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1988 DIGILAW 220 (KER)

George Joseph v. Food Inspector

1988-05-27

K.SREEDHARAN

body1988
ORDER : 1. Petitioner is the accused in S.T. 125/1986 on the file of First class Magistrate's Court, Moovattupuzha. He was prosecuted by Food Inspector for offence punishable under the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for having sold sesame oil which was found to be adulterated on analysis. The report submitted by the Public Analyst in Form No. III is dated 16.7.1986. On the application of the accused another sample taken by the Food Inspector was sent to the Central Food Laboratory. The Director of Central Food Laboratory issued certificate dated 16-12-1986 in Form II. While examining DW-1 Sri Nandakumar, Associate Professor in Chemistry, attached to the. Kerala Agricultural University, the accused wanted to refer to the Public Annlyst's report and to compare the same with the certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory to explain the differences on account of the delay caused in getting the sample analysed. The Assistant Public Prosecutor objected to the said course. He contended that when the certificate in Form II has been received the Public Analyst's report in Form III cannot be referred to for any purpose. This objection was heard and the learned Magistrate passed a detailed order on 24-3-1988. That order states: “the prayer of the learned defence counsel to allow him to put questions with regard to the contents of the certificates and compare the result noticed is disallowed.” 2. This order is under challenge in this Criminal M.C. Section 13(3) of the Act reads: “The certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (under sub-section (2-B) shall supersede the report given by the public analyst under sub-section (1).> 3. In all ordinary cases primarily the language employed by the Legislature is the determining factor in understanding the provision of law. The words used in the statute must bear a plain meaning unless the context otherwise requires. The meaning of the word ‘supersede’ used in this clause must bear the ordinary plain meaning. As per Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary the word ‘supersede’ means: “to desist or refrain from: to override: to set aside: to set aside in favour of another: to come or put in the room of, to replace.” 4. As per the Random House Dictionary of English Language its meaning is: “(1) to replace in power, authority, effectiveness etc. As per Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary the word ‘supersede’ means: “to desist or refrain from: to override: to set aside: to set aside in favour of another: to come or put in the room of, to replace.” 4. As per the Random House Dictionary of English Language its meaning is: “(1) to replace in power, authority, effectiveness etc. (2) to set aside or cause to be set aside as void, useless or obsolete, usually in favour of something mentioned, (3) to succeed to the position, function, office etc. of; supplant.” 5. Therefore when the section says that the certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory shall supersede the report given by the Public Analyst it means that the Certificate of the Director of Central Food Laboratory will replace or supplant the report given by the Public Analyst. When the Directors certificate has so replaced or supplanted the report given by the Public Analyst, can the report in Form III be referred to for any purpose in a proceeding under the Act? This aspect was considered by a Larger Bench of this court consisting of Five Judges in Mathukutty v. State of Kerala ( 1987 (2) KLT 867 ). This Court stated the law as: “Even if there is wide variation between the Director's certificate and Analyst's report, the former supersedes the latter and the superseded report cannot be revived for any purpose. (emphasis added) 6. This means that the superseded report of the Public Analyst cannot be made use of for any purpose, not even for explaining the variation between the Director's Certificate and the Analyst's report. It will not be open to the court to look to the report of the Public Analyst and rely on the details mentioned therein for any purpose. 7. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Charanji Lal v. State of Punjab (1983 F.A.J. 435) argued that the view taken by the Larger Bench in the decision referred to earlier requires reconsideration. In that case, Food Inspector purchased 750 grms of ‘Katcha Khoya’ for analysis. Public Analyst on 3-2-1978 found the sample to be adulterated with sesame oil (til oil) besides being insect infested. The fat content of the sample was reported to be 25%. Accused then exercised his right under Section 13(2) of the Act. In that case, Food Inspector purchased 750 grms of ‘Katcha Khoya’ for analysis. Public Analyst on 3-2-1978 found the sample to be adulterated with sesame oil (til oil) besides being insect infested. The fat content of the sample was reported to be 25%. Accused then exercised his right under Section 13(2) of the Act. The Director of Central Food Laboratory, Calcutta, by letter dated 2-5-1978 intimated that the sample was decomposed and therefore unfit for analysis and stated that the other sample may be sent to him immediately. On 10-11-1978 the learned Magistrate forwarded the remaining part of the sample to the Director of Central Food Laboratory, Ghaziabad. The Certificate of the Director of the Laboratory, Ghaziabad, dated 7-12-1978, showed that the sample was adulterated. Fat content was stated to be 33.12% with a note that “the extracted fat of 20.37% did not comply with the standard of milk for the State of Punjab.” The prosecution then applied to Court for getting a clarification from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, Ghaziabad, as the report was not clear. This prayer was rejected. 8. Their Lordships, after observing. “True it is, under proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act, the certificate of the Director, Central Food Laboratory. Ghaziabad, is final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein” remanded the case to the High Court stating: “There are certain aspects of the case which are rather disturbing. It is not clear as to how the fat content of the same article of food the sample of which, according to the report of the Public Analyst, Chandigarh dated February 3, 1978 was 25%, went up to 33.12% as appears from the report of the Director, Central Food Laboratory Ghaziabad dated December 7, 1978. Further, it is also not clear that when the fat content of the sample was 33.12% and the R.M. value of the extracted fat was 20.37%, still the Director on analysis found the sample to be adulterated. Was it due to the presence of any substance not found in milk like Sesame oil (til oil) as found by the Public Analyst, Chandigarh or was it that there was a Higher fat content prescribed for Khoya for the State of Punjab as appears from the appended note? These are some of the aspects which require investigation. Was it due to the presence of any substance not found in milk like Sesame oil (til oil) as found by the Public Analyst, Chandigarh or was it that there was a Higher fat content prescribed for Khoya for the State of Punjab as appears from the appended note? These are some of the aspects which require investigation. There is no other alternative but to remit the matter to the High Court for a decision afresh. The High Court may call for a clarification from the Director, Central Food Laboratory, Ghaziabad, or take such other steps as it deems fit.”. 9. This decision will not in any way go to support the petitioner's argument that the report of the Public Analyst can be acted on as evidence to contradict the Certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory. Their Lordships remanded the case only for getting clarification on some of the aspects mentioned in the Certificate. It was not on account of any of the differences between the report of the Public Analyst and the certificate issued by the Director. In the above circumstances, I hold that the order passed on 24-3-1988 by the learned Magistrate is perfectly legal and it calls for no interference. The Criminal M.C. is devoid of any substance. It is accordingly dismissed.