JUDGMENT Palok Basu, J. 1. Petitioner Kripal Singh has filed this writ petition challenging the order of the Prescribed Authority, Kashipur, district Nainital. dated 2-4-1977 (Annexure 3) and that of the District Judge, Nainital, dated 3-2-1978 (Annexure 4) thereby directing that the petitioner should be ejected from over plot no. 36/2 (6 bighas 4 biswas) and plot no. 42/2 (7 bighas 6 biswas) situated in village Santoshpur, Tehsil Bazpur, district Nainital. 2. The short facts are that one Jageer Singh was entered as adhivasi over the said two plots who, by a registered sale deed dated 10-4-1972, transferred the same in favour of the petitioner. A notice under section 4 (i) of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act, was issued by the Prescribed Authority being subject-matter of case No. 22/82 of 1975-76. The petitioner showed cause, filed objections pleading, inter alia, that the provisions of the Act were not applicable, that the proprietary rights should be deemed to have vested in the petitioner in accordance with the various laws and regulations and that the notice should be discharged because no ground was mentioned in it thus flouting the mandate contained in Section 4 of the Act. However, being satisfied that the proceedings were valid, the Prescribed Authority passed the impugned order. The petitioner's appeal to the District Judge having failed, the present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I have heard Sri Rajesh Tandon, Advocate, on behalf of the petitioner and M. M. Chaturvedi, Standing Counsel, for the opposite party. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has virtually argued the same three points as detailed above. They may be conveniently formulated as under :- (1) The notice (Annexure 1) itself is invalid and should be quashed. (2) The provisions of the Act are not attracted to the facts of the case. (3) The judgment of the Prescribed Authority was contrary to the mandate of Section 5 inasmuch as he has not dealt with any of the points raised before him. That being so, the order of the Appellate Authority is also bad which has only upheld the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. 4. After giving my anxious consideration to the entire matter I am of opinion that this writ petition must succeed. That being so, the order of the Appellate Authority is also bad which has only upheld the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. 4. After giving my anxious consideration to the entire matter I am of opinion that this writ petition must succeed. As regards the first point, it must be stated at the outset that the notice which was served upon the petitioner was indeed too cursory. Section 4, however, provides that the Prescribed Authority shall issue a notice in writing which shall specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made and fix a date by which the affected person is to show cause. The section further makes provision as to how the notice will be served upon persons who may be affected by the proceedings. It is thus apparent that the legislature had intended that unless the party sought to be affected is made fully aware of the grounds at the very outset the proceedings shall not begin at all. The only ground in the instant notice, translated into English, reads as under : “Unauthorised occupation of the public premises described in the Schedule below. “(details of the two plot numbers given) To say the least, the notice is wholly vague and does not comply with the requirements of law. The learned counsel for the State, however, said that since the petitioner participated in the proceedings and came to court with his defence, as such there was no prejudice caused to him. It was further, therefore, argued that it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the invalidity of the notice now that the judgment on merits has gone against him. Such an argument must be rejected at once. At the stage when proceedings begin one does not know whether the information conveyed to the Prescribed Authority is truthful or not. If the issuing of notice was a mere formality and could be by passed, the language of section 4 would not have been the same as we find. Question of prejudice, therefore, does not arise where the notice is not in compliance with law. To hold otherwise will negate the very purpose of issuing notice, and citizens may be put to unnecessary harassment by vexatious proceedings under the Act. Question of prejudice, therefore, does not arise where the notice is not in compliance with law. To hold otherwise will negate the very purpose of issuing notice, and citizens may be put to unnecessary harassment by vexatious proceedings under the Act. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the instant notice is bad in the eyes of law and the entire proceedings emanating therefrom have to be quashed. I am fortified in this view by the two decisions reported in 1984 AWC 546 and AIR 1977 Orissa page 201. Normally, the matter may have been sent back to the Prescribed Authority for proceeding in accordance with law from the stage of issuing notice all over again, but in view of the discussion following, that course is not necessary. 5. Coming now to the second point, before going into the merits of the contentions raised a few facts require mention. It may be noted that under the UP ZA and LR Act previously there was a class of tenure holder known as “Adhivasi ". However, “Adhivasis “were to be completely eliminated with effect from the appointed day on which sirdari rights were conferred on them in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter IX-A, newly added by U.P. Act No. XX of 1954. Consequently, all “Adhivasis “(governed by relevant notification) come by operation of law to be sirdars of the land held by them. In the district of Nainital a notification was issued by the Government, reference about which has been made in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the writ petition, which are being quoted below : 22. “That on 1st of July, 1969, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was enforced in Bazpur area with the result that all the sub-tenants were given Adhivasi rights of the land of which they were in possession. A true copy of the above notification dated 1st of July 1969, is being annexed to this writ petition and is marked as Annexure 5. 23. “That in continuation of the Notification dated June 30, 1969, in exercise of the powers under sub-section (1) of Section 240-A, the Adhivasis were given the sirdari rights from 1st of April, 1974. A true copy of the notification confirming (should be conferring) the sirdari rights on the adhivasi is being annexed to this writ petition and is marked as Annexure 6. “ 6. A true copy of the notification confirming (should be conferring) the sirdari rights on the adhivasi is being annexed to this writ petition and is marked as Annexure 6. “ 6. In paragraph 21 of the counter affidavit filed by the State the two said paragraphs have been jointly replied as under : 21. “That with regard to the contents of paragraphs 22 and 23 of the writ petition it is stated that the petitioner came into possession over the land in dispute since 1383F. and as such there is no question of his acquiring adhivasi right over the land in dispute. It is further stated that the petitioner was neither a sub-tenant nor an adhivasi but an unauthorised occupant since 1383F. and no benefit can be claimed by the petitioner. Any averment to the contrary are wrong and denied. “ It is common knowledge that once a tenure holder was classified as sirdar he could under the said Act (before the amendments of 1977) become a bhumidhar by fulfilling certain requirements laid down in Sections 134 and 135. The learned counsel argued that in view of the aforesaid notification issued by the State concerning district Nainital, all adhivasis were to become sirdars and that “regularisation “as required would be deemed. On this basis he contends that admittedly after Jageer Singh executed the transfer deed in his favour, the petitioner's possession came to be consequently noted in column 4 in the revenue records, it should indicate that his possession has been regularised. In this connection the relevant portion in the definition of the word ' premises ' and 'public premises' as contained in the Act is quoted below for beneficial reference :- 2 (b) "Premises” means any land (including any forest land or trees standing thereon, or covered by water, or a road maintained by the State Government or land appurtenant to such road) or any building or part of a building and includes : (i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any appurtaining to such building or part of a building, and (ii) any fitting or fixtures affixed to or any furniture supplied with such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof : but does not include land which for the time is held by a tenure bolder under any law relating to land-tenures (underlined by me). (i) is vested in or entrusted to the management, of Gaon Sabha or any other local authority or (ii) is held by a tenure holder under the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956, the Jaunsar-Bawar Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956, the Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960, the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, or the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 ; " “2 (e) "public premises” means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the State Government and includes any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of- (i) any company defined......... (ii) any local authority ; (iii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, or a local authority) owned or controlled by the State Government, or (iv) any society......... and also includes :- (i) Nazul land or any other premises entrusted to the management of a local authority (including any building built with Government funds on land belonging to the State Government after the entrustment of the land to the local authority, not being land vested in or entrusted to the management of a Gaon Sabha or any other local authority under any law relating to land tenures) ; (ii) any premises acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with the consent of the State Government for a Company (as defined in that Act) and held by that company under an agreement executed under section 41 of that providing for re-entry by the State Government in certain conditions. " 7. A mere look at the provisions will indicate that any land which is held for the time being by a tenure holder under any law relating to land tenure would not be included within the said definition, if it is treated as having vested in or entrusted to the management of a Gaon Sabha or any local authority or that the same is held by a tenure holder under any of the enactments governing land tenures in Uttar Pradesh. 8. To me, it appears that the provision for excluding land of such tenure holders has a special purpose. 