JUDGMENT : H.L .Agrawal, C.J. - When this writ application was taken up for hearing, learned Counsel for the opposite parties raised a preliminary objection that the writ application as constituted is not maintainable since all the authorities whose orders are in question have not been impleaded as parties and the relevant orders passed by them have not been annexed to the writ application. 2. I may briefly state the facts: On 27-3-1964. opposite parties 1 and 2 who are members of the Scheduled Tribe, executed a registered sale deed in favour of the Petitioners in respect of certain agricultural lands situated in mouza-Simakhal under Madanpur-Rampur Police Station in the district of Kalahandi without taking permission of the prescribed authority. The permission was however, granted by the Sub-Divisional Officer by order dated 25-6-1964 for sale of the lands to non-Adivasi persons. Long thereafter, in the year 1977, opposite parties 1 to 4 made an application u/s 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act before the Revenue Officer Bhawanipatna praying for restoration of the lands in question in their favour. The Revenue Officer by his order dated 15-8-1978. allowed the application of the opposite parties and ordered restoration of the lands in their favour. The Petitioners took the matter in appeal before the Additional District Magistrate, Bhwanipatna who dismissed the appeal on 9-10-1979. 3. The Petitioners then filed a revision before the Collector, Kalahandi, apposite party No. 5, who also by his order dated 19-10-1980 (Annexure 3) dismissed the revision leading to the filing of the present writ application. 4. The Petitioners have neither impleaded the Revenue Officer and the Additional District Magistrate who passed the orders nor have challenged the initial and the appellate orders on, which account the preliminary objection is raised. . 5. In order to meet the objection, Sri B. K. Nayak appearing for the Petitioners took shelter under the plea of 'merger' and submitted that the order of the Revenue Officer merged in the appellate order of the Additional District Magistrate and similarly, the appellate order merged in the reversional order of the Collector (Annexure 3) and therefore it was not necessary for the Petitioners either to implead them as parties or to challenge the orders passed by them. He also pressed into service the following observations made in the case of Sheodan Singh Vs. He also pressed into service the following observations made in the case of Sheodan Singh Vs. Smt. Daryao Kunwar, which was a case dealing with the principle of res judicata within the ambit of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure: ..It is well settled that where a decree on the merits is appalled from, the decision of the trial court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicata again becomes res sub judice and it is the decree of the appeal court which will then be res judicata. But if the contention of the Appellant were to be accepted and it is held that if the appeal court dismisses the appeal on any preliminary ground, like limitation at default in printing, thus confirming in toto the trial court's decision given on merits, the appeal court's decree cannot be res judicata, the result be that even though the decision of the trial court given on the merits is confirmed by the dismissal of the appeal on a preliminary ground there can never be res judicate..... It is difficult to accept the submission of Sri Nayak. The decision of the Supreme Court does not answer the preliminary objection in any manner. 6. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the theory of merger could apply even to cases not strictly governed by the Code of Civil Procedure; laying down the principle, that on account of the application of the theory only the final authority need be impleaded and the final order challenged is likely to create in many cases various anomalies. It may well be that an order of a subordinate authority is affirmed by a higher authority not on all the points but only on some points; then there may also be cases where the same direction or observation of the subordinate authority has to be worked out. The matter may be all the more complicated where the judgment of a subordinate authority is reversed only on one point without touching the other points and the like. It would, therefore, not be safe to interfere with the order of the final authority without impleading the authorities subordinate to him and in the absence of the orders passed by them. It would, therefore, not be safe to interfere with the order of the final authority without impleading the authorities subordinate to him and in the absence of the orders passed by them. I find support for this proposition from a Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Naziruddin Sirajuddin v. P. S. Lawale and Ors. AIR 1956 Nag 65, where it has been ruled that if a Petitioner under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution wishes a certain order to be quashed, it is necessary to implead not only the appellate authority but the primary authority also, even though it may be a judgment of affirmance. . 7. The preliminary objection is accordingly accepted and the writ application as laid, being incompetent, must fail and is hereby dismissed. No costs. K.P. Mohapatra, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed