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1988 DIGILAW 207 (ORI)

V. RAMA SHANKAR PATNAIK v. STATE OF ORISSA

1988-08-02

G.B.PATTANAIK

body1988
G. B. PATNAIK, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was working as a Revenue Inspector in Jeypore Town in the district of Koraput. The Tahsildar, Jeypore (P. W. 5), lodged a report (Ext. 11) stating therein that the petitioner as the Revenue Inspector had collected a sum of Rs. 763/- from the Raja Saheb of Jeypore towards land revenue on 22. 3. 1971 and also passed on a receipt (Ext. 6/1) to that effect, But he accounted for only Rs. 163/- by interpolating the entry in the register (Ext. 3) and thereby misappropriated the sum of Rs. 600/ -. It was also stated in the said report that later on the petitioner deposited the defalcated sum of Rs. 600/- as well as Rs. 60/- towards interest with P. W. 10 on 30. 10. 1972 under Ext. 21 in the name of Raja Saheb. Thus there had been a temporary misappropriation for the period from 22. 3. 1971 to 30. 10. 1972 and there had been forgery committed by the petitioner. On receipt of the said report which was treated as F. I. R. , the Officerin-charge, Jeypore Police Station, registered a case and took up investigation. In course of investigation, he seized several documents, examined some witnesses and on completion of investigation filed the charge sheet and the accused-petitioner stood his trial being charged under Sections 409 and 466, Indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) THE accused took his defence that he did collect the Sum of Rs. 763/- and also deposit the said amount in the official account and there had been no manipulation of record by him. ( 3 ) THE prosecution examined 16 witnesses of whom P. W. 5 is the Tahsildar, Jeypore, who lodged the F. I. R. on 22. 10. 1979; P. W. 6 was the Revenue Supervisor attached to Jeypore Tahsil from 1970 to 1972; P. W. 7 was the Manager of the Raja Saheb; P. W. 8 was the Allditor who allied the office of Jeypore Tahsil on 17. 4. 1978; P. W. 9 was the Loan Mohurir who had accompanied the accused to the office of Raja Saheb on 22. 3. 1971 when the alleged payment was made: P. W. 10 was the Revenue Inspector of Jeypore Town Circle working on 30. 10. 1972; P. W. l1 was the Tehsildar, Jeypore Tahsil, on 12. 5. 1978 and P,ws. 4. 1978; P. W. 9 was the Loan Mohurir who had accompanied the accused to the office of Raja Saheb on 22. 3. 1971 when the alleged payment was made: P. W. 10 was the Revenue Inspector of Jeypore Town Circle working on 30. 10. 1972; P. W. l1 was the Tehsildar, Jeypore Tahsil, on 12. 5. 1978 and P,ws. 12, 14, 15 and 16 arc the different in vestigating officers. P. W. 13 was a constable and the rest of the precaution witnesses were different seizure witnesses. Relying upon the evidence of P. Ws. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 as well as the relevant documents, namely Exts. 6/1 and 6/2, Ext. 3, Ext. 13 and Ext. 21, the learned Magistrate found the accused guilty under Sections 409 and 466, Indian Penal Code and accordingly convicted him thereunder. So far as the sentence is concerned, the learned Magistrate sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year and also to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month on each count and directed that the sentences would run concurrently. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge uphold the confection and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate after discussing the evidence more particularly the evidence on which the Maltreat relied upon. ( 4 ) THE accused admits to have received a sum of Rs. 763/- and yet takes up the plea that he has deposited the entire amount and h2ls not fabricated Ext. 3/1 as well as the counterfoil of the receipt (Ext. 13) by overwriting and altering the amount to Rs. 163/ -. This plea has not been substentiated and the courts below have rejected the aforesaid plea and in my view rightly, particularly when the accused himself deposited the said defalcated amount of Rs. 600/- together with interest of Rs. 60/- under Ext. 21. Once the entrustment is admitted, it is for the accused to explain as to how he dealt with the money. The explanation sought to be offered not being, acceptable and in view of the evidence of the witnesses to the effect that Ext. 13 and the entry Ext. 3/1 are in the handwriting of the accused, the courts below were fully justified in the convicting the accused under sections 409 and 466, Indian Penal Code. ( 5 ) MR. The explanation sought to be offered not being, acceptable and in view of the evidence of the witnesses to the effect that Ext. 13 and the entry Ext. 3/1 are in the handwriting of the accused, the courts below were fully justified in the convicting the accused under sections 409 and 466, Indian Penal Code. ( 5 ) MR. Palit, the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that though a plea. has not been taken by the accused either during trial or in appeal, But was possibly available, namely that in view of the relationship between the accused and the clerk of the Raja Saheb, in order to accommodate that clerk out of the original due of Rs. 763/ only Rs. 163/- had been paid at the first instance and the subsequent sum of Rs. 600/was paid later on which was deposited on 30. 