JUDGMENT SANKARI PARSAD DAS GHOSH, J. 1. THEIR is an appeal by the plaintiffs in respect of a wall-almirah with adjoining open space in premises No. 84/34, Bepin Behari Ganguli Street, P.S. Muchipara, Calcutta, which is popularly known as Bowbazar Market. 2. THE respondent No. 1, Hiralal Shah, was in possession of the Wall- almirah since about 1947 on payment of daily fee, which was at first 0-50p., and which was subsequently enhanced to 0-75p., per diem. THE wall-almirah is used for selling spices. Hiralal, the respondent No. 1 (the defendant No. 1 in the suit) filed a suit, being Title Suit No. 844 of 1969 in the Tenth Bench of, the City Civil Court, Calcutta, against the respondent No. 2, Gobinda Shaw (the defendant No. 2 in the suit) for recovery of possession of the spices-shop on declaration of his title thereto and for a preliminary decree against Gobinda for rendition of accounts since 1968. THE allegation in the plaint of that suit, by Hiralal was that Gabinda was previously his Karmachari and that, due to his illness in 1960, Gobinda was looking after the spices-shop on the basis of an arrangement that Gobinda would pay Hiralal 10 an nas of the profits and would himself take his remuneration at the rate of 6 an nas of the profits. It was alleged in the plaint of that suit that though Gobinda rendered accounts to Hiralal upto the end of 1967, no accounts were rendered to Hiralal since 1968 and as such, that suit, being Title Suit No. 844 of 1969, was filed by Hiralal against Gobinda, praying for the aforesaid reliefs. That suit was decreed on contest on 29.1.71. Gobinda preferred an appeal, being First Appeal No. 122 of 1971, in this Court. THE appeal was dismissed on 6.3.73. THEreafter, there was Letters Patent Appeal No. 73 of 1973, in this Court, which was also dismissed on 21.1.75. Before the dismissal of the Letters Patent appeal, Hiralal had filed Title Execution Case No. 42 of 1973 in the City Civil Court, Calcutta, for executing the decree passed in Title Suit No. 844 of 1969 against Gobinda. During the pendency of that execution case, the Letters Patent appeal was dismissed. Gobinda had filed a Misc. case, being Misc. Before the dismissal of the Letters Patent appeal, Hiralal had filed Title Execution Case No. 42 of 1973 in the City Civil Court, Calcutta, for executing the decree passed in Title Suit No. 844 of 1969 against Gobinda. During the pendency of that execution case, the Letters Patent appeal was dismissed. Gobinda had filed a Misc. case, being Misc. case No. 370 of 1975, under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in that Title Execution Case No. 42 of 1973 and obtained a stay order on 25.4.75, which was subsequently extended till the disposal of the misc. case, which was ultimately dismissed on 3.1.76. THE respondent No. 1 filed misc. case under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. for police help for executing the decree passed in Title Suit No. 844 of 1969 against Gobinda. One Ramdeo Poddar the respondent No. 3, that filed a suit against Hiralal on showing the present plaintiffs as defendants No. 3 and 4 in 1976. That suit was numbered as Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 in the Court of the learned Judge, Eighth Bench, City; Civil Court, Calcutta. THE allegation in that Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 by Ramdeo was that Ramdeo was a licensee in respect of the spices-shop under the plaintiffs-appellants on payment of licence-fee therefor. On 16-12-77, a petition was filed in that suit on behalf of Ramdeo Poddar for not proceeding with the suit. It was alleged in that petition that Ramdeo was never in possession of the spices-shop and that the suit was filed at the request of the respondent No. 2, Gobinda. On the basis of that petition dated 16-12-77, that Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 was dismissed for non-prosecution on 16-12-77. In the background of the aforesaid facts, the plaintiffs filed Title Suit No. 123 of 1978 in the City Civil court, Calcutta, on 13-1-78 alleging that the respondent No. 1 Hiralal, was a licensee under them on payment of licence-fee at the rate of 0.75p., per diem in respect of the spices-shop (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit:-property' for the sake of convenience) and that by a notice dated 17-10-75,, the licence was revoked. By that notice the appellants demanded vacant possession by 30-10-75. By that notice the appellants demanded vacant possession by 30-10-75. On expiry of that date, the appellants took vacant possession of the suit-property and settled it with Ramdeo as a licensee on or about 1-11-75 at a licence-fee at the rate of 0.80p., per diem. Therafter, Ramdeo filed the Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 praying for declaration that he was a licensee under the appellants and for permanent injunction for restraining Hiralal. from interfering with or disturbing his peaceful possession of the suit-property. The petition filed on 16-12-77, alleging that Ramdeo was never in possession of the suit-property, was actually filed by Ramdeo in collusion with Hiralal. After the dismissal of that Title Suit No. 2(43 of 1976 on -16-12-77, the plaintiffs took again vacant and peaceful possession of the suit-property on and from 17-12-77 and were in possesstion of the property from that date. On alleging that the appellants were not bound by the decree obtained by Hiralal against Gobinda Title Suit No. 844 of 1969 as they were not parties to that suit, the appellants filed the Title Suit No. 123 of 1978 for permanent injunction for restraining Hiralal from interfering with' their peaceful possession of the suit-property on declaration that they were in lawful possession of the property and on further declaration that Hiralal had no bright, title and interest in the suit-property after revocation of licence by them 3. THE suit was contested by Hiralal, the respondant No. 1. Though Ramdeo Poddar, the respondent No. 3, tiled a written statement, he did not contest the suit. THE respondent No. 2, Gobinda, did not file any written statement and did not contest the suit. THE defence of Hiralal was that he was a tenant and not a licensee in respect of the suit-property and that Gobinda set up Ramdeo and caused Ramdeo to file the Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 and that the present suit had been filed by the appellants at the instance of Gobinda, the defendant No. 2. 4. THE appellants examined two witnesses. THEy were their Manager, Sunity Chatterjee (P.W. 1) and an employee of the Corporation of Calcutta (P.W.2). Hiralal examined himself as D.W.I. His son was examined as D.W.3. One Ganesh Prasad Gupta, who has also one shop at Bowbazar Market was examined as D.W.2. 4. THE appellants examined two witnesses. THEy were their Manager, Sunity Chatterjee (P.W. 1) and an employee of the Corporation of Calcutta (P.W.2). Hiralal examined himself as D.W.I. His son was examined as D.W.3. One Ganesh Prasad Gupta, who has also one shop at Bowbazar Market was examined as D.W.2. Considering the evidences of these witnesses and the materials of record, the learned 3udge in the court below held that the appellant had failed to prove that Hiralal was a licensee in respect of the suit- property and that Hiralal had rather been able to prove that he was a tenant in respect of the property. He was further of the opinion that the appellants had brought the suit in collusion with Gobinda and that the appellants were not in lawful possession of the suit-property. On holding that the suit was not maintainable on the basis of the provisions in section. 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the suit was dismissed. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed by the appellants. Mr. Sengupta, the learned Advocate for the appellants has assailed the judgment and decree passed by the court below on several grounds. His first contention is that the suit-property is not a 'premises' within the meaning of section 2(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and hence, Hiralal cannot be a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. His next contention is that Hiralal is not at all a tenant but only a bare licensee, whose licence was revoked by the notice dated 17-10-75 sent by the appellants to him. The last contention of Mr. Sengupta is that after revocation of the licence the appellants, as landlords, had right of re-entry in the suit-property, which they actually "exercised, at first on 31-10-75 and thereafter on 17-12-77. According to Mr. Sengupta, the plaintiffs appellants are in possession of the suit-property and are entitled to get a decree for permanent injunction and the declarations sought for. 5. THE meaning of the word, 'premises', in section 2(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 came up for consideration before a Special Bench of this court in the case of B. R. Properties v. L. B. Kapuria (65 CWN 259). 