S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is detained under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 1985 (PASAA for short) pursuant to the order dated 16-4-1988 passed by the Commissioner of Police Surat city has brought in challenge the order in this petition on diverse grounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) AT the time of final hearing of the petition Mr. M. C. Kapadia learned Advocate for the petitioner raised the following contentions in support of the petition: (1) There was no material before the detaining authority that the petitioners alleged activities bad disturbed public order at any time and consequently his subjective satisfaction that there was urgent need to datain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from disturbing public order in future is based on no material whatsoever and hence the condition precedent to the exercise of power is lacking in the present case and consequently the order of detention is liable to be quashed. (2) The aspect of less drastic remedy viz. externment of the petitioner from the area of his alleged obnoxious activities under the provisions of the Bombay Police Act is not properly considered. In support of this contention it was also submitted that in past the externment proceedings against the petitioner were already taken and they hat desired effect on him and consequently before deciding to preventively detain the petitioner the authority ought to have considered this vital aspect and should have seen to it whether it was feasible to again extern the petitioner rather than detaining him under PASAA. (3) The first information reports filed against the detenu and as shown at 51. Nos. 1 to 13 of the chart supplied to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention showed that the detenu was absconding meaning thereby this material clearly showed that the detenu was not on spot when the concerned raids were affacted. It indicated that he was not involved in these cases. This aspect of the matter was not kept in view by the detaining authority while ordering his detention and hence the subjective satisfaction underlying the detention order has got vitiated. It indicated that he was not involved in these cases. This aspect of the matter was not kept in view by the detaining authority while ordering his detention and hence the subjective satisfaction underlying the detention order has got vitiated. (4) The statements in the grounds of detention to the effect that out of 13 cases under the Bombay Prohibition Act 10 were pending before the Criminal Courts is not correct and teat chargesheet were not filed in these cases against the detenu in any Criminal Courts. Consequently the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on this score is not genuine and is based on imaginary grounds and hence also the order of detention is liable to be quashed. (5) The detaining authority has not applied his mind to the vital aspect that the petitioner was not enlarged on bail by any Criminal Courts and that every time he was being enlarged on bail by the concerned police station officer himself and still it was wrongly assumed by the detaining authority that in the grounds of detention that the petitioner was released on bail on diverse occasions by the Criminal Courts and that there was no possibility of getting such bail cancelled by the Court. Consequently the consideration of noncancellation of bail is based on no genuine and real material and hence also the subjective satisfaction an underlying the detention order has got vitiated. (6) In the grounds of detention it has been stated that the petitioner is a Muslim which four witnesses who have deposed against him are Hindus and there was possibility of the petitioner beating them if he comes to know about their statements and there was possibility of communal riots between the groups of Hindus and Muslims. That this conclusion of the detaining authority is based on no material. In any case the relevant material underlying this conclusion is not supplied to the petitioner with the result that his right under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of making a representation against this ground has got vitiated. (7) The most material and vital aspect of the matter viz. that the detenu was not a fierce person but a weak man and he was always absconding and that never ill past any actions under Secs. 107 and 110 of the Cri. Pro. (7) The most material and vital aspect of the matter viz. that the detenu was not a fierce person but a weak man and he was always absconding and that never ill past any actions under Secs. 107 and 110 of the Cri. Pro. Code were ever taken against him or was he rounded up at any time during the communal riots were not considered by the detaining authority. Atleast these aspects were never placed Therefore the detaining authority for consideration and hence his subjective satisfaction underlying the detention order on account of non-consideration of these vital aspects has got vitiated. ( 3 ) CONTENTION No. 1: At para 4 of the petition it has been stated that the allegations made in the grounds of detention are not correct and the petitioner denies the same. The petitioner says and submits that the said allegations have no rational connection with the disturbance of the public order situation. This contention has been combated by the respondents in the affidavit-in-reply of the detaining authority. It has been pointed out at para 7 that he was fully aware at the time of passing the order of detention against the petitioner about the distinction between the public order and law and order. He had passed she order of detention against the petitioner after carefully considering the entire material which was placed before him and he was subjectively satisfied that the order of detention should be passed against the petitioner as his activities had resulted into breach of public peace ant order. With a view to finding out as to whether there was any material with the detaining authority for reaching the aforesaid subjective satisfaction we may now turn to the grounds of detention supplied to the detenu alongwith the order of detention. In these grounds it has been pointed out that the petitioner was a bootlegger and from 1982 to 1988 he was arrested in 13 offences under the Bombay Prohibition Act out of which 10 cases were pending in Court for trial and three were pending police investigation. Details thereof are supplied to the detenu. Then in para 2 it has been stated that an illegal den was being run in public and many persons used to collect at his den for taking liquor illegally in public. Many persons under the influence of liquor used to move here and there. Details thereof are supplied to the detenu. Then in para 2 it has been stated that an illegal