The Civil Revision No. 201 of 1984 is directed against the order dated 30.6.84 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 1, Gauhati whereby the application of the plaintiff opposite party under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was allowed and Title Suit No. 92 of 1982 which had been dismissed in default of the plaintiff on 13.3.84 had been restored. The Civil Revision No. 296 of 1984 is directed against the order dated 30.6.84 for the restoration of a Misc. Case which had arisen out of an order of injunction in the aforesaid Title Suit. Both the revisions are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Briefly, the facts are that the plaintiff opposite party had filed the Title Suit No. 98/82 against the present petitioner and others, challenging a sale deed in respect of the land in favour of the petitioner on the ground that the land was joint property of the plaintiff opposite party and the defendant No. 2, but the defendant No. 2 had illegally transferred by sale 'specific' portion of the property to the petitioner. On the prayer of the plaintiff an order of temporary injunction was made in the aforesaid suit against the defendant petitioner and subsequently an application was moved for the alleged breach or violation of the said order which was Misc. Case No. 22 of 84. Both the Title Suit and the aforesaid Misc. Case were listed for hearing on 13.3.84, but due to the absence of the plaintiff and his counsel, the suit was dismissed in default and the Misc. Case was disposed of as redundant in view of the dismissal of the suit. The learned counsel for the plaintiff applied for restoration of the suit by an application on 21.3.84. The learned Assistant District Judge, Gauhati, after hearing the parties, by the impugned order dated 306.84. restored the suit. The learned Judge also res­tored the aforesaid Misc. Case by a separate order which is impugned in the other revision. 3. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come to this Court and Shri N. M. Lahiri, learned counsel appearing on his behalf, has submitted that the application for restoration of the suit was not maintainable and the learned Court below had erred in exercise of jurisdiction. Case by a separate order which is impugned in the other revision. 3. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come to this Court and Shri N. M. Lahiri, learned counsel appearing on his behalf, has submitted that the application for restoration of the suit was not maintainable and the learned Court below had erred in exercise of jurisdiction. Shri Labiri has also submitted that on merits too, the petition for restoration was not correct, and the learned Court below had gravely erred in making the order of restoration of the suit which was 'perverse.' Shri Lahiri has in the other revision, submitted that just because the suit has been restored it did not follow that Misc. Case should also be restored and it could not ipso facto be revived as held the trial Court. Shri B. K. Goswami, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent on the other hand, has refuted the above submissions for the petitioner. 4. I have considered the respective submissions for the parties and the materials on record. 5. In so far as the Civil Revision No. 301/84 is concerned, the main submissions of Shri Lahiri as elaborated are that the Suit No. 98/82 having been dismissed in default on 13.3.84. the power of attorney which the learned counsel for the plaintiff had filed in the suit had terminated or ceased to be operative and consequently said learned counsel ( Shri R-L. Yadav ) could not move application for restoration of 'the suit on 21.3.84 that in any case the power of attorney of said learned counsel produced in the suit could not be construed to cover the power to move application for restoration. In this connection, Shri N.M. Lahiri has referred to the provisions of section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereafter the Code to show that in a proceeding under Order IX of the Code, the procedure prescribed for pleading under the Code shall apply. Shri Labiri has also referred to Order IV Rule 1 and Order VI Rule 14 of the Code to show how the proceeding under Order IX Rule 9 could be initiated and the scope of the authority of a pleader who appears for the parties. Shri Labiri has also referred to Order IV Rule 1 and Order VI Rule 14 of the Code to show how the proceeding under Order IX Rule 9 could be initiated and the scope of the authority of a pleader who appears for the parties. Shri Lahiri has submitted that the power of the counsel ceases to be available or to be operative after dismissal of the suit, on the basis of the explanation which has been added to sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order III of the Code by amendment in 1976 to contend that the said explana­tion specifies the proceedings which are covered by it and that it docs not include proceedings under Order IX and consequently the said provision is not available for a proceeding under Order IX of the Code. The contention raised in short is that the power of attorney filed in the suit ceased to be operative on its dismissal in default on 13.3.84 and hence the aforesaid power was not available to the learned counsel for taking any action for and on behalf of the plaintiff. The next submission of Shri Lahiri is that under Order IX Rule 9, it is the plaintiff who has to move the application. Shri Lahiri has laid emphasis on the word 'he' in the said rule 9 to submit 'he' means only the plaintiff. Shri Lahiri has referred to Order VI, Rules 14 and 15 of the Code, to contend that the application had to be in the form of the pleading in view of the provisions of section 141 read with Order IV Rule 1 of the Code and therefore under Rule 14 had to be signed and verified by the plaintiff which had not been done for it was signed by Shri R.L. Yadav, learned counsel for the plaintiff, and accordingly Shri Lahiri has submitted that the application for restoration was not maintainable. 6. 