5. THE meaning of the word, 'premises', in section 2(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 came up for consideration before a Special Bench of this court in the case of B. R. Properties v. L. B. Kapuria (65 CWN 259). It was held in that case that the word, 'premises' in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act included a market and that sheds and stalls in such a market would come within the definition of the word, 'premises', provided they could be held to be buildings or huts or parts thereof. THE definition of- the word 'premises', in section 2(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, included any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures affixed for the use of the tenant in a building of part of a building or hut or part of hut let separately to a tenant. If no building or part of a building or hut or part of a hut is let out to a tenant, a person cannot claim to be a tenant of any fixture in that building or part of that building or hut or part of that hut. It is not the case of Hiralal that the outer wall on which the wall-almirah, which is a fixture, is embedded, was let out to him. If the outer wall on which the wall-almirah is embedded is not out to Hiralal, the wall-almirah or the suit-property cannot be a 'premises' within the meaning of section 2(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. if the suit-property is not a 'premises', Hiralal cannot claim the benefit of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act for his eviction from the suit-property. 6. MR. Sengupta has relied mainly on the case of M. N. Clubwaia v. Fida Hussain Sahab ( AIR 1965 SC 610 ) in support of his contention thai Hiralal is a licensee and not a tenant in respect of the suit-property. The case of M. N. Clubwala (supra) relates to status of stall-holders in a private market. Hiralal cannot, however, be a bare licensee on the basis of the material on record. It is not disputed that Hiralal was in possession of the suit- property since 1947 at a daily rent of Rs.0.50p., which was subsequently enhanced to 0.75p. Ext. H series are some of the receipts showing payment of daily rent by Hiralal. Hiralal cannot, however, be a bare licensee on the basis of the material on record. It is not disputed that Hiralal was in possession of the suit- property since 1947 at a daily rent of Rs.0.50p., which was subsequently enhanced to 0.75p. Ext. H series are some of the receipts showing payment of daily rent by Hiralal. A letter dated 16-10-57 from the predecessor of the appellants to Hiralal, Ext.A, was to the effect that Hiralal was a daily tenant in respect of one room at the rent of Rs.8/- per day. By that letter the predecessor of the appellants intimated Hiralal that the rent was to be increased at the rate of 10% per annum on the existing rent under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Subsequently, by a letter dated 7-12-74, Ext.3, the appellants intimated Hiralal that the was being enhanced by 20% with effect from 15-12-74 in view on rise in municipal rates/taxes and the general rise in the costs of maintenance of the market-premises. It is to be stated, in this connection, that the plaintiffs-appellants are the owners of Bowbazar Market. They run the market on the basis of a licence granted by the Corporation of. Calcutta under section 451(l)(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. Ext. 10 is the relevant municipal licence for the year 1I977-78. By the letter, Ext.3, the plaintiffs-appellants first communicated to Hiralal that the daily amount paid by him was towards licence-fee, and not towards rent as intimated earlier to Hiralal by the letter dated 16-10-57, Ext.A. Thereafter, the notice dated 17-10-75 was issued to Hiralal, revoking the licence on and from 30- 10-75. Even after the expiry of 30-10-75 Hiralal was depositing in each month rent in the office of the Rent Controller at the rate of 0.75p., per day from the month of November, 1975. Ext.F series, are some of the Challans showing deposit of rent per month, calculated on the basis of daily rent at the rate of 0.75p., in the office of the Rent Controller, Calcutta, for some months from November, 1975 upto May, 1980. By sending replies on 29-10-7.5 and 5-11-75, Exts. L and L(l), Hiralal intimated the appellants that was a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and was ejectable under that Act. By sending replies on 29-10-7.5 and 5-11-75, Exts. L and L(l), Hiralal intimated the appellants that was a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and was ejectable under that Act. It is to be stated, in this connection, that after the suit was filed by the two plaintiffs, the plaintiff No. l, out of the two plaintiffs, died and the present appellant No. 1 is the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff No. 1. Be that as it may, when the suit-property cannot be a 'premises' within the meaning of 'section 2(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and when