Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner was convicted by the Special Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ernakulam for having committed the offences under S.468, 471, 419 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The appeal filed against the conviction and sentence was dismissed by the Sessions Court. 2. Accused Joy son of Francis has studied only upto S.S.L.C. He appeared for the S.S L.C. Examination several tiroes, but be could not register a pass in the Examination. However, he pretended that he passed the S.S.L C. Examination and had been undergoing Pre-Degree course in the Mar Evanios College, Trivandrum. Despite his poor academic performance, the accused was very much desirous of getting admission to M.B.B.S. course. In answer to the invitation of application for admission to M.B.B.S. course in 1981 the accused submitted duly filled up form. In the application form be bad stated that he bad passed Pre-Degree Examination and secured 441 marks out of 450 He also showed in the application form that he sat for the Pre-Degree Examination and his register number was 35671. In fact one Sekhar was the true candidate who appeared for the Pre-Degree Examination with register No. 35671 for the examination held in 1981 April. The authorities who selected the candidates for M.B.B.S. course included the name of the accused in the provisional list. However, before the finalisation of the list the forgery of the accused came out. Several other instances of forgery of mark list and other allied offences came to light and a special court was constituted for trial of these cases. 3. The trial court as well as the appellate court found that the accused furnished false information and that he bad also changed his name from Joy to Rajmohan F. Joy to secure admission for the M.B.B.S. course and thereby committed cheating by personation. In view of the overwhelming evidence against the accused the learned counsel for the revision petitioner has not urged anything regarding the sustainability of the conviction. It is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed offences under S.468, 471, 419 and 420 IPC. The only point that was urged before me was that the accused was aged 20 at the time of commission of the offence; therefore, he should have been dealt with under S.6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act. 1958. It is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed offences under S.468, 471, 419 and 420 IPC. The only point that was urged before me was that the accused was aged 20 at the time of commission of the offence; therefore, he should have been dealt with under S.6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act. 1958. A similar plea was made before the trial court and the learned Magistrate refused to invoke the benevolent provision of the Probation of Offenders Act. The observation made in the sentence portion of the judgment would give an insight into the manner in which the trial court dealt with the matter. The court observed as follows: "The accused is a typical specimen of his contemporary society with its arrogant ignorance of the human soul, with its self satisfied perversions, with its pride, and vanity, with its vile meanness, lust and greed, jealousy and envy, and releasing him to such a society, even with a supervision order will only land him in recidivism. This society, will have the least tendency to adopt him as an erring brother and is devoid of any material for his resurrection. This accused will have also no complementary part to play in the welfare of his own family. Thus his elimination for a short period, in a prison, is the suitable solution for his reformation by recognising bis own inner self and find absolute peace of mind". The way in which the learned Magistrate viewed this matter is opposed to the new trends in sentencing policy. It is true that the severity of the punishment that will be imposed on a convicted criminal offender depends in very large measure on the personality and social attitudes of the particular judge before whom the offender comes for sentence. A crime that strikes one judge as deserving of a long prison term may seem appropriate for far milder punishment to another judge on the same Bench. In Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976 SCC (Cri) 546) his Lordship Justice Bhagawati made an illuminating observation as follows: "It is unfortunate that in our country there is no system of continuing education for judges so that judges can remain fully informed about the latest developments in the law and acquire familiarity with modern methods and techniques of judicial decision making. The world is changing fast and in our own country, vast social and economic changes are taking place There is a revolution of rising expectations amongst millions of human beings who have so far been consigned to a life of abject poverty, hunger and destitution Law has, for the first time, adopted a positive approach and come out openly in the service of the weaker sections of the community. It has ceased to be merely an instrument providing a framework of freedom in which men may work out their destinies. It has acquired a new dimension, a dynamic activism and it is now directed towards achieving socio economic justice which encompasses not merely a few privileged classes but the large masses of our people who have so far been denied freedom and equality social as well as economic and who have nothing to hope for and to live for. Law strives to Rive them social and economic justice and it has, therefore, necessarily to be weighed in favour of the weak and the exposed. This is the new law which judges are now called upon to administer and it is, therefore, essential that they should receive proper training which would bring about an orientation in their approach and outlook, stimulate sympathise in them for the vulnerable sections of the community and inject a new awareness and sense of public commitment in them. They should also be educated in the new trends in penology and sentencing procedures so that they may learn to use penal law as a tool for reforming and rehabilitating criminals and smoothening out the uneven texture of the social fabric and not as a weapon, fashioned by law. for protecting and perpetuating the hegemony of one class over the other". 3A. Ia earlier times the judicial administration was in the hands of the propertied class. The sentence was initially vengeance oriented. Primitive man believed that crime created an imbalance which could be rectified only by punishing the wrong doer. "The rower of the landed gentry was disproportionately great, but they saw in the administration of criminal justice the common interest of all the upper strata; the conservation of property was the main business of society. The sentence was initially vengeance oriented. Primitive man believed that crime created an imbalance which could be rectified only by punishing the wrong doer. "The rower of the landed gentry was disproportionately great, but they saw in the administration of criminal justice the common interest of all the upper strata; the conservation of property was the main business of society. Since persona] liberty of the upper class was fully recognized by the existing law, reform could benefit only the common people and the moment for greater leniency faced strong resistance." (See Punishment & Social Structure by Rusche and Kircheimer-page 80). The theory and practice in the area of sentencing have undergone gradual but drastic change through the years. Today each offender is valued as a unique individual and sentencing judge seeks to know why he has committed the crime and what are his chances of repetition of the future offence. The object of the sentencing judge is to place the prisoner in a position where he can do no further harm. At the same time deterrence is one of the basic purpose of a sensible sentencing programme. 