6. The provisions of section 141 of the Code do specify that "the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as for as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction" and the Explanation which has been added by the amendment of the Code in 1976 includes the proce­edings under Order IX, but, it only means that the procedure laid down for the suits shall be followed as far as it can be applicable in all proceedings including a proceeding under Order IX of the Code. Order IV relating to institution of suit in its rule I provides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf and every plaint shall comply with the rules contained in Orders VI and VII, so far as they are applicable. In view of section 141, it may, therefore be said tbat an application for setting aside dismissal of suit, is to be in accordance with the rules contained in Order VI as far as can be applicable. Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI are as under: "Rule 14. Pleading to be signed - Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any ): Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf." Rule 15. Verification of pleading - (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquain­ted with the facts of the case. 2.... 3...." 7. Verification of pleading - (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquain­ted with the facts of the case. 2.... 3...." 7. The first question to be seen is that whether a proceeding for setting aside the dismissal of suit is continuation of the suit or not, for if it is a continuation of the suit it may be clear that the power of attorney in favour of the learned counsel ( Shri R.L. Yadav ) filed in the suit would continue to be valid and be available for filing application for setting aside the dismissal of the suit, in view of the clear provisions in sub-rule (2) "-… or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client." Sub-rules (I) and (2) of Rule 4 of Order III of the Code, read as under: “ (1) No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or under a power-of attorney to make such appointment. (2) Every such appointment shall be ( filed in Court and shall, for the purposes of sub-rule (1), be) deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a wri­ting signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client." 8. Shri Lahiri has strenuously urged that the proceeding for setting aside the dismissal of suit for default is not a continuation of the suit, because the suit had been dismissed. Shri Lahiri has strenuously urged that the proceeding for setting aside the dismissal of suit for default is not a continuation of the suit, because the suit had been dismissed. The relevant por­tion of Rule 9 of Order IX reads : "But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hea­ring, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit". It clearly means that when the order of dismissal is set aside, there would be no order of dismissal and the suit as it was before the order of dismissal was made shall come back to existence. In my opinion such a proceeding for setting aside dismissal of suit is a continuation of the suit for the reasons, that the expression 'setting aside', implies that the suit which ended because of dismissal in default, is again revived from the stage, it was so dismissed, hence the proceeding which sets aside the dismissal and brings about restoration or the revival of the suit from the stage, it was dismissed, is manifestly a very important link for the purpose and should be considered as continuation of the suit. Any other view of the proceedings under Rule 9 of Order IX would not be justified and would not in my opinion be reasonable. I, therefore, hold that a proceeding for setting aside the dismissal of the suit in default or for restoration of the suit is a continuation of the suit. 9. It may be clear that the last part of sub rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order III is significant and it means that the appointment of pleader made shall continue except in the circumstances noted therein earlier which do not exist in this case, until all proceedings in the suit ended so far as regards the client. 9. It may be clear that the last part of sub rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order III is significant and it means that the appointment of pleader made shall continue except in the circumstances noted therein earlier which do not exist in this case, until all proceedings in the suit ended so far as regards the client. In the instant case, the suit was dismissed for default and application for setting aside the dismissal or restoration of the suit stated that even the learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party had no information about the hearing, i.e. 13.3.84 as fixed by the Court and the petition had been moved by the learned counsel ( Shri R. L. Yadav). I am quite unable to accept that in so far as the plaintiff opposite party was concerned, it could be said that all proceedings in the suit had e2ded just because the suit stood dismissed in default; that the pro­ceedings in the suit had not ended is obvious from the fact that the order of dismissal of the suit could be set aside and was indeed set aside and the suit stood revived at the stage before it was dismissed. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that in such facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said that all proc­eedings in the suit had ended in so far as the plaintiff was concerned with the dismissal of the suit in default on 13.3,84. It follows that the power of Shri R, L. Yadav in the aforesaid suit was valid and was available to him when he filed the application for restoration on 21.3.84. 