there can be no estoppel against statute, Hiralal cannot claim to be a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 in spite of the letter dated 16-10-57, Ext. A, from the predecessor of the appellants. Even though the respondent No. 1 is not a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, he was regularly paying the " predecessor of the appellants and the plaintiffs daily amount for use and occupation of the suit-property and as such, he must be a licensee for consideration and not a bare licensee. In this perspective, it is not necessary to discuss if, on a scrutiny of the municipal licence, Ext. 10, Hiralal can be a tenant of the suit-property, Hiralal is not a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 19%. It is not the case of Hiralal that he is a tenant under the Transfer of Property Act. Mr. Sengupta has relied on the cases of State of West Bengal v. Birendra Nath ( AIR 1955 Cal. 601 ), Beant Singh v. Cantonment Executive Officer (AIR 1960 J and K 83) and Chandu Lal v. Delhi Municipality (AIR 1978 Delhi. 174) and has contended that when, on the basis of these decisions, a landlord has a right of re-entry on revoking a licence, the plaintiff-appellants are perfectly justified in effecting re-entry, in the suit property on 31-10-75 and 17-12-77. According to Mr. Sengupta, the plaintiffs-appellants settled the suit-property with Ramdeo Poddar on ad from 1-11-75 and are themselves in possession of the property on and from 17-12-77. Considering the evidences on record, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sengupta that the plaintiffs-appellants actually re-entered the suit-property on 31-10-75 or thereafter on 17-12-77. According to Mr. Sengupta, the plaintiffs-appellants settled the suit-property with Ramdeo Poddar on ad from 1-11-75 and are themselves in possession of the property on and from 17-12-77. Considering the evidences on record, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sengupta that the plaintiffs-appellants actually re-entered the suit-property on 31-10-75 or thereafter on 17-12-77. In fact, on a consideration of the totality of the evidences on record, we find nothing to disagree with the finding of the learned Judge in the court below that the suit in the court below was brought by the plaintiffs, in collusion with the defendant No. 2, Gobinda. While unfolding the background of the suit filed by the plaintiffs- appellants, we have shown that the suit was filed on 13-1-78 by the plaintiffs in the court below after Hiralal succeeded in obtaining a decree against Gobinda, the respondent No. 2, for recovery of possession of the suit-property and for rendition of accounts by Gobinda since 1968. Hiralal was successful in that suit up to the Letters Patent appeal in this court, which as dismissed on 21-1-75. During the pendency of that Letters Patent appeal, the letter, Ext. 3, was first sent by the plaintiffs on 7-12-74 claiming for the first time that the daily payment by Hiralal was towards licence-fee and not towards rent, as stated earlier by them by their letter dated 16-10-57, Ext. A. After the dismissal of the Letters Patent appeal, payment must have been made to the plaintiffs in the name of Hiralal for use and occupation of the suit-property by Gobinda before sending of the notice dated 17-1-0-75, Ext.4, by the plaintiffs to Hiralal. It was after the sending of this notice that Hiralal first deposited rent in the office of the Rent Controller. Calcutta from the month of November, 1975. To show the alleged settlement of the suit property with Ramdeo, the Respondent No. 3, the plain tiffs have exhibited four counter-foils of rent-receipts, Exts.2, 2(a),2(b) and 2(c) out of which only one counter-foil, Ext. 2(c) is relevent and. the other counter-foils relating to other persons are relevant. The counter-foil, Ext.2(c) bears the signatures of Ramdeo Poddar on 1-11-75 against payment of O80p. for that day. Besides this counter-foil Ext.2(c), the plaintiffs exhibited an entry in the Demand Register of Trade and Profession Tax for 1976-77, Ext. 2(c) is relevent and. the other counter-foils relating to other persons are relevant. The counter-foil, Ext.2(c) bears the signatures of Ramdeo Poddar on 1-11-75 against payment of O80p. for that day. Besides this counter-foil Ext.2(c), the plaintiffs exhibited an entry in the Demand Register of Trade and Profession Tax for 1976-77, Ext. 12, showing payment of Rs.50/- by Ramdeo Poddar on 30-11-76 towards Trade Licence in respect of the suit property as seller of spices. Barring the above counter-foil and the entry in the Demand Register of Tirade and Profession Tax, there is no other material