Order: The petitioners against whom the; respondent has filed a charge sheet underS.498 A read with S. 34 , I.P.C., and underS.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with S. 34 , I.P.C., invoke the inherent powers of this Court under S.482, Crl.P.C, to quash the above proceedings. 2. Facts briefly are: On 13th September, 1985 the Complainant Sarala alias Suganiya presented a Complaint before 13th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, against the petitioners, wherein she alleged that she was married to the first petitioner on 11th March, 1976 and petitioners 2 and 3 are his mother and sister respectively that at the time of the marriage, the petitioners, in furtherance of a common intention, demanded dowry, gold jewels and silver articles from her and that subsequent to marriage they continued to demand the sam and when she and her father, were not able to satisfy their demands, the petitioners, harassed her, treated her cruelly and finally drove her away and had therefore, committed offences underS.498-A readS.34I.P.C., and also under the Act 3. Learned Magistrate forwarded the Complaint to the respondent, who registered it as Crime No.2979 of 1985 for an offence underS.498-A, I.P.C., and alter investigation filed the charge-sheet against the petitioners for the offences shown in Paragraph 1 above. The above charge sheet is now sought to be quashed. The contentions of Thiru A. Packiaraj, learned counsel for the petitioners were two-fold: (i) Prosecution under S.498-A read with S.34, I.P.C., has to be quashed, since the above offence itself was created by an amendment, to the Penal Code, only on 20th December, 1983. In the charge-sheet the offence is said to have been committed between 11th March, 1976 and 11th December, 1983, when S.498-A, I.P.C., has not yet been introduced. (ii) Prosecution under the Act was barred by limitation. According to the learned counsel the offence under S.4 of the Act is said to have been committed between 11th March, 1976 and 11th December, 1983, and according to the S.7(b) of the Act, as it then stood, prosecution has to be launched, within one year from the date of the offence. Cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate on 13th January, 1986 was beyond the period of limitation. 4. Cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate on 13th January, 1986 was beyond the period of limitation. 4. Answering the above contentions, learned Public Prosecutor stated that: (i) Though S.498-A, I.P.C., was introduced in the Penal Code only subsequent to 11th December, 1983, yet, in view of the fact that on the date when the charge sheet was filedS.498-A, I.P.C, had been introduced, the prosecution could still be sustained. (ii) Though S.7(b) of the Act, as it stood prior to the amending Act 63 of 1984 , stipulated a period of one year, for launching prosecution, the Act has subsequently been amended by Act 63 of 1984 which came into force on 2nd October, 1985 and which removed the provision relating to limitation for launching prosecution and, therefore, the prosecution launched after the amending Act had come into force, ought to be sustained. In the alternative, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that S.470(3), Crl P.C., which came into force prior to the launching of the prosecution, permitted the period taken for obtaining sanction to be excluded and in the instant case, sanction was applied for on 10th May, 1984 and obtained on 20th August, 1984 and when this period was excluded, the prosecution would be within the period of one year, stipulated under the old Act 5. The question that arises for consideration is whether the proceedings should be quashed, on any of the grounds put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioners? 6. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that S.498-A, I.P.C., was not in the penal statute at the time when the offence is said to have been committed, and that penal provisions have no retrospective effect, has to be accepted. According to the charge sheet, the offence of S.498-A, I.P.C., was committed between 11th March, 1976 and 11th December, 1983. Chap. XXA containingS.498-A has been introduced in the Penal Code by Amending Act 46 of 1983, which came into force on receipt of the assent of the President on 20th December, 1983. It is, therefore, clear that S.498-A , I.P.C., was not in the Indian Penal Code, at the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Chap. XXA containingS.498-A has been introduced in the Penal Code by Amending Act 46 of 1983, which came into force on receipt of the assent of the President on 20th December, 1983. It is, therefore, clear that S.498-A , I.P.C., was not in the Indian Penal Code, at the time when the offence is said to have been committed. According to Art.20(1) of the Constitution of India: “No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as on offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence”. The penal provision, therefore, can have no retrospective effect. On this short ground, the prosecution underS.498-A, I.P.C., has to be quashed. 