposed were all considered to be the managerial function which the Tribunal has no power to interfere unless the findings were perverse or the punishment was so harsh as to lead to inference of victimisation or unfair labour practice. This position is now clothed with the power to reappraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by the employer established the misconduct alleged against the workman. What was orginally plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to the satisfaction being arrieved at by the tribunal that the finding of the misconduct is correct. The limitations imposed on the power of the Tribunal by the decision in Indian Iron and Steel company Ltd. no longer be invoked by the employer and the Tribunal is at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by the employer is correct, but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out. What was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer has ceased to be so, arid now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter. What was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer has ceased to be so, arid now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter. Considering the provisions of section 11 A, Industrial Disputes Act, supreme Court in Ramakant Misra v. State of U. P. and Others, A. I. R. 1982 sc 1552 observed that, it is now clear that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction and power to substitute its measure of punishment in place of managerial wisdom once it is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is also observed that before exercising the discretion conferred under Section 11a, the Court has to be satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and the said words indicate that, even though the misconduct is proved and the penalty has to be imposed, the extreme penalty of dismissal or discharge was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case meaning thereby that the punishment was either disproportionately heavy or excessive. Their Lordships of the supreme Court in case of The Workman of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (supra) proceeded to consider the circumstances in which no inquiry is held by the employer or even if the inquiry is held, the same is held to be defective. In such a case, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order had to give an opportunity to the -employer and employee to adduce evidence, even for the first time justifying the action. Even after the incorporation of Section 11a, that legal position has remained unchanged. In that case also the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and then it has to decide whether the misconduct alleged is proved and the exercise of managerial function does not arise at all. Their lordships observed that, both in respect of cases where the domestic inquiry has been held as also in the cases where the tribunal consider the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under Section 11a about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned is that of the tribunal. Their lordships observed that, both in respect of cases where the domestic inquiry has been held as also in the cases where the tribunal consider the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under Section 11a about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned is that of the tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or the other. Even in the cases where an inquiry has been held by the employer and the finding of misconduct is arrived at, the Tribunal can differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved. The Tribunal will have to reappraise the evidence for itself arriving at the proper conclusion. Ultimately, the Tribunal may hold that the misconduct is not proved or that the misconduct proved does not warrant the punishment of dismissal or discharge. Section 11a gives full power to the tribunal to go into the evidence and satisfy itself on both these points. The another change that has been effected by Section 11a is the power conferred on the Tribunal to alter the punishment imposed by the employer. Even though in case the misconduct is held to be established, the Tribunal may be of the opinion that the order of discharge or dismissal for the said misconduct is not justified and does not merit punishment by way of discharge or dismissal. In such circumstances, Tribunal may award only lesser punishment. The power to interfere with the punishment and alter the same is conferred by Section 11a on the tribunal. These observations by the supreme Court are an answer to the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the management. The effect and the change in the law by section 11a is, however, relating to the punishment of discharge and dismissal and not for other kinds of punishment. Managerial rights are now restricted to that extent under Section 11a and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the tribunal is widened to that extent so far as the finding of misconduct and the punishment of discharge and dismissal are concerned. The law on the point for other kinds of punishment except the punishment of discharge or dismissal remains unaffected by the provisions of section 11a, Industrial Disputes Act. The law on the point for other kinds of punishment except the punishment of discharge or dismissal remains unaffected by the provisions of section 11a, Industrial Disputes Act. ( 13 ) THE powers and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Industrial tribunal to interfere with the finding of misconduct and order imposing the punishment other than the punishment of discharge or dismissal is restricted even though the Labour Court or Tribunal had wider powers than revisionsl powers. It cannot exercise the powers of an appellate authority and reappraise the evidence and set aside the finding only because the other view is possible or even plausible. The Labour Court or the Tribunal also cannot interfere with the nature or the quantum of the punishment casually because it considers to impose other kind of punishment or to impose lesser punishment than the one awarded by the management. The Tribunal can interfere with the finding of misconduct or the nature and the quantum of the punishment only under the circumstances as set out above and specifically by various judicial pronouncements. The Tribunal can interfere with the finding of the management in the following circumstances : (1) Want of good faith. (2) Victimisation or unfair labour practice. (3) Basic error or violation of principles of natural justice. (4) Finding completely baseless or perverse. (5) Colourable exercise of power or want of bona fide, and (6) Punishment shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the