on record to show the possession of the suit-property by Ramdeo on and from 1-11-75. Though the sum of Rs.50/- was paid in the name of Ramdeo on 30-11-76, the Trade Licence for 1976-77 had actually been issued by the Corporation Calcutta in the name of Hiralal on 23-6-76. Ext.A(2). The Trade Licence, Ext. A(10), shows Hiralal selling spices hi the suit-property during the year 1950-1)1. That Trade Licence was issued under sections 175 and 176 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. Hiralal has filed several Trade Licences, Exts. A series, showing that since at least 1950-51 the Trade Licence was being issued in his name in respect of the suit-property as a spices-shop up to 1980-81. We cannot but take with a grain of salt the entry in the Demand Register, Ext. 12, showing payment of Rs. 50/- towards Trade Licence in the name of Ramdeo Poddar as spices-seller on 30-11-76, when on an earlier date on 23-6-76, the Trade Licence was obtained in the name of Hiralal for the self-same year 1976-77, when for the earlier year 1975-76, Trade Licence, Ext.A(3), was obtained in the name of Hiralal and for the subsequent year 11977-78, Trade Licence, Ext.A(l), was obtained in the name of Hiralal. As already stated, the Trade Licences were thereafter issued in the name of Hiralal upto 19S0-81, Ext.A(11). In this connection, one is also to consider the fact that in Misc. Case No. 370 of 1975 filed by Gobinda in the Title Execution Case No.42 of 1973 in the City Civil Court, Calcutta, arising out of the decree obtained by Hiralal in Title Suit No. 844 of 1969 against Gobinda, a stay order was first obtained by Gobinda on 25-4-75 and that the stay order was subsequently extended the, disposal of that Misc. Case No. 370 of 1975 under section 47 C.P.C. on 3-1-76, vide Ext. D(2). After filing of the suit in the court below, there was also an order for temporary injunction on 24-1-78, restraining also the plaintiffs from entering the suit-property or parting with its possession to any person. In these circumstances and specially when Ramdeo himself filed the petition dated 16-12-77, Ext,E, for not proceeding with the Title Suit No. 2043 of 1 976 against Hiralal on averring that Ramdeo was never in possesion of the suit-property and that the Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 was filed to the request of Gobinda, we are not at all inclined to rely on the case of the piaintiffs-appellants that they re-entered the suit-property on 31-10-75 id settled the property with Ramdeo or that they were in possession, of the suit-property ever since 17-12-77 after the dismissal of the Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 for non-prosecution on 16-12-77. As such, it is not necessary for us .to discuss in details the cases referred to by Mr. Sengupta in support of his contention that the plaintiffs-appellants have right of re-entry on revoking the licence of Hiralal. It is, however, to be stated, in this connection, that the view of the Division Bench of this court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Birendra Nath (AKR 195.5 Calcutta 601) has not been accepted by the Supreme Court in the case of Yeswant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (AIR 196S SC 620), in so far as the decision of this court in that case of Birendra Nath (supra) is that a lessor is 'entitled to use force to throw out his lessee. Moreover, the case of Birendra Nath (AIR 1955 Calcutta 601) was a case under section 3 of the Crown Grants Act, 1895 under which operation of all Acts including the Transfer of Property Act was excluded. 7. ON the analogy of the decision of this court in the case of Birendra Nath (supra) it cannot thus be stated that the landlord has right of re-entry in the suit-property on revoking the licence of Hiralal. The suit in the case of Beant Singh v. Cantonment Executive Officer (AIR 1960 JandK 83) was based on an agreement with the Centonment Board on the basis of Centonment d Administration Rules. The suit in the case of Beant Singh v. Cantonment Executive Officer (AIR 1960 JandK 83) was based on an agreement with the Centonment Board on the basis of Centonment d Administration Rules. There was a written document of licence in that case for erection of wooden shed temporarily on a piece of land in the Cantonment area for dry-cleaning of cloths. The licence to correct wooden shed temporarily was validly revoked in that case. As such, it was held in that case of Beant Singh (supra) that law did not permit a licensee, whose licence had been validly revoked, to exercise his licence any longer. It was further held in that ca.se that if after valid revocation of