ORDER S. Swamikkannu, J. 1. The Petitioner in this writ petition seeks the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records of the first respondent herein relating to its letter in Ref: No. 21255/T-1/79-7, dt. 15.12.1979 and Letter No. 16267/T-1/80-1, dt. 7.6.1980 and quash the said two orders and consequently to direct the first respondent to consider and deal with the application of the petitioner for exemption afresh in accordance with law. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition the petitioner would state that R.S. No. 1/12 in Block No. 1 in Puraswalkam village in Madras Urban agglomeration (Door No. 1076, Poonamallee High Road, Madras-84), belongs to her absolutely and the said property is located in a residential area, near the Junction of Poonamallee High Road and Ritherdon Road. She is the only daughter of her father. Dr. R.M. Algappa Chettiar, a well known Philanthropist, Educationalist and industrialist. She and her husband constituting the family as defined in the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 24 of 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the act) with their only son who is married and has no other property. She is the Correspondent of the Educational Institutions run in the name of her late father under a trust. After the advent of the act she submitted her return to the third respondent the competent authority under the act on 13.12.1978 as required and followed it up by an application for exemption of excess land if any from the provisions of the act setting out the necessity of keeping the entire extent in tact in her occupation in view of her social standing and status and also bringing to the notice of the authority that she has only one son who is married and has no property of his own. In the honest belief that her application would be granted and that the excess land, if any, would be only negligible, the petitioner proceeded with her plan for construction of multi-storeyed flats in the property pursuant to the plan. She applied to the Corporation for approval of the plan. The Corporation required the petitioner to produce a certificate from the competent authorities under the act about the actual extent of excess land if any, so that the plan to be approved could be confined to the limits of extent permissible under the act. She applied to the Corporation for approval of the plan. The Corporation required the petitioner to produce a certificate from the competent authorities under the act about the actual extent of excess land if any, so that the plan to be approved could be confined to the limits of extent permissible under the act. The petitioner moved the first respondent on 24.4.1979 to determine the excess land, if any in the property in question and issue a certificate as required by the Corporation. The Officials of the Urban Land Ceiling Department inspected the property and determined the excess extent of land to be 62 sq. metres, and the second respondent passed an order to that effect on 26.5.1979 and communicated the same to the petitioner, on the strength of which the petitioner re-submitted her application for sanction of the plan to the corporation and for a building permit. The Corporation approved the plan by its order dated 28.7.1979. Thereafter while she proceeded with the construction of residential flats in the property, and was half way through the said construction the second respondent issued proceedings in Letter No. 12/29418/79, dt. 29.9.1979, wherein the second respondent stated that the excess land in the possession of the petitioner was 312 sq. metres and not 61 sq. metres as earlier determined and that she should not proceed with the construction till her application for exemption was disposed of by the Department. 3. The petitioner contends that the respondents are estopped from taking the stand that the excess land is 312 sq. metres, and not 61 sq. metres they having permitted her to proceed with the constructions on the basis of their assessment of excess land to be 61 sq. metres. The fact that the petitioner has an only son who is married and that he is in possession of no other property, ought to have weighed with the second respondent and the second respondent ought to have found that she is entitled to the grant of exemption. The directive of the second respondent, dt. 20.7.1979 re-determining the excess land in the petitioner's possession, is wholly inoperative and unenforceable. The petitioner received a communication from the first respondent in its proceedings dt. The directive of the second respondent, dt. 20.7.1979 re-determining the excess land in the petitioner's possession, is wholly inoperative and unenforceable. The petitioner received a communication from the first respondent in its proceedings dt. 15.12.1979 to state that her application for grant of exemption was carefully examined and the Government saw no ground for grant of exemption and that further action would be taken in accordance with the provisions of the act in regard to the alleged excess land of 312 sq. metres. The said order of the first respondent, according to the petitioner is Ab Initio illegal, bad, arbitrary and unjust. 4. On 21.1.1980, the petitioner addressed the Honourable Minister for Revenue and later during the Governor's regime another letter to the Adviser to the Governor of Tamil Nadu on 21.2.1980 requesting review and re-consideration of her request for exemption. These petitions were however had no effect. By a letter dt. 18.7.1980 that the third respondent sent a communication to the petitioner requiring her to file an application under Section 22 of the act for the Government to acquire the surplus extent for the benefit of the weaker sections of the society. Apprehending precipitate action in view of the orders passed, the petitioner moved the second and third respondents by letters dt. 13.8.1980 respectively requesting reconsideration of the determination of the actual excess extent, also agreeing, in the alternative, to surrender the excess as may be determined. 