10. Shri Lahiri has laid emphasis on the explanation added by amendment of 1976 to sub rule (2) to contend that since the pro­ceedings under Order IX had not been included therein, the said proceedings under Order IX could not be considered to be within the ambit of sub-rule (2). I am unable to accept this submission for the reasons that the explanation is not exhaustive of the 'pro­ceedings' in a suit and the explanation added appears to have been inserted for clarification of matters relating to application for review, application under section 144 or under section 152 of the Code or for obtaining of copies or document, etc. I am unable to accept this submission for the reasons that the explanation is not exhaustive of the 'pro­ceedings' in a suit and the explanation added appears to have been inserted for clarification of matters relating to application for review, application under section 144 or under section 152 of the Code or for obtaining of copies or document, etc. It may be clear from the nature of the proceedings stated in the explanation that the proceedings about which there could be some doubt that whether or not the same were continuation of the suit were by the said explanation, specified. So far as the proceeding for restora­tion of the suit is concerned, it appears that there was no doubt about it and it could be said that it did not require any clarification. I, therefore, hold that the power of attorney which the learned counsel Shri R.L. Yadav had filed in the suit was available and in force to enable him to file the application for restoration on 21.3.84. II. Shri Lahiri has sumitted that the aforesaid power of attorney did not specify the power to apply for restoration, and that it could not be construed as power to take action after the dismissal of the suit which was taken. On consideration of the said power of attorney on record of the original suit, I have not found it possible to accept the submission of Shri Lahiri for the simple reason that it is expressed in such wide terms that it must imply the authority to take any action in relation to the suit which included action for filing application for restoration of the suit dismissed in default. It reads : "to be my true and lawful Advocate to appear and act for me in the matter noted above and in connection therewith and for that purpose to do all act whatsoever in that connection including...." (emphasis supplied) The said power of attorney clearly gave authority to the learned counsel not only to appear for the plaintiff in the suit but in connection therewith also and to do all act whatsoever in that con­nection. I am, therefore, unable to put a restrictive construction on the aforesaid power of attorney, as submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, and hold that the learned counsel ( R.L. Yadav ) had the authority to move the application for restoration. 11. I am, therefore, unable to put a restrictive construction on the aforesaid power of attorney, as submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, and hold that the learned counsel ( R.L. Yadav ) had the authority to move the application for restoration. 11. The submission for the petitioner that application for restora­tion could be moved only by the plaintiff is not correct. The application could be moved by any person duly authorised by the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the plaintiff under the power of attorney had the necessary authority from the plaintiff to do so for and on his behalf. 12. Under Rule 14 of Order VI, a pleading requires to be signed by the party and also his pleader and tinder Rule 15 requires to be verified. The application dated 21 3.83 was signed by the counsel ( R.L. Yadav ). Considering that the application was moved on the ground that the learned counsel was not aware of the date fixed despite his earlier efforts as the reason for absence which were in the knowledge of the learned counsel. I think the application signed by the learned counsel and supported by his own affidavit was quite in order and in any case there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the provisions of Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the Code. I, therefore, hold that the application for setting aside the order of dismissal was in order. There was no error in exercise of jurisdiction by the Court below. 13. Shri Lahiri for the petitioner has submitted that the facts stated in the application were not correct, that the 'case' was duly listed for hearing in the Court diary, and the impugned order was perverse. Shri B. K. Goswami on the other hand has submitted that the order dated 2.2.83 itself shows that the date 13.3.83' had been written in different ink and that the petitioner had not filed the copy of 'Court Diary' earlier. The learned Court below had considered the matter and had been satisfied about the cause shown for the absence of the plaintiff on 13.3.83. The matter, i.e. fixation of the date for hearing and its information to the learned counsel for the plaintiff pertained to the work of his Court. The learned Court below had considered the matter and had been satisfied about the cause shown for the absence of the plaintiff on 13.3.83. The matter, i.e. fixation of the date for hearing and its information to the learned counsel for the plaintiff pertained to the work of his Court. I am inclined to think that the view taken by the Court below should not be considered unreasonable and was in any case not perverse as urged for the petitioner. There is no reason for any interference with the impugned order. 14. As regards the other revision, I am unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the restoration of the suit could not lead to the revival of the 'Misc' case which had arisen out of order made in the suit. If the 'Misc.' case could be abandoned on 13.3.83, for reasons of dismissal of the suit, I do not see any reason why the 'Misc.' case could also not be revived or restored with the restoration of the suit. The cause for its abandonment was dismissal of the suit so when the dismissal was set aside the Misc. Case was also restored. The order for restoration of the Misc. Case does not therefore suffer from any illegality or error in exercise of jurisdiction and requires no interference. 15. For the aforesaid reasons both the petitions fail and are dismissed. The records be sent back to the trial Court immediately. The parties to appear before the trial Court on 9. 1. 89.