JUDGMENT Roy, J. This Rule, which was obtained on 31st August, 1979, was heard along with C. R. No. 15741 (W) of 1987 in (1) Smt. Molina Ghosh v. The State of West Bengal, (since reported in 1988(2) Cal LJ 20) which we have disposed of today by a separate judgment. 2. Since the facts relating to the acquisition of premises No. 48, Old Ballygunge Road, Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the said premises), which was sought to be done under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) have been indicated in details in the other judgment, we are not restating those facts in this case. 3. There is no doubt that the said premises along with others were attached for the payment of sums which were said to be embezzled by one Shri S.K. Ghosh since deceased and for the purpose of realising the penalty imposed on him and the total amount of such amount is 75 Lakhs. It would also appear that on an application made by the Province of Bengal, in the proceedings which were initiated in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance XXXVIII of 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance), being Suit No. 53 of 1944, one shri K. B. Bose, Barrister-at Law, since deceased was appointed Receiver of all the properties, including the said premises and which was also attached by or in terms of an order dated 22nd November, 1944. 4. The petitioner bas stated that by latter dated 10th February, 1969, the said Receiver, informed her husband Shri Puspa Kumar Bagla since deceased, that the lower flat of the said premises could be given to him on, inter alia, the following amongst other terms: (1) Use and occupation of the premises as a licensee shall be for your own residence only. (3) Licence is to be discontinued as soon as the attachment by Court over this property is vacated and the Court ceased to have anything to do with the property. (4) A written undertaking must be given by the Licensee to Court to vacate the premises as soon as the attachment is vacated and the Court ceases to have anything to do with the property. (4) A written undertaking must be given by the Licensee to Court to vacate the premises as soon as the attachment is vacated and the Court ceases to have anything to do with the property. (5) All repairs that may be necessary to the premises shall be done at your cost for which you will not be entitled to claim any payment or adjust the same or any part thereof against the monthly payments to be made by you. No demand whatsoever for the repairs or maintenance of fixturies and fittings is to be made during the period of licence. (8) You will pay Rs. 485/• per month as licence fee or damages during the period you shall occupy the premises. It has been stated by the petitioner that although her husband was mentioned in the letter in question, as the licensee of the ground floor of the said premises, be in fact, became or was treated as a tenant in respect of the flat in question at a monthly rent of Rs. 485/- per month and as such, she has claimed that the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, became applicable in respect of the tenancy and the Receiver as mentioned herein before, really treated the tenancy as such. Such statements were sought to be made and relied upon, on the basis of a letter dated 20th January, 1970, addressed by the erstwhile Receiver to the Executive Engineer, Water Works, Corporation of Calcutta, which was to the following effect :- This is to inform you that the ground floor of the premises No. 48, Old Ballygunge Road, Calcutta, was let out to Sri P. K. Bagla, and is under his occupation since January, 1969. He has approached me for signing the application for a new connection of filtered water. I have advised him to apply to you directly as the occupier. I have no objection to the connection of filtered water being given to him. All expenses however for such connection shall be borne by the said gentleman. He has approached me for signing the application for a new connection of filtered water. I have advised him to apply to you directly as the occupier. I have no objection to the connection of filtered water being given to him. All expenses however for such connection shall be borne by the said gentleman. It has also been stated by the petitioner that in terms of the Receiver's letter dated 10th February, 1969, creating the tenancy in question, the tenancy was really and in fact created and that too on the basis of an undertaking given by the tenant in question, to vacate the ground floor of the said premises as soon as the Court ceases to have anything to do with the same and on the basis thereof, on or about 14th February, 1969, possession of the ground floor of the said premises was duly delivered to the said Shri Bagla, the husband of the petitioner. It has also been stated by the petitioner that on the death of the erstwhile Receiver, Shri K. B. Bose, the present Receiver, Shri Tapan Roy Chowdhury, Respondent No.2, was appointed Receiver. 5. It would also appear that without giving due and necessary particulars, the petitioner has claimed that the tenant in possession, on receipt of the delivery of the tenancy in question, spent large sums of moneys to make the said tenancy habitable, since the same was in a dilapidated condition. It has also been asserted that such improvement was effected with the permission, knowledge and consent of the erstwhile Receiver. The petitioner has also indicated that her husband died leaving her as widow, five minor children and widowed mother and after the death of her husband she has duly tendered rent in respect of the tenancy in question, but on refusal to receive such rent by the Receiver concerned, on necessary and due advises received, the rent for the premises in question, has been deposited with the Rent Controller. Calcutta, upto August, 1979. 6. Calcutta, upto August, 1979. 6. It would appear that by letter of 11th April, 1974, the District Judge, L4-Parganas, Respondent No.1, asked and directed her to quit and vacate the tenancy in question and then on 21st August, 1974, she made an application before the said learned District Judge to the effect, that the tenancy was protected under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and that she cannot be asked to vacate the tenancy, except as provided under the provisions of that Act. It has also been stated that by an Order No. 2247 dated 24th August, 1974, the petition as mentioned herein before, was directed to be kept on record. 7. The petitioner has stated that by another letter dated 8th September, 1975, the Receiver in question, informed her that she was in unauthorised occupation of the tenancy in question, the possession whereof, was required to be taken and she has also informed by that letter, that by an Order No. 2469 dated 5th September, 1975. the learned District Judge had directed the learned Receiver to serve such notice on her and she was also informed that failing compliance with the requirements of the said notice, appropriate legal steps would be taken. It was her case that since the tenancy in question, was continuing under the provision of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act as mentioned above, the learned Receiver was not entitled to call upon her to deliver possession of the same and in any event, the said notice was contrary to the provisions of that Act and such being the position, the entire action was illegal and of no effect. The petitioner has also indicated that attachment of the said premises has not been withdrawn and the learned District Judge, Respondent No.1, has not ceased to have anything to do with the said premises and the conditions contemplated by the letter creating the tenancy as mentioned hereinbefore were conbinuary. It has also been stated that the said Order No. 2469 was passed without hearing the petitioner. In fact, she was not given any notice of such or any hearing, before passing the said order. 8. It has also been stated that the said Order No. 2469 was passed without hearing the petitioner. In fact, she was not given any notice of such or any hearing, before passing the said order. 8. Admittedly, on or about 19th September, 1975, the petitioner moved this Court and obtained Civil Rule No. 16253(W) of 1975, praying, inter alia, for a writ of Mandamus, commanding the Respondents of the same to quash, set aside and/or recall the said Order No. 2469 and the notice dated 8th September, 1975 and asked, for an order of injunction restraining the Respondents from enforcing and/or implementing the said order or the notice dated 8th September, 1975 as mentioned earlier. It bas been stated by the petitioner that the said Civil Rule No. 16253 (W) of 1975 was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 20th June, 1976 in the following manner: "Mr. Chakraborty appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that the petitioner was not given any opportunity to place her case before the learned District Judge before the impugned order was passed. It is not disputed that after the death of her husband the petitioner is occupying the portion of the premises. So, considering the facts and circumstances of this• case it is desirable for the ends of justice and fair play that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to have her say before she actually delivers possession of the property in favour of the learned District Judge, 24-Parganas. Accordingly, I direct the learned District Judge to give the petitioner an opportunity of being heard upon a notice to her within two weeks from date and the matter should be decided within the weeks thereafter." 