BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition what is challenged is the resolution dated 26-9-1981 passed by the 1st respondent as well as the judgment dated 27-2-1982 passed by the 2nd respondent, vide Annexures 'a' and 'b' respectively. ( 2 ) ANNEXURE-A is the resolution passed by the 1st respondent holding that the petitioner has admittedly violated the provisions of Section 59 (1) of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with Rule 134 of the karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to a 'the Rules') and, therefore, rejecting the application of syed Ismail for transfer of permit and cancelling the Autorickshaw permit held by the petitioner for misrepresentation of facts and also for having sold the permit held by him. ( 3 ) ANNEXURE-B relates to the judgment passed by the K. S. T. A. T. (2nd respondent) on 27 2-1982 holding that the cancellation of the permit held by the petitioner is quite legal and correct. ( 4 ) THE petitioner is aggrieved by the above resolution and the judgment because, according to him, there is no violdtion of Section 59 (1) of the Act and further even if there is a violation for the sake of argument but not conceding, the action of cancellation of the permit ot the petitioner is not justified in law because section 60 of the Act which empowers such a cancellation does not refer to a violation of Section 59 (1) of the Act as one of the grounds for such an action. ( 5 ) THE only point for consideration in this case is whether the cancellation of permit made under Section 60 of the Act by the authorities could be supported on the ground that there is an infringement of Section 59 (1) of the Act. ( 6 ) IN order to decide this short point, the provisions of Section 60 of the Act have to be examined. Section 60 (1) (a) to (c), which is relevant for this case, reads as follows : 60. ( 6 ) IN order to decide this short point, the provisions of Section 60 of the Act have to be examined. Section 60 (1) (a) to (c), which is relevant for this case, reads as follows : 60. Cancellation and suspension of permits : (1) The transport authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit- (a) on the breach of any condition specified in sub-section (3) of section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit ; or (b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit j or (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to own the vehicle or vehicles covered by the permit. " it is very clear from a reading of the above provision that there is no reference to violation of Section 59 (1) of the Act. ( 7 ) IN the resolution passed by the 1st respondent it is manifestly clear that cancellation of the Autorickshaw permit held by the petitioner was for violation of the provisions of Section 59 (1) of the Act read with Rule 134 of the Rules. The said violation is also the ground for rejection of the prayer of one Syed Ismail for transfer of permit. However, in this case, i am only concerned with the petitioner who is the holder of an Autorickshaw permit. A perusal of the judgment passed by the K. S. T. A. T. shows that the 1st respondent has been held to be justified in cancelling the permit for violation of the provisions of Section 59 (1) of the Act. ( 8 ) I do not find any support for these findings of both the R. T. A. and the k S. T. A. T. from the provisions of Section 60 of the Act which is the only provision which deals with cancellation and suspension of permits. Even assuming that there is a violation of Section 59 (1) of the Act, the authority has no power to cancel the permit under Section 60 of the act. ( 9 ) THE writ petition was filed in the year 1982 and the petitioner has been enjoying the benefit of an interim order of stay till this day. Even assuming that there is a violation of Section 59 (1) of the Act, the authority has no power to cancel the permit under Section 60 of the act. ( 9 ) THE writ petition was filed in the year 1982 and the petitioner has been enjoying the benefit of an interim order of stay till this day. Taking this factor also into consideration, it is not possible to hold that the impugned resolution and the judgment are in accordance with law and that the petitioner should be deprived of his permit. ( 10 ) THE view that I have taken in the peculiar facts of this case is not, in the least, intended to put a premium on violation of law. If the authority has the necessary power and if violation has taken place, the Court would not hesitate to confirm and approve such exercise of power subject only to the condition that the power is exercised in accordance with the provisions of law governing such violations. This is another instance in which one would come to a conclusion that the statutory authorities or the public officials should take utmost care not to exercise power which is not vested in them or to exercise power under misconceived provisions. ( 11 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned resolution and the judgment vide Annexures 'a' and 'b' respectively are quashed. The rule is made absolute. ( 12 ) SRI P. R. Ramesh. learned Government pleader, is directed to take notice for the respondents and he is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks from today. Writ Petition Allowed. --- *** --- .