particular conduct or the past record or is such that no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances unless he is actuated by considerations of victimisation or natural labour practice. The above circumstances are illustrative and not exhaustive and the tribunal can interfere with the finding or the punishment in circumstances alike also, but the Tribunal cannot interfere with the finding or nature and quantum of punishment casually or as if exercising appellate jurisdiction. ( 14 ) THE submission of Shri Shelat. learned Advocate for the management, that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction at all to interfere with the order in inquiry in which the punishment other than that of the discharge or dismissal is imposed, cannot be accepted. ( 14 ) THE submission of Shri Shelat. learned Advocate for the management, that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction at all to interfere with the order in inquiry in which the punishment other than that of the discharge or dismissal is imposed, cannot be accepted. Shri Shelat submits that provisions of Section 11a, Industrial disputes Act only empower the Tribunal to interfere with the order in which the punishment of discharge or dismissal is imposed and in no other order and, therefore, the Tribunal cannot interfere with any other order in which the other punishment is imposed. There is no provision under the Act prohibiting the tribunal in exercising the jurisdiction except in the case of punishment of discharge or dismissal. We have extensively discussed the provisions of sections. 7, 7a and 15, and the Schedule, and it is evident that the Tribunal has jurisdiction even to interfere with the order imposing the punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal. Even prior to the incorporation of Section 11 A, industrial Disputes Act, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment is recognized and accepted by the courts, of course, that is only under certain circumstances as discussed above. The acceptance of the submission would lead to absurd results and even in case of punishment other than that of discharge or dismissal which may lead to victimisation, the Tribunal will not be in a position to interfere and give proper justice to the workman. ( 15 ) THE submission by the learned advocates for the management that even if it is accepted that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to interfere in the nature and quantum of the punishment, it cannot substitute the nature or the quantum of the punishment except in the case of discharge or dismissal falling within the purview of Section 11a, Industrial disputes Act and should remand the matter back to the management for taking proper decision for the nature and the quantum of the punishment. For the same reasons recorded above, we cannot accept this submission. Once the Tribunal finds valid reasons as discussed above to interfere with the order of punishment, it can exercise its powers to consider the nature and the quantum of the punishment. The restricted jurisdiction is only to the extent of of inference in the finding and order of punishment. For the same reasons recorded above, we cannot accept this submission. Once the Tribunal finds valid reasons as discussed above to interfere with the order of punishment, it can exercise its powers to consider the nature and the quantum of the punishment. The restricted jurisdiction is only to the extent of of inference in the finding and order of punishment. The restricted jurisdiction is only to the extent of inference in the finding and order of punishment. But once the circumstances and the reasons exist for interfering with the finding or the punishment, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal cannot be restricted to remanding the matter to the management and not exercising the power to substitute the nature or the quantum of punishment. In some cases, that may also lead to absurd results as the management may impose same punishment and the workman will be compelled to approach the Tribunal again and that will cause much hardship and incovenience to the workman. In absence of any such provision, we think there is no reason to restrict the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as submitted by the learned Advocates for the management. 20a. We are conscious of the limited jurisdiction of the High Court under article 227, Constitution of India as laid down by the Supreme Court in Waryam singh and Another v. Amarnath and another, A. I. R. 1954 SC 215, The ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ramlahel Ramanand Raichand and others, A. I. R. 1972 SC 1598, Babhulmal raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and Another, A. I. R. 1975 SC 1297 and mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqum and others, A. I. R. 1984 SC 38, in which it is held that the High Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot interfere with the finding of the fact or the decision of the authorities below even if it may not agree with the reasons advanced by the said ahthority or merely because the decision of the authority is wrong. It is also well settled law that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the constitution of India is limited to seeing that the inferior court or the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the fact to the record, much less an error of law. It is also well settled law that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the constitution of India is limited to seeing that the inferior court or the Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the fact to the record, much less an error of law. The High Court has also no jurisdiction to review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or Tribunal is purported to have been based, but the function of the High Court is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. Guided by these. principles, we shall now consider the orders passed by the Tribunals and ascertain whether the Tribunal in each case has functioned within the limits of its authority or the limited jurisdiction, as discussed above. ( 16 ) KEEPING in view the above position of law about the limited jurisdiction of the Tribunal, we shall consider the order of the Tribunal interfering with the order of punishment in each case. We have discussed the facts of each case above and, therefore, we shall confine only to the final order of punishment. Special Civil Application No. 327 of 1985 : ( 17 ) THE negligence of the workman was established and he was put on the minimum of the time- scale. In the view of the Tribunal, the conductor had put in service of five years and putting him back on the lowest time scale would amount -to loss of five years increments which is a bit harsh. The Tribunal has not found that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to call for the interference by the Tribunal. As such there was no valid reason for the Tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment. The Tribunal exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it and did not function within the limits of authority and, therefore, the order by the Tribunal should be set aside and that of the departmental appellate authority should be restored. We, accordingly, allow the petition, set aside the order by the Industrial Tribunal, rajkot and reinstate the order of the departmental appeallate authority. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. We, accordingly, allow the petition, set aside the order by the Industrial Tribunal, rajkot and reinstate the order of the departmental appeallate authority. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 4225 of 1986: ( 18 ) THE Tribunal found that the respondent-driver was negligent and the accident resulted in the death of the shepherd and some goats. In view of the tribunal, the punishment of putting the respondent driver back in the lowest stage of the time-scale is too harsh and the recurring monthly loss would be about rs. 100/ -. The Tribunal, accordingly, substituted the punishment by the punishment of withholding of the increments for two years with permanent effect. It is, therefore, evident that the tribunal found that the driver was negligent and the death of the shepherd and goats were caused by the negligent driving of the driver, and even then, interfered with the order of punishment by observing that it is too harsh. It appears that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that the respondent driver was reinstated in service by the appellate authority. The punishment awarded can never be considered to be shockingly harsh or the act of victimisation. As such, there was no convincing reason for the tribunal to interfere with the order by the appellate authority. The order by the tribunal, therefore, should be set aside and that of the appellate authority should be reinstated. We, therefore, allow the petition, set aside the order by the tribunal and restore the order passed by the appellate authority. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 4470 of 1986: ( 19 ) BY the misconduct of the respondent no. 2, the damage was caused to the extent of Rs. 2377/- and that was directed to be recovered from him by 47 instalments. Even though the Tribunal had no other evidence before it to assess the damage, it reduced the amount of damage caused, to Rs. 500/- by observing "looking from all angles, if an amount of Rs. 500/- by way of damage is recovered from the respondent, then also the principles of natural justice would be met". As such, there was absolutely no valid reason for the Tribunal to interfere with the order by the Competent authority. 500/- by observing "looking from all angles, if an amount of Rs. 500/- by way of damage is recovered from the respondent, then also the principles of natural justice would be met". As such, there was absolutely no valid reason for the Tribunal to interfere with the order by the Competent authority. As such, the Tribunal exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it and, therefore, the order passed by the tribunal should be set aside and that of the Competent Authority to recover the amount of Rs. 2377/- be restored. Petition is allowed, the order by the Industrial tribunal, Rajkot is set aside and that of the Competent Authority, directing to recover Rs. 2377/- by 47 instalments is reinstated. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 5815 of 1986: ( 20 ) THE road booking in violation of the instructions was established even though the dishonesty of the conductor was not held to be proved, in spite of the fact that the tickets were not issued to certain passengers after the fare was collected and, therefore, the punishment of reducing four stages in scale of pay of the respondebt No. 2 was passed. The tribunal agreed with the finding of the inquiry authority, but held that the punishment was harsh and excessive looking to the gravity of the default. The tribunal, accordingly substituted the penalty of placing the respondent No. 2 one stage back without permanent effect. As such, there was no convincing reason for the Tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment and it appears that the tribunal has substituted the punishment as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal, accordingly exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it and did not function within the limits of its authority. The order by the Tribunal, therefore, should be set aside and that of the Competent Authority should be restored. We, therefore, allow the petition, set aside the order by the Industrial tribunal, Rajkot and restore the order passed by the departmental Competent authority. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 4735 of 1987. . ( 21 ) THE respondent-conductor had collected fare from 14 passengers, but had not issued the tickets and had kept the tickets in his hand, and the way bill was also found corrected. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 4735 of 1987. . ( 21 ) THE respondent-conductor had collected fare from 14 passengers, but had not issued the tickets and had kept the tickets in his hand, and the way bill was also found corrected. The order of the dismissal passed by the enquiry authority was set aside by the appellate authority and the respondent was reinstated with the minimum scale of pay. The Industrial tribunal observing that the respondent had put in the service of eight years and the punishment would entail the perpetual loss of eight increments, resulting into serious financial loss to the respondent, substituted the punishment by withholding increments for two years without permanent effect. It is apprarent that the Tribunal has not observed that the punishment was shockingly harsh or imposed because of the victimisation. As such, there was no valid reason for the tribunal to substitute the punishment. The Tribunal exercised the. jurisdiction not vested in it and did not function within limit of authority. The order by the tribunal, therefore, should be set aside and that of the appellate authority should be restored. Petition is allowed, the order by the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad is set aside and the order passed by the departmental appellate authority is restored. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 5207 of 1987: ( 22 ) FOR the misconduct of misappropriating the money by the respondent No. 1-conductor by not issuing the ticket and for other acts of misconduct, he was dismissed in departmental inquiry and that punishment was confirmed in First appeal, but the Second Appellate authority directed reinstatement, but awarded the punishment of putting the respondent on the minimum of the pay scale, in spite of the fact that various acts of default were committed by the respondent in past. The Industrial tribunal, Ahmedabad reduced the penalty, directing to withhold the increments for three years with permanent effect only on the ground that the respondent will be financially affected by such punishment as he had put in the service of about 15 years. In view of the proved misconduct and dishonesty, there was no reason as such for the tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment. In view of the proved misconduct and dishonesty, there was no reason as such for the tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment. The Tribunal exercised the jurisdiction not vested it it and exceeded the authority, and, therefore, the order of the Tribunal should be set aside, the petition is allowed. The order by the industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad is set aside and that of the Second Appellate authority is restored. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 822 of 1988. ( 23 ) THE misconduct of the respondent-conductor for not issuing the tickets to the passengers was proved and he was placed in the pay-scale at the initial salary, but in appeal, three stages in the pay-scale were reduced. The tribunal reduced the penalty to withholding the increment for one year without permanent effect. In view of the tribunal, the said economic loss would be unbearable to the respondent and, therefore, the punishment was substituted. As such, even the Tribunal did not record any convincing reason to interfere with the order of punishment. The Tribunal exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it and did not function within the limits of the authority vested in it and, therefore, the order of the Tribunal interfering in the order of punishment should be set aside and the punishment imposed by the appellate authority should be restored. Petition is, accordingly, allowed. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 1359 of 1988: ( 24 ) THE misconduct did not involve dishonesty and the Tribunal also found that the punishment for attending duty one hour late was excessive, harsh and punitive. The workman had lost the past wages also. The punishment being oppressive, leading to the inference of victimisation of the workman, the tribunal was justified in interfering with the order of punishment. Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 2337 of 1988: ( 25 ) THE misconduct of misappropriating the money by collecting the fare, but not issuing the tickets, etc. was held to be proved, but with a view to giving him an opportunity to improve, the punishment of reducing to the initial pay-scale for three years was inflicted. The Tribunal substituted the punishment by reducing one increment with permanent effect. was held to be proved, but with a view to giving him an opportunity to improve, the punishment of reducing to the initial pay-scale for three years was inflicted. The Tribunal substituted the punishment by reducing one increment with permanent effect. As such, the Tribunal did not record any convincing reason for interfering with the order of punishment. The punishment also could not be said to be oppressive or harsh meriting the interference by the Tribunal. The tribunal erred in exercising the jurisdiction or authority not vested in it and reduced the sentence without valid reasons as if exercising the appellate jurisdiction. The order by the Industrial tribunal, Rajkot in interfering with the order of punishment is set aside and that of the departmental authority is restored. Petition is allowed, accordingly. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. Special Civil Application No. 3544 of 1988: ( 26 ) THE facts are extensively discussed above. It is apparent that the respondent was in possession of the cheque-book and cheque was lost, and some other acts were also committed by the respondent, which facilitated the withdrawal of Rs. 74. 500/- from the bank under forged signatures. In a departmental inquiry, the Competent authority directed to stop two increments of the respondent with future effect and the period of suspension of the respondent was treated as the suspension period with 50 per cent of the salary. The appeal was also dismissed by the appellate authority. The Industrial Tribunal Ahmedabad upheld the order of the Chief Executive officer to consider the suspension period as period under suspension, but considering the fact that the respondent was acquitted in the criminal case and, therefore, in departmental inquiry lighter charges were proved and observing that the Corporation was not caused any financial loss by the negligence of the respondent, the Tribunal directed to pay the salary for the period of suspension and also interfered with the order withholding two increments with permanent effect and directed to withhold two increments without permanent effect. It is clear from the discussion that the misconduct of the respondent was proved and because of his negligence, the cheque was lost from his custody and it was presented in the bank, and the amount of Rs. 74,500/- was withdrawn. It is clear from the discussion that the misconduct of the respondent was proved and because of his negligence, the cheque was lost from his custody and it was presented in the bank, and the amount of Rs. 74,500/- was withdrawn. It was also proved that the respondent did not care to tally the amount with the bank in spite of the instruction. The Tribunal had, therefore, no valid reason to hold that no loss was caused to the Corporation because of the negligence of the respondent. It is also clear that the criminal case was filed against the respondent and he was suspended and the departmental inquiry was instituted against him for the acts of misconduct, and, ultimately, some charges were proved. In such circumstances, there was no valid reason for the Tribunal to direct to pay the salary for the suspension period or to interfere with the order of punishment. The Tribunal exercised the jurisdiction and authority not vested in it and, therefore, the order of the Tribunal should be set aside. The petition is, accordingly, allowed. The order by the industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad is set aside and that of the punishment imposed in the departmental inquiry is restored. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. ( 27 ) I have read the elaborate judgment prepared by my learned Brother Chauhan j. , and while I agree with the conclusion reached by him, I would like to say a few words of my own since it is of late noticed that Labour Courts/industrial tribunal lightly interfere with the punishment imposed by the management as if they are appellate authorities resulting in a spate of such litigation. Case have come to the notice of this Court, and many of the cases on hand are instances of such cases, where, even after the legality and the validity of the departmental inquiry is upheld and the misconduct is held proved, the Labour court /industrial Tribunal interfere with the order of punishment as if the same is capable of being weighed in golden scales. This attitude of the Labour court /industrial Tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment as a matter of course and not merely in genuine cases where it is found to be harsh or excessive, has encouraged litigation as it has given rise to the belief that the punishment would invariably be reduced by the labour Court/industrial Tribunal. In several cases the management approached this Court under Article 227 of the constitution of India complaining that the labour Court/industrial Tribunal had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law and, therefore, we thought it wise to clearly indicate the parameters of the labour Court/industrial Tribunals jurisdiction to interfere with the order of punishment in cases where the departmental enquiry is found to be legal and valid and the alleged misconduct fully established and the punishment imposed is short of dismissal or discharge. There is no controversy that in cases where the employer has visited the workman with the penalty of dismissal or discharge, section 11a of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) empowers the Labour Court/industrial tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment. In order that even advocates having similar matters wherein this point is involved but which are not listed, may have an opportunity to put forth their say, we directed the office to put up a notice on the notice board of the Court inviting all those interested in the outcome of the point raised before us to appear as intervenors. Accordingly, a few learned advocate appeared before us as intervenors. ( 28 ) THE point under consideration may broadly be formulated thus : Whether in a case where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal that the workman was found guilty of misconduct at an inquiry held in accordance with law and consistently with the principles of natural justice, it is open to the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal to interfere with the order of punishment passed by the employer and substitute it by its own punishment even if the punishment imposed by the employer is short of dismissal or discharge from service not attracting Section 11a of the act ? On behalf of the management it was contended that in such cases the labour Court/industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere at all with the quantum of punishment (some made a concession that interference would be justified in cases where the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the established guilt) whereas on behalf of the workman it was argued that the jurisdiction of the Labour court/industrial Tribunal under the Act was wide enough to permit such interference. In order to appreciate these extreme rival points of view, it may be advantageous to bear in mind the scheme of the Act in so far as it relates to adjudication of such disciplinary disputes. ( 29 ) THE act was enacted to provide for the investigation and settlement of industrial dispute meaning any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. Section 2-A provides that if ah employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the service of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer of the type indicated earlier shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute. Section 7 empowers the appropriate government to constitute one or more labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any of the matters in the Second Schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned under the Act. Under Section 7a the appropriate Government may constitute one or more Industrial tribunals for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second or the Third Schedule. Section 10 provides inter alia that if it appears to the appropriate Government that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may by a written order refer such dispute or any matter connected with or relevant to that dispute to the Labour Court or Industrial tribunal, as the case may be. Section 11 indicates the procedure to be followed by such Labour Court /industrial tribunal. The matters enumerated in the second Schedule are :"1. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an Employer under the standing orders;2. The applications and interpretation of standing orders;3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed;4. The matters enumerated in the second Schedule are :"1. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an Employer under the standing orders;2. The applications and interpretation of standing orders;3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed;4. Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege;5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or lock-out; and6. All matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule. "and those enumerated in the Third schedule are :"1. Wages, including the period and mode of payment;2. Compensatory and allowances;3. Hours of work and rest intervals;4. Leave with wages and holidays;5. Bonus, profit sharing, provident fund and gratuity;6. Shift working otherwise than in accordence with standing orders;7. Classfication by grades;8. Rules of discipline. "it is thus obvious that compulsory adjudication of industrial disputes through specially established forums was introduced with a view to avoiding confrontation which may disturb peace and affect production. The power conferred under the Act on industrial adjudicators is, therefore, very wide and is not confined to giving effect to contractual obligations only but extends to creating new rights and obligation or modifying the existing ones if that be necessary for maintaining industrial peace and preventing victimisation or unfair labour practice; Thus the power conferred on these bodies is wider than that of a civil Court. Therefore, in cases where two competing claims are under adjudication, it is open to the industrial adjudication to modify existing contracts pip introduce new obligations, which a civil Court cannot do, provided the interest of industrial peace so demands and valid reasons consistent with the provisions of the statute exist. This would no doubt depend on the circumstances of each case and the need of the industry. It is not necessary to dwell on this