den was being run in public and many persons used to collect at his den for taking liquor illegally in public. Many persons under the influence of liquor used to move here and there. Even children of young age used to come to the den for taking liquor and there were persons who after taking liquor at the den were cutting jokes at She girls and ladies passing by the said den. Because of his bootlegging activities atmosphere of terror was being created as he used to beat people who tried to interfere with his nefarious activities. So far as these allegations are concerned it is true that they are general in nature and can be considered to be vague. However thereafter follows extract of statements of four witnesses (1) Rakesh Arunlal Khatri (2) Gangaram Sadvi (3) Bhagaram Viraji Chaudhari and (4) Bahadurlal Chauhan. Statements of witnesses (1) and (2) clearly indicate that on 29-3-1988 at about 8 oclock when the witness was passing by the den of the petitioner a group of persons had gathered and they were taking liquor and were consuming liquor in public. Some of the customers had become tipsy and were moving helter-skelter. At that time one lady passed by that den. Seeing her one person who was drunk started whistling and when she came near he caught bold of her. The witness therefore intervened and got her released. The said lady thereafter being ashamed went away. At that time the witness asked the petitioner as to why he was allowing such things to happen and not saying anything. On being so told the petitioner became angry and told the witness as to why he was asking him anything. Thereupon it was told by the witness that that had happened because of his activities and he should give them up. There upon the petitioner got further excited and took out his Rampuri knife and ran to assault the witness. On seeing this incident people moving on road got afraid and ran away and the persons residing in the surrounding locality immediately closed down their doors and windows and at that very place atmosphere of terror was generated. There upon the petitioner got further excited and took out his Rampuri knife and ran to assault the witness. On seeing this incident people moving on road got afraid and ran away and the persons residing in the surrounding locality immediately closed down their doors and windows and at that very place atmosphere of terror was generated. The petitioner gave first blows to the witness and allowed him to go and threatened him that if he filed any complaint to the police he would be murdered. ( 4 ) THE second witness who had seen the incident fully corroborated the say of witness No. 1. The third witness refers to another incident of 30-3-1988 at about 10 oclock in the morning. That incident also took place at the den of the petitioner. He referred to various persons drinking illicit liquor at his den at that time and moving here and there in tipsy condition. He then described the incident that happened on spot wherein one tipsy person who had taken liquor at the den of the petitioner dashed against the cycle of the witness. The witness tried to beat him and push him with the result that he fell down. Seeing that the petitioner became very angry and ran to beat the witness with a hockey stick and threatened that because he was harassing his customers he would not leave him and so saying he gave 2-3 hockey blows. Because of this witness became afraid and persons there started sunning helter-skelter and persons residing in the vicinity closed their doors and windows. The witness was threatened with dire consequences if he reported the matter to the police. Accordingly the witness did not report the matter. ( 5 ) WITNESS No. 4 fully corroborated what happened on 30-3-1988 as deposed to by witness No. 3. In view of these specific statements made by the concerned witnesses it becomes clear that there was clear cut material before the detaining authority to indicate that on two occasions because of the bootlegging activities of the petitioner public order was disturbed. In view of these specific statements made by the concerned witnesses it becomes clear that there was clear cut material before the detaining authority to indicate that on two occasions because of the bootlegging activities of the petitioner public order was disturbed. People moving on the street had run helter skelter at that point of time in that locality and the persons residing there had closed their doors and windows being afraid of the situation Therefore part of public got disturbed because of the bootlegging activities of the petitioner and even tempo of public life on spot on these two occasions got disrupted It therefore cannot be said that this material did not indicate that there was disturbance of public order on spot on these occasions ai deposed to be these witnesses However Mr. Kapadia placing strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. The Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad City and Anr. [1989 (1) GLR 563] being Writ Petition (Criminal No. 403 of 1988 decided by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court Consisting of M. M. Dutt and S. Natarajan JJ. on 16-12-1988) submitted that on identical facts the Supreme Court has taken the view that the activities to which the witness have deposed against the detenu who was a bootlegger would not amount to disturbance of public order. It is true that in the aforesaid decision the detenu was a bootlegger who was said to have been involved in prohibition cases under the Bombay Prohibition Act. However so far as his activities as a bootlegger disturbing public order were concerned Dutt J. speaking for the Supreme Court noted on the facts of that case that the witnesses had deposed about the concerned offences in that case being minor incidents of beating by the petitioner. The witnesses had alleged that the petitioner was high-handed and fierce by nature and his high-handedness and pickering nature bad caused terror to the public of the area; he and not afraid of the police; his activities were anti-social he always kept with him a knife and a revolver and he threatened surrounding people. These allegations made by the witnesses against the detenu were found to be very vague and not furnishing valid material for showing disturbance of public order. These allegations made by the witnesses against the detenu were found to be very vague and not furnishing valid material for showing disturbance of public order. It was further observed by the Supreme Court that the allegations made against the petitioner might give rise to a question of law and order but they had nothing to do with the question of public order. A person may be very fierce by nature but so long as the public generally are not affected by his activities or conduct the question of maintenance of public