Judgment S. Ali Ahmad, J. 1. Through this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the detention of the petitioner under Sec.12 (2) of the bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981, passed by the Deputy Commissioner, dhanbad has been challenged. A prayer, therefore, has been made to direct the release of the petitioner by issuing a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. 2. The order under Sec.12 (2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (for short the Act) was signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad on 5-9-1987 (Annexure 2) but the order could not be served on the petitioner as he was evading arrest. He surrendered on 10-3-1988 in connection with some other case. On 14-3-1988, the petitioner sent a letter to the Deputy Commissioner, dhanbad stating that he is in Dhanbad jail. He requested therein for issue of production warrant so that he may be produced before him in the detention matter. When the Deputy Commissioner received this letter he passed an order on 28-3-1987 stating that he has received an information through the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad that the petitioner, who is currently lodged in jail is likely to be released on bail. He, therefore, passed an order for service of the detention order on the petitioner in jail as he was of the opinion that his detention was necessary even on that day. A copy of the order has been marked as Annexure a to the counter affidavit filed today on behalf of respondent No.2, the Deputy commissioner, Dhanbad. The detention order was consequently served on the petitioner in jail that date itself, namely 28-3-1988 and the grounds were served on the following day, i e.29-3-1988. 3. Annexure 5 to the writ application is the order dated 15th September, 1987 by which the State Government approved the order of detention dated 5-9-1987 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad against the petitioner. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad has challenged the detention of the petitioner on several grounds. His first attack is that the ground on which the petitioner has been detained is not of a public order rather it is a case of law and order. In order to appreciate his argument it will be convenient to quote the ground. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad has challenged the detention of the petitioner on several grounds. His first attack is that the ground on which the petitioner has been detained is not of a public order rather it is a case of law and order. In order to appreciate his argument it will be convenient to quote the ground. It is as follows : - "on 4-8-1987 at around 2 p. m. Jai Prakash Singh s/o Jogendra Singh was going to his place of residence at Gazlitan d under Katras P. S. neer Kali Mandir, ahead of Gazlitand hard coke bhatta the subject fired upon him in order to kill him, since he was an important prosecution witness in Katras P. S. Case No.331/85 under Sections 149/307/326 IPC and 27 Arms Act in which the subject is the main accused. As a result of firing by the subject in broad day light, panic was created in the area. There was a stampade among the colliery workers and they left their places of work in panic. The coal loading operation at the Hard Coke "bhatta" and the nearby Gazlitand colliery pit head completely stopped till the arrival of the police. In nearby residential areas, the residents closed their doors. Local police had to introduce patrolling in the area in order to restore normalcy. Thus, the incident disturbed normal tempo of life and public order. Supervision of the case by Dy S. P. and S. P. further reveals that apart from attempt to murder complainant Jai Prakash Singh, the firing was resorted to by the subject to terrorise the local population and establish his supermacy as a rangdar of the area. The incident refers to Katras P. S. Case No.176 dated 4-8-1987 under section 307 I. P. C. and 27 Arms Act. The copy of Fardbeyan FIR supervision notes by Dy. S. P. Baghmara s. P. Dhanbad are enclosed. " It is said that the allegation was that the petitioner fired a gun in the broad day light as a result of which there was panic in the area. This, according to Mr. Prasad, was at best law and order problem and cannot be termed to be a problem of public order. I do not think, learned counsel is correct. I have quoted the ground on the basis of which the petitioner has been taken into custody. This, according to Mr. Prasad, was at best law and order problem and cannot be termed to be a problem of public order. I do not think, learned counsel is correct. I have quoted the ground on the basis of which the petitioner has been taken into custody. A perusal of that will show that as a result of the firing by the petitioner, there was panice in the area and also stampade among the colliery workers. The coal loading operation at the Hard Coke bhatta and the nearby Gazlitand colliery pit head completely stopped till the arrival of the police. Further more important thing is that the residents of the area closed their doors and the police had to start patrolling to restore normalcy. These facts in my opinion were such on the basis of which the detaining authority was justified in coming to the conclusion that the incident disturbed the normal tempo of life and public order. I am conscious of the fact that in some cases shooting of guns per se in a crowded area may not create the problem of public order but no hard and fast rule can be laid down for that purpose. It depends on the facts of each case. In this case not only the shutters were downed in the market but the colliery workers also stopped the work. People in the area closed their doors and police patrolling had to be introduced to bring back confidence of the people. Thus, in my opinion, cannot be said to be a case of law and order only. 4. The next argument of Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad is that under section 12 (2) of the Act, the District Magistrate can order detention of any anti social element provided the other requirements of sub-section (1) of Sec.12 of the Act are fulfilled. anti social element has been defined under Sec.2 (d) of the Act which reads as thus : - "2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . anti social element has been defined under Sec.2 (d) of the Act which reads as thus : - "2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d) anti social element means a person who - (i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code ; or (ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 ; (iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities ; or (iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls ; or (v) who has been convicted of an offence under Sections 25, 26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959. " The argument of Mr. Prasad is that the petitioner has been detained on the basis of one single isolated incident which is said to have taken place on 4-8-1987. Learned counsel urges that one single incident will not make the petitioner a person, who habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any offence. Mr. Advocate General appearing in support of the order of detention does not dispute this fact. He also says that one single incident is not sufficient to characterise a person as anti-social element. He, however, says that the petitioner during the past six years has been involved in at least six cases where he is a co-accused along with others in cases under Sections 302, 307 and other sections of the Penal Code. He says that if those cases are taken into consideration then it will transpire that the petitioner has been continuously indulging into criminal activities and that will make him anti-social element. Mr. Prasad, who counters this argument says that the only ground as mentioned in the order of detention is Katras Case No.331/85 under Sections 149/307, 326 ipc and Sec.27 of the Arms Act. Mr. Prasad, who counters this argument says that the only ground as mentioned in the order of detention is Katras Case No.331/85 under Sections 149/307, 326 ipc and Sec.27 of the Arms Act. He says that the other cases have been mentioned in the ground as only background of the subject. He, therefore, says that these cases cannot be taken note of. It is difficult to accept this argument of Mr. Prasad. Chinnappa Reddy, J. (as he then was) in the case of Mohd. Yousuf Rather V/s. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1979 SC 1925 observed as follows : - "it is not permissible to dissect or trisect the grounds of detention into introduction background and grounds as such. There is no warrant for any such division. So far as grounds of detention are concerned no distinction can be made between introductory facts, background facts and grounds as such and it could not be said that even if introductory facts or backgrounds facts are vague or irrelevant, the same would not vitiate detention. All allegations of fact which have led to the passing of the order of detention are grounds of detention. If such allegations are irrelevant or vague the detenu is entitled to be released. " The six cases, therefore, in which the petitioner has been involved under different sections of the Penal Code are definitely relevant to show that he is a person who habitually commits or attempts to commit offence punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Penal Code. This, however, does not solve the problem. Undisputedly the six eases referred to as background of the petitioner in the ground of detention were subject matters of two detention orders passed against the petitioner under the National Security Act. The first detention order was dated 2-1-1986 which was challenged in this Court. This Court did not find any fault with the order of detention. It, therefore, dismissed the writ application. The matter then went to the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.317 of 1986 ( 1987 BBCJ 1 ). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the order of detention, but it observed that the detaining authority may reconsider as to whether another order of detention could be passed against the petitioner on the same grounds. The matter then went to the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.317 of 1986 ( 1987 BBCJ 1 ). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the order of detention, but it observed that the detaining authority may reconsider as to whether another order of detention could be passed against the petitioner on the same grounds. In compliance with the order passed by the Supreme Court, the petitioner was released but he was again taken into detention on the same ground on the basis of another order of detention passed on 12-10-1986. That detention order was also challenged in this Court in Cr. W. J. C. No.37 of 1987. This writ application was also allowed and the petitioner was directed to be released. It was argued in that case that sines the ground in the two detention orders were same, therefore, the total period of detention could not be more than 12 months. The learned Judges found that the petitioner had remained in custody in the earlier detention case for 8 months 24 days. They, therefore, held that any detention beyond 3 months 6 days in the second detention order was illegal. According to them, therefore, the detention became illegal with effect from 19-1-1987. That writ application in the circumstance was allowed on 14-4-1987 and the petitioner was directed to be released. Now the question arises as to whether the same ground on the basis of which the petitioner has already remained in detention can be used to keep him in custody. I think not. The position, therefore, is that the six cases referred to as background in the ground of detention are irrelevant and cannot be taken into consideration for holding that the petitioner is a person who habitually commits offences punishable under chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Penal Code. If those cases go, then there is nothing left on the basis of which the petitioner can be said to be anti-social element. His detention is, therefore, bad. Annexure 2, the detention order and annexure 4, the grounds, are, therefore, quashed and the petitioner is directed to be released forthwith. If those cases go, then there is nothing left on the basis of which the petitioner can be said to be anti-social element. His detention is, therefore, bad. Annexure 2, the detention order and annexure 4, the grounds, are, therefore, quashed and the petitioner is directed to be released forthwith. 5 In the earlier part of the judgment, I have held that the ground on which the petitioner has been detained certainly creates problem of public order but I have allowed the application on the ground that it has not been established that the petitioner is an anti-social element. The authority, if so advised, may consider if the petitioner can be detained on the same ground under the National security Act. Petition allowed.