point any longer since the question which this court/industrial Tribunal can interfere with the managerial discretion of the employer in the matter of imposition of punishment for proved misconduct of an employee after proper hearing at a domestic enquiry if the punishment falls short of termination of employment by way of discharge or dismissal and the action of the management is bona fide. To put it differently, is it wihtin the ambit of the Labour Court/industrial Tribunals jurisdiction to interfere with the employers discretion in the field of disciplinary jurisdiction and reduce the penalty imposed by the employer after the charge of misconduct was proved at a properly held domestic enquiry even when the punishment imposed is short of dismissal or discharge and the Labour court/industrial Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the enquiry was in accordance with the principles of natural justice and finding of guilt was not perverse or mala fide? Such a power is specifically conferred in cases of discharge or dismissal under the newly inserted Section 11a by Industrial disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971 (45 of 1971) with effect from December 15,1971. The newly added section reads as under :"11-A. Powers of Labour Courts. Industrial Tribunals and National tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen: Where an Industrial disputes relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter. "the Statement of Objects and Reasons disclose two reasons which necessitated the insertion of this provision, namely, (i) the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their workmen, (1958) 1 LL. J. 260 = A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 130 wherein the Supreme court observed that in cases of dismissal or misconduct the Tribunal does not act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management unless want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. Ltd. v. Their workmen, (1958) 1 LL. J. 260 = A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 130 wherein the Supreme court observed that in cases of dismissal or misconduct the Tribunal does not act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management unless want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. , on the managements part is proved; and (ii) the recommendation No. 119 of I. L. O. concerning the workers right to challenge his terminationn before a neutral body. Therefore, in cases where the employer has visited the workman with the punishment of discharge or dismissal, the labour Court/industrial Tribunal is specifically empowered, to interfere with the order of punishment if the same is not justified and substitute the same with such punishment as it considers appropriate. But this power is specifically confined to cases of discharge or dismissal and not to other case where the punishment imposed is short of that. That would ordinarily mean that the legislature intended to permit interference in managerial discretion by the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal in cases where the punishment results in termination of employment and not in all cases. In other words, cases of punishment other than discharge or dismissal would continue to be governed by the law laid down by judicial pronouncements prior to the insertion of section 11a in the Act. It would, therefore, be advantageous to examine the case law in this behalf as obtaining section 11a was placed on the statute book. 4. Before I proceed to set out the position obtaining before the introduction of Section 11a, it is necessary to state that in law before an employer visits his wokrman with punishment for misconduct it is incumbent on him to conduct an enquiry against the workman on specific charges in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the standing Orders. If the punishment is imposed after an enquiry as stated above, the question is, whether the Labour court/industrial Tribunal can interfere with the order of punishment and if yes, under what circumstances. If the punishment is imposed after an enquiry as stated above, the question is, whether the Labour court/industrial Tribunal can interfere with the order of punishment and if yes, under what circumstances. However, if it is found that the employer had not held any enquiry or the enquiry held was defective being in violation of the standing Orders or the principles of natural justice, the Labour court/industrial Tribunal cannot proceed to direct reinstatement straightway but must permit the employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the labour Court/industrial Tribunal to prove the misconduct and to support the order if the employer seeks leave to adduce such evidence. In such a case, if the employer succeeds in proving the misconduct of the workman, the question is, whether the Labour Court/industrial tribunal can interfere with the quantum of punishment. Let us now turn to the case law obtaining before the insertion of Section 11a in the Act. 5. In the first leading case, Western india Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, (1949) LL. J. 243 = A. I. R. 1949 F. C. 111, the federal Court, while enunciating the extent of jurisdiction of the adjudicatory machinery under the Act said, per mahajan J. , that adjudication did not mean adjudication according to the strict law of master and servant and it was open to the adjudicatory forums to travel beyond the same and order reinstatement of a dismissed worker if that was essential to maintenance of industrial peace. In buckingham and Carnalic Co. Ltd, v. Workers. (1952) L. A. C. 490, the Labour appellate Tribunal for the first time clearly indicated the parameters of jurisdiction of the adjudicatory forums to interfere with the otherwise exclusively managerial function of taking disciplinary action against its erring workers. It however said that the power could be exercised (i) where there is want of bona fides on the part of the employer, or (ii) the action smacks of victimisation and/or unfair labour practice, or (iii) there is a basic error of facts, or (iv) the finding on material facts is perverse. It however said that the power could be exercised (i) where there is want of bona fides on the part of the employer, or (ii) the action smacks of victimisation and/or unfair labour practice, or (iii) there is a basic error of facts, or (iv) the finding on material facts is perverse. Later, the supreme Court in Indian Iron and Steel companys case (supra) reiterated that the managements power in the field of exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction over its workmen was not absolute and unfettered and could be interfered with if a dispute is referred for adjudication in cases where the termination of service is