T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) FOURTEEN petitioners are joined by an equal number of interveners to make common grievance against cancellation of their LL. B. Part I Examination by the University. Because they prayed interim relief to allow them to appear in the Supplementary Examination in the paper "constitutional Law" in the examination commencing on 07-09-1988, we heard this matter expeditiously after the petition was admitted on 23-08-1988. ( 2 ) AT the conclusion of hearing on 08-09-1988, we arrived tentatively at the conclusion that the interim relief prayed could not be granted and as such, we reserved our order for disposing of the matter finally on merit as counsel addressed us extensively on the rival contentions on 7th as also on 8th September, 1988. Still, while reserving our final orders, we found some merit in the grievance made at the conclusion of the hearing that the candidates who were likely to be affected by the impugned order need not suffer the anguish of further derailment in their academic career. That grievance, we considered reasonable and we made appropriate direction in that regard immediately so that those who were serious in prosecuting their studies and take examination at next chance are not deprived of that opportunity. ( 3 ) THE several petitioners and interveners were candidates for LL. B. Part I Examination of Jiwaji University which commenced on 8th April, 1988. They were granted Admission Cards and they took examination at Government Post-Graduate College, Guna. although in the petition as also in the application for intervention, the case that is made out is not admitted by the University in the perspective presented, the fact which has appeared duly established and duly admitted on both sides is that all did not go well on the first day of the Examination. Who were the gangsters may be disputed, but the fact which is established beyond doubt is that violence erupted suddenly in the Examination Hall leading to a bizarre situation. It is University's case which is duly established by materials on record that we propose to accept as we do not have any materials before us to accept the case set up by the candidates that they were in no way responsible for all that happened on that date of examination. It is University's case which is duly established by materials on record that we propose to accept as we do not have any materials before us to accept the case set up by the candidates that they were in no way responsible for all that happened on that date of examination. There is no material before us to accept the case pleaded by the candidates that some outsiders entered in the Examination Hall and snatched the answer-books from them to tear those off. Indeed, except relying on an ambiguous statement appearing in Annexure-R/7, the candidates who have come before us have even failed to establish that they had complained against the action of those outsiders "hooligans and miscreants" and had sought protection. Indeed, it is not established that they requested the invigilators or the Superintendent of the Examination Centre to supply them fresh answer-books. ( 4 ) ANNEXURE-R/7 is a report by three invigilators, submitted to the Superintendent of Examination Centre in connection with the incident in which it was, inter alia stated that at the time of their leaving Room No. 10, they had with them 22 answer scripts of students appearing in LL. B. Part I Examination which were either undistributed copies or copies returned by the students and those they had deposited with the Centre Superintendent. From this, it is difficult to accept the case of the petitioners or interveners that some of them had answered the question paper and answer-scripts were submitted by them to the invigilators. Indeed, what is stated in para 6 of the petition demolishes conclusively petitioners' own factual contention pressed by their counsel because therein it is stated - "not even a single student including respondent No 4 could submit their answer-books due to miscreants and even the answer-book of respondent No. 4 was torn by the miscreants with whom the petitioners had nothing to do". ( 5 ) WITH the return filed by the University has come on record, among others, the report of Dr. B. Saxena, Principal of the College which was the Examination Centre (Annexure-R/1), the report of Shri Ahuja who was Superintendent of the Examination Centre (Annexure- R/2), the report of Shri Yashpal Singh, Assistant Superintendent of the concerned evening shift of the Examination (Annexure-R/3) besides the report of the Invigilators (Annexure- R/7), aforesaid. B. Saxena, Principal of the College which was the Examination Centre (Annexure-R/1), the report of Shri Ahuja who was Superintendent of the Examination Centre (Annexure- R/2), the report of Shri Yashpal Singh, Assistant Superintendent of the concerned evening shift of the Examination (Annexure-R/3) besides the report of the Invigilators (Annexure- R/7), aforesaid. We also have before us Annexure-R/10 which is a copy of the report dated 23-04-1988 submitted by the Committee appointed by the University to enquire into the question. An Advocate of this Court, Shri Govind Singh, who is a Member of the Executive Council and Dr. A. R. Das, Professor and Head of Botany Department of the University, were Members of the said Committee which had conducted the enquiry. On a careful perusal of the several annexures to the petition, we are satisfied ourselves that, as the University's case is, except one candidate, Kumari Archana Sharma, impleaded in the petition as respondent No. 4, other candidates had boycotted the Examination on 08-04-1988 in the First Paper (Constitutional Law) of LL. B. Part I Examination. They did so in total disregard of condition No. 17 of the Admission Cards (Annexure-R/11) containing the prohibition against boycotting by candidates of any question paper. The said condition made it clear to the candidates that there