licence, a licence exercised his licence., he became a trespasser after losing his right under the licence and the owner of the land was entitled to deal with him as a trespasser. We have already stated that Hiralal is not a bare licensee but licensee for consideration. As such, the case of Beant Singh (supra) cannot come to the aid of Mr. Sengupta. The case of Chandu lal v. Delhi Municipality (AIR 1978. Delhi, 174) is also to be distinguished from the facts of the present case, inasmuch as there was allotment of one Kiosk for a period of 11 months in that case and thereafter there was no extension of the period of licence. The licence was terminated in that case. It was held in that case that after termination of licence, the licensor, was entitled to deal with the property as he liked and that the owner got this right because he was the owner in possession of the property. It was further held in that Full Bench decision in the case of Chandu lal (supra) that an owner need not secure a decree of the court to obtain his right of dealing with the property as he liked, after revocation of licence. It was also held in that case that the owner was entitled to resist in defence of his property the attempt of a trespasser to come upon his property by. exerting necessary and reasonable force to expell a trespasser. This case of Chandu Lal (supra) is to be distinguished from the facts of this case as Hiralal is not a bare licensee, whose licence had not been properly revoked. exerting necessary and reasonable force to expell a trespasser. This case of Chandu Lal (supra) is to be distinguished from the facts of this case as Hiralal is not a bare licensee, whose licence had not been properly revoked. In fact, in that case of Chandu Lal (supra), there was a discussion of the case of Puran Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1975 SC 1674 ). Even then, when that was a case of licence with liberty to occupy for a period of eleven months only in the first instance and the period was not 'subsequently extended, the case of Puran Singh was distinguished \in that case. The case of Puran Singh ( AIR 1975 SC 1674 ) cannot be so distinguished in the present case inasmuch as Hiralal was in "settled possession" for a long time since about 1947. Law respects possession even if' there is no title to support it. It does not permit anyone to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. This view of the Allahabad High Court in the Full Bench decision in the case of Yar Md. v. Lakshmi Das (AIR 1959 Allahabad I) and similar Privy Council decision in the case of Midnapur Zaminadary Company Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy (AIR 1924 Privy Council 144), were accepted by the Supreme Court in the case of Yeshwant Singh v. .Jagdish Singh ( AIR 1968 SC 620 ). Even in the case of a trespasser, it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Puran Singh (supra) that if a trespasser was in "settled possession", meaning clear and effective possession, he was not entitled to be evicted except in due course of law and that he was entitled to resist or defend his possession against any rightful owner who tried to dispossess him. This was also the view of the Supreme Court in another decision, in the case of Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration ( AIR 1968 SC 702 ). This was also the view of the Supreme Court in another decision, in the case of Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration ( AIR 1968 SC 702 ). In these circumstances, and when there is nothing on record to show or suggest that the possession of the suit-property by Hiralal was for a specific limited period, the landlords (appellants) cannot claim a right or re-entry in the suit-property after revoking the licence by the letter dated 17-10-75 on the basis of the aforesaid decisions relied on by Mr. Sengupta. Moreover, as already stated, the suit was filed by the plaintiffs in collusion with the defendant No. 2 against whom attempts for recovery of possession bf. the suit propery in Title Execution Case No. 42 of 1973 was unsuccessful in spite of obtaining of police help by Hiralal under order of the court below in proceeding under Order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. the such preceding was Misc. Case No.. 35 of 1976, Ext.D(2). The Bailiff's report, Ext.J, shows that on 29-11-76 Hiralal could not get back possession of the suit-property due to some dispute regarding the number of the premises. The defendant No.3, Ramdeo, was present when the Baiiiftf had gone to the premises. The Bailiff's. Report, Ext.J, shows that Ranjit Kumar. Roy, Advocate, showed the Bailiff an