the result of (i) want of good faith on the employers part, or (ii) there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, or (iii) when the management is guilty of a basic errors or violation of the principle of natural justice, or (iv) when on the materials on record, the finding is completely baseless or perverse. It, however, clarified that this jurisdiction of the adjudicatory forums to interfere with the managerial discretion or function was not of appellate nature and did not permit it to subsitute its own judgment in place of that of the management unless one of the four circumstances mentioned above is shown to exist. Absence of good faith, victimisation or unfair labour practice are grounds touching the bona fides of the employer and render the infliction of punishment unsustainable in law whereas commission of basic error or infraction of the principles of natural justice or a finding which is wholly baseless or perverse bear on the fairness and propriety of the decision of the management. It is therefore, clear from this decision that while the Supreme court recognised the power of adjudicatory forums to interfere in matters of discipline to the limited extent of the case falling within one of the four stipulations delineated above, it at the same time cautioned that the role of such forums was not of appellate nature, meaning thereby, that it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the employer even if any one of the four conditions did not exist. In view of this decision and having regard to the recommendation no. 119 of the I. L. O. the legislature stopped in by introducing Section 11a on the statute book. In view of this decision and having regard to the recommendation no. 119 of the I. L. O. the legislature stopped in by introducing Section 11a on the statute book. By this new provision the limitation placed by the Supreme court was sought to be lifted by permitting the adjudicatory authorities to interfere in cases of discharge or dismissal if the concerned authority found that the order was not justified and has entitled the said authority to substitute the punishment. Since Section 11a is limited in scope, in that, it governs cases of punishment of discharge or dismissal only, it follows by necessary implication that the legislature did not intend to clothe the adjudicatory authorities with similar power where the punishment is other than discharge or dismissal. The legislative intent is obvious, namely, it did not desire that the managerial prerogative of taking disciplinary action against the erring workmen should be absolute or unlimited even in cases of termination of service presumably because it was apprehended that such extreme, unchecked and unfettered power may not be conducive to maintenence of industrial peace. The view expressed by the Supreme court in Indian Iron and Steel Companys case (supra) was followed in subsequent cases: (1) Chartered Bank v. Chartered bank Employees Union, (1960) II LL. J. 222 = A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 919; (2) bengal Bhaldee Coal Co. Ltd. v. Ram probesh Singh (1963) 1 LL. J. 291 = A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 486; (3) Anand Bazar palrika (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1963) II LL. J. 670 : A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 399; (4) M/s. Khardah and Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1963) II LL. J. 452 A. I. R 1964 S. C. 719; (5) Tata Oil Mills co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1964) II LL. J. 113 = A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 155; (6) hind Construction and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1965) I LL. J. 462 = A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 917, etc. J. 452 A. I. R 1964 S. C. 719; (5) Tata Oil Mills co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1964) II LL. J. 113 = A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 155; (6) hind Construction and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1965) I LL. J. 462 = A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 917, etc. , and it was emphasised that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal to interfere with the managements right to decide on the quantum of punishment could not be interfered with unless the case fell within one of the four grounds delineated earlier or the punishment was so grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct as no reasonable man would inflict unless actuated by malice or vendetta. This was the position in law till the introduction of Section 11-A in the Act. ( 30 ) AFTER the insertion of Section 11 A, the Supreme Court, in the Workmen of firestone Tyre and Rubber Co, of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management. (1973) 1 LL, J. 278 = A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 1227, held that the light to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment was essentially a managerial function and although the adjudicatory authority had the power to oversee the action taken, it has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the employers decision and substitute it by its own decision unless the findings arrived at are perverse or the management is guilty of want of bona fides, victimisation or unfair labour practice. In cases of no enquiry or defective enquiry, if the employer adduces evidence and proves the misconduct, it could not be permissible to interfere with the punishment unless the punishment is so harsh as to smack of victimisation. In east India Hotels v. Their Workmen, (1974) 1 LL. J. 282 = A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 696, M/s. Bharat Iron Works v. Bhanubhai Balubhai Patel, A. I. R. 1976 s. C. 98 and -Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 1 LL. J. 137 = A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 1896, the principles enunciated by the supreme Court in Indian Iron and Steel co. J. 137 = A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 1896, the principles enunciated by the supreme Court in Indian Iron and Steel co. Ltd. (supra) and in Firestone Tyre and Rubber Companys case (supra) were approved except that in the last mentioned case it was held that in the case of no inquiry or defective inquiry the whole matter including that of punishment is at large before the authorities before which evidence is adduced for the first time. In manekchowk and Ahmedabad manu/acturing Co. Ltd. v. I. G. Thakore industrial Court. (1967) 1 LL. J. 463 = 10 G. L. R. 786, this Court was required to point out that merely because the labour Court/industrial Tribunal has power to interfere with the managerial prerogative in certain specified cases, it does not mean that it can substitute its own finding and punishment