would be no re-examination in any paper boycotted and that if any candidate faced any difficulty in regard to any question paper, he would be entitled to send his application in that regard for University's consideration through the Centre Superintendent. The materials which have come on record clearly disclose that a reign of terror was let loose and with the singular exception of respondent No. 4, all candidates made a common cause in boycotting the Examination concerned, first paper, aforesaid. So much so that they did their best to terrorise respondent No. 4 to compel her to join their ranks, but she stood her ground and with the help of the authorities, answered the question-paper though the candidates did not allow even that answerscript of her to be left with the authorities. That was snatched away and in doing so, resort to violence was not considered immoral or subversive of discipline. That was snatched away and in doing so, resort to violence was not considered immoral or subversive of discipline. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH on subsequent dates in other papers, candidates were allowed to take examination, it is submitted before us by University's counsel Shri J. P. Gupta that only the Kulapati (Vice Chancellor) was authorised to take action in emergency, but he was not available in station for report on which he could take any action in the exercise of powers vested in him under M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, for short, the Adhiniyam, and the Statutes and Ordinances of the University. Because of all candidates taking examination in all other papers except first paper, Shri Arun Mishra, who has appeared for them, contended that they ought to have been treated at par with respondent No. 4 whose result of the examination was declared and she was declared "pass" on being awarded average marks for the first paper in which she could not be examined like others. Shri Arun Mishra has also assailed the validity of the Resolution passed by the Executive Committee on 09-07-1988 (Annexure-P/12) by which the entire examination of the candidates boycotting the first paper was cancelled for their misbehaviour and breach of discipline. ( 7 ) WE required, in the premises aforesaid, to examine twin contentions aforesaid. In regard to Annexure-P/12, it is contended by Shri Arun Mishra that infringement of sub-cl. (iv) of Cl. 23 (f) of Ordinance No. 6 is writ large on its face in that right of personal hearing of "opportunity to show cause in writing" is contemplated thereunder before any action can be taken by the Executive Council to cancel the examination of any candidate. True, in the instant case, admittedly show-cause notices were not served on any candidate and in the petition, at para 7, it is stated that on 01-08-1988, a representation vide Annexure-P/3 was submitted to the Registrar of the University for declaring the results of the candidates who had taken LL. B. Part I Examination at Guna. Evidently, prior to that, the aggrieved candidates had not made any representation as contemplated under Condition No. 17 of the Admission Card as they preferred rather to boycott the examination in first paper. B. Part I Examination at Guna. Evidently, prior to that, the aggrieved candidates had not made any representation as contemplated under Condition No. 17 of the Admission Card as they preferred rather to boycott the examination in first paper. But, even in Annexure-P/3, the candidates did not put up their case that they were not at fault and that "outsiders" had prevented them from taking examination in first paper. ( 8 ) UNIVERSITY's counsel Shri J. P. Gupta's contention is four-fold. Firstly, reliance on Cl. 23 of Ordinance No. 6 is misconceived as that deals with the case of a single candidate and not of a "group". Secondly, to the facts and situation of the instant case, provisions of Cl. (xxxvi) of S. 24 of the Adhiniyam apply as that deals exclusively with the case of a "group". Thirdly, Condition No. 17 of the Admission Card being statutory (relatable to Cls. 21 and 22 of Ordinance No. 6) violation thereof, impairs legal entitlement of the candidates concerned. Fourthly, the case of respondent No. 4 could be validly dealt with separately by the University under Cl. 11 (iv) or Ordinance No. 5 as she had answered the question paper and had entrusted the same to the custody of the Centre Superintendent. Counsel has also submitted that in Kumari Kiran Sisodia's case, 1988 Cri Civ LJ (MP) 132 , this Court has recently considered scope and effect of S. 15 of the Adhiniyam and relevant provisions of Ordinances Nos. 5 and 6 in the context of Art. 51-A of the Constitution and Apex Court's holding in Liberty Oil Mills, AIR 1984 SC 1271 and Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 . He has relied on the following observations of one of us (Dr. T. N. Singh, J.), made in that case, speaking for the Court :"we hold therefore that University Ordinances, Regulations and other statutory provisions fulfilling the mandate of Art. 51-A (j) are to be construed liberally, and enforced strictly to subserve their purpose effectively. Unless University's decision is mala fide, or so arbitrary and discriminatory as is voided by Art. 14 of the Constitution, a candidate adopting unfair means may be rendered defenceless by the University's Ordinances by excluding expressly also the right of personal hearing. Unless University's decision is mala fide, or so arbitrary and discriminatory as is voided by Art. 14 of the Constitution, a candidate adopting unfair means may be rendered defenceless by the University's Ordinances by excluding expressly also the right of personal hearing. Non-compliance by the University of the provisions of the Ordinances would however, be a valid plea to be decided by the Court in all cases. "'( 9 ) WE take up firstly the last two contentions together as the relevant provisions of the concerned Ordinances fully support counsel's submission. Two