A. Raghuvir, C. J. — Muzahid Uddin Ahmed was a Sub Inspector of Police in the State against whom disciplinary proceedings were initiated on May 19, 1973. In the inquiry held witnesses were examined and a report was sent holding him guilty of charges. The disciplinary authority dismissed him from service. Au appeal by M. Ahmed filed before the Inspector General of Police, was not disposed of in six months therefore he approached the Assam Administrative Tribunal at Gauhati. Such a procedure under section 4 (2) of the Assam Administrative Tribunal Act, 1977 is contemplated under clause (2) of section 4 of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal on March 29, 1977. Hence the writ petition. In this writ petition a contention raised before the Inquiry Officer repeated before the Tribunal is reiterated in this Court. The contention is the writ petitioner was not provided a defence assistant in the inquiry proceeding therefore the entire inquiry proceedings for that reason are vitiated in law. As of fact the writ petitioner was not provided with a defence assistance. The contention raised by the petitioner did not find favour with any authority including the Tribunal. The Tribunal stated. "It has been submitted before us on behalf of the appellant that in the enquiry reasonable opportunity was not given to the appellant to defend himself. Two griev­ances are made on this score-the first is about the denial of assi­stance of a lawyer to the appellant as requested by him and the next is that the names of all the witnesses who were examined in the inquiry had not been furnished to him in advance. To satisfy us that giving of reasonable opportunity requires right to be repre­sented by a counsel, reference is made to AIR 1962 Orissa 78 and 1972 Lab I.C. 89. In the Orissa case, it had been held that though in a departmental enquiry the delinquent may not be entitled as a right to legal assistance to defend himself, there may be special circumstances connection with the case as complexity of facts, volume of evidence, the educational attainments and experience of the public servant which may show that without legal assistance he will not be able to adequately cross examine the witnesses or to establish his innocence. The present is not a case involving complication of facts and the appellant cannot also be said to be a man of no educational attainment as he was at the relevant time Sub Inspector of Police. We do not therefore think that the Orissa case can he called in aid by the appellant. In the case reported in Labour and Industrial Cases, the view taken was that where the facts are com­plicated or questions of law are involved, or the subject matter is technical, or the evidence is voluminous, a lawyer should be permitted for the delinquent officer. The present does not seem to be a case of the nature mentioned in the above decision. We do not therefore think that reasonable opportunity was denied to the appellant by not allowing him to be represented by a counsel in the enquiry. In coming to this conclusion, we have borne in mind the views of Supreme Court expressed in various rulings of which mention may be made of AIR 1960 SC 914 where it was held that the workman has no right to be represented even by a representative of his union in a domestic enquiry against him. This and other decisions of the Supreme Court were noted in AIR 1975 Kerela 158 where it has been held that such a right should be conceded where the principles of natural justice require this. Engagement of a legally trained person or advocate for the prosecution was regarded as a good ground in this regard, so also physical incapacity to defend one. As these cir­cumstances are missing in the present case, we cannot concede that the enquiry was vitiated due to denial of "lawyer representation" Since we hold the contention should succeed. We also intend to review the cases. To start with we may recount as to how such an issue was considered in the United Kingdon and in the United States of America. In the United Kingdom we start with the case where a prisoner needed assistance of friend or adviser. That was dealt in a very old case in 109 ER 1290 at 1292 (Collier vs. Hicks). To start with we may recount as to how such an issue was considered in the United Kingdon and in the United States of America. In the United Kingdom we start with the case where a prisoner needed assistance of friend or adviser. That was dealt in a very old case in 109 ER 1290 at 1292 (Collier vs. Hicks). In that case the Chief Justice held "Any person, whether he be a professional man or not, may attend as a friend of either party, may take notes, may quietly make suggestions, and give advice......" and his compa­nion Judge observed-"All may be present, and either of the parties may have a professional assistant to confer and consult with, but not to interfere in the course of the proceedings". There were many case on this aspect dealt in one way or the other. But we wish to recount the landmark cases. See in this regard a divorce case (1970) 3 AER 1034 (McKenzie vs. McKenzie) where it was held a next friend should be permitted. We go next to the case of General Medical Council vs. Spackman (1943) AC 627 at 638 where the House of Lords enumerated the difficulty and delay in allowing the next friend where the apex authority in that country observed ''But mere administrative difficulties, simpliciter, are not in our view enough. Convenience and justice are often not on speaking term". With that we may go next to the case in (1977) 1 All ER 64 (Maynard vs. Osmond)at 79 where it was observed ''On principle, if a man is charged with a serious offence which may have grave consequences for him, he should