JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - The plaintiff decree-holder has come up in appeal against an order of remand. The facts, in so far as they are relevant for our purposes, need to be set out first. 2. One Khalil was the owner of the disputed house bearing Municipal No. A-39/337, A registered agreement of sale was executed by him in favour of the appellant on 16-6-1975 for a consideration of Rs. 4000/- out of which Rs. 2000/- was received in advance. Requisite permission from the ceiling authorities was obtained on 31-10-1975. It appears that later on the aforesaid Khalil was unwilling to execute the sale deed and the plaintiff had to resort to civil action seeking a decree for specific performance in suit No. 15 of 1976. Despite contest, the suit was decreed on 27-5-1977 and in pursuance thereof sale deed was also executed by the court for and on behalf of the defendant on 29-4-1978. When the said decree was put into execution for obtaining delivery of possession, it was resisted by one Yusuf whose wife Amna Bibi claimed to have purchased the property from khalil through sale deed dated 27-7-1977. The property was later purchased by respondents 1 and 2 on 13-1-1978. In view of this resistance, the decree-holder moved an application under Rule 97 of order 21 which was opposed by respondents 1 and 2 on various grounds. It was assessed that by an oral agreement of sale dated 16-12-1974, Khalil had agreed to - sell the property to Amna Bibi for a consideration of Rs. 8000/- and the sale deed date 22-9-1977 had been executed in pursuance of the oral agreement. It was also contended that the sale deed in favour of the objectors was of a prior date as the sale deed in plaintiff's favour was of 29-4-1978. It was also claimed that the objectors had purchased the property from Amna Bibi and were bona fide purchaser for value and as such not liable to eviction in execution of plaintiff's decree. 3. The trial court rejected these objections and ordered delivery of possession even against the respondents. Aggrieved by the said order, respondents 1 and 2 filed an appeal and by the order impugned herein the matter has been remanded by the appellate court. According to the appellant the order of remand was erroneous as no proper ground for remand existed. 3. The trial court rejected these objections and ordered delivery of possession even against the respondents. Aggrieved by the said order, respondents 1 and 2 filed an appeal and by the order impugned herein the matter has been remanded by the appellate court. According to the appellant the order of remand was erroneous as no proper ground for remand existed. The matters for the reconsideration of which the remand has seen ordered had already seen discussed in details by the trial court after considering the evidence available on the record. The appellate court was quite capable in deciding the matter itself on that material without any prejudice to the parties. The respondent has countered this argument mainly on the ground that the trial court gave its finding any issue causing serious prejudice to the respondents that it had failed to decide the question whether Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act applied in the facts and circumstances of the present case and that on some other points also no clear finding had been recorded. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and I have been taken through the orders passed by the trial court as well as by the appellate court. The facts as stated above are not much in dispute. However, the main controversy between the parties centres around the question about the existence of the alleged oral agreement of sale of 1974 between Khalil Ahmad and Amna Bibi and consequently whether under the sale deed dated 22-7-1977 any valid title could be passed on to Amna Bibi. Linked with this is another question as to how the sale deed dated 22-7-1977 affect the sale deed executed by the court in favour of the appellant in pursuance of decree in suit No. 15 of 1976. According to the appellant the observations made by the lower appellants court about certain infirmities in the order of the trial court were not correct, as the trial court had recorded its findings on all the points in controversy and that the order of remand was not justified on the ground that no issues had been framed by the trial court. Reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Nusserwanji E. Poonergar and other v. Mrs. Shirin Bai F. Bhesaniya, AIR 1984 Bom. 357 was placed by the respondent. Reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Nusserwanji E. Poonergar and other v. Mrs. Shirin Bai F. Bhesaniya, AIR 1984 Bom. 357 was placed by the respondent. In that decision, is was held that proceedings in pursuance of an application under order 21 Rule 97 C.P.C. are in the nature of a suit and it is necessary that the court should framed issues before proceeding to record the evidence. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that these proceedings were miscellaneous proceedings and it was not essential to frame issues because the parties were fully aware about their respective cases and had full opportunity of leading evidence on the points in controversy. It was urged that even though no issues had been framed no prejudice was caused to the parties so as to require setting aside of the order merely for omission to frame issues. 