This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31. 1. 78 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Goalpara at Dhubri in reversing the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff, Dhubri passed in Title Suit No 362 of 1972. The plaintiffs are the appellants in this second appeal. The plaintiffs brought the suit being Title Suit No. 362 of 1972 in the Court of Munsiff at Dhubri against the present respondents-defendants for declaration of right, title in respect of suit la ad described in the schedule to the plaint and also for confirmation of possession along with a prayer for correction of record of right and for permanent injunction. The plaintiffs' further prayed for khas possession of 'kha' schedule land described in the plaint. The facts leading to the plaintiffs' case may be summarised as under:- A jote holding of 22 bighas 16 katha 17 dhurs of land under Zamindari record of right was the property of late Meghchand and Mohan Chandra Das. They were the joint owners -of 'Ka' schedule land. Mohan Chandra Das died sometime 50 years ago before filing of the suit leaving behind him two sons Shrikanta and Hari Kanta. Hari Kanta was the plaintiff No. 1 and plaintiffs No. 2 to 6 are the heirs of Srikanta. Meghchand died issueless about 38 years ago before filing of the suit leaving behind his wife Sobharani Barmani who also died about 20 years ago. Therefore, Shrikanta and Harikanta, both sons of late Mohan Chandra Das became the owners of entire 'Ka' schedule property of the plaint, It is further pleaded that the two brothers amicably partitioned the property and enjoyed the same in equal share. On the death of Srikanta his share in ka schedule property has been in possession of plaintiffs No. 2 to 6 as of their own right. The further case of the plaintiffs is that the father of original defendant No. 1 Mandal Roy was given shelter by late Sobharani Barmani while alive and after her death both the brothers, namely, Shrikanta and Harikanta did not drive him out but permitted him to live in the house left by Shobharani Barmani which is situated within the 'Kha' schedule and a part of 'Ka' schedule land. After the death of Mandal Roy, the defendant No. 1 Ramesh Chandra Roy continued to possess the 4Kha' schedule land on the same terms and conditions as a licensee. During tie last survey and settlement operation, the defe­ndant No. 1 collusively got Khatian No. 183 showing ejmali posse­ssion along with Srikanta and Harikanta in respect of the land. Though the defendant No. 1 entered his name collusively in the khatian he did not assert any title of his own. It was in July, 1982 for the first time the defendant No. 1 filed a petition before Gaon Sabha claiming his share in 'Ka' schedule property and in doing so it had cast a cloud on the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the entire 'Ka' schedule property. Therefore, the plaintiffs had to file the suit for declaration of right, title and interest and for khas possession along with further prayer as made in the plaint. During the pendency of the suit, plaintiff No. 1 Harikanta died and his legal heirs were duly substituted and subsequently his wife was transposed as defendant No. 5 in the suit. The plaintiffs by way of amendment had also added the two brothers of the sole defendant No. 1 and his one sister as party-defendants. However, the suit was resisted only by defendant No. 1 Ramesh Chandra Roy. Besides raising other pleas, the defendant No.l contested the suit on the ground that his father Mandal Roy was the adopted son of Megh Chand Roy and by a registered deed of gift dated 25. 11. 52 the wsife of late Megh Chaad Roy Smti. Sobharaai Barmani gifted her share in the suit property to defendant No.l and since then he has been in ejmali possession along with Harikanta and Srikanta in respect of his share in the land and the house. On the pleadings as many as seven issues were framed by the learned Munsiff but issues were recast for proper adjudication of the dispute as raised by the parties. Both the parties led evidence in course of trial. On the pleadings as many as seven issues were framed by the learned Munsiff but issues were recast for proper adjudication of the dispute as raised by the parties. Both the parties led evidence in course of trial. On" consideration of the materials on record learned Munsiff held that the alleged adoption of the father of defendant No. 1 by late Megh Chand was not proved and also the plaintiffs could prove their right, title and interest in respect of the suit land and, as such, upon those findings, learned Munsiff decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. Being aggrieved, the defendant No. 1 preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Assistant District Judge, Goalpara being Title Appeal No. 88/77. The learned Asstt. District Judge heard the appeal but did not agree to the findings arrived at by learned Munsiff. Therefore, the learned appellate court allowed the appeal of the defendants and reversed the judgment and decree of learned trial Court and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs. 2. Mr. A. R. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has advanced his argument on the following points :-(1) That the defendant No-1, though took the plea of adoption of his father by Megh Chand but he subsequently in course of argument relinquished the plea of adoption of his father stated to be the adopted son of the husband of Sobharani Barmani late Megh Chand. Therefore, the plea of adoption as advanced by defendant No. 1 does not exist as a subject matter for adjudication by this Court. The next submission Of Mr. Banerjee is that the defendant No. 1 has taken a plea that the share of Sobharani, the widow of Meghchand was gifted in favour of the minor son of Mandal Roy, the present defendant No. 1 in 1952, which she inherited from her husband prior to coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, the Act). The widow Sobharani died in 1954 two years before the coming into force of the Act. Therefore, according to learned counsel the widow during her life time was a limited owner in respect of the property she inherited, from her husband and as such, she had no absolute right to dispose of the property by way of gift. The widow Sobharani died in 1954 two years before the coming into force of the Act. Therefore, according to learned counsel the widow during her life time was a limited owner in respect of the property she inherited, from her husband and as such, she had no absolute right to dispose of the property by way of gift. (2) The next submission is that the widow died in 1954 prior to coming into force of the Act, and, as such there cannot be any retrospective operation of the Act as because on her death the pro­perty she enjoyed as limited owner immediately divested to the next reversioner. Admittedly, it was not her self-acquired property but inherited from her husband. Therefore, she had only limited interest, during the relevant period without having any absolute right to transfer the land in favour of defendant No. 1. In course of submission Mr.Banerjee has pointed out to me as to when, how and to whom a Hindu widow can make a gift. He has referred to me the provisions of Sections 178,179, 181, 183(4) of Mulla's Hindu Law (Fourteenth Edition) In respect of the property enjoyed by limited owners prior to coming into force of the Act the provisions of Section 178 of Mulla's Hindu Law prescribes that to uphold an alienation, by a widow or other limited heir, of the corpus of immovable pro­perty inherited by her, the limited owner must show : (1) that there was legal necessity or (2) that the alienee, after reasonable inquiry as to the necessity acted honestly in the belief that the necessity existed ; or (3) that there was such consent of the next reversioners to the alienation as would raise a presumption that the transaction was a proper one, or (4) that is was a surrender by her of her whole interest in the whole estate in favour of the nearest reversioner or reversioners at the time of alienation. Therefore, it appears that a widow or other limited heirs has no power to dispose of the corpus of immovable property inherited by her except in the four cases as mentioned above. Admittedly, while the adoption could not be proved the defendant No. 1 gave up the plea of adoption. The next question would therefore arise as to whom a widow can make a gift. Admittedly, while the adoption could not be proved the defendant No. 1 gave up the plea of adoption. The next question would therefore arise as to whom a widow can make a gift. The defendant No. 1 is a third party and, therefore, the provisions of Section 181 of Mulla's Hindu Law may be looked into. It prescribes the extent of power of alienation her by a widow. The extent of power of alienation by a widow or other limited heir to alienate an estate inherited by her must be for legal necessity which is to be proved either by limited owner or by the alienee. Here in the present case in hand a peculiar circumstance appears. In the registered deed of gift the widow being the limited owner of the property before coming into force of the Act, made an absolute gift in favour of defendant No. 1 who was by that time a minor boy of about 2 years. The recital of the deed of gift did not disclose that the minor was represented by his father or by any legal guardian capable of accepting the gift. There is also no finding of learned appellate Court that the gift was accepted by father or by natural guardian of the minor in whose favour the gift was made by the widow. Another fact cannot be lost sight of. If the limited owner of the property alienates either the whole or a part of the same in respect of which the limited owner had interest for the life time only such alienation without any legal necessity cannot bind the next reversioners to whom the property may be divested after the death of the limited owner. Admittedly, widow died in 1954 prior to coming into force of 1956 Act and the Act has no retrospective operation. It is next submitted by Mr. Banerjee that as the plea of adoption was abandoned the defendant cannot stand only on the basis of alleged deed of gift made in his favour by the limited owner in 1952 who subsequently died in 1954 prior to coming into force of the Act. This aspect of the matter was not considered by the learned appellate court below. Banerjee that as the plea of adoption was abandoned the defendant cannot stand only on the basis of alleged deed of gift made in his favour by the limited owner in 1952 who subsequently died in 1954 prior to coming into force of the Act. This aspect of the matter was not considered by the learned appellate court below. The plea of the defendant No. 1 claiming ejmali possession in respect of the property mentioned in the Schedule to the plaint cannot create any right unless a title is created either by the deed of gift or by a valid document in favour of defendant No. 1. The claim of defendant No. 1 to the effect that his name was mutated as ejmali pattadar in respect of the land along with plaintiffs would not bestow any right, title and interest on the land unless the defendant No. 1 proves that he had a valid title on the basis of the registered deed of gift. The plea of the-plaintiffs that defendant was nothing but a licensee and he was allowed to occupy the suit land was considered by the learned appellate court below but the findings that the defendant No. 1 having been in possession of the suit land his title has ripened by right of adverse possession cannot stand as because the defendant No. 1 never pleaded that he had a valid title by right of his adverse possession. Referring to paragraph 7 of the written state­ment, the learned appellate court below held that "it left no doubt in the mind of the appellate court that the defendant pleaded adverse possession and it could sub satiate the plea". The finding is without proper appreciation of the averments