JUDGMENT Palok Basu, J. - National Textile Corporation, U.P. Employees Union has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order of the Labour Commissioner U.P. dated 4.6.1980 and also for a writ of mandamus commanding M/s. National Textile Corporation U.P. Sylverton Kanpur and the Labour Commissioner to extend the benefits emanating from the agreement dated 6.6.79, to the employees in the head office of the said Corporation in Kanpur. 2. The claim, of the petitioner - Union in effect is that since an agreement was reached between the representatives of workmen of some of the cotton mills vested in the National Textiles Corporation, U.P., hereinafter referred to as the Corporation, on the one hand the corporation itself on the other which was to the effect that all workmen including the clerical staff of the mills could be given an increase of Rs. 45/ - in their basic wages w.e.f. April 1,1979, and some other ancillary benefits were also to accrue to them, the employees employed in the head office of the corporation, should also be given the same benefits. It is stated that the petitioner - Union laid its claim and demand but the corporation refused it. Then they made an application purporting to under clause (vi) of the aforesaid agreement before the Labour Commissioner U.P. which has been wrongly negatived by him. The basic foundation of the argument. Therefore, is that the agreement dated 6.6.1976 should be interpreted to include the employees in the head office of the corporation being represented by the petitioner - Union. I have heard Sri Kameshwar Prasad Agrawal, Senior Advocate and Sri A.K. Sinha. Advocate on behalf of the petitioner in support of this writ petition in detail. 3. The corporation, however, right from the beginning, took the stand that so far as the agreement is concerned it relates to and will thus govern the employees and workmen in the mills units and the question of giving those benefits to the employees in the head office does not arise. 3. The corporation, however, right from the beginning, took the stand that so far as the agreement is concerned it relates to and will thus govern the employees and workmen in the mills units and the question of giving those benefits to the employees in the head office does not arise. It has further been agitated that the petitioner - Union was never a party to the said agreement dated 6.6.19/9 and that the necessity to call for the tripartite conference arose because of the unrest in the mills units which again had nothing to do with the employees working at the head office of the corporation, I have heard Sri V.K. Tewari, Advocate, representing the corporation at length. 4. In support of his argument the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised only two points: (1) Section 3(b) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, empowers the State Government to issue a notification in order to give effect to an agreement reached between the employer and the employees, and, once a notification is issued it has to be given effect irrespective of the fact as to who were parties to the agreement giving rise to the issuance of the said notification. It is thus argued that statutory duty is cast upon the corporation to follow the mandate contained in the notification dated 24.7.1979, which came to be issued in pursuance of the agreement dated 6.6.1979. (2) The employees working in the mills unit are transferred to the head office and vice - versa. Thus in effect there is no distinction between an employee working in the head office and those working in the mills. 5. Therefore, it is argued that the Labour Commissioner was wrong in refusing to pass an order in their favour under clause (vi) of the said agreement which empowers the Labour Commissioner to give his own opinion whenever there was a difference of opinion with regard to interpretation of any of the terms of agreement. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that none of the points are tenable because there is inherent fallacy in them and the petitioners are entitled to no relief whatever and that the view of the Labour Commissioner is justified for the reasons contained there in as also for some additional reasons argued. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties. I am of the view that this writ petition lacks merit and must be dismissed. 6. An important fact which is to be noted is that in a case where an industrial dispute comes to be raised, a full procedure is prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act (Central or the State), recourse to which must be had by an aggrieved Union or employee so that the law has its full play. In the instant case, however, neither the Head Office employees nor the petitioner - Union appear to have taken the matter to the proper authority for adjudicating any industrial dispute within the meaning of the Central or State Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, prima facie I am to conclude that there is no industrial dispute as much in the instant case. 7. Coming now to the first point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner it has to be noted that there is in fact a fallacy in the argument. It is admitted case of the parties that a notification under Section 3(b) of the Act was issued by the State Government on 24.7.79 to give effect to the agreement arrived at on 6.6.1979. The power to issue a notification under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act can be exercised 'for requiring employers, workmen or both to observe for such period, as may be specified in the order, such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in accordance with the order. 'It is stated in Section 3(b) itself that only when the State Government is of the opinion that for securing public safety etc. It is necessary to take recourse to passing of an order under Section 3 that a notification, a copy of which was produced before be at the time of hearing itself states as under : "Whereas the workmen employed in the Cotton Textiles Mills at Kanpur had been agitating for some time over the question of wages rise............ And whereas to press their demands, the workmen went on token strike on May 1, 1979 and a dated 23rd May 1979, was also served on Textiles Mills of Kanpur threatening general strike........... And whereas to press their demands, the workmen went on token strike on May 1, 1979 and a dated 23rd May 1979, was also served on Textiles Mills of Kanpur threatening general strike........... And whereas apprehending the emergent situation due to strike notice, the issues relating to the demands of increase in wage and in the rates of the dearness allowances were discussed with the representatives of the employers and the workmen and in a meeting held at Lucknow on June 6, 1976, in the presence of Labour Commissioner, U.P. And whereas in the opinion of the State Government it is expedient to require the employer and the workmen both to observe the terms and conditions agreed upon in the settlement aforesaid in the maintenance of public order etc. Now, therefore in exercise of the powers under Section 3(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Governor is pleased to make the following order in respect of workmen employed in the Textile mills at Kanpur and to direct with reference to Section 19 of the said Act that notice of this order shall be given by publication in the official Gazette." (There after order runs into 7 paragraphs of which No. 6 and 7 may be relevant): "No. 6 : In case of any difference of opinion with regard to interpretation of this order or any part thereof the matter shall be referred to the Labour Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh whose decision shall be final. No. 7 : This order shall come into operation with immediate effect and shall remain in force for a period of five years." A perusal of the said notification itself indicates that it has been only to cover the workmen at the 'Mills'. Again, it is narrated there in that because of the agreement arrived at between the representatives of the corporation and representatives of the various unions of the workmen the said notification was being issued. It being an admitted case between the parties that the petitioner union was never a party to the said agreement; it goes without saying that the head office workmen were not at all concerned with the said agitation nor with the said settlement and naturally, therefore, not with the said notification issued by the State Government. It being an admitted case between the parties that the petitioner union was never a party to the said agreement; it goes without saying that the head office workmen were not at all concerned with the said agitation nor with the said settlement and naturally, therefore, not with the said notification issued by the State Government. It has been rightly argued that in order to judge and find out the purpose and import of the notification we must confine to the Language used in the Statute, the agreement and the notification alone. For the reasons stated above, the first point does not merit any further consideration. However, a passing reference should also be made to another argument that was by the learned counsel for the respondent. He rightly argued that Section 3(b) contemplates a temporary measure taking note of a situation which raises an emergency.Elaborating further it has been argued that since the notification was to remain in force only for five years, it should be held that permanent benefits were not to accrue as a result of lapsation of time. I, however, feel that it is not necessary for me to go into the later question because the petitioner union was obviously not a party to the agreement dated 11.6.79. The Labour Commissioner rightly held that he could exercise the power under clause (vi) of the agreement only if the issue of interpretation of terms of agreement was raised by those who were parties to the agreement. Before parting with the instant point I may state that only one authority reported in 1986, Indian Factories and Labour Reports page 661 S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Company Limited and another was cited by the Learned counsel for the petitioner. The facts of the said case are entirely different in as much as the point in controversy was wholly foreign to the one involved in the instant case. Incidently I may mention that none of the counsel has cited any other authority. 8. Though in view of the finding recorded above, the point no. 2 may not strictly require determination, yet wish to decide the same because both the counsel laid emphasis on it. Incidently I may mention that none of the counsel has cited any other authority. 8. Though in view of the finding recorded above, the point no. 2 may not strictly require determination, yet wish to decide the same because both the counsel laid emphasis on it. A perusal of the terms and conditions as quoted in Annexure - 2 to the writ petition (Copy of appointment letter issued for appointing an employee in the head office) and the terms and conditions as noted in Annexure - 2 (Copy of appointment letter issued for appointing an employee in the mills unit) are different in many material particulars. For example while House Rent Allowance is payable at certain rate to the head office employee it is not payable to the mills workmen. As regards the clause where by an employee in the mills unit can be transferred any where in U.P. which may include the Head Office, it will operate only when a transfer in fact takes place. The transfer clause should not be interpreted to indicate equality in the terms and service conditions of the workmen of the mill with the employees in the head office of the Corporation. Thus,point no. 2 also fails. 9. In view of the discussion made above the Labour Commissioner was fully. Justified in passing the impugned order dated 4.6.1980 (Annexure - 10 to the writ petition). Consequently there is no force in the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. However, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, I make no orders as to cost.