9. This Rule is disposed of as above without any order as to costs. I make it clear that the disposing of this Rule, I am not deciding the right, title and interest of the petitioner. This Rule is disposed of as above without any order as to costs. I make it clear that the disposing of this Rule, I am not deciding the right, title and interest of the petitioner. It was also her case that pursuant to the directions as given by the order as mentioned above, the learned District Judge, Respondent No. I, issued a notice directing her to appear before him and to submit her representation, if any, about her grievances in respect of the directions given by the said learned District Judge, requiring her to vacate the tenancy in question, within a stipulated time and pursuant thereto, on or about 15th July, 1976, she filed an objection petition before the said Respondent No.1, praying, inter alia, amongst others that she should not be directed to vacate the premises in question and alternatively she could not be asked to quit and vacate to make over possession of the same, in such a summary manner as indicated. In fact, the petitioner has stated that in her petition as above, she took the following points: (a) The said deceased during his life time and thereafter your petitioner were tenant in respect of the ground floor of he said premises and that your petitioner cannot be evicted except in accordance with the due process of law. (b) Your petitioner in any event cannot be evicted in the summary manner. (c) Your petitioner cannot be evicted or deprived of the possession of the ground' floor of the said premises under the provisions of the said Ordinance. (d) The said deceased during his life time and thereafter your petitioner being a tenant in respect of the said premises was protected from such eviction under the Provisions of Law and to that Respondent No.3, Smt. Molina Ghosh, wife of left S.K. Ghosh who is also the petitioner in other Civil Rule, filed an objection petition and similarly one M/s. Development Consultants (P) Ltd" claiming to an intending purchaser of ~he said premises, also filed an objection. There is also no dispute that the objection petition of the petitioner was heard by the learned District Judge Respondent No. I on 30th July, 1976 and by Order No. 2574 of that date, she was directed by the said learned District Judge, to vacate the ground floor of the said premises within August, 1976. There is also no dispute that the objection petition of the petitioner was heard by the learned District Judge Respondent No. I on 30th July, 1976 and by Order No. 2574 of that date, she was directed by the said learned District Judge, to vacate the ground floor of the said premises within August, 1976. The said order of the learned District Judge has been disclosed as Annexure J to the petition and it would appear that the learned District Judge was of the view that whatever right was given to the petitioner to occupy the tenancy in question, was no better than that of a licensee and as such, the contentions as raised by her in her concerned petition, were of no effect or any assistance. The learned District Judge also directed the intending purchaser, M/s. Development Consultants (P) Ltd. to deposit in Court the entire balance amount of consideration money within a stipulated time. From a reference to the judgment in the other Civil Rule, it would appear that the said Development Consultants (P) Ltd. had duly deposited the entire earnest money, and that proceeding was also contested by Smt. Molina Ghosh and the effect of such contest, we have also indicated in that judgment. 10. It was the case of the petitioner that no suit or any proceeding has been instituted or initiated against her for her eviction from the tenancy in question and the proceeding being Original Suit No. 53 of 1944, was not also instituted against her or her husband and in fact, none of them were or have been made parties in that proceeding. It was the claim of the petitioner that without institution or initiation of the proceeding in the manner as mentioned above, she cannot be called upon to vacate the tenancy in question and in any event, the right, title and interest of the petitioner, in respect of the tenancy in question, have not been adjudicated in any manner or in any proceedings whatsoever. It was of course claimed by her that the learned District Judge had no power or authority to adjudicate upon her right, title and interest in respect of the tenancy in question and, if at all, the said Respondent No.1, has derived the necessary power from the said Ordinance, under which he would not also be authorised to adjudicate upon her right, title and interest in respect of the tenancy. That being the position, the petitioner has also claimed that the directions given by the said learned District Judge on her to vacate the tenancy in question, was excessive and issued in irregular use and exercise of power and jurisdiction and such being the position, the entire proceeding has been vitiated by illegality and irregularity. 11. The petitioner has stated that under the circumstances as mentioned above, she, in or about August, 1975, moved this Court in its Revisional jurisdiction and Obtained C. R. No. 2804 of 1976 praying, inter alia, for a Rule on the Respondents therein to show cause why the impugned order dated 30th July, 1976 passed by the learned District Judge, Respondent No.1 herein in the Original Suit No. 53 of 1944 should not be set aside and/or cancelled and if no cause or sufficient cause was shown, why the said Rule should not be made absolute, apart from praying for ad interim stay of the said order and also for an order of injunction restraining the Respondents therein from acting in terms of the concerned order of from disturbing the possession and occupation of the petitioner in respect of the tenancy in question. This Rule was heard by Murari Mohan Dutt and Dhiresh Chandra Chakraborty, JJ. on 19th April, 1978 and the following order was passed: In our view there can no doubt that the petitioner cannot be evicted from the disputed premises or from the said flat except in due course of law. Mr. Bagchi, learned Advocate on behalf of the State Government submits that the petitioner would not be evicted from the flat forcibly or illegally but the State Government will take recourse to legal process for the eviction of the petitioner from the flat in question. In the circumstances we do not think any further order need be made in this Rule. The Rule is disposed of as above. 12. In the circumstances we do not think any further order need be made in this Rule. The Rule is disposed of as above. 12. It has been stated by the petitioner that she was surprised to find a news item in the daily issues of the Ananda Bazar Patrika of 10th August, 1979, that the Respondents and more particularly the Minister-Charge has disclosed to the press, that there would be a National Theatre on the lands where He said premises is situate and which includes her tenancy. It has been claimed that from such discloser of the policy decision, it is thus clear that the whole purpose of the concerned acquisition of the said premises was given a total go-by or became non-est and a new pretended purpose was sought to be brought in and for that, the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act have not at a been complied with. 13. It was also the case of the petitioner that on or about 17th August, 1979, people claiming to be from the office of the Respondent No. 4, the First Land Acquisition Collector came to the said premises and informed her that their purpose was to vacate and take possession of the said premises and asked her to quit and vacate the tenancy. It has been stated that those persons also disclosed that there was an order passed for acquisition of the said premises. It was also claimed by the said petitioner that such action was thoroughly illegal and irregular, as she could not in any way be evicted from the tenancy in question, without the due process of law and she has now claimed, the notification under section 4 and declaration under section 6 of the said Act or the steps as taken under the said Act, for taking possession, were thoroughly illegal, irregular, inoperative and without jurisdiction, apart from claiming (hat such steps were taken, to ha\e her evicted from the tenancy in question, in a malafide manner. She has also claimed that appropriate steps under the said Act, for the purpose of completing the acquisition were not taken by the authorities concerned and in fact, there was no public purpose involved in the matter of acquisition of the said premises, with which alone, she is interested. She has also claimed that appropriate steps under the said Act, for the purpose of completing the acquisition were not taken by the authorities concerned and in fact, there was no public purpose involved in the matter of acquisition of the said premises, with which alone, she is interested. The public purpose as alleged, was also claimed by the petitioner to be not genuine and bona fide, apart from claiming, that the action of the concerned authorities to take possession of the said premises