Judgment :- 1. The third respondent, Regional Transport Authority, Wynad by its proceedings dated 9-6-1987 and 18-6-1987 granted a temporary stage carriage permit for four months to ply on the route, Kalpetta-Manantoddy in favour of the first respondent. The present appellant filed Motor Vehicles Act Appeal No. 284 of 1987, before the fourth respondent, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and obtained an interim order of stay of issue of the permit on 22-6-1987. He also obtained Ext. P5 order on 17-7-1987. by which the State Transport Appellate Tribunal directed issue of a temporary permit for 20 days each to him on the route Kalpetta-Manantoddy until the disposal of the appeal. He happily continued on short-term temporary permits obtained pursuant to the order dated 17-7-1987. The appeal itself was heard and dismissed by Ext. P7 judgment dated 3-5-1988. almost one year after the order of the Regional Transport Authority, granting the temporary permit in favour of the first respondent. The last of the short-term temporary permits granted to the appellant pursuant to Ext. P5 order is to expire on 18-5-1988. He continues to ply on the route pursuant to that permit in spite of the dismissal of his appeal, The State Transport Appellate Tribunal found in Ext. P7 judgment, that the grant in favour of the first respondent was not illegal because it was entitled to preference under S.47 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as also under rule I77A of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules. The Tribunal also noted, that the seating capacity of the vehicle offered by the first respondent was much more than that in the vehicle-of course of a later model offered by the appellant. It was in those circumstances that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal in affirmance of the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The appellant filed O.P. No. 3690 of 1988., challenging Ext. P7 order. That was dismissed in limine. While doing so, this court, however, observed that there shall be no preferential claim for the K. S R T. C. when the question of issuance of temporary permit on the same route is to be considered next, merely because the KS R.T.C. obtained the temporary permit at present. P7 order. That was dismissed in limine. While doing so, this court, however, observed that there shall be no preferential claim for the K. S R T. C. when the question of issuance of temporary permit on the same route is to be considered next, merely because the KS R.T.C. obtained the temporary permit at present. It was further stated, that if the K.S.R T.C. fails to put their vehicle on road to operate service covered by the temporary permit on 18-5-1988, the petitioner is free to approach the Secretary of the R.T.A., Wynad for issuing temporary permit to operate service on the same route. The appellant assails that judgment in this appeal. 2. It may be seen that the temporary permit, which was the subject matter of appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, in the Original Petition and this Appeal, was granted for a period of four months by Ext. PI order dated 9-6-1987 and 18-6-1987. That period must necessarily have expired in October, 1987, had it not been for an interim stay, Ext. P4, granted by the Tribunal on 26-6-1987. In that event, the Regional Transport Authority should have considered the grant of a fresh temporary permit in continuation of the permit under challenge. Even that could have been done by the Regional Transport Authority on a finding, that the temporary permit did exist or continued, and not otherwise. It has been repeatedly held by this court, that there shall be no reissue of a temporary permit, and there must be a finding of temporary need as a jurisdictional pre-condition for the grant or issue of any temporary permit under S 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The fact that the issue of the temporary permit granted under Ext. P1 was held-up by reason of Ext P4 interim order of the fourth respondent-Tribunal was no reason for that Tribunal to direct the issue of short-term temporary permits for an indefinite period of time. No such direction could have been granted beyond the period of four months, since the temporary permit, grant of which was under challenge, could have been only for maximum period of four months. No such direction could have been granted beyond the period of four months, since the temporary permit, grant of which was under challenge, could have been only for maximum period of four months. Piling of an appeal against the grant of a temporary permit for four months cannot have the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the Appellate Tribunal to grant or direct the issue of a temporary permit beyond the period of the original grant. If it is otherwise, it will be more profitable for an applicant to get his application for grant of temporary permit for four months rejected by the Regional Transport Authority, file an appeal and obtain directions which would enure in his favour for an indefinite period of time, as in the present case for more than two-and-a-half times the period of the temporary permit, which is the subject matter of the appeal. We should have thought that on the expiry of the period of the permit, which was granted and which was impugned in the appeal, the appeal became infructuous and ought to have been disposed of on that basis. If the filing of an appeal would confer a new jurisdiction to grant temporary permit, irrespective of the trammels of S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, on the Tribunal or on the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority as per the directions of the Tribunal, we feel that that will be abuse of the process of law and will be totally devoid of jurisdiction. A person, who has obtained an undeserving benefit of plying service on successive temporary permits for ten months in an appeal which he filed against the grant of the temporary permit for four months, cannot be considered as a person aggrieved by the ultimate dismissal of the appeal. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that the learned judge was right in dismissing the Original Petition, not only for the reason stated in the judgment but also for the reason that the appellant was not a person aggrieved by the impugned order. We are also satisfied that there was no error of law, or absence of jurisdiction, or contravention of the principles of natural justice, or any other ground vitiating Ext P7 order, which justify invocation of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, affirm the judgment under appeal. 3. We are also satisfied that there was no error of law, or absence of jurisdiction, or contravention of the principles of natural justice, or any other ground vitiating Ext P7 order, which justify invocation of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, affirm the judgment under appeal. 3. It is common knowledge, that if a party in whose favour a permit wag granted did not avail of that permit, it is for the authority which granted the permit to take necessary action to cancel it. In that event, the authority may invite applications afresh and grant the permit to the most competent and qualified applicant, provided temporary need existed or continued. The only fact that one of the unsuccessful applicants had filed an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is no reason why this ordinary procedure for the grant of temporary permit should have been short circuited for a fairly long period of time by the Appellate Tribunal issuing interim directions for an indefinite period. It has to be noticed, that Ext. PS direction was only a sequel to Ext. P4 interim order of stay of issue of the permit in favour of the successful applicant. The person who obtained Ext. P4 order of stay should not have been considered as automatically entitled for the temporary permit, irrespective of an adverse finding entered against him by the competent authority and without even caring to consider whether there would not have been other equally, if not more competent applicants. 