by the one it would have recorded had the matter come up before it for the first time. In cases where two views are possible, it is not open to the adjudicatory authority to substitute its view in place of the one recorded by the employer. ( 31 ) IT will be seen from the above discussion that the position in law before and after the insertion of Section 11a has been consistent in so far as cases other than termination of service by an order of discharge or dismissal are concerned. It is only in cases of discharge or dismissal that the legislature enlarged the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory forums to interfere with the order of punishment by introducing Section 11-A in the Act. The tendency of the Labour court/industrial Tribunal to lightly interfere with the order of punishment, in cases where punishment inflicted is short of dismissal or discharge, as if it were exercising appellate jurisdiction must be deprecated. It must be remembered that the quantum of punishment cannot be measured in golden scales and will offer from individual to individual depending on his notions of discipline but the Labour Court/industrial tribunal will not be justified in interfering with the employers order of punishment merely because it would have visited the workmen with a lighter punishment if it were wearing the employers shoes. It is only in cases where the Labour court/industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion, for reas to be stated in writing, that the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the proved misconduct, that it my interfere with the order of punishment. Such cases would be far and few. Unfortunately, we have noticed that Labour court/industrial Tribunal freely interferes with the quantum of punishment, some of the cases on hand are examples of unwarranted interference, which has been responsible for generating a lot of avoidable litigation. That is why it was thought that the time was ripe for clearly stating the jurisdictional parameters of the Labour court/industrial Tribunal in such cases. However, a word of caution for the managements seems necessary, namely, that it must act in a responsible manner in the choice of punishment from the wide range of censure to dismissal if it does not want the Labour Court/industrial tribunal to interfere on the ground that the severity of the punishment betrays victimisation. ( 32 ) BEFORE I part, I must refer to two decisions on which considerable reliance was placed on behalf of the workmen. These are (1) Vithoba Maruti Chavan v. Taki Bilarami, 66 Bom. L. R. 426 = A. I. R. 1965 Bombay 81 and Babulal nagar v. Shri Syenthetics Ltd. A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1164, This Court had occasion to consider the impact of both these decisions in The Ahmedabad New textile Mills v. Textile Labour association. Special Civil Application No. 5552 of 1984 decided on 16-17th June 1988. Therein also it was pointed out that the Labour Court exercising power under section 79 read with Section 78 (1), paragraph A, clause (a) (1) of the Bombay industrial Relations Act, 1946 can interfere with the order of punishment if the same is found to be so harsh as to shock judicial conscience. In Vithobas case (supra) the Court while interpreting the same provision observed that the section gave ample power to the Labour court to interfere with the punishment to avoid injustice which can only happen in cases where the punishment is disproportionate to the proved misconduct. In Manekchowk which too was under the same provision, this Court pointed out that the adjudicatory forum will not interfere with the order of punishment unless it was shockingly disproportinate to the act said to have been committed the workman. In Manekchowk which too was under the same provision, this Court pointed out that the adjudicatory forum will not interfere with the order of punishment unless it was shockingly disproportinate to the act said to have been committed the workman. ( 33 ) IN Babulals case (supra) the supreme Court was considering the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in the context of similar provisions contained in Sections 61 and 66 of the Madhya pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. Dealing with the expression propriety or legality of an order it proceeded to observe in paragraph 14 that the adjudicatory authority under the enactment had the same jurisdiction as the original authority to come to a different conclusion on the same facts that the one recorded by the disciplinary authority. It was said that since item No. 1 of Schedule II of the Act employed the same expression it must follow that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court/ industrial Tribunal is wide enough to permit taking of a different view on the same facts. However, it must be realised that the scheme of the Bombay as well as the Madhya Pradesh Act is not similar to the scheme of the Act with which we are concerned. Besides, there is no specific observation in Babulals case to indicate that the Labour Court is entitled to exercise jurisdiction akin to appellate jurisdiction although the observations are couched in wide language. Be that as it may, it must be remembered that so far as the extent of jurisdiction under the act is concerned, the same has been the subject of scrutiny in several decisions of the Supreme Court, some of them by larger benches, and it seems well settled from the catena of decisions referred to earlier that the Labour Court/industrial tribunal exercising jurisdiction under the act is not exercising appellate powers and can interfere with the employers order in certain stated circumstances only. Further, the introduction of Section 11a also by necessary implication rules out the construction that the Labour court/industrial Tribunal can interfere in any and every order passed by the management short of discharge or dismissal as if its jurisdiction was akin to the employers disciplinary jurisdiction. If that was the true interpretation, where was the need to insert Section 11a and enlarge the jurisdiction of the Labour court/industrial Tribunal in cases of discharge and dismissal? If that was the true interpretation, where was the need to insert Section 11a and enlarge the jurisdiction of the Labour court/industrial Tribunal in cases of discharge and dismissal? Such a view would render the entire line of decisions starting from Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. , and ending with Gujarat Steel Tubes ltd. , otiose. Since Brother Chauhan has given detailed reasons for not applying the said ratio of Babulals case, I need not dilate any more. ( 34 ) THESE are my reasons for agreeing with the final conclusion reached by my learned Brother Chauhan, J. , orders accordingly. .