5. The point for determination is whether the orders dated 15.12.1979 and 7.6.1980 of the Government are correct and in accordance with law. 6. In the counter-affidavit sworn to by the Deputy Secretary to the Government, it is stated on behalf of the respondents that the property in question was inspected by the Director of Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax on 8.8.1979 and the extent of excess vacant land was arrived at as 312 sq. metres and the Board (U.L.C.) recommended to the Government the acquisition of such excess land. The Secretary of the Board of Revenue (U.L.C. & U.L.T.) by his letter dated 20.9.1979 required the petitioner not to undertake any construction in the land till the disposal of her application for exemption and stating that any sale of the land would be void under Section 6(l) of the Act. The Secretary of the Board of Revenue (U.L.C. & U.L.T.) by his letter dated 20.9.1979 required the petitioner not to undertake any construction in the land till the disposal of her application for exemption and stating that any sale of the land would be void under Section 6(l) of the Act. Accordingly, by order dated 15.12.1979 the Government rejected the request of the petitioner for exemption to retain the excess vacant land and ordered acquisition of the excess land of 312 sq. metres. 7. Mr. A.R. Lakshmanan learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the orders now impugned by the petitioner are not speaking orders and merely saying that the request of the petitioner could not be complied with and informing the result as such, would not satisfy the requirements of an order wherein it is necessary that all the reasons for the rejection must be disclosed. In the instant case the impugned order dated 15.12.1979 issued by the Revenue secretariat of the Government does not give the reasons for the rejection, but only states that in respect of the excess vacant land of 312 sq. metres in R.S. No. 1/12 the matter had been carefully examined by the Government and they saw no grounds to comply with the request of the petitioner. It is therefore submitted that the entire proceedings which culminated in the rejection of the petition's request for exemption are vitiated in that no speaking order had been pronounced by the authorities concerned after duly considering the merits and demerits of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner, especially when the petitioner has stated that she has only one married son who is also living with her and, taking into account her status and the circumstances of her family, the exemption prayed for by the petitioner has to be necessarily granted to her. In support of his argument learned Counsel for the petitioner refers to the decision in Mahabir Prasad v. State of U.P., wherein it has been held that recording of reasons in support of a decision by a quasi judicial authority is obligatory as it ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not result of caprice, whim or fancy or reached on ground of policy or expediency and that the necessity to record reasons is greater if the order is subject to appeal. It has further been held that decision as could be seen from the observations of the Supreme Court in para 6 of the report which run as follows: From the materials on the record it cannot be determined as to who considered the appeal addressed to State Government, and what was considered by the authority exercising power on behalf of the State Government. The practice of the executive authority dismissing statutory appeal against orders which Prima Facie seriously prejudice the rights of the aggrieved party without giving reasons is a negation of the rule of law. The power of the District Magistrate was quasi-judicial; exercise of the power of the State Government was subject to the Supervisory power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and of the appellate power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The High Court and this Court would placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given, and the appeal is dismissed without recording and communicating any reasons. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also refers to the decision in Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner, wherein it has been held: When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise an order had in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Learned Counsel for the petitioner refers to a third case reported in Chakravarthi v. Thillaimoorthy (1970)1 M.L.J. 476 for the following proposition: Where Government has made an order of assignment of certain land in favour of a person and it is establishing that the person in whose favour the order has been made, had made repeated efforts to get the formalities of assignment completed but has failed in his attempts due to the delay on the part of the authorities, such a person has acquired some rights which cannot be adversely affected by orders of the Government except on grounds contemplated in Rule 18 of the Board's Standing Orders 15. The mere fact that the formalities were not completed by issuing an order in Form D cannot mean that the assignment can be revoked by the Government at any time at its discretion. 8. The mere fact that the formalities were not completed by issuing an order in Form D cannot mean that the assignment can be revoked by the Government at any time at its discretion. 8. Viewing the present order which is impugned in this petition as one which does not give reasons for the conclusion of the authority, but is in the nature of only intimating the result or conclusion, this Court is definitely of the opinion that the order which rejects the prayer of the petitioner for exemption must necessarily contain also the reasons for the rejection, since several grounds have been raised by the petitioner in support of her request for exemption. Under these circumstances, by merely disposing of the petition for exemption by an order which does not disclose reasons therefore is certainly not in accordance with law. Hence in the interests of justice, this Court remits the matter for consideration of the various points raised by the petitioner herein and to come to a correct conclusion in accordance with law and also to make known to the petitioner of the Government's reasons for either allowing or for rejecting the prayer for exemption, in a comprehensive way such that it will be self explanatory. In this view without expressing anything on merit regarding the prayer of the petitioner for exemption, this Court remits the matter to the first respondent by setting aside the orders impugned herein and directing the first respondent to give opportunity to the petitioner to put forth her case and to consider the said submissions and thereafter come to a conclusion in accordance with law. The first respondent is directed to dispose of the petition as expeditiously as possible. The petitioner also should put forth her case before the first respondent on receipt of notice from the first respondent. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. There will no order as to costs.