4. Two observations have been made in the judgment under appeal viz., that I make it clear that there shall be no preferential claim for the KS R.T.C when the question of issuance of temporary permit on the same route is to be considered next, merely because the K S R.T C. obtained the temporary permit at present". "It is also made clear that if the K.S.R.TC. fails to put their vehicle on road to operate service covered by the temporary permit on 18-5-1988, the petitioner is free to approach the Secretary of the R.T.A, Wynad for issuing temporary permit to operate service on the same route": We are of the opinion, that neither of these two directions are called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. If the learned single judge was of opinion, that Ext. If the learned single judge was of opinion, that Ext. P7 order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal did not require interference, there was no occasion to dictate the manner in which the Authority should consider future applications for the grant of permit. Apart from that, the direction that operation on the basis of a temporary permit, which was affirmed in appeal and which was not interfered by this court, shall not be a preferential claim, runs counter to a number of decisions of this court. No reason is stated why that observation against the K.S.R T.C. should have been made in spite of the fact that the grant in its favour was affirmed by the Tribunal, and this court refused to interfere with the order in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 5. That observation becomes more unjust when it is seen that the appellant will be entitled to take advantage of the experience gained by him by operating on short term temporary permits for ten months, which be obtained during the pendency of the appeal. In other words, the experience obtained by operating on the basis of temporary permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority and affirmed in appeal by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal should not be considered on future occasions, whereas experience gained by an applicant, whose claim was rejected concurrently by the original and appellate authorities, by reason of interim orders passed during the pendency of the appeal by the Appellate Tribunal will be considered as a preferential factor. This, unfortunately, is the effect of the observations made by the learned single Judge. We are of the opinion, that there was no occasion to make those observations in view of the fact, that the learned single judge was refusing to exercise the jurisdiction to interfere with the grant of the temporary permit concurrently made by the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal in favour of the first respondent. 6. The further observation, that if the K.S.R.T.C. fails to produce the vehicle to operate service covered by the temporary permit on 18-5-1988, the petitioner is free to approach the Secretary, R.T.A, Wynad for issuing temporary permit to operate service on the same route, also seems to us to be unsustainable It may be seen, that in Ext. 6. The further observation, that if the K.S.R.T.C. fails to produce the vehicle to operate service covered by the temporary permit on 18-5-1988, the petitioner is free to approach the Secretary, R.T.A, Wynad for issuing temporary permit to operate service on the same route, also seems to us to be unsustainable It may be seen, that in Ext. P5 order, the Appellate" Tribunal directed the issue of temporary permits to the appellant herein only "until the disposal of the appeal". The appeal itself was disposed of on 3-5-1988. Any temporary permit, which was issued in terms of Ext. P5 order, bad validity only till 3-5-1988. Operation on the basis of temporary permit granted pursuant to Ext. P5 order beyond that date was not authorised. If the K.S.R.T.C. failed to put the vehicle on the route pursuant to Ext. P1 order, as affirmed by Ext. P7 order, it is for the Regional Transport Authority to take necessary action either to cancel the permit and invite applications afresh so as to choose the best applicant. The mere fact that an unsuccessful applicant bad approached this court will not justify an observation, that that person, though found to be unqualified, shall get preference for operating service on the route. 7. Counsel for the appellant submitted at this stage, that the appellant would rather be satisfied with the judgment under appeal and therefore does not press the appeal. Ordinarily, we should have dismissed the appeal as not pressed. But. we are of the opinion, that it is essential that the observations contained in the judgment under appeal have to be removed. Otherwise, they may have the effect of granting an undeserving preference on future occasions when applications for the grant of temporary permit on the same route come up for consideration. It is also necessary, that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is told that it has no jurisdiction for issuing interim directions for the grant of temporary permits to operate services for periods beyond the subject matter of the appeal, it should not have directed issue of temporary permits as a matter of course for any period in excess of the period of four months, for which alone the original authority granted the permit. We are also of the opinion, that it is necessary that the Tribunal shall be reminded, that the maximum period for which a temporary permit could be granted is four months, that even this jurisdiction could be exercised only on a finding that there is temporary need lasting for that period and that these two essential limitations imposed by S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act shall inform any order of the Appellate Tribunal in the matter of grant or issue of temporary permits, except, of course, to respect of temporary permits granted under S.68-F(1-A) and (1-C) or under S.62 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. If the observations contained in the judgment under appeal remain undisturbed, the appellant is likely to take advantage of this court, as be did of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. We dismiss this appeal as not pressed. We, however, delete the observations contained in the judgment under appeals as indicated above. The result is, that Ext. P1 order, as affirmed by Ext. P7 order, will remain in tact. The rights of parties will be governed by those orders, without any reference to the observations contained in the judgment under appeal. It is also clarified, that a party who obtained interim directions for the issue of a temporary permit from the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in an appeal, which was ultimately dismissed, will not be entitled to take advantage of the experience gained on such temporary permits in any future grant of temporary permit on the same route in pursuance of the same proceedings. Communicate a copy of this judgment to respondents 2 to S forthwith for information and compliance. A copy will be communicated to the Transport Commissioner for necessary action. Issue photo copies of the judgment to counsel for the appellant and the first respondent on usual terms, if applied for in that behalf.