7. It has next to be seen whether, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the prosecution underS.4of the Act, is barred by limitation. According to the charge-sheet the offence under this Act had been committed between 11th March, 1976 and 11th December, 1983 the last act of commission being on 11th December, 1983.S.7 of the Act, prior to its amendment in 1984, stood as follows: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1988): (a) No court inferior to that of Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence under this Act; (b) No court shall take cognizance of any such offence except on a Complaint made within one year from the date of the offence; (c) It shall be lawful for a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class to pass any sentence authorised by this Act on any person convicted of an offence, under this Act” It is clear, therefore, that the Court should have taken cognizance of the offence on or before 10th December, 1984. Instead, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on 13th January, 1986. Learned Public Prosecutor, however, would contend that since the Amending Act 63 of 1984 taking away limitation, had come into force on 2nd October, 1985, and cognizance had been taken after limitation had been taken away the prosecution could be sustained. This position of law put forward by the learned Public Prosecutor is too general for immediate acceptance. Learned Public Prosecutor, however, would contend that since the Amending Act 63 of 1984 taking away limitation, had come into force on 2nd October, 1985, and cognizance had been taken after limitation had been taken away the prosecution could be sustained. This position of law put forward by the learned Public Prosecutor is too general for immediate acceptance. It is true that the Act was amended by the Amending Act 63 of 1984, which came into force on 2nd October, 1985. It is also true thatS.7 of the Act had been substituted by a new section and no limitation is prescribed for prosecution under the present Act. However, the learned Public Prosecutor overlooks the fact, that the Amending Act 63 of 1984, which came into force on 2nd October, 1985 can save the prosecution only if the right to prosecute was alive on 2nd October, 1985 when the Amending Act came into force. This is so by virtue of S.6(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which is as follows: “Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hear-after to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal take effect” It is well settled proposition of law, that an Amended Act taking away the period of limitation will not revive the right that had already become extinct by limitation. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the right to prosecute was alive on 2nd October, 1985, when the Amending Act removed limitation. 8. It is in this context that the learned Public Prosecutor contends that the Criminal Procedure Code had been amended by Act 2 of 1974 of Chap. XXXVI had been introduced containingS.470(3), Crl.P.C., which, while Computing limitation, permits excluding the period taken to obtain sanction. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the period between 10th May, 1984 and 20th August, 1985 taken by the Complainant to get sanction under the Act, had to be excluded. XXXVI had been introduced containingS.470(3), Crl.P.C., which, while Computing limitation, permits excluding the period taken to obtain sanction. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the period between 10th May, 1984 and 20th August, 1985 taken by the Complainant to get sanction under the Act, had to be excluded. The learned counsel for the petitioners would however contend, that by virtue of the non-obstante clause inS.7 of the Act, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898 ) the Criminal Procedure Code would not apply to the Act and that therefore the period taken for obtaining sanction could not be excluded. The counsel also contended that when the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was amended by Act 2 of 1974, by virtue of S.8(1) of the General Clause Act, reference to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 inS.7 of the Act has to read as reference made to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, as amended by Act 2 of 1974 S.8(1) of the General Clauses Act is as follows: “(1) Where any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, the references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provisions so repealed shall unless a different intention appears, be construed as reference to the provision so re-enacted. It is clear, therefore, that after the repeal of the earlier Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and the passing of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Act 2 of 1874 ) wherever reference is made in the Act, to the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974). 9. The effect of the non-obstante clause inS.7 of the Act has now to be considered. It will have to be seen whether the non-obstante clause referring to the amended Criminal Procedure Code would exclude the entire Code from the purview of that section of whether the exclusion, is limited to the actual period of limitation prescribed underS.7(b) of the Act. In the former contingency the period taken for obtaining sanction could not be excluded while Computing limitation while in the latter contingency, it could be. The effect of a non-obstante clause in a legislation is to enable that legislation to prevail over the provisions in any other legislation, which are contrary to it. In the former contingency the period taken for obtaining sanction could not be excluded while Computing limitation while in the latter contingency, it could be. The effect of a non-obstante clause in a legislation is to enable that legislation to prevail over the provisions in any other legislation, which are contrary to it. In the case of conflict, the legislation having non-obstante clause would prevail. In the instant case,S.7 of the Act, as it then stood, prescribed one year as the period of limitation for launching prosecution. If, therefore, in the Code of Criminal Procedure, a different period of limitation bad been prescribed, for prosecution of offences under the Act, depending upon the punishment awardable for such offence, then by virtue of the non obstante clause, inS.7 of the Act, the period of limitation provided under the Act, would prevail over the period of limitation prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is only in this area of conflict, that the non-obstante clause could really come into operation. In matters where there is no conflict or where the special Act is silent, general procedural Code would apply. This is so by virtue of S.4(2) , Crl.P.C., which requires offences under laws, other than the Indian Penal Code also, to be investigated inquired into, tried or otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating them. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. I.C.Lala Union of India v. I.C.Lala 1973 Crl.L.J.1190, held that the non-obstante clause inS.5-A(1) in the Prevention of Corruption Act merely carved out a limited exemption from the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in so far as they limited the class of persons who were Competent to investigate in to offences mentioned in the section and to arrest without a warrant. It did not make the rest of the Code of Criminal Procedure including Sch.II, inapplicable. 10. Analysing the provisions ofS.7 of the Act on the basis of the above principles, it is seen that in three specified areas,S.7 of the Act excludes the Criminal Procedure Code .S.7(a) of Act prohibits any Magistrate, below the rank of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate: of the First Class, to try any offence under the ActS.7(b) of the Act refers to limitation. S.7(C) of the; Act makes it possible for Presidency Magistrates or Magistrates of the First Class to pass any sentence authorised by the Act on any person convicted under the Act. The corresponding provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to these three aspects will, by virtue of the non obstante clause inS.7of the Act, yield to the provisions of the Act. These alone are the areas of conflict between the Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other areas where there is no conflict or where the Act is silent, the Code of Criminal Procedure will apply. It cannot, therefore, be contended that as a result of the non-obstante clause the other provisions of the Code, which are not in conflict with any of the sub-sections ofS.7 of the Act are also excluded from the operation of the Act. It would follow thatS.470 (3) of the Code excluding time taken for getting sanction, would apply to the Act. 11. A decision of this Court rendered by S.A. Kader, J., in Veerasami v. State Veerasami v. State 1984 L.W. (Crl.) 268 was placed before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In that case, the learned Judge held that in a prosecution for defamation launched by the Public Prosecutor underS.199(2) , Crl.P.C, the limitation prescribed underS.199(2) , Crl.P.C, would not stand extended by resorting toS.470(3), Crl.P.C, by excluding the period taken to obtain sanction. The learned Judge held that this was so becauseS.199(2), Crl.P.C.was an enabling section and was an exception to the general rule permitting the Public Prosecutor to launch prosecution on behalf of certain aggrieved persons mentioned in that sub-section, who, otherwise, would have to file the Complaints themselves. Under these circumstances, that being an exception to the general rule, had to be construed strictly since even withoutS.199(2) , Cr.P.C. the right of the aggrieved person to file a Complaint was not taken away by that section, A prosecution under the Dowry Prohibition Act, however, is different. Prior to 2.10.1985, when the Act was amended, offences under the Act were non-cognizable Prosecution for an offence underS.4required sanction of the State Government of such officer as the State Government could specify. When therefore the Act required previous sanction for prosecution, all provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code , relatable to grant of sanction would apply to the ActS.470(3)is one such provision. When therefore the Act required previous sanction for prosecution, all provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code , relatable to grant of sanction would apply to the ActS.470(3)is one such provision. The reasons given by the learned Judge for excluding S.470(3) , Crl.P.C. to a prosecution under section 199(2), Criminal Procedure Code cannot apply to a prosecution under the Act. 12. In fact, a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Lajpat Rai Sehgal v. State Lajpat Rai Sehgal v. State (1983) Crl.L.J.888 under exactly similar circumstances, has taken the view that the Act is not a Complete Code and apart from what is actually provided for in the Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure including section 470(3) would apply. Time taken for obtaining sanction was therefore to be excluded while Computing the period of limitation under section 7(b)of the Act I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge. 13. It is not disputed that if the sanction period is excluded cognizance has been taken within the period of limitation laid down under section 7(b) of the Act. The offence was last committed on 11.12.1983. The period of limitation was one year. Sanction was applied for on 10.5.1984, and obtained on 20.8.85 Cognizance by the learned Magistrate was taken on 13.1.1986. When the sanction period is excluded, the prosecution is within time. 14. In the result the charge-sheet in so far as it related to the offence under section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is quashed. This petition in so far as it relates to the offence under section 4 of the Act will stand dismissed. B.S.----- Petition dismissed.