5. After the enforcement of The C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, substantial changes in the procedure have been made. Before the amendment any decision given on an objection under Rule 97 of order 21 could be challenged by means of a regular suit, but now such an order has been given the status of a decree and made appealable as such A regular suit challenging such an order is now barred. All questions relating to right, title and interest in the property arising between the parties to the proceeding on an application under Rule 97 since the amendment has to be determined by the court dealing with the said application and not by means of a separate suit, merely because the decision in such proceedings has been made appealable as a decree, it does not necessarily follow that the proceedings stand converted into a regular suit. The proceedings instituted by means of an application under Rule 97 will still retain the character of miscellaneous proceeding although there is no doubt valuable rights and title and interest in the property are at stake therein. Considering the vital nature of he rights involved in such proceedings and the heavy stakes involved it would be advisable for the court to frame issues on the controversy raised before the parties are called upon to lead their evidence on those questions but this cannot be regarded as an inflexible rule and each case must be judged on its own facts. It would be going too far if the court were to say that an omission to frame issues could vitiate the whole proceeding just on that ground, although the learned Single Judge in the Bombay decision (supra) has observed that the proceedings on an application under Rule 96 are in the nature of a suit but he also did not go any further to lay down that issues must invariably be framed in such case. All that the learned Judge has observed is that '"It would be appropriate for the executing court to frame issues'. That also appears to be the correct position of law. As matter of fact although in most of the miscellaneous proceedings, framing of issues is not essential, yet it is always regarded as advisable for the court to frame issues or at least draw up the points in controversy so that the parties may be aware about the points in dispute and to know the evidence which they would be required to adduce on matters in controversy. It is, however, difficult for the court to accept the contention that merely because issues had no been framed by the trial court, it should invariably lead to the conclusion that the trial was vitiated or that should form a ground to remand the matter for fresh consideration. 6. It must always be kept in mind by the courts that power of remand should to be exercised lightly. Remand as a matter of fact is the remedy of last resort and as far as possible the appellate court should try to undo the mistake committed by the trial court by setting it right itself and only when it finds itself unable to rectify any procedural or other defects in trial should the court remand the material. It must also be realised that remand on this huge wasteful expenditure of public time and money always contributes to the unnecessary prolongation of litigation and inconvenient consequences flowing therefrom. 7. Having these broad principles in mind we must now try to find if the parties were in any way prejudiced in adducing the evidence on the points in dispute and whether the trial court had considered and recorded findings on all there points to judge if the order of remand was justified. 7. Having these broad principles in mind we must now try to find if the parties were in any way prejudiced in adducing the evidence on the points in dispute and whether the trial court had considered and recorded findings on all there points to judge if the order of remand was justified. It is open to the lower appellate court to appraise the evidence itself and to come to its own finding on the points in controversy, It was only when it is the view that the findings arrived at by the court below were erroneous or that the parties and been prejudiced due to some illegality in procedure adopted by the trial court that the court may resort to remand. While remanding this matter the court had omitted to frame issues and it had not specified the points on which finding of the trial court were desired. As a matter of fact, the observations made that the trial court has not given any finding the oral agreement of 1974 or that the sale deed dated 22-7-1977 was executed in pursuance thereof or that sale deed executed by the court on 29-4-1978 was in any way binding on the respondents do not appear to be justified. In fact, findings on these points have been given by the trial court. If the lower appellate court did not agree with any of these findings, it should have recorded its own finding instead of remanding the case. 8. In the circumstances, do find merit in the appeal. The order of remand is set aside and the lower appellate court is directed to readmit the appeal at its original number and to decide the appeal on merits, after framing necessary issues or by drawing up points in controversy. It is, however, made clear that should the court find that any prejudice has been caused to any of the parties due to the procedure adopted by the trial court, it would be free to give an opportunity to the parties for adducing necessary evidence before it or it may permit the particular point for recording finding thereon to the trial court. In the circumstances of the case, in the opinion of the court, it would be just and proper to leave the parties to bear their own costs of the appeal.