Ordinances Nos. 5 and 6, deal with matters concerning respectively "conduct of Examinations" and "examinations (General)'', framed under S. 37 of the Adhiniyam. As per Cls. 21 and 22 of Ordinance No. 6, only an eligible candidate is issued an "admission Card" and unless that candidate produces Admission Card as and when required by any invigilator or the Centre Superintendent, he is not permitted to appear, or continue to sit at, the examination for which it is issued. Evidently, therefore, rights of a candidate appearing at any examination are regulated by the conditions of the Admission Card and he would forfeit the right to take the examination on his violating any condition thereof. As per Cl. 11 (iv) of Ordinance No. 5, the Result Committee of the concerned faculty constituted by the Academic Council is enabled "to decide cases of candidates whose answer books were lost in transit". It will be competent, according to us, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, for the University to give "average marks" to a candidate in a paper of which his answer book is lost after the candidate had handed over the same to the authorities concerned at the examination centre. In the instant case, in Annexure-P/2 appears the endorsement "average marks awarded as per Rules under V. C. 's order dated 06-06-1988" against the name of respondent No. 4 and she is declared "pass", while against others, the remark is "w. H. " (withheld ). However, to deal with the first two contentions, we extract relevant portions from S. 24 :"24. However, to deal with the first two contentions, we extract relevant portions from S. 24 :"24. Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations made thereunder, the Executive Council shall have the following powers and perform the following duties namely - (xxxvi) to cancel examinations in the event of malpractices partially or wholly and to take action against any person or group of persons or institutions found guilty of such malpractices, including rustication of students". ( 10 ) ON the holding in Kiran Sisodia's case (AIR 1989 Madh Pra 18) (supra), we would have no hesitation to accept Shri Gupta's contention that the provision aforequoted excludes application of the Rule audi alteram partem. Indeed, S. 24, in terms, circumscribes the scope and ambit of the provision in the manner contemplated thereunder by subjecting the same to the provisions, inter alia, of the Ordinances. We have read Cl. No. 23 of Ordinance No. 6 in its entirety. In all the sub-clauses, case of "a candidate" is dealt with and expressly under Part (iv) of sub-cl. (f) only provision is made for show-cause notice before awarding penalty on the candidate concerned in respect of use of unfair means by him. The word "malpractices" spoken of in the afore-extracted Cl. (xxxvi) has evidently to be construed widely to include cases other than of use of unfair means. As it speaks of malpractices by "group of persons" it would evidently include cases of the type of gross indiscipline and violence resorted to by a large body of candidates, as in the instant case. Such type of cases are evidently excluded explicitly from the purview of Cl. 23 of Ordinance No. 6 by limiting application thereof to cases of "a candidate". In such cases, personal hearing would obviously be neither possible, nor useful. The participants would be supporting a common cause and their common concern and concert, whether in the commission of "malpractices" or in defending themselves, would render the hearing an exercise in futility. No provision being accordingly made anywhere in Ordinance No. 5 or 6 for hearing the "group", S. 24 (xxxvi) of the Adhiniyam must be deemed to exclude impliedly that right in such a case. No provision being accordingly made anywhere in Ordinance No. 5 or 6 for hearing the "group", S. 24 (xxxvi) of the Adhiniyam must be deemed to exclude impliedly that right in such a case. ( 11 ) RELIANCE is also placed by Shri Gupta on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1269 . That was a case of mass copying and it was held that the Chairman of the Board had rightly cancelled the examination at one centre in its entirety, on report being submitted to him of a vast majority of the examinees of that centre having adopted unfair means on his own satisfaction about truth of the report. It was held that the Board had not charged any particular candidate with unfair means being adopted so that he could claim to defend himself; the examination as a whole was vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. It was observed that to make such decision depends upon a full-fledged enquiry would hold up functions of such autonomous bodies as Universities and School Boards. A detailed or quasi-judicial enquiry in such cases was not contemplated and the decision of the University was not liable to challenge if the University had before it sufficient materials on which the decision was taken. Relying on this decision, a Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Ravindra Roy 1988 MPLJ 333 , upheld cancellation of LL. B. Part II Examination by the Bhopal University of the petitioners in that case. Reliance on University's Ordinance similar to one on which reliance in this case is placed by Shri Arun Mishra, was held inappropriate taking the view that the provision was only available when the individual examinee was being charged with a specific act of unfair means and not in the case of mass-using of unfair means. The further penalty imposed on the petitioners debarring them from appearing in three examinations was held discriminatory as they were not treated similarly with the other candidates taking the same examination. ( 12 ) CASE-LAW cited by Shri Arun Mishra, has an enormous corpus, but we do not think if his clients can derive any benefit of the judicial opinion expressed therein. ( 12 ) CASE-LAW cited by Shri Arun Mishra, has an enormous corpus, but we do not think if his clients can derive