made in the pleadings. In course of submission Mr. Banerjee has referred to me two decisions of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1964 SC 1254 (SM Karim vs. Mst. Bibi Sakina) and AIR 1969 SC 135 (Rajkumar Mohan Singh & ors. vs. Rajkumar Pasnpatinath). It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in SM Karim (supra) that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and to the extent that such a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. vs. Rajkumar Pasnpatinath). It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in SM Karim (supra) that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and to the extent that such a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. A mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession. Therefore, it appears that in order to succeed in such a plea of adverse possession, the burden lies on the party pleading such adverse possession. But in this case the plea of adverse possession was neither found place in the pleadings nor in the evidence as discussed by learned appellate court below- Therefore, the only plea that remains is the claim of right to the property on the basis of the deed of gift. According to learned counsel the deed was not a valid document as because it was executed in favour of a minor not represented by father or any other natural guardian to accept such gift coupled with the fact that the deed of gift was made by a limited owner who died prior to coming into force of the 1956 Act. Therefore, on the death of the limited owner the property reverted back to the next reversioners. It is further submitted by learned counsel that there was no evidence nor any finding as to whether the natural guardian accepted the deed of gift on behalf of the minor. Unless the provisions of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act read with the relevant provisions of the Hindu Law are complied with, the gift cannot be treated as a valid gift. It is further submitted that possession of the suit land by defendant No. 1 is immaterial if the defendant fails to prove the existing right to occupy or to possess the same. It is further submitted that possession of the suit land by defendant No. 1 is immaterial if the defendant fails to prove the existing right to occupy or to possess the same. Counsel further submits that since the limited owner made a gift in favour of a third party before coming into force of the Act and after her death when the property immediately reverted back to the next reversioners, thedefendant No. 1 cannot have any right over the property even if the gift is taken to be a valid one. 3. Mr. A. Mannan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that by virtue of the provisions of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act the widow possessed the right to the property absolutely after the death of her husband and she became the full owner till her death. This submission cannot be accepted as because the relevant period when the gift was made must be considered as one of the vital question in the present case at hand. In the year|1953 the widow had only limited interest to enjoy the suit property ^during her life time without any right of alienation. It has already been observed that there was no such circumstance appearing! to justify such alienation. Furthermore, it is an admitted fact that* the widow died two years before the Act (1956) came into force. Therefore, immediately after her death the property reverted back Pto £her next reversicners, namely the heirs of the plaintiffs. The next submission of Mr. Mannan is that though the gift was made in 1952 in favour of the minor the gift, cannot be said to be invalid as because the father of the minor impliedly accepted the gift and possessed the land on behalf of the minor. It is further submitted that acceptance of gift in the present case may not be relevant factor to be proved as required u/s. 122 of TP Act as because the father was in possession of the land along with the donee. The third contention raised by Mr. Mannan is with regard to the adverse possession. It is further submitted by counsel that though specific issue was not framed but by implication and on evidence on record it may be said that the right of adverse possession was established and proved by the defendant. Lastly, Mr. The third contention raised by Mr. Mannan is with regard to the adverse possession. It is further submitted by counsel that though specific issue was not framed but by implication and on evidence on record it may be said that the right of adverse possession was established and proved by the defendant. Lastly, Mr. Mannan submitted that if the deed of gift is said to be invalid, yet the claim of the defendant as regards adverse possession stands. The last submission of Mr. Mannan cannot hold good because the defendant No. 1 in his written statement has pleaded ejmali possession along with plaintiffs in respect of the land. In such a case and there being no hostile assertion of his title as against the original owners of the plaintiffs, the plea of adverse possession cannot sustain. Therefor, submissions of Mr. Mannan have no substance. 4. I have given my anxious consideration on the submissions made by learned counsel of both the parties with regard to the legal position involved in this appeal. I have also considered the impugned judgment of the appellate Court below. Learned appellate court did not consider the legal aspect of the matter as discussed above and did not approach the case in its proper perspective. There­fore, I am constrained to hold that the judgment and order of the learned appellate Court below are liable to be set aside, 5. For the reasons set forth above, I set aside the impugned judgment and decree dated 31. 1. 78 of the learned appellate court below and affirm those passed by learned Munsiff. In the result, the appeal is allowed. But on the facts and circumjtances of the case I leave the parties to bear their own costs.