4. The development of probation is indicative of the progressively humanitarian approach as distinguished from retributive and punitive approach in the criminal justice system. The Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1923. S.562 of 1923 Code (Now S.360 of Cr. P. C. 1973) enabled the court to release the offender on probation. Under the said section a person who is a first offender need not be sentenced to imprisonment provided certain conditions set out in that section are fulfilled. Toe Central Probation of Offenders Act 20 of 1958 introduced a comprehensive measure applicable to the entire country with some very progressive provisions as compared to the earlier legislation. The Act is applicable to all offenders not punishable with death or life imprisonment. S.6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows: "6. Toe Central Probation of Offenders Act 20 of 1958 introduced a comprehensive measure applicable to the entire country with some very progressive provisions as compared to the earlier legislation. The Act is applicable to all offenders not punishable with death or life imprisonment. S.6(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows: "6. Restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty-one years of age (1) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life, the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence ana the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under S.3 or S.4, and if the court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so." 5. The object of S.6 of the Act broadly speaking, is to see that young offenders are not sent to jail for the commission of less serious offences. If they are directed for custodial sentence they are likely to have close association with hardened and habitual criminals and this would clearly do more harm than good and for that reason it would be prejudicial to the larger interest of society. A plain reading of S.6 would indicate that if the offender is under 21 years of age and be is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment other than imprisonment for life, the court shall not sentence him to imprisonment straight away. The court must consider the circumstance of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and decide whether it would be expedient to deal with him under S.3 or 4 of the Act. If the court decides to pass any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it should record reasons for adopting such a course. There are ever so many decisions discussing the various aspects of the applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act. Dault Ram v. State of Haryana (1973 SCC. (Cri) 41), Ishar Das v. State of Punjab (1973 SCC. (Cri.) 708), Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar (1972 (1) SCWR. 630), Rattanlal v. State of Punjab (AIR. There are ever so many decisions discussing the various aspects of the applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act. Dault Ram v. State of Haryana (1973 SCC. (Cri) 41), Ishar Das v. State of Punjab (1973 SCC. (Cri.) 708), Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar (1972 (1) SCWR. 630), Rattanlal v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1965 SC 444) and Arvind Mohan Singh v. Amulya Kumar Biswas (1974 S7C. (Cri.) 391) are some of them. In Masarullah v. State of Tamil Nadu (1993 SCC (Crl.) 84) the Supreme Court observed as follows: "In case of an offender under the age of 21 years on the date of commission of the offence, the court is expected ordinarily to give benefit of S.6 of the Act. While deciding whether the offender should be granted the benefit, it is necessary for the court to keep in view three relevant aspects viz., nature of the offence, character of the offender and the attendant and surrounding circumstances as revealed in the report of the Probation Officer. Having regard to these considerations as also in conformity with the modern trend of reclamation of offender rather than condemnation, the present case appears to be preeminently fit case for grant of the benefit under S.6." The above case was in respect of an offence under S.397 and 452. The Supreme Court on several other instances also invoked the provision of Probation of Offenders Act. 6. The learned Special Prosecutor pointed out that this Court in Nandakumar v. State of Kerala (1985 KLT 664) declined to invoke the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act in a similar case. The facts of that case are different from the facts in this case. In that case the accused clandestinely obtained Pre-Degree certificate of another student, made corrections in the same and used it for getting admission in a college. The facts of the present case is clearly distinguishable from the typical mark list case, where the usual modus operandi of the accused is to obtain false mark list from the University and make use of the same forgetting admission to M.B.B.S. and other courses. In the present case the accused submitted an application to the M.B.B.S course. It is true that the application form contained false informations. The evidence against the accused show that be did not pursue further. He did not obtain a false mark list of Pre-Degree Examination. In the present case the accused submitted an application to the M.B.B.S course. It is true that the application form contained false informations. The evidence against the accused show that be did not pursue further. He did not obtain a false mark list of Pre-Degree Examination. It is quite possible that he submitted an application form to the M.B.B.S. course out of ignorance and immaturity. The accused has no criminal antecedents. A report of the local Probation Officer was submitted to this Court on 18-11-1987. The report shows that the accused had been living under very poor circumstances. His parents are coolie workers. The conduct of the accused subsequent to the offence also has been stated by the Probation Officer as good and that he has been leading a peaceful life. 7. Considering the overall circumstances of the case and having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender it is desirable to invoke S.4 of the Act and I propose to do so. 8. The accused shall appear before the Special Court of the Judicial I Class Magistrate on 25th May, 1988. The magistrate shall release him on probation on his executing a bond for Rs. 5000/- with two sureties each for the like sum. The bond shall be for a period of three years. The accused shall be under the supervision of the City Probation Officer, Trivandrum during the period of bond. He shall submit a report regarding the conduct and behaviour of the accused every three months, a copy of which should be furnished to the accused by the court. The Magistrate shall explain the effect of the order to him. The Magistrate shall review and consider the case as and when the reports are received. If the Magistrate finds that the accused had indulged in any criminal or disorderly activities or was not keeping the peace and was of no good behaviour the bond executed by the accused shall be cancelled and the accused be directed to surrender to the bond and undergo the remaining period of imprisonment. The office will send a copy of this order to the City Probation Officer, Trivandrum.