includes the said tenancy has infringed her right to hold and acquire property under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 31 of the Constitution of India. She hall also claimed that such act or actions as taken in the instant case by the authorities concerned, to be arbitrary, wrongful, illegal and malafide. She has further stated that in any event; she having acquired the right in respect of the tenancy in question and had to spent money thereon and that too with the knowledge and consent of the learned District Judge and the learned Receiver, it was incumbent upon the Land Acquisition Collector and other authorities, to give her notice, prior to the acquisition of the property and it was also her claim that she could not be deprived of her right in such arbitrary manner as involved in this Case. It was also chimed that the action of the authorities concerned, in the matter of acquiring the said premises which included her tenancy, was contrary to the principles of natural justice. She has also pleaded that on the basis of the representation made to her or Co her husband, by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, they had to make substantial invesments in respect of the said premises and in that view also, she cannot now be evicted from the tenancy in question, without the due process of law and in any event, the Respondents, because of their conduct, should be estopped from taking any action, which would be contrary to the representation as made by them, the particulars whereof have been indicated hereinbefore. Under the above circumstances, challenging the acquisition in question, this Court was admittedly moved as mentioned earlier, on 31st August, 1979 i e., after a long lapse of time. 14. Under the above circumstances, challenging the acquisition in question, this Court was admittedly moved as mentioned earlier, on 31st August, 1979 i e., after a long lapse of time. 14. On the facts of the case, it struck up as to whether the petitioner has locus standi to maintain the petition, challenging the acquisition proceedings undo: the said Act at such a late stage and if at all, how was she interested, and if at all she may at best be interested in her tenancy or for necessary of damages or compensation, on dispossession. The same arguments were also advanced by Mr. Bajoria, appearing for the Respondent Nos. 1 and 4-6. The Full particulars of his submission on the facts of this case would be indicated hereafter. In fact, on such point being raised Mr. Chatterjee states that in the facts of the case and more particularly, the way and the manner in which the tenancy was created and enjoyed, the petitioner will have locus standi to maintain this proceeding and also to see that she is not disposed either without the due and necessary process of law or in an illegal, irregular and unauthorised use of power under the said Act or by any excessive use of power by the authorities concerned and also to see that the proceeding under the said Act, - have been initiated or taken with authority and appropriately and not in a malafide manner. While on his submissions as above or in support of his contentions on locus standi of the petitioner, Mr. Chatterjee, firstly referred to section 248 of American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition which indicates that the term "owner" in the statutes relating to the – exercise of eminent domain includes any person having a lawful interest in the property to be concerned. It does not necessarily mean the owner of the legal title, but may refer to the person in possession and having control (If the land. As a general proposition, where property is sought to be taken under condemnation proceedings the owner thereof at the time the title to the property becomes vested in the condemnor is entitled to the award. If title vests in the condemnor before the property is conveyed, the award should be paid to the vendor; it is not material that the quantum of damages is not fixed until after the title vested in the condemnor. If title vests in the condemnor before the property is conveyed, the award should be paid to the vendor; it is not material that the quantum of damages is not fixed until after the title vested in the condemnor. The right to collect the compensation does not pass to the purchaser unless specially assigned. Under the prevailing view, where property is purchased which is subject to pending condemnation proceedings, under which title has not vested in the condemnor, and the deed conveying such property is silent as to the right to the award money to be paid, such money belongs to and is recoverable by the vendee. In some cases, however, a grantor who had conveyed pending condemnation proceedings has been had entitled to the damages; the difference in result in some of these cases is explainable, in part at least, by terms of the particular statute involved. 15. Since in equity a vendee in possession of the land under a contract of purchase is regarded as the owner, the dominant view is that if the land is taken for public use under the power of eminent domain, he, and not the, vendor, is entitled to the award. It has been held, however, that the vendor is entitled to the entire amount of the award subject to the right of the vendee to have the amount of the award applied upon the balance due on the contract. Under a statute providing that where neither the legal title nor the possession has been transferred to the purchaser and all or a material part thereof is taken by eminent domain the vendor cannot enforce the contract and the purchaser may recover any portion of the price he has paid, it has been held that a purchaser out of possession is entitled to receive from the condemnation only his deposit or the amount be has paid the vendor. 16. The damages awarded to an abutting owner for vacation of a street or highway, or change in toe grade thereof, are personal, and belong to the person owning the land at the crime, and win not pass to a purchaser except as specially granted or mentioned in the deed. They neither run with the land nor pass be a conveyance thereof. They neither run with the land nor pass be a conveyance thereof. Where a part of a tract of land or an easement therein is required for a public use such as a railroad and the company has taken actual possession of the amount of land required for its right of way, though without the consent of the owner a subsequent vendee of such tract is generally considered as having no right to the compensation for the part so taken though there are some exceptions to this rule. 17. Where land which had been conveyed in fee to its present holder upon condition that it be devoted to a use is taken by eminent domain for a different use, whether the original conveyance is regarded as in trust for the grantor as a determinable fee, or as a grant upon condition sub-sequent, the grantor is not entitled to compensation: Since the interest of the grantee is a fee simple the entire estate is in him, and the rights of the grantor, whatever they may be called, and however they might be enforced in equity in case of an unlawful use of the property are not an estate or interest in the land so are not properly in the constitutional sense. He, secondly referred to the determinations in the case of (2) Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd., (1956) l All ER 273, a determination by the Queen's Bench Division, where in his statement of claim, in an action against the defendants, the plaintiff alleged that he was tile inventor of a new design of adhesive dispenser in the shape of a pen; know as the Fastik Pen; that he disclosed the an "know-how" of the pen to the defendants during negotiations for an agreement, whereby the defendants were to market the pen; that in February, 1954, the negotiations broke down; that there was an implied contract that the defendants would treat as confidential the information given to them during the negotiations, and that the defendants were in breach of that contract in that they had ,made use of the information by manufacturing an adhesive dispenser called she Stixit Pen, which contained three distinctive features of the Fastik Pen. The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendants and an injunction to restrain the defendants from disclosing to other persons or making use of the information disclosed by the plaintiff without his consent. The defendants, before filing a defence, applied by summons under R. S. C., Order 16, Rule 11, for leave to joint as a defendant and D, who by affidavit alleged, among other things, that he was the inventor of the Stixit Pen. Subsequently, D, filed another affidavit alleging, among other allegations, that the defendant were under contractual obligation to him to manufacture and distribute the Stixit Pen in certain territories and on such facts, it has been held that (i) the test whether under R. S. C , Order 16; Rule 11, the court had jurisdiction to add as defendant a person whom the plaintiff did not with to sue was whether the order for which the plaintiff was asking in the action might directly affect the intervener (i.e. the person proposed to be added as a party), by curtailing the enjoyment of his legal rights for the only reason which might render the presence of a party before the court to be "necessary" to enable the court to adjudicate completely (within the meaning of R.S.C , Order 16, Rule 11) was that he should be bound by the result of the proceeding and (ii) D, should be added as defendant in the present case because the defendant were shown prima facie to be bound to him in contract to manufacture the Stixit Pen, which obligation constituted a legal right of D's the enjoyment of which might be curtailed by relief (i. e., the injunction) asked by the plaintiff in the action. Mr. Chatterjee, thirdly relied on the determinations by a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of (3) Jayanta Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1981 Calcutta 138, where it has been observed that acquisition of interest in a property is not the sole test for determining the locus standi to move the writ petition, but prejudicial affection of a right concerning the property should be the test to determine the locus standi to move a writ petition. A person is legally interested in an answer, only if he can say that it may lead to the result that would affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his right. A person is legally interested in an answer, only if he can say that it may lead to the result that would affect him legally, that is, by curtailing his right. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the right of the petitioner to enforce a contract for sale would be curtailed and such contract would be frustrated if the property in question would be acquired. In such circumstances, the petitioner must be held to have locus standi to question the correctness of the acquisition proceeding, because acquisition of the property would ultimately frustrate the contract, relying on the determinations in Amon's case (Supra), and fourthly, to the case of (4) Jagadishwar Salival v. Collector of Goalpara & Anr., AIR 1975 Calcutta 197, where the point for consideration was, whether under section 18 of the said Act, a tenant or sub-tenant can claim to be heard, even though he has no saleable interest in the land and it has been observed that a tenant or a sub-tenant, even though his interest is not transferable except with the sanction of the superior landlord, has an interest which entitles him to be heard upon cite question of adequacy of compensation. It should also be noted final while on the point, Mr. Chatterjee also referred to the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Hariyana High Court in the case of (5) State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh & Anr., AIR 1984 P&H 1 , but on a second thought and reconsideration, very farily elected not to rely on the same. 18. While on the question of locus standi or to find out whether " the petitioner has the necessary character to challenge the acquisition proceeding under the said Act in this proceedings, we must note that on 29th August, 1962, the declaration under section 6 of the said Act was made and on 3rd October, 1962, objection under section 5A of the said Act was duly filed by Shri S.K. Ghosh, while alive. Thereafter, personal hearing was given to the said Shri S. K. Ghosh, on his objection on 4th December, 1962 and after that, on 18th May, 1963, the declaration under section 6 of the said Act was made. Thereafter, personal hearing was given to the said Shri S. K. Ghosh, on his objection on 4th December, 1962 and after that, on 18th May, 1963, the declaration under section 6 of the said Act was made. It should also be noted that in between the said date of 18th May, 1963 and 7th August, 1965, by the erstwhile Receiver, Shri K.B. Bose was appointed and steps were duly taken under sections 9 and 19 of the said Act. It should also be noted that on such appointment, the said erstwhile Receiver applied to the Land Acquisition Collector concerned, claiming compensation and on 4th January, 1967, the Award in the instant case was made and thereafter and more particularly on 15th February,1967, an application for reference under section 18 of the said Act was filed by the said erstwhile owner Shri S. K. Ghosh and then, on 6th January, 1967, he once moved his Court, but ultimately withdrew the said proceeding. After that, on or about 10th February, 1969, the husband of the present petitioner was inducted has a licensee in respect of the flat in question of the said premises, in terms of the offer as given to the said licensee by the erstwhile Receiver as mentioned in Annexure-A to the petition and there is no doubt, that on 28th January, 1970, by Annexure-B to the petition, the said Receiver addressed a letter to the Executive Engineer, Water Works, Corporation of Calcutta, wherein he state that the fiat in question was let out to Shri P.K. Bagla, the husband of the present petitioner, since deceased. There is also no doubt or any dispute that the terms as referred to Annexure-A to the petition and as indicated hereinbefore, were accepted by the husband of the petitioner on 13th February, 1969 and thereby, he specifically undertook to vacate the tenancy in question, as soon as the Court ceased to have anything to do with the property. Mr. Chatterjee of course could not disagree with the established fact, that the tenancy in question, in respect of the deceased husband of the petitioner, if at all, was entered much after the acquisition proceedings. We shall have to consider, whether in view of the terms of the agreement, there' was really a tenancy agreement or an agreement for inducting the husband of the petitioner as a licensee. Mr. We shall have to consider, whether in view of the terms of the agreement, there' was really a tenancy agreement or an agreement for inducting the husband of the petitioner as a licensee. Mr. Chatterjee of course wanted to contend that neither the husband of the petitioner nor the petitioner was ever informed about the acquisition proceedings in respect of the said premises, wherein the flat in question, situate. These submissions of Mr. Chatterjee are very difficult for us to be accepted, because on the basis of the trend of the records as disclosed, there cannot be any doubt or hesitation in holding, that the character of the proceedings, which were pending, was well-known to the husband of the petitioner. 19. Mr. Bajoria also indicated the above dates, for the purpose of establishing that the petitioner had or has no. locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceeding under the said Act, when this Rule was obtained on 31st August, 1979 i.e., after a long lapse of about 17 years. He also submitted that after the notification under section 4 of the said Act, under section 5A, any person interested in any land which have been so notified under section 4(1) as needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or of a Company, may within 30 days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or any lands in the locality, as the case may be. Here, he pointed out, that such objection was filed by the erstwhile owner Shri S. K. Ghosh and such objection was really heard and disposed of after giving him due opportunities. Mr. Bajoria also pointed out that the husband of the present petitioner had not really filed any objection and in fact, in view of the sequence and events as indicated hereinbefore and more particularly when, the said Shri Bagla entered as a licensee on 10th February, 1969, he had no right or authority to file such objection and that too whom, section 5A(3) of the said Act, postulates that a person interested, shall be deemed to be such person, who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation, if the lands were acquired under the said Act or in other words, such person must be interested at the point of time, the proceeding under the said Act were taken. It was also pointed out by him that section 5A of the said Act did not visualise the exercise of the right to object retrospectively and such objection, if at all, cannot be kept alive for an indefinite time. It was also claimed by him, that if the contentions of the petitioner are accepted now, the situation would become impossible and the same would frustrate the purposes of the said Act or the concerned acquisition proceedings rather than to give effect to the same. It was also pointed out by Mr. Bajoda that section 5A(3) postulates that every objection under section 5A(3), shall be made to the Collector in writing and the said Collector shall duly dispose of the same, after hearing the objector and giving opportunities to him. Such hearing, according to Mr. Bajoria, cannot be given in this case to the petitioner, since neither she nor her husband filed any objection within the stipulatime and according to him, such bearing cannot also be given to a ted person, who has admittedly acquired the interest later, i. e., like the petitioner. On reading section 5A(3) of the said Act, Mr. Bajoria also as submitted that he interest as mentioned therein, must be and subsisting interest since, such was not the case here, the petitioner cannot claim to have the right to file such objection or a consideration of the same. It was also pointed out by him that the scheme of section 6 of the said Act, would show, prove and establish that the declaration in question, is to be made, not with what will happen in future an1 under sub-section (3) of section 6, such declaration, when made, ,shall be conclusive evidence that the land in question, was needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may 'be, and