order will not arise. It was further observed that if any act of a person creates panic or fear in the minds of the members of the public upsetting the even tempo of life of the community such act must be said to have a direct bearing on the question of maintenance of public order. Thereafter reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal 1959 (2) SCC 626 wherein it was held that when two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. It was further held in that case that in this connection a line of demarcation has to be drawn between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individual and only in a secondary sense public interest. Thereafter Dutt J. referred to the totallity of the averments made in the statements of the concerned witnesses in that case and observed that it is true that some incidents of beating by the petitioner of that case bad taken place as alleged. But such incidents did not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner might be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but surely the acts constituting the offences could not be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community and thereafter it was observed that merely because the petitioner is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless as laid down by sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the Act his activities as a bootlegger affect adversely the maintenance of public order it was further observed:"we have carefully considered the offences alleged against the petitioner in the order of detention and also the allegations made by the witnesses and in our opinion these offences or the allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the public of the area in question giving rise to the question of maintenance of public order". A reference was then made to certain general allegations which were held to be of vague nature in Pushkar Mukherjees case. These allegations were to the effect that the detenu had become a menace to the society and there had been disturbance and confusion in the lives of peaceful citizens of Paraset and Khardan P. S. areas under 21 Parganas District and the inhabitants thereof were in constant dread of disturbance of public order. Having noted these allegations in Pushkars case it was observed that in Pushkars case these allegations were found to be vague and gave no particulars to enable the petitioner to make an adequate representation against the order of detention and thus infringed the constitution safeguard provided under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. It was then held that in the case on hand before the Supreme Court the grounds of detention were more or less similar to the grounds in Pushkars case (supra ). Statements of the witnesses in the case before the Supreme Court did not remove the vagueness of the grounds. We fail to appreciate how the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court can at all be of any avail to the petitioner in the present case. It is no doubt true that if allegations of disturbance of public order are vague in nature that would not supply valid material for sustaining the detention order. In Piyush Mehtas case it was found that what the five witnesses had stated was of general nature as indicated at diverse places in the judgment and that nowhere the witnesses were found to have stated anything concrete about the disturbance of even tempo of public life of community at a given place. In Piyush Mehtas case it was found that what the five witnesses had stated was of general nature as indicated at diverse places in the judgment and that nowhere the witnesses were found to have stated anything concrete about the disturbance of even tempo of public life of community at a given place. It is in this peculiar fact situation that the Supreme Court was constrained to hold that there was no legal and valid material indicating disturbance of public order due to the bootlegging activities of the petitioner before them. Such is not the situation in the present case. As observed earlier there is clear cut specific material to indicate that on two occasions near his den there was actual disturbance of public order. Even tempo of public was affected and was upset. People closed their doors and windows and people on the street ran helter skelter. Such type of material was not found to be existing in the case of Piyush Mehta as observed by the Supreme Court and it is precisely in the absence of such clear cut material that the Supreme Court was constrained to set the petitioner at liberty. On the facts of this case therefore it cannot be said that there is no clear cut material indicating disturbance of public order on account of bootlegging activities of the petitioner. There is on the contrary clear cut specific material which can be easily gleaned from the statements of the witnesses. Therefore the detaining authority was perfectly justified in passing the impugned order being subjectively satisfied that detenus activities as a bootlegger bad disturbed public order on these occasions and therefore there was immediate need to preventively detain the petitioner so as to keeping him out of harms way so that he may not disturb public order. The first contention of Mr. Kapadia therefore fails and is rejected. ( 6 ) HOWEVER Mr. Kapadias one submission in this connection based on the decision of Supreme Court in Piyush Mehtas case may be considered. The first contention of Mr. Kapadia therefore fails and is rejected. ( 6 ) HOWEVER Mr. Kapadias one submission in this connection based on the decision of Supreme Court in Piyush Mehtas case may be considered. He submitted that in Piyush Mehtas case the Supreme Court had referred to earlier decision in Pushkar Mukherjees case and in that decision it was clearly mentioned that we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggregated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individual and only in a secondary sense public interest. So far as these observations are concerned it is obvious that they fall in line with the well accepted difference in the connotation of words public order as contra-distinguished with the connotation of the words law and order. If material on record indicates minor breach of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injures specific individual then of course it can be said in the secondary sense that public interest is affected because the victim is also a member of public but if alongwith injuring him other members of the public in the locality where the incidents took place also got affected adversely and thereby normal tempo of life got adversely affected then obviously it would not remain in the domain of minor disturbance but it would assume form of major disturbance affecting public at