10. 1972. I am afraid, to sustain such a plea there is not even an iota of material on record. It is no doubt that the accused is not required to establish his plea beyond reasonable doubt and the defence plea can be accepted on preponderance of probabilities, But here, in the present case, not only that such a plea has not been taken in the two courts below But also the learned counsel for the petitioner is not in a position to point out a single material on record from which the aforesaid plea can even be remotely substantiated. In this view of the matter, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Palit, the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 6 ) MR. Palit, the learned counsel, then urges that the accused having already deposited the alleged defalcated amount together with the interest thereon since 30th of October, 1972, and there being no other similar recurrence during the service career of the accused, the courts below should have considered the application of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and at least reasons should have been indicated as required under Section 361 of the Code as to why they have not thought it fit to invoke Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions contained in Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are intended to enable the Court to deal leniently with the first offenders and to carry out the object of reformation. The provisions contained in Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are intended to enable the Court to deal leniently with the first offenders and to carry out the object of reformation. The said provision confers a discretion on the Court and the Court has to exercise its discretion according to the circumstances of each case and an accused cannot claim as of right such exercise of discretion in his favour. The obvious object underlined in Section 360 of the Code is that the legislature intended that an effort may be made to reform an offender. It is only in the case of these offenders who are hardened criminals and cannot be reformed, the courts should deny the benefit of Section 360. At the same time, the Courts also should not allow themselves to be misled to apply Section 360 by a misplaced leniency and sympathy. A balance has to be struck keeping in view the object for which the provision has been engrafted and also the nature of offence and the character of the offender. Section 361 of the Code costs an obligation on the Court to indicate reasons in these cases where Section 360 of the Code could have been applied, But the Court has not applied. Neither the trying magistrate nor the appellate judge has focussed his attention to the aforesaid two provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (4) of Section 360 enables the High Court while exercising its power of revision also to exercise the power under Section 360, provided the conditions precedent are satisfied. The first part of Section 366 makes it applicable (0 any person not under 21 years of age provided he is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less. The second part of the said section makes it applicable in case where a person under 21 years or age of any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The petitioner in the present case is undoubtedly above 21 years of age, his age on the date of examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being 43 years. Therefore, if at all, he could be covered by the first part of Section 360. The petitioner in the present case is undoubtedly above 21 years of age, his age on the date of examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being 43 years. Therefore, if at all, he could be covered by the first part of Section 360. But the offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code, of which the petitioner has been convicted is punishable with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and shall. also be liable to fine. In that view of the matter, Section 360, Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be made applicable to the case of the petitioner. Therefore, the quest ion of releasing the petitioner on executing a bond does not arise. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, taking into consideration the fact that the amount in question has been paid back much before the initiation of the criminal proceeding, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, I think in the ends of justice the petitioner should be sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of rupees one hundred, in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month, on each count, and the sentences are to run concurrently. Subject to the aforesaid modification of the sentence, this Criminal Revision is dismissed. .