after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in the manner as specified under the said Act. 20. Mr. Bajoria further pointed out that the petitioner's husband derived the title in respect of the flat in question either from the erstwhile Receiver or from S.K. Ghosh and which right, the present petitioner is trying to follow up. The petitioner according to Mr. 20. Mr. Bajoria further pointed out that the petitioner's husband derived the title in respect of the flat in question either from the erstwhile Receiver or from S.K. Ghosh and which right, the present petitioner is trying to follow up. The petitioner according to Mr. Bajoria, thus, has no independent right in respect of the alleged tenancy and her husband entered the flat in question, which at the time of such entry was already encumbered and that being the position, the petitioner cannot get or claim a better or higher right viz, there was no encumbrance in respect of the flat in question when the licensee was granted. Here of course, we must mention that the petitioner cannot dispute that her husband entered into the flat in question, as a licensee in terms of the letter dated 10th February, 1969, as disclosed in paragraph 6 of the petition and on the basis of the other letter in Annexure-B as mentioned hereinbefore, she is now claiming to be a tenant and that too, because of the description of the character of the petitioner's husband in respect of the flat, as was given by the erstwhile Receiver, to the Executive Engineer, Water Works, Corporation of Calcutta. 21. While answering the question of locus standi and to establish that the petitioner had no right to maintain the petition, Mr. Bajoria referred to the case of (6) Isabhai Musabhai Patel & Anr. v. The Ahamedahad Municipal Corporation & On, AIR 1971 Gujarat 145, which has indicated that the petitioners in that case, who entered into possession of land after award, cannot be allowed, to challenged the award after remaining indifferent for over five years and particularly when, no infringement of legal or fundamental rights made out and a tenant entering into possession of and after award, is not a person interested' within the meaning of the said Act, who can challenge the notifications or a ward. 22. There is no doubt or any disputes that apart from the said premises, five other premises, whose particulars have been indicated by us in the other judgment, remained attached in exercise of the powers as conferred under the said Ordinance, which was promulgated under sec. 72 of the 9th Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935. On the basis of facts of this case, Mr. 72 of the 9th Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935. On the basis of facts of this case, Mr. Chatterjee contended that by virtue of the criminal proceedings, initiated under the said Ordinance, the District Judge, exercise of power under section 12 and 13(3) of the said Ordinance held, that an amount of 30 Lakhs together with the cost of attachment to be determined by the District Judge had to be forfeited to the Union of India. He pointed out that in this case, the District Judge has not as yet determined the cost of attachment, but has determined the amount of fine to the tune of Rs. 45 Lakhs, which is to be paid to the State Government. He also contended that as long as the amount of forfeiture and the cost of attachment to be determined by the District Judge, is not paid to the Central Government, the properties will remain attached and in fact, attachment has not been withdrawn. According to him, the interest, lien and charge of the Central Government, in respect of said premises are therefore kept intact and in that view of the matter, the said premises cannot be acquired by the State Govt. nor can the same vest in the State Govt. free from all encumbrances. As indicated earlier, Mr. Chatterjee also pointed out that no notice of acquisition proceeding has been given to the Central Government nor is the Central Government a party to such proceedings and as such the acquisition proceeding itself could be bad. 23. Mr. Chatterjee restated that the said Ordinance is an existing law within the meaning of Article 366(10) of the Constitution as well as laws in force within the meaning of Article 13(3)(b) of the Constitution of India and the same was promulgated by India Legislative, which is equivalent to Parliament under the Constitution, so the said Ordinance was promulgated in exercise of the powers of the Parliament. He also pointed out that the said Land Acquisition Act was promulgated by virtue of the Legislative Power in the List III, the Concurrent List (Item 42 of the Seventh Schedule in the Concurrent list). Therefore, the law made by Parliament viz., the said Ordinance shall prevail over the law made in respect of a subject in the Concurrent List in terms. Therefore, the law made by Parliament viz., the said Ordinance shall prevail over the law made in respect of a subject in the Concurrent List in terms. (Article 254 of the Constitution) and in that view of the matter, the order of attachment under the said Ordinance, in order to protect the interest of the Central Government, must prevail over the order of acquisition under the said Act. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that the orders of acquisition are ex-facie mala fide inasmuch as one that is on 29th August, 1982, notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act as passed in respect of many properties including the said premises and as such he contended that there cannot be any bona fide formation of opinion as to the necessity of acquisition of all the properties including the said premises in public interest and further more, since the said purported "acquisition is for the purpose of office and residential accommodation in Ward No.59 of Calcutta Municipality, it would be absurd on the face of it that all the properties were required to serve that purpose. According to Mr. Chatterjee, mere recital of the phrase public purpose does not prove public purpose and when the existence of public purpose is challenged the same has to be proved by the Government, who asserts' such purpose and in this case, no such material has been placed. 24 Mr. Chatterjee submitted that there was no such existence of public purpose would also be proved by the subsequent fact, whereby the Government wanted to change the purpose. Such change of purpose according to him was only permissible when the property vests in the acquiring authority and he indicated that in this case, the property cannot vest for the reasons stated above and as such, change of the avowed public purpose and the substitution of the same by another purpose, was wholly bad in law and a fraud on power, inasmuch as the property cannot vest in the acquiring authority as long as the interest of Central Government remains. It was also contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the right of the Central Government, created under a Jaw, cannot be extinguished by an executive order of requisition under the said Act. It was also contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the right of the Central Government, created under a Jaw, cannot be extinguished by an executive order of requisition under the said Act. In other words, the Central Government, cannot be divested of its right created under the la w made by the competent legislature on the basis of a mere executive order. Mr. Chatterjee also submitted that the matter can also be looked into from another angle. In respect of 6 properties in question, which included the said premises, the appropriate legislature has respected the private right of the ownef6 namely Shri S. K. Ghosh, since deceased and such right of the owner of the property is recognised by the said Ordinance, specially in section 13 thereof. Therefore, when the property, in respect of which the proper legislature has created the right of the owners, such right cannot be taken away and/or extinguished by the State Government, by passing any executive order of acquisition, in exercise of its power under 'Eminent Domain'. 