order of injunction passed by the learned Judge, Eighth Bench, City Civil Court,' Calcutta. This Ranjit Kumar Roy was the Advocate for Ramdeo in Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976, in which the order for injunction was passed. He had filed an application in the court of the learned Judge, Eighth Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, on 16-12-77, Ext.M, about filing of the petition by Ramdeo through another Advocate on that date for dismissal of the Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 for non-prosecution. Ranjit Kumar Roy had filed the Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976. It was; he who showed the order of injunction to the Bailiff on 29-11-76 as a result of which possession could not be deli- vered to Hiralal on 29-11-76. It was he, who complained about 'the filing of the petition for dismissal of Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 for non-prosecution through another Advocate by Ramdeo. The collusion between Gobinda and the appellants, which is hatched in secrecy, is evident, in the filing of Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976. It was he, who complained about 'the filing of the petition for dismissal of Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976 for non-prosecution through another Advocate by Ramdeo. The collusion between Gobinda and the appellants, which is hatched in secrecy, is evident, in the filing of Title Suit No. 2043 of 1976. We are, therefore, unable, on a consideration of the totality of 'the evidences on record,, to accept the case of the plaintiffs- appellants that they took vacant possession of the suit-property on 31-10-75 of thereafter on 17-12-77. It is in the evidences of D.Ws. l and 2 that at the time of closing of the shop at night by Hiralal, merchandise used to be kept under lock and key in the suit-property. As such, without collusion of the defendant No. 2, Gobinda, who was actually in possession of the suit- property on 31-10-75, 1-11-75 and 17-12-77, there could not be any possession of the suit-property on these dates by the plaintiffs. The defendant No. 2, Gobinda, has not come forward to depose in this suit in favour of the plaintiffs. He has not also filed any written statement in the suit in the court below to support the case of the plaintiffs. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that there was no re-entry in the suit-property by the plaintiffs on 31-10-75 or 17-12-77 and that there was no settlement of the suit-property with or any possession of the same by Ramdeo, the respondent No.3. 8. IN the back-drop of the aforesaid facts, let us now see if the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to any relief in the- suit. As already stated, the suit was for permanent injunction for restraining Hiralal from interfering with possession of the suit-property by the plaintiffs on declaration that the plaintiffs were in lawful possession of the suit-property and that Hiralal had no right, title and interest in the property. There is no question of granting any permanent injunction to the plain tiffs when the plaintiffs did not re-enter the suit-property and did not posses the same, which was in the possession of Gobinda on 31-10-75; on 1-11-75 and thereafter till the order of the temporary injunction was passed! in the suit by the court below on 24-1-78. As the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit-property, they cannot obtain a declaration about possession in their favour in respect of the suit-property. in the suit by the court below on 24-1-78. As the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit-property, they cannot obtain a declaration about possession in their favour in respect of the suit-property. As for the negative declaration that Hiralal has right, title and interest in the suit-property as sought for by the plaintiffs, it is to be stated that Hiralal is not a bare licensee. The INdian Easements Act, 1882 does not apply to the State of West Bengal. The principles underlined that Act have however, been applied as principles of equity, justice and good conscience. IN the case of Sumomoyee Peshakar v. Chunder Kumar Das (12 CLJ 443), it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that though, as a general rule, a licence is revocable at the will of the grantor, as no interest in the land is conferred on the grantee by grant of a licence, the position is different if, on the basis of the licence, the licensee executes work of a permanent character. IN such a case the grantor of a licence is entitled to revoke it, if he makes compensation to the licensee for the loss he may incur by reason of the revocation of the licence. The same, view was taken by this court in another Division Bench decision in the case of Motilal Rai v. Kalu Mondar (19 CLJ 321). If the INdian Eassments Act would have applied to the State of West Bengal, necessary provisions regarding a licensee for consideration were to be found, in sections 60 and 64 of the INdian Easements Act, 1882. Under section 64 of the INdian Easements Act, where a licence has been granted for a consideration and the licensee, without any fault of his own, is evicted by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the licence, the right for which he contracted, he is entitled to recover compensation from the grantor. This principle has been followed by this court in the cases of Sumamoyee Peshakar (supra) and Motilal Rai (supra). This principle has been followed by this court in the cases of Sumamoyee Peshakar (supra) and Motilal Rai (supra). IN these circumstances, though the INdian Easements Act does not apply to the State of West Bengal, we are to hold, on the basis of these two Division Bench decisions of this court, that the licence of Hiralal cannot be revoked in the manner done by the plain tiff-appellants by the letter dated 17-12-75, Ext.4, when Hiralal is a licensee for consideration. As the licence of Hiralal has not been validly revoked, though Hiralal is not a tenant in respect of the suit-property under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1955, the plaintiffs-appellants cannot get the negative declaration and are not entitled to any relief in the suit in the court below and we find accordingly. Some arguments have been advanced before us about the maintainability of the suit as regards the negative declaration sought for by the plaintiffs to the effect that Hiralal has no right, title and interest in the suit-property. These arguments were advanced on the basis Of the provisions in section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It is not necessary to discuss this legal question in this appeal when Hiralal, is a licensee for consideration and his licence had not been validly revoked by letter dated 17-10-75. The appeal is, accordingly, to be dismissed. 9. IT appears that by this Court's order dated 10-8-82, an application filed by the appellants, for restraining Hiralal from dispossessing the appellants from the suit-property in execution of the decree in Title Suit No. 844 of 1969 against the respondent No.. 2, was allowed on several conditions, one of such conditions being deposit of Rs. 100/- per month by the appellants according to English calendar month since 15-9-82 and another condition of furnishing of security by the appellants for a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. After hearing the learned Advocate for the appellants and the respondent No. 1, we are of the opinion that the appellants should be permitted to withdraw the security of Rs. 100/- per month by the appellants according to English calendar month since 15-9-82 and another condition of furnishing of security by the appellants for a sum of Rs. 1,000/-. After hearing the learned Advocate for the appellants and the respondent No. 1, we are of the opinion that the appellants should be permitted to withdraw the security of Rs. 1,000/- furnished by them in pursuance of this court's order dated 10-8-82 and that the respondent No. 1, Hiralal, should be permitted to withdraw the sum of Rs.100/- deposited by the appellants per month in pursuance of this court's order dated 10-8-82 .after deducting the daily licence-fee at the rate of 0-75p., per day, from this amount of Rs.100/- for each month. The appellants will be entitled to withdraw the daily licence-fee at the rate of 0-75p. per day from this amount of Rs.100/- per month deposited by them in pursuance of this court's order dated 10-8-82. 10. THE appeal is dismissed. THE judgment and decree passed by the court below are affirmed. THE appellants to withdraw the sum of Rs. 1,000/- deposited by them in pursuance of this Court's order dated 10-8-82, THE respondent No. 1 to withdraw the sum of Rs.100/- deposited by the appellants per month, after deducting from this amount the daily licence-fee of Rs.0-75p. per day, which should be withdrawn by the appellants. As regards the decretal costs deposited by the appellants in pursuance of this court's order dated 10-8-82, necessary order for withdrawal of that amount has already been passed -on 10-8-82. THE appellants are no longer required to deposit any money in pursuance of this court's order dated 10-8-82. In the special circumstances of this appeal, the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.