8. To me, it appears that the provision for excluding land of such tenure holders has a special purpose. For a tenure holder his land is generally a source of his and his family's livelihood particularly in our State of Uttar Pradesh where the majority of citizens consists of agriculturist. Needless to say, the Act has a drastic method of ejectment. Though a trespasser can certainly be ejected under the common law whether it be civil or revenue, the Act, however, sets aside those procedures and instead empowers the Prescribed Authority to record in a manner which lays down a much quicker and faster method of ejecting a trespasser. In the UP ZA and LR Act we find sufficient safeguards for the Gaon Sabha and other authorities to eject a trespasser, if the land can be claimed to have vested in them-see Section 122-B. Thus the land of such tenure holders as the petitioner should not be governed by the provisions of the Act, appears to be one of the main objectives, to attain which the exception has been carved out in the definition clauses by the legislature. Even from the other provisions of the Act it is clear that the possession alone whether of the original adhivasi or of the transferee adhivasi has to be seen by the Prescribed Authority and attempt to trace his title will be futile in the present Proceedings under the Act. Under the circumstances it must be held that but for the stop which may be available under the land tenure laws, the provisions of the Act will be wholly in-applicable for the ejectment of the petitioner. The nearest case on the point is the one reported in 1984 AWC 568 , Baldeo Raj v. State of Uttar Pradesh in which it has been held by Hon. Mr. Justice B. D. Agarwal that recourse to the provisions of the Act could not be taken concerning land where eviction was possible under the proceedings of UP ZA and LR Act I, therefore, decide this point in favour of the petitioner. At this stage one factual controversy may be set at rest. In paragraphs 21 and 24 of the writ petition it has been stated that it is the Gaon Sabha alone which is entitled to file a suit for ejectment against the petitioner. At this stage one factual controversy may be set at rest. In paragraphs 21 and 24 of the writ petition it has been stated that it is the Gaon Sabha alone which is entitled to file a suit for ejectment against the petitioner. The reply of the State as contained in paragraphs 20 and 22 of the counter affidavit which indicates that since there was no Gaon Sabha in the concerned village the proceedings under the Act ensued on the report of the revenue officials. The existence of the Gaon Sabha is not a pre-condition to the argument that is being raised on behalf of the petitioner. What has been challenged is the right to initiate such ejectment proceedings at any one's behest. It goes without saying that the UP ZA and LR Act and the allied laws provide ample power to the revenue officials where there is no Gaon Sabha to initiate proceedings under the said laws. Therefore, for the purpose of our discussion it will be unnecessary to go into the question whether the Gaon Sabha was constituted in the village in question or not. 9. Now coming to the third point, I am of the view that this should also prevail. The judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority has been much too sketchy. I have a feeling that a proforma which is appended towards the end of the Rules framed under the Act has perhaps been made the basis by the Prescribed Authority for passing the impugned order. Section 5 in its turn lays down definite guidelines as to what is to be incorporated in the judgment which Prescribed Authority pronounces in a case of ejectment under the Act. It has apparently to be made clear that the Prescribed Authority had applied his mind to the questions raised before him by a respondent being proceeded with. Section 5 in its turn lays down definite guidelines as to what is to be incorporated in the judgment which Prescribed Authority pronounces in a case of ejectment under the Act. It has apparently to be made clear that the Prescribed Authority had applied his mind to the questions raised before him by a respondent being proceeded with. In the instant case all that the Prescribed Authority has said, translated into English reads : “Whereas, I, the undersigned, am satisfied for the reasons recorded below that Sri Kripal Singh residing at Santoshpur Farm, district Nainital, is in unauthorised occupation of the Public Premises described in the Schedule below : Reasons Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers under sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972, I hereby order the said Sri Kirpal Singh who is in occupation of the said public premises to vacate said public premises within thirty days of the date of publication of this order. In the event of refusal or failure to comply with this order within the period specified above, the said Sri Kripal Singh and all other persons concerned are liable to be evicted from the said public premises, if need be, by the use of such force as may be necessary (details of the two plots quoted). " 10. A perusal of this will show that there is no discussion whatsoever on any of the points raised by the petitioner in his reply which has been filed before me as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. As stated above, the petitioner had not only challenged the legality of the notice but he had, in fact, challenged the entire proceedings. The Prescribed Authority has not even the courtesy to mention the grounds taken by the petitioner before him, much less any reasons for coming to the conclusion that the proceedings were validly instituted and should result in the ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed land. The order passed by the Prescribed Authority is only a verbatim copy of the proforma (Form B re : Rule 3) appended towards the end of the Rules framed under the Act. I fail to appreciate how this point escaped the notice of the appellate authority. It is indeed expected that whenever such matters are raised before the Prescribed Authority he should come out with a reasoned order. I fail to appreciate how this point escaped the notice of the appellate authority. It is indeed expected that whenever such matters are raised before the Prescribed Authority he should come out with a reasoned order. In the result, the petition is allowed. The notice (Annexure 1) and the judgment of the Prescribed Authority and that of the Appellate Authority dated 2-4-77 and 3-2-78 respectively (Annexures 3 and 4) are thereby quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.