25. Mr. Chatterjee, then contended that it is well-settled as a principle of construction that al1 the statutes relating to the power of Eminent Domain, should be strictly construed in favour of the land owner and against the authority exercising such power and it is 'extremely doubtful whether such power of Eminent Domain will be exercised in respect of the properties, which are subjected to a different law enacted by competent legislature, as in this case and it is further well-settled that in case of any doubt, the same must be resolved against two powers granted. Mr. Chatterjee also pointed out that in this case, the predecessor-in-office of the Central Government committed itself to a particular stand about the said promises by enacting a law as to how to deal with the Same. The said Ordinance was therefore, a representation by appropriate legislature, as to how the same would be dealt with. He pointed out further that the said law in question, has not been changed/modified or repealed or alterned and without altering/modifying/repealing the said law, the State Government, which is bound by the said law, would be estopped from exercising its power of acquisition, which is contrary to the representation made by the Central Government as mentioned earlier. He pointed out further that the said law in question, has not been changed/modified or repealed or alterned and without altering/modifying/repealing the said law, the State Government, which is bound by the said law, would be estopped from exercising its power of acquisition, which is contrary to the representation made by the Central Government as mentioned earlier. In other words, the State Government must, before initiating acquisition proceeding in respect of the self same premises take into consideration the legislative intent in respect of the same and the avowed and declared policies of the said Ordinance and they cannot ignores the said avowed and declared policy and act in a manner, which would be contrary to such policy. In fact, Mr. Chatterjee claimed that the State Government would be estopped from exercising its power in a manner, which is contrary to the said Ordinance, which is a law declared by the Central Government. In this connection, Mr. Chatterjee made a referance to Article 266 of the Constitution of India, which prescribes that exercise of executive power of the state, shall be so done, as to ensure compliance with the law made by the Parliament. In this case, Mr. Chatterjee indicated that the said Ordinance is an existing law and as such, the executive power of the State must be exercised to ensure the compliance with that law. He submitted further that in this case. exercise of power of the State viz., issuance of a Notification under section 4 of the said Act has been exercised, to nullify the said existing law, which applies in the State and therefore, the exercise of power under section 4 of the said Act and all steps taken thereunder, were unconstitutional and contrary to Article 256 of the Constitution of India and would thus be void and without jurisdiction. There is also Mr. Chatterjee contended gross delay in the matter of this acquisition. 26 The points as submitted by Mr. Chatterjee and the particular whereof have been indicated hereinbefore, were really pointed out by Mr. Bajoria to have been raised and argued before the earlier Division Bench judgment dated and April, 1977 as made in the case of Smt. Molina Gnosh v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. 26 The points as submitted by Mr. Chatterjee and the particular whereof have been indicated hereinbefore, were really pointed out by Mr. Bajoria to have been raised and argued before the earlier Division Bench judgment dated and April, 1977 as made in the case of Smt. Molina Gnosh v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. (Supra) and as such they cannot be reargued, more particularly when those points were either directly or indirectly repelled by the said determination, which again bas become final, since after that determination, the petition for a Certificate for leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected and from such rejection, no further appeal was taken. It appeared to us that the points as are sought to be urged now are really concluded by the earlier Division Bench judgment. Mr. Chatterjee of course submitted otherwise and said that at least the points regarding the question that the said premises will remain attached so long as the amount of forfeiture and cost of attachment to be determined by the learned District Judge, is not paid to the Central Government and in fact, the attachment in -question, has net been withdrawn, was not involved or armed in the earlier proceedings before the Division Bench. Similar was the position in respect of the point or the effect of Article 366(10) of the Constitution of India, as well as law in force within the meaning of Article 13(3)(b) and the law made by Parliament i. e. the said Ordinance shall prevail over the Concurrent List and that was also the position in respect of the point regarding that the Central Government cannot be divested of its right created under the law made by competent legislature on the basis of a mere executive order. It should also be noted that same or similar submissions were made by the petitioner Smt. Molina Ghosh in the other proceeding, which we have determined today and there also, we have not accepted, those submissions and we feel that for the reasons as given in that determination, the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee as made now, cannot be accepted. Mr. It should also be noted that same or similar submissions were made by the petitioner Smt. Molina Ghosh in the other proceeding, which we have determined today and there also, we have not accepted, those submissions and we feel that for the reasons as given in that determination, the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee as made now, cannot be accepted. Mr. Chatterjee, of course to his usual fairness stated that if the point as indicated by him were in any way involved and decided in the earlier Division Bench proceedings, then he will have no case on these points and they cannot be reargued and responed in the facts of the case. He reiterated that the said Ordinance is not only a valid law, but the same is the existing law under or in terms of the provisions of the Constitution of India, as indicated earlier. 27. Mr. Chatterjee further submitted that the notification under section 4 of the said Act and so also the declaration as made under section 6 of the same, should be deemed to be or considered as useless, because, the 'public purpose' as mentioned therein is 'for the purpose of Office and Residence', without mentioning the particulars, as to for whose office and residence. He also pointed out that such purpose as mentioned is a myth or an eye wash, would be patent from the fact that the said premises was ultimately decided to be sold to Development Consultants (P) Ltd. i.e., a sale was sought to be effected to a private party and such fact would be enough to indicate and establish, that there was no 'public purpose' involved in the concerned acquisition proceeding, and such character of the proposed acquisition would also appear from the fact that the concerned 'public purpose' has been sought to be replaced by another purpose. He reiterated that the character of the petitioner, being that of a licensee during attachment, under section 10 of the said Ordinance, the concerned attachment must also be continued unless the same is withdrawn by the learned District Judge, Alipore Mr. Chatterjee also indicated that this proceeding will be maintainable, as under section 14 of the said Ordinance, she cannot go in or claim compensation, if she is not satisfied with the same. 28. In additions to his submissions as indicated hereinbefore, Mr. Chatterjee also indicated that this proceeding will be maintainable, as under section 14 of the said Ordinance, she cannot go in or claim compensation, if she is not satisfied with the same. 28. In additions to his submissions as indicated hereinbefore, Mr. Bajoria contended that since Shri Bagla, the husband of the petitioner entered into possession of the flat in question, admittedly in February, 1969, so he came into picture long after the initiation of the proceeding under the said Act and admittedly, much after the proceedings under section 18 of the said Act were taken both by the owner and the learned Receiver and that being the position, the right of the petitioner, if any or if at all, must be subject to the proceedings which' were initiated earlier. He also indicated that as such, the petitioner could not claim any interest in the property, she can, at best put his claim as a licensee, if that is permissible. 29. Thereafter, Mr. Bajoria contended that even inspite of the aforesaid admitted facts, the petitioner bas now sought to challenge the validity and bona fide of the concerned acquisition proceeding, the validity whereof or the purposes as involved, were not challenged by the original owner. It was also indicated, on a reference to the grounds of the petition, that the petitioner has really sought to challenge the acquisition proceeding or to reck open the same, on grounds, which were not urged or were accepted by the original owner and the grounds as taken now, according to Mr. Bajoria, would be nothing but an attempt to reopen the grounds, which the original had abandoned or could not argued and such attempt would how and established, that the present petitioner was really acting in collusion with the petitioner in the other Rule viz., Smt. Molina Ghosh, wife of the original owner. Mr. Bajoria, would be nothing but an attempt to reopen the grounds, which the original had abandoned or could not argued and such attempt would how and established, that the present petitioner was really acting in collusion with the petitioner in the other Rule viz., Smt. Molina Ghosh, wife of the original owner. Mr. Bajoria, in short argued that since the original owner did not challenge the public purpose as involved, the present petitioner or her husband, the original owner, who acquired the interest of the fiat in question in 1969 and at the time when steps were taken, Shri Bagla was no where in the scene and he became a lessee after the acquisition and not at the time of the same, so the grounds as taken in the petition, would not be maintainable and tenable and for the above submissions, notice, either to the said Shri Bagla or the present petitioner could not be issued. 