large. Distinction is to be drawn between these different types of cases. On the facts of this case therefore. it can be said that the material clearly indicated that incidents to which the witnesses have deposed had not merely remained in the domain of minor disturbance of peace affecting individual victims but had disturbed even tempo of public life in the locality because the persons found present on the street at the time of the incidents had ran helter-skelter and the persons residing in the locality had closed their doors and windows. On such material no other view can be taken save and except the one that even tempo of public life got actually disturbed and disrupted because of the nefarious activities of the petitioner as a bootlegger. Therefore the attempt of Mr. On such material no other view can be taken save and except the one that even tempo of public life got actually disturbed and disrupted because of the nefarious activities of the petitioner as a bootlegger. Therefore the attempt of Mr. Kapadia to show that the present ease falls within smaller circle of minor disturbance of peace affecting only some persons and not of public at large remains abortive. The first contention of Mr. Kapadia as noted earlier fails and stands rejected. ( 7 ) CONTENTION No. 7 : So far as this contention is concerned it was submitted by Mr. Kapadia that the detenu was not a fierce person but a weak-minded man and was always absconding and that never in past any action under Secs. 107 and 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code were ever taken against him nor was he rounded up at any time during the communal riots. These aspects according to Mr. Kapadia have not been considered by the detaining authority. These aspects were never placed for consideration by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority and therefore the subjective satisfaction is said to be vitiated. So far as this contention is concerned the basis thereof is found in para 15-B (1) and 15-B (II) to the effect that the petitioner himself had surrendered before the police authority and was arrested and released by the police authority. He was never prosecuted before the learned J. M F. C. and he was never required to present bail application and the bail was never resisted by the police. This contention is also based on further averments found in para 15-B (11) to the effect that the petitioner was a fearing person and was always found absconding and no action under Secs. 107 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had ever been initiated and that he was never required to be rounded up during the communal riots and/or on any other occasion and these aspects were not considered by the detaining authority or atleast not placed by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority. This contention stands repelled by the detaining authority in his affidavit-in-reply in para 6 wherein it is stated that what is stated in these paras is not true and nor does it furnish any material and basic fact for passing the order of detention. This contention stands repelled by the detaining authority in his affidavit-in-reply in para 6 wherein it is stated that what is stated in these paras is not true and nor does it furnish any material and basic fact for passing the order of detention. That when the filing of the cases in the Criminal Court does not deter the detenu no useful purpose could have been served by taking actions under Secs. 107 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because merely taking of bonds could not have prevented the detenu from indulging in similar activities in future and it was necessary to curb his activities immediately and therefore the order of detention under the PASAA was passed after considering all the alternatives provided under other laws. It has further been stated therein that evidence of rounding up during the communal tension and/or any other occasion is not a relevant material to take action under the PASAA and that whatever is stated in the grounds of detention was relied upon by the detaining authority for passing the order of detention. In our view the aforesaid stand taken by the detaining authority is quite justified on the facts of this case. The grounds of detention clearly indicate that the detaining authority was alive to the aspect as to whether any proceedings under Secs. 107 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could serve the purpose against this. It might be that the detenu might not have been rounded up in past in connection with communal tension or that he might not have been proceeded against under Secs. 107 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the moot question is as to whether looking to his nefarious activities as a bootlegger which had disturbed public order the detaining authority was justified in passing the impugned order of detention by way of preventive measure to keep the detenu out of harms way as that he may be prevented from repeating these nefarious activities in near future. So fat as this aspect is concerned there was direct material before the detaining authority which was kept in view and which has been furnished to the detenu alongwith the grounds of detention. So fat as this aspect is concerned there was direct material before the detaining authority which was kept in view and which has been furnished to the detenu alongwith the grounds of detention. In these circumstances the detention order can be said to be based on all relevant material and non-consideration of aspects which were not relevant cannot be said to have vitiated the subjective satisfaction underlying the detention order. The material on record clearly indicated that the petitioner was a strong-headed and fierce person who was indulging in bootlegging activities which disturb public order in past. Such person who was required to be prevented from indulging in such nefarious activities. For that purpose there was ample material on record before the detaining authority. It cannot therefore be urged that the detenu was not a fierce person or was a weak-minded person as averred by Mr. Kapadia. It is for the detaining authority to come to his conclusion one way or the other against the detenu in the light of the relevant material. This Court cannot substitute the decision of the detaining authority on relevant material by taking a contrary view as sought to be suggested by Mr. Kapadia. Consequently it cannot be said that the subjective satisfaction on which detention order is based had got vitiated on account of non-consideration of any relevant aspects of the matter as tried to be submitted by Mr. Kapadia. This contention also therefore has no factual basis and therefore has to be rejected. (REST of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.)PETITION dismissed. .