be entitled to have a qualified lawyer to defend him. Such has been agreed by the Government of this country when it adhered to the European Convention on Human Rights. But also, by analogy it should be the same in most cases when he is charged with a disciplinary offence before a disciplinary tribunal, at any rate when the offence is one which may result in his dismissal from the force of other body to which he belongs; or the loss of his livelihood; or, worse still, may ruin his character for ever. There are two cases which throw considerable light on this issue. The two cases also indicate how the judicial opinion was regulated in the recent past. There are two cases which throw considerable light on this issue. The two cases also indicate how the judicial opinion was regulated in the recent past. The two cases are (1) (1968) 2 All ER 545 (Pett. vs. Greyhound Racind Association Ltd (2) (1969) 2 AH ER 221 (Pett. vs. Greyhound Racind Association Ltd). The two cases arose from one proceeding. The former case for short is called Pett No.l and the latter is called Pett No. 2. The former is an order in the interlocutory stage and the second one is the final order. In these two cases a like issue as we are dealing with was the subject of discussion. In Pett lit is held: "if justice is to-be done, he ought to have the help of someone to speak for him; and who better then a lawyer who has been trained for the task ?" He should, therefore, be entitled to have a lawyer if he wants one. But, even if he should not be entitled as of right, I should have thought that as a general rule the tribunal should have a discretion in the matter. Legal representation should not be forbidden altogether. The tribunal should have a discretion to permit him to have a lawyer if they think it would assist. They are the masters of their own procedure and, unless clearly forbidden, should have a discretion to permit it." In Pett 2 it was held-"we will never allow any one to have a lawyer to appear for him. The Tribunal must be ready in a proper case to allow it." Thus what was said in Pett No. 1 was considerably watered down in Pett No. 2 (We will see later Indian Supreme Court did not follow Pett 2, but followed Pett 1). The following passage in (1970) 3 All ER 535, Pergamon Press Ltd. Reat 542 show the threads of this issue again were revived. "In the application of the concept of fair play, there must be real flexibility, so that very different situations may be met without producing procedures unsuitable to the object in hand. That need for flexibility has been empasised in a number of authoritative passages in the judgments cited to this Court. "In the application of the concept of fair play, there must be real flexibility, so that very different situations may be met without producing procedures unsuitable to the object in hand. That need for flexibility has been empasised in a number of authoritative passages in the judgments cited to this Court. In the forefront was that of Tucker LJ in Russell vs. Duke of Norfolk (1949) in All ER 109 at 118, and the general Affect of his views has been once again echoed recently by Lord Donovan and Lord Wilberforce in Wiseman vs. Borneman (1969) 3 All ER 275 at 280, 283, 288 ; (1971) AC 297 at 311, 314, 320. It is only to easy to frame a precise set of rules which may appear impeccable on paper and which may yet unduly hamper, lengthen and, indeed, perhaps even frustrate (see per Lord Reid in Wisemam vs. Borneman (1969) 3 All ER at 277, (1971) AC 297 at 308 the activities of those engaged in investi­gating or otherwise dealing with matters that fall within their proper sphere. In each case careful regard must be had to the scope of the proceeding,, the source of its jurisdiction.....the way in which it normally falls to be conducted and its objective”. It is not possible to discuss all the cases in full particulars we have endeavoured as to how the pulls were worked out by the Courts towards fair play. All these cases were finally reviewed in the case (1984) 1 All ER 799 (R vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors., exparte Tarrant & anr , R vs. Warmwood Scrubs Prison Board of Visitors, exparte Anderson and Ors. That is the position as on todlay in United Kingdom. This resume indicates that the judicial opinion is that in the adversary system assistance to persons as to be provided when persons are involved in inquiries. Coming to United State of America the question was considered from two angles under the Sixth Amendment and under the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution. It is not necessary to show the distinction when the Sixth Amendment is enforced against the State and=Fourteenth Amendment which is enforced against the States and the federal Government. Suffice to state the American Supreme Court considered appointment of counsel for next friend or Defence assistant as a fundamental right essential to a fair trial. It is not necessary to show the distinction when the Sixth Amendment is enforced against the State and=Fourteenth Amendment which is enforced against the States and the federal Government. Suffice to state the American Supreme Court considered appointment of counsel for next friend or Defence assistant as a fundamental right essential to a fair trial. The same idea sometimes they have expressed as a fundamental principles in civil and political, institutions. This right was emphasised from the perspective of an adversary system. In a landmark case Gideon vs. Wainwright 9 Led 2d 799 at page 805 the American Supreme Court held-"Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognise that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defences. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxurious. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguard designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realised if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. A defendants need for a lawyer is no where better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell vs. Alabama, 372 US 34 held : "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. A defendants need for a lawyer is no where better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell vs. Alabama, 372 US 34 held : "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of con­viction because he does not know how to establish his innocence." The case of Betta vs. Brady 86 Edn. 1595 taking a contrary view was overturned in the Gideon's case. The American Supreme Court experienced all the tribulations which were experienced by the Courts of United Kingdom. We have for both the countries avoided reference to the cases in chronological order, and brought out to show the opinion finally that is current now in the two countries. Coming to the Indian Supreme Court the first case is an Industrial case, AIR 1960 SC 914 (N. Kalindi and others vs. M/S Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co. Ltd. Jamshedpur). In that case the general practice of workmen conducting their own defence in domestic inquiries, was referred and to engage a co-worker as next friend was held did not form part of natural justice. The next case is Dunlop Rubber Co. (India) Ltd. vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1965 SC 1392 . The Supreme Court shifted the right in this case from 'practice' to 'natural justice' and held such a right was part of reasonable opportunity and held-in a domestic inquiry person concerned in the inquiry can seek the services of a co-worker to represent him. This was a case of Civil servant, In that Rule 15 (5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1967 were considered. This was a case of Civil servant, In that Rule 15 (5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1967 were considered. In appropriate cases, it was held, a lawyer can be permitted to be appointed if the facts and circumstances warranted such an appointment. The next case is in AIR 1974 SC 1589 (Krishna Chandra Tandon vs. The Union of India ) there was a set back when it was held ''no legal complexities", in the case and therefore assistance was properly not permitted to be appointed at the inquiry. In the (Bombay) Port Trust Employees Regulation a case under the Port Trust Employees Regulation, 1976 in AIR 1983 SC 109 ( The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay vs. Dilipknmar Raghavendranath Adkarni) clause (8) of Regulation 12 was interpreted. There is elaborate discussion in the cases as to rights of the workers in domestic inquiries. The deci­sions referred to earlier AIR 1960 SC 914 and AIR 1965 SC 1392 were reviewed. The decisions set in Pett I and Pelt 2 were recounted in particular in the former where it is observed 'when a man's reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth, he has also a right to speak by counsel or solicitor' was adopted. The final decision in Pett 2 was not followed. This Court in 1988 (2) Gauhati Law Journal 386 (Amulya Chandra Das vs. Assam Administrative Tribunal and others apropos the subject and issue observed : "..... The delinquent officer, more particularly where he is a Class IV Government servant whose educational qualifi­cation is such as would had to eh inference that he may not be aware of technical rules prescribed for holding enquiry, that he is entitled to be defended by another Government servant of his choice. If the Government servant declines to avail of the opp­ortunity, the enquiry would proceed. But if the delinquent officer is not informed of his right and an overall view of the inquiry shows that the delinquent Government servant was at a comparative disadvantage compared to the disciplinary authority represented by the Presiding Officer, the same would vitiate the enquiry unless it is shown that the Government servant had not suffered any prejudice. But if the delinquent officer is not informed of his right and an overall view of the inquiry shows that the delinquent Government servant was at a comparative disadvantage compared to the disciplinary authority represented by the Presiding Officer, the same would vitiate the enquiry unless it is shown that the Government servant had not suffered any prejudice. We are of the view that non informing the petitioner about his right to be represented by defending officer did cause prejudice to him in the present case" (page 388 para 4 ). We have surveyed these cases to show the right discussed in the above cases is now well entrenched in the Courts of India. We hold in all disciplinary proceedings the concerned officer is entitled to the assistance of a next friend or Defence Assistant call by wha­tever the surname. The next friend should be provided unless the concerned officer refuses to take assistance from such assistants. We therefore for the aforesaid reasons set aside the impugned order of the Assam Administrative Tribunal and that of the discip­linary authority and remit the subject matter to the Inquiry Officer first to provide the petitioner a defence assistant and to hold the inquiry dc novo thereafter. Incidentally some complaints are made by the petitioner as to non furnishing of documents Since we are re­mitting the inquiry, we trust the Inquiry Officer will afford reasonable opportunities to the writ petitioner including documents in accordance with law. This writ petition for the aforesaid reason is allowed as indicated. No costs. S.K. Homchoudhury, J. — I agree.