30. Apart from the above, Mr. Bajaria placed the earlier Division Bench .judgment dated 22nd April, 1977. as made and passed in Appeal from Original Order No. 190 of J911 and reiterated that in view of such determinations which were become final in the facts and circumstances as stated hereinbefore, the other points as sought to urge by Mr. Chatterjee, would be of no avail or any assistance to the petitioner and in fact, she cannot be allowed to reagitate them. Bajoria also restated that if the grounds as sought to be urged now are allowed, that will be against public policy and the established principles that points when decided on merits and have become final, should not be allowed to be reopened or reargued.. Mr. Bajoria also indicated further, that if such liberty to the petitioner, to challenge toe proceeding now, considering her character, is given, that would create an impossible position, as in case of her failure, another person may be set up claiming the same right and urging the same point and in that event, no acquisition could be completed. 31. Apart from the cases as mentioned earlier, Mr. Chatterjee also cited and. 31. Apart from the cases as mentioned earlier, Mr. Chatterjee also cited and. referred to the case of (7) Durgapada Mukherju v. Land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan & Anr., 71 CWN 499, where it has been observed amongst others, that when the existence of public purpose or bonafides thereof is disputed by the petitioner, it is the duty of the respondent Co deal with and reply to those allegations specifically in its affidavit-in-opposition and public authorities enjoy large discretionary powers in public interest, but those powers have to be exercised in good faith, openly and fairly. One of the tests of good faith is whether the authorities answer the question frankly and fairly when they are asked for what specific public purpose these powers are sought to be exercised, apart from indicating that the duty to disclose all relevant facts and appear in court with a clear conscience and clean hands is no less 0n the respondent, especially when the relevant facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the respondents and this is not an abstruct rule of ethics but a practical necessity dictated by circumstances. He then referred to the case of (8) Munshi Singh & Ors. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337 , where, dealing with a case under sections 4 and 5A of the said Act and if the statements for public purpose in the notification to the effect 'planned development of the area', is sufficient and specific, it has been observed that it is apparent from sub-section (2) that the public purpose which has to be stated in sub-section (1) of section 4 has to be particularised because unless that is done, the various matters which are mentioned in 1mb-section (2) cannot be carred out. If the public purpose stated in section 4(1) is planned development of the area without anything more, it is currently difficult to comprehend how all the matters set out in sub-section (2) can be carried out by the officer specially authorised in this behalf and by his servants and workmen and section 5A embodies a very jus. and wholesome principle, that a person whose property is being intended to be acquired, should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. and wholesome principle, that a person whose property is being intended to be acquired, should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. The legislature has made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objection against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of section 5A and the view was that the wishes of the owner of the land were wholly irrelevant but after to insertion of section 5A, the position has completely changed and it cannot be said that the owner's wishes are not relevant and that be does not need an opportunity to file his objection. To take such a view would render section 5A otise. In the absence of specific particular purpose being stated, the objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under section 5A, which he has a right to do under that provision, apart from observing on facts, that owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notification under section 4(1) and in the absence of any proof that the appellants were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the Master Plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question, the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right under section 5A of the Acquisition Act. 32. Mr. Bajoria pointed out that the determinations in the case of Durgapada Mukherjee v. Land Acquisition Collector Burdwan & Anr. (Supra), have been reversed in the case of (9) Land Acquisition Collector & Anr. v. Durgapada Mukherjee, AIR 1980 SC 1678 , bolding, inter alia, amongst others that a declaration made under section 6 of the Act and published in the Official Gazette shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose and that to this rule there was only one exception, namely, that the declaration could challenged on the ground of mala fide or colourable exercise of power. In the face of the conclusive presumption which the Court has to raise under subsection (3) of section 6 of the Act about the nature of the purpose stated in the declaration being true, the onus on the landowners to displace the presumption was very heavy indeed and the same could not be said to have been discharged by a mere allegation in that behalf which has been denied by the State and that merely on the strength of the absence of production of documentary evidence by the State that the onus (which rested heavily on the shoulders of the respondents) to proceed mala fides or colourable exercise of power on the part of the State Government has been discharged. Even so the landowners have produced no material to show that the assertion about the public purpose as stated in the third notification was incorrect for the reason that the acquired land was not suitable for any industry or that no industrial activity except that by the Company had been undertaken in the neighbourhood of the acquired area. On the basis of the above determination, it was claimed that declaration as made under section 6 of the said Act, to which we agree, would be conclusive and the same would not be justiceable. On a reference to the case of Munshi Singh & Ors. v. Union of India (Supra), Mr. Bajoria agreed that there cannot be any occasion to doubt or to challenge the finding therein. But he claimed that the observations as made in that case would not fit in appropriately in the facts of this case. He indicated that the basis of that determination without any doubt in an opportunity to object to the acquisiti0n proceeding, if they are vague. But here, no such difficulty was faced by the original owner and in fact, objection on the ground of vagueness was never raised or put forward and unfortunately such objection regarding vagueness is now being raised by a person, who at the material time acquired no interest or any locus standi. The submissions of Mr. Bajoria were substantial. Here, admittedly, neither the original lessee or the present petitioner had any interest or anywhere in the picture on the relevant date of initiation of the proceeding under the said Act. 33. The case Jagadishwar Sanval v. Collector of Goalpara & Anr., (Supra), as rightly pointed out by Mr. The submissions of Mr. Bajoria were substantial. Here, admittedly, neither the original lessee or the present petitioner had any interest or anywhere in the picture on the relevant date of initiation of the proceeding under the said Act. 33. The case Jagadishwar Sanval v. Collector of Goalpara & Anr., (Supra), as rightly pointed out by Mr. Bajoria, was on prejudicial affection of compensation and inadequacy of compensation and as such, cannot be appropriately applied in the facts of the case and the petitioner cannot also take advantage of that determination, since she did not acquire interest before the acquisition proceedings were initited but case in the picture as a lessee long thereafter. He rightly claimed that to get the benefit of such determination or any right to challenge the acquisition proceedings, one should establish the right, accrued before the initiation of acquisition and not after that. On such submissions as above, Mr. Bajaria contended that the determinations in the case of Jayanta Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (Supra), will have no application in this case. Mr. Bajoria also distinguished the determinations in the case of Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (Supra), because there the decision was made while the proceeding was pending, but here the position is just the otherwise. He submitted that locus standi or interest, must be shown or proved to be pending at the relevant time of the acquisition proceeding or the initiation thereof. 34. On the facts of submissions of the Respondents as mentioned hereinbefore and the particular finding on them, which would also be recorded by us hereinafter, we feel that the cases as cited by Mr. Chatterjee, the particulars whereof; we have indicated earlier would not apply in this case. It should also be noted that the citation as made by Mr. Chatterjee on the term "owner", from American Jurisprudence as recorded hereinbefore, will not also, in the facts of this case, apply. 35. We have indicated earlier. the relevant dates when the acquisition under the said Act was initiated steps upto section 18 were taken and so also the date, when the husband of the petitioner viz., Shri P.K. Bagla entered into the flat in question, as a licensee, in terms of the letter as in Annexure-A to the petition, which was addressed to him by the learned Receiver, appointed under the said Ordinance. We feel that since the husband of the petitioner entered into the flat in question. as a licensee, so the present petitioner cannot claim to have a better or higher right or any other right than that of a licensee and in any event, she cannot claim to be a tenant in respect of the flat, for the term and language as used by the learned Receiver, in his letter dated 20th January, 1970 to the Executive Engineer, Water Works, Corporation of Calcutta. 36. This Rule was admittedly obtained on 31st August, 1979 i.e., after long lapse of time from the initiation of the said proceedings or other steps as taken thereunder. On the basis and the scheme of the said Act, any person interested in any land as needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company, has the right to object to the acquisition under the said Act, within 30 days after the necessary notification. Here, admittedly the erstwhile owner Shri S. K. Ghosh had only filed his objection and none else and really, he was heard in person and on such hearing, the objection was disposed of. Their is also no doubt that the said erstwhile owner viz., the husband of the petitioner bad not actually objected to the purpose of the concerned acquisition and had also opted for compensation. In fact because of the date of entry which was much subsequent to the steps as taken under the said Act, the petitioner, in our view was not entitled to any right or opportunity to file the objection. It should be noted here, that the husband of the petitioner, entered into the said premises as a licensee on or about 10th February, 1969. That being the position, we hold that at the relevant time and on the date, when the steps were taken under the said Act, he was not a party interested and consequently, the petitioner at this stage, cannot also claim such interest. If at all and if she has now any right, she can try to get necessary compensation in accordance with law, if that is possible, for her wrongful dispossession. 37. Section 5A of the said Act do not visualise the exercise of the right of objection as claimed by the petitioner retrospectively and such right, cannot also be kept alive for time eternity. 37. Section 5A of the said Act do not visualise the exercise of the right of objection as claimed by the petitioner retrospectively and such right, cannot also be kept alive for time eternity. If such submission as put forward now by the petitioner is accepted, then, we feel, that the position would become impossible as in that event no acquisition proceedings under the said Act would be completed. It must also be noted that under the scheme of the said Act, every objection is required to be made to the Collector in writing within a stipulated time and the Collector is also required to have the same duly disposed of after hearing the objector and giving opportunities to the objector. Such hearing, admittedly, was not required to be given to the petitioner, since neither she nor her husband, filed any objection or there were any such occasion to file such objection within the stipulated time, as admittedly they enteled into the flat in question, as a licensee, long after the appropriate time. We hold that such hearing is no also required to be given to a person, here in this case the petitioner, who has admittedly acquired the interest, later. There is also no doubt that the interest, in terms of section 5A (3) of the said Act, must be a subsisting one and as such, the petitioner cannot also claim to have any right to file objection or for any consideration of the same, particularly in view of the fact, that her interest, if at all, evolved much later than the acquisition proceedings or the steps as taken therein and more particularly when, applications claiming compensation, were beard by the husband of Smt. Molina Ghosh and so also by the learned Receiver as appointed, much earlier than the date when the licensee in favour of Shri. P. K. Bagla came into force. It cannot also be doubted, on the basis of the determinations in the case of Land Acquisition Collator & Anr. It cannot also be doubted, on the basis of the determinations in the case of Land Acquisition Collator & Anr. v. Durgapada Mukherjee (Supra), a declaration under section 6 of the said Act, when made and completed, will give rise to a conclusive presumption under section 6(3) of the said Act, with regard to the nature or the purposes as mentioned in the declaration and the: claimant has to get such presumption rebutted and such presumption will also not be rebutted, only on the mere and unsustainable al1egations, as made in this case. 38. We further observe that neither the husband of the petitioner nor the petitioner had or has any independent right in respect of the alleged tenancy as Shri P.K. Bagla entered into the flat in question, at a point of time, when the same was already encumbered and such being the position, the said Shri Bagla or his heir cannot get or claim a better, larger or higher right or claim or to claim that there was no encumbrance in respect of the flat in question, when the license in question, was granted. The claim of the petitioner, that she is holding the premises as a tenant, we feel, has no basis in terms of the letter in Annexure-A to the petition as mentioned hereinbefore. There is also no doubt or any dispute in this matter and that too considering the circumstances of the case in which the licanse in respect of the flat in question, was granted that the original licensee had due knowledge and notice of the proceedings under the said Ordinance, as admittedly, the said letter in Annexure-A would show that the same was addressed to Shri P.K. Bagla by the erstwhile Receiver, as appointed under the said Ordinance. That being the position, the claim of Mr. Chatterjee that neither the husband of the petitioner nor the present petitioner had any knowledge of the concerned acquisition proceedings, has no basis whatsoever. 39. That being the position, the claim of Mr. Chatterjee that neither the husband of the petitioner nor the present petitioner had any knowledge of the concerned acquisition proceedings, has no basis whatsoever. 39. We also hold that since either the husband of the petitioner or the petitioner herself, came to this Court after such a long lapse of time as indicated earlier and did not challenge the acquisition proceeding under the said Act at the appropriate time and moment or they remained indifferent for such long years and there has been no infringement or any legal or fundamental right of them as alleged, considering their character, none of them, can claim to be the person interested in the concerned proceedings and more particularly when, the original licensee came into the picture, long after the award was made in this case. As such they cannot be held to be "person interested", within the meaning of the said Act and as such, would not be entitled to challenge the proceedings as initiated under the said Act or the Award as made. While on the point, we agree with and refer to the observations as made in the case of lsabhai Musabhai Patel & Anr. v. The Ahamedabad Municipal Corporation & Ors. (Supra). 40. We also do not agree with the contentions of Mr. Chatterjee, that the, purposes as mentioned for acquiring the Slid premises, were vague and that being the position, we feel and find that the determinations in the case of Munshi Singh & Ors. v. Union of India (Supra), will not help the petitioner and more particularly, the observations as made therein, would not fit in appropriately in the facts of this case. While on the point, it must also be noted and as we have indicated earlier, that the said determination is also distinguishable in the facts of the present case. Such being the position, we feel that the petitioner, more particularly in the facts and circumstances of this case and considering her character or that of her prodecessor, cannot claim to have any locus standi to move this Court. There is also no doubt that the other points as sought to be urged by Mr. Chatterjee, are really covered by the determination of the earlier Division Bench judgment dated 22nd April, 1977, as made in F. M. A. No. 190 of 1971 State of West Bengal & Anr. There is also no doubt that the other points as sought to be urged by Mr. Chatterjee, are really covered by the determination of the earlier Division Bench judgment dated 22nd April, 1977, as made in F. M. A. No. 190 of 1971 State of West Bengal & Anr. v. Smt. Molina Ghosh and more particularly when, the findings as made therein, have become final. We also hold, considering the faces and circumstances and the grounds as taken in this case and in Civil Rule No. 15141 (W) of 1987 Smt. Molina Ghosh v. State of West Bengal & Ors., which I have disposed of today, that both the proceedings are collusive. In fact, the arguments of the two cases were practically turned on the same line and tone. Above being the position and our findings, we feel that this proceeding has no merit and as such, the Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Stay, as prayed for, is refused. Basu, J.: I agree