any benefit of the judicial opinion expressed therein. The decision in Board of High School v. Ghanshyam, AIR 1962 SC 1110 is by the Constitution Bench, but the decision deals with a case of three respondents whose examination was cancelled and who had been debarred from appearing in the next examination for using unfair means and the case evidently being not one of mass-copying or gross indiscipline on mass scale by candidates, is clearly inapplicable to the facts of this case, Suresh Koshy's case AIR 1969 SC 198 was a case of single candidate and is, therefore, even less applicable. Reliance on the case of Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 is difficult to comprehend inasmuch as their Lordships observed in that case that "courts should be slow to interfere with the decision of domestic tribunals appointed by autonomous bodies like Universities", albeit in dealing with the case also of a single candidate who had been charged for using unfair means in examination and enquiry into that charge being made by Special Committee appointed by the University. Kumari Chittra Shrivastava's case AIR 1970 SC 1039 , cited by Shri Arun Mishra is also the case of a single candidate whose examination was cancelled on the ground of shortage of attendance at lectures, without affording her adequate opportunity to meet the charge. That decision would not also evidently help the petitioners in this case. The decision in Prem Prakash, AIR 1972 SC 1408 also concerned a single candidate, but therein also, it was observed that it was for the Standing Committee of the University to decide whether the examinee had used the unfair means and the conclusion reached on evidence by the Committee could not be reexamined by the courts except on limited grounds. Reliance on a Bench decision of this Court in Surendra Kumar Patel's case 1969 Jab LJ 392 must also be deemed misconceived as that is also the case of a single candidate using unfair means. The decision in the case of Sarvesh Narayan v. Aligarh Muslim University, AIR 1982 SC 843 rests on the concession of the University noted in the first para of the order; it did not rest on merits of either side's case. The decision in the case of Sarvesh Narayan v. Aligarh Muslim University, AIR 1982 SC 843 rests on the concession of the University noted in the first para of the order; it did not rest on merits of either side's case. ( 13 ) ON a survey of authorities cited at the Bar, we are of the view that the contention of Shri J. P. Gupta must prevail and we do not think if we can be persuaded to take a different view today, departing from one taken in the case of Kiran Sisodia (AIR 1989 Madh Pra 18) (supra ). On the other hand, we would say that it is not only the case of clause (g) of Article 51-A of the Constitution with which have to reckon, but we must also give due effect to the mandate inscribed in clause (i) which requires citizens to "abjure violence" in behaving as dutiful citizens of this country. We are clear in our mind that the petitioners and interveners and, for that matter, other candidates also who have not come before us, but who have behaved irresponsibly in boycotting the Examination, in question, were bound by Condition No. 17 of the Admission Card and in violating that condition, they disabled themselves in invoking the aid of this Court only to secure approval to an act of mass-violence in the precincts of a temple of learning. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court on the writ side is meant to help those who have meekly suffered injustice and it is not meant for supporting such acts as would cause affront to constitutional values and ethos resulting in demolition of established norms and institutions of society by which hopes and aspirations of rising generations of scholars are to be fulfilled. ( 14 ) WE have also no hesitation to uphold the action of the University in cancelling the examination not wholly, but only partially with respect only to the candidates misbehaving by boycotting examination in first paper. Power in that regard is vested in the Executive Council and that power in the instant case has not been misused or abused and the action of the University cannot be considered arbitrary if it has not cancelled the examination of respondent No. 4, but of others. Power in that regard is vested in the Executive Council and that power in the instant case has not been misused or abused and the action of the University cannot be considered arbitrary if it has not cancelled the examination of respondent No. 4, but of others. She did not indulge in any kind of "malpractices" like others, but she behaved courageously in standing against mob-violence and discharging her duty righteously in answering the question paper and not boycotting the same, being fully mindful of her obligation in that regard, envisaged under Condition No. 17 of the Admission Card. Her case evidently is distinguishable from the others, who had violated that Condition and had thereby forfeited their right to approach this Court. No question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution would arise in such circumstances inasmuch as it cannot be said to be a case of one dutiful and law-abiding citizen being "favoured" and other of the same class being disfavoured. If fourth respondent's examination was not cancelled, by that she was given credit for complying with statutory Condition No. 17 of the Admission Card. She was not favoured; but given her rightful due which she could legally claim even in terms of Clause 11 (iv) of Ordinance No. 5. She had answered the question paper but her answer book was "lost" when it was in the custody of the Centre Superintendent. ( 15 ) IN the result, the petition fails and it is dismissed. We hold that neither the petitioners nor the interveners are entitled to any relief except that allowed to them by the interim order passed in this matter on 08-09-1988. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .