AJIT KUMAR NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals, one by the claimant petitioners and the other by the objector, Calcutta State Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Corporation), are directed against the judgment and order, dated 28th May, 1982, passed by Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Additional District Judge, Midnapore in J. Misc. Case No. 10 of 1980, awaking compensation of Rs. 101304 to the claimant/petitioners, the wife and children of the deceased and further directing payment of interest on failure to pay such sum within a period of two months from the date of award. ( 2 ) THE case of the claimant petitioners, viz. , the wife and four, sons and two daughters of the deceased, late Sri Chittaranjan Mal was that on the fateful day, i. e. , on 6th August, 1979 late Sri Mal was travelling by a Calcutta bound State Transport Corporation Bus No. W. B. S. 1805 on N. H. 6, the National High Way, on 6th August, 1979, at about 11-30 a. m. , the said bus while being driven at a very high speed and in rash and negligent manner near Kharagpur, the driver lost control of the bus which suddenly went off the road and fell into a way side ditch or water pool resulting in the instantaneous death of one of the passengers and injury to a large number of passengers. Sri Chittaranjan Mal, the deceased, sustained serve bodily injuries when he was rescued by the local people and was sent for treatment to Sadar Hospital, Midnapore where he succumbed to this injuries on 13th August, 1979. A sum of Rs. 2,71,520 was claimed as compensation before the Claims Tribunal by the claiment|applicants for the consequent loss of income, mental shock and medical expenses incurred for the deceased. ( 3 ) THE opposite party, Calcutta State Transport Corporation, contested the application by filing written objections, denying that the accident took place due to rash and negligence of the driver or that the bus being driven at high speed and asserting that the accident took place due to excessive rain and slippery condition of' the road way. The learned Tribunal Judge awarded the aforesaid sum of Rs. The learned Tribunal Judge awarded the aforesaid sum of Rs. 101304 as compensation to the claimant|applicants, on a finding that the accident ultimately causing the depth of the deceased took place due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of the opposite party/corporation and also in consideration of the age of the deceased, his earning capacity both existing and potential, and the loss sustained thereby in consequence of his death by the members of his family. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by such judgment and award the claimant applicants as well as the corporation have preferred these two sets of appeals on grounds mentioned hereinbelow. ( 5 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the claimant|applicants that in computing the amount of compensation the learned Tribunal Judge was not justified in deducting 1/3rd of the income of the deceased for his personal expenses and that the life expectancy of the deceased and his capacity to earn thereby should have been taken up to the age of 70 years instead of 65 years as adopted by the Tribunal Judge. It has been further urged that interest on the sum awarded should have been ordered unqualified from the date of application instead of the date of award and cost ought to have been granted by the learned Tribunal Judge which he failed o do. On the other hand it has been urged on behalf of the corporation that the accident in question became inevitable due to excessive rain and slippery condition of the roadway for which the bus skided off the road and not due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver at a high speed as alleged by claimants. It has been contended that in calculating the quantum of compensation normal service tenure of the deceased, who was the Headmaster of the local school, should have been taken at the age limit of 60 years, instead of 66 years, as adopted by the learned Tribunal Judge and further that interest and cost should not be granted as claimed by the applicants. ( 6 ) BEFORE entering into the merits of the ease regarding the assessment of the quantum of compensation, it may be stated at the very outset that admittedly stage carriage No W. B. S 1805 of the Calcutta State Transport Corporation, plying between Digha and Calcutta, was involved in an accident on 6th August, 1979 when it fell into a way side ditch near about Kharagpur on the National Highway No 6 at about 11. 30 a. m. resulting in the death of the driver of the ill-fated bus and serious injuries to many passengers. It is also an admitted fact that 15 of such injured persons were given exgratia payment of Rs 100 each and the Corporation also received 8 claims for compensations which were under consideration at the time the present claim petition was filed The fact that the deceased, Chittaranjan Mal, was seriously inured while travelling in the aforesaid but has not been seriously disputed by the corporation. There is overwhelming evidence on record including the unchallenged evidence of P. W. 3, the widow of the deceased, that late Shri Mal was going to Calcutta in connection with his school business on the relevant day when he was involved in accident sustaining severe injuries, and died in consequence thereof, at Midnapore Hospital on 13. 8. 79. It has also been corroborated by the evidence of P. W. 2, Ashish Kumar Hazra, a fellow passenger of the said ill-fated bus. There is no good reason to disbelieve the evidence of P. W. 2 on this point. ( 7 ) THE next question for consideration is whether the accident took place due to any negligence on the part of the driver at the relevant time. The specific case of the claiment|applicants in this regard is that the ill-fated bus was being driven rashly and negligently by the driver at a very high speed when there was excessive rain on the same day and the road condition was slippery As a result, the driver lost control of the said bus which skided off the road into the way side ditch. The contention of the Corporation on the other hand is that it was the rain-soaked slippery condition of the road that caused this accident and not the rash and negligent driving of the driver. The contention of the Corporation on the other hand is that it was the rain-soaked slippery condition of the road that caused this accident and not the rash and negligent driving of the driver. ( 8 ) IN view of the contentions of the parties the physical condition of the locality where accident took place and the surrounding facts and circumstances would actually he1p us in deciding the said question whether the accident took place due to the negligence of the driver. Admittedly, the accident took place in the month of August, that is the height of rainy season in Bengal. Admittedly also, there was excessive rainfall on the same day and the road condition was slippery. It is disclosed by evidence on record that there is a ditch ( nayanjuli ) just beside the high-way at the place of occurrence. The accident did not take place on the road, but the bus went off the road, overturned and fell into the way side ditch. Together with this we find from evidence of P. W. 2, Ashish Kumar Hazra, a fellow passenger in the said bus that at the relevant time it was running at a speed of 90-100 K. M. per hour. The very fact that quite a number of passengers sustained bodily injuries including some who succumbed to such injuries goes to show by itself that the bus was running at a very high speed. In view of the wet and slippery road condition and the topography or physical condition of the locality, the driver ought to have been reasonably cautious in driving the vehicle and had such discretion been exercised even if the bus had skided, it could not have resulted in such violent bodily injuries to so many persons. Again the very fact that the driver died on the spot goes to show that the impact of the accident was highly severe and this could not have happened had the bus been in moderately slow motion. So, even giving due allowance to the suggestions put to P. W. 2 that he was not travelling by the same bus at the relevant time which of course, he denied very vehemently, the broad facts and surrounding circumstances and the probabilities arising therefrom tell their own tale that the bus was being driven at a high speed and that there was negligence on the part of the driver. (There is reason to believe that P. W. 2 was present at the relevant time ). It is exactly in a situation like this where the facts disclosed by evidence on record are such that proper and natural inference immediately arising therefrom is that the injury complained of can only be caused by negligence that the maxim res ipse loquitur applies. The presumption in that case would be that the event was caused by negligence and the plaintiff succeeds unless the defendant can rebut this presumption. It is for the defendant therefore, to show how the event could occur without negligence on his part. When there is a duty cast upon the defendant to exercise care and caution, it is for him in the first instance to disprove his liability by showing that he exercised the same. The defendant cannot escape or avoid his liability by putting forward this or that plea. As pointed out so succinctly by Justice Asquith L. J. in Barkway vs. South Wales Transport, 1948-2 All ER 460 (471 ). "it is ho rebuttal for the defendants to show, without more, that the immediate cause of the omnibus leaving the road is a tyre-burst, since a tyre-burst per se is a neutral event consistent, and equally consistent, with negligence or due diligence on the part of the defendants. When a balance has been tilted one way, you cannot redress it by adding an equal weight to each scale. The depressed scale will remain down. " This is also the effect of the decision in Lurie vs. Raglan Building Co. , 1942-1 KB 152, where not a tyre-burst but a skid (as in this case) was involved. To displace the presumption, the defendants must go further and prove "or it must emerge from the evidence as a whole either (a) that the burst itself was due to a specific cause which does not connote negligence on their part but points to its absence as more probable, or (b) if they can point to no such specific cause, that they used all reasonable care in and about the management of their tyres". The principles so enunciated have been adopted by our Supreme Court in series of cases, viz, AIR 1962 SC. 1 , AIR 1977 S. C. 1735, AIR 1980 S. C. 695, AIR 1980 S. C. 1354. The principles so enunciated have been adopted by our Supreme Court in series of cases, viz, AIR 1962 SC. 1 , AIR 1977 S. C. 1735, AIR 1980 S. C. 695, AIR 1980 S. C. 1354. The plea of the inevitability of the accident as urged by the learned counsel for the Corporation must be raised specifically and proved by them. It is definitely within the special knowledge of the Corporation to rebut presumption by adducing evidence that they took all reasonable care and caution to avert the same. Neither the bus conductor of the ill-fated bus nor any of the passengers who were injured or otherwise had been examined to prove that there was no negligence on the part of the driver. An adverse presumption can, therefore, be drawn against the Corporation that had such witnesses been examined they would have lent support to the case of the claimant|applicants. Moreover there is nothing on record to show nor any evidence was adduced on behalf of the Corporation showing that the driver in question followed the instruction regarding speed limit prescribed under Section 71 read with 8th Schedule of Motor Vehicle Act. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, we can draw from the broad facts and circumstances is that the accident happened not merely because the driver lost control of the bus due to the slippery condition of the road by excessive rain or that there was any mechanical failure beyond human control or comprehension but due to the negligence on the part of the driver. ( 9 ) SO quite apart from liability for tort and the need to have greater awareness on the part of public corporation about the safety and security of the passengers and reverence for human life as such, the State as pointed out by Justice Krishna Iyer, has a "paramount duty to make provision for disablement in cases of undeserved want" as envisaged in Article 41 of the Constitution. So what is desired in a case like this is a humane approach to settle the claims expeditiously instead of including in "wasteful litigation" and, "tenaciously resisting" the claim preferred by the dependants of the deceased. So what is desired in a case like this is a humane approach to settle the claims expeditiously instead of including in "wasteful litigation" and, "tenaciously resisting" the claim preferred by the dependants of the deceased. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, in view of what has been stated above we have no hesitation to hold affirming the finding of the Tribunal Judge that Shri Chittaranjan Mal, the victim died as a result of accident occurring on 6th August, 1979, when the offending State Bus No. WBS 1805 was driven in the rash and negligent manner ( 11 ) THE next question is regarding the fixation of quantum of compensation as claimed by the dependants|claimants amounting to Rs. 2,71,522 which on being resisted by the Corporation has been reduced to Rs. 1,01,304 by the Tribunal Judge. We find from the evidence of P. W. 1 Mihir Kumar Ray, clerk of Khetra Mohan High School, Contai District Midnapore, the deceased, Shri Chittaranjan Mal was a Head Master of the School and that his total emoluments at the time of his death in August, 1979, was Rs. 1407. It is in evidence that he was aged 56 years when the accident happened, and was to retire 9 years after the date of accident. It is also in evidence that the pay scale of the Head Master was revised on 1. 4. 81 and the decease would have received about Rs. 2100 per month on such revision of pay, had he been alive at the time. He also stated that he would have received a sum of Rs. 900 as monthly pension on superannuation. The facts that he was the Head Master of the school and was getting a sum of Rs. 1407 per month as salary remain unchallenged in cross-examination. It is in evidence that in addition to his income from monthly salary, the deceased was the author of many text books and used to get Rs. 2100 per month as royalty therefrom. The witness brought the acquittance role of the school in support of his statement. We find from his evidence that he was contributing 6 1/4 p. c. of his basic pay of Rs. 1025 towards provident fund and that the deceased would have received Rs. 10,000 as Government contribution towards his provident fund account. 2100 per month as royalty therefrom. The witness brought the acquittance role of the school in support of his statement. We find from his evidence that he was contributing 6 1/4 p. c. of his basic pay of Rs. 1025 towards provident fund and that the deceased would have received Rs. 10,000 as Government contribution towards his provident fund account. The witness stated further that the deceased would have got the benefit of revision of pay scale on exercising such option for revision on and from 1. 4. 81. What is important for the purpose of assessment of compensation in this case due to pecuniary loss sustained by the dependant/claimants arising out of the death of the victim is the tenure of service of the deceased, which according to this clerk was 60 years with an extension upto the age of 65 years, as a matter of course subject to his physical fitness. The evidence of P. W. I regarding the age, occupation, status, income existing as well as potential of the deceased was corroborated by P. W. 3, wife of the deceased. We find from the evidence of P. W. 3, wife of the deceased, that they have 4 sons and 2 unmarried daughters reading in the college. Mother of the deceased died three months after this incident. We also have it from her evidence that the deceased had very good health and that the longibity rate of the family was very high as her father-in-law died at the age of 85 years and the mother-in-law died at the age of 79 years. None of the sons of the deceased was earning at the time of hearing of the case before the Tribunal. In the absence of any other evidence to prove the contrary, we can reasonably presume that the victim was the only earning member and had been supporting his big family by his personal income. ( 12 ) THE dependant/claimants have claimed a total sum of Rs. 271520 including Rs. 10,000 as compensation for mental shock Rs. 1,000 for medical expenses and Rs. 260520 as pecuniary loss sustained by the death of only earning member of the family that is the deceased. ( 12 ) THE dependant/claimants have claimed a total sum of Rs. 271520 including Rs. 10,000 as compensation for mental shock Rs. 1,000 for medical expenses and Rs. 260520 as pecuniary loss sustained by the death of only earning member of the family that is the deceased. ( 13 ) IT is a now settled principle of law as endorsed by series of judicial decisions that in a case like this, compensation on account of pecuniary loss can be and should be granted by the Court not only on account of the actual income being earned by the victim at the time of his death but also on account of the prospective income which the victim was reasonably expected to earn in future had his life not been cut short by such accident. So in computing the quantum of compensation it is not only the actual income earned by the deceased but also the prospective income which he was reasonably expected to earn will have to be taken into consideration. It is of course true that such prospective income must have a reasonable basis and should not be only a "speculative one". We may refer in this connection to the Bench decision of our Court reported in 90 C. W. N. page 624, relying upon similar such Bench decision of Allahabad High Court which again followed a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C. K. Subramania Ayar vs. Kunhi Kyttam Nair reported in A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 376. The Supreme Court in its turn, has relied upon similar such principle being enunciated by the Privy Council in the case of Taff Vale Railway Company vs. Jenkins, reported in 1913 Appeal Cases, page 1, wherein not only the actual income earned at the time of accident but also the prospective income of the victim has been taken into consideration to ascertain the pecuniary loss on account of the death of the victim. ( 14 ) IN assessing the amount of compensation the guiding principle as laid down in Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 is that it should be "just". No method of calculation of compensation would be justified if it does not result in awarding a "just" amount looking to the peculiar circumstances of each case. ( 14 ) IN assessing the amount of compensation the guiding principle as laid down in Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939 is that it should be "just". No method of calculation of compensation would be justified if it does not result in awarding a "just" amount looking to the peculiar circumstances of each case. The Court should have and as a matter of fact has wide and ample power in the matter of granting compensation to the aggrieved party. It should not be bound by rigid mathematical formula if it is of opinion that to do justice, the case requires either increase or decrease in the amount of compensation. ( 15 ) WHATEVER differences of opinion there many be among the decisions of the different Courts regarding the heads and the determining factors in the matter of granting compensation, there is unanimity of opinion that it can be so granted in a case of claim preferred by the dependants for the pecuniary loss caused to such dependants by the death of the victim. In calculating "just" compensation, the period of dependency of the defendants the income and expectation of life of the deceased having regard to his age, bodily health, and various imponderable factors, like early natural death of the deceased, his becoming incapable of supporting the dependants due to illness or any other natural handicap, in the case of a widow her re-marriage, the dependants developing independent source of income and various other factors are to be taken into consideration. The basic figure thus arrived at may then be multiplied by suitable multiplier. The basic figure thus arrived at may then be multiplied by suitable multiplier. It is true that the multiplier principle that is, multiplying the amount of annual loss to the dependants with the number of years by which the life of the deceased has been cut short without anything else, has not found favour with or endorsed by the full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court, reported in A. I. R. 1979 page 50 P. N. H. , but the same together with various other factors was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Sudhakar's case, A. I. R. 1977, S. C. 1189 as well as in Mallett's case 1969 A. C. C. CJ 312 (H. L.) ( 16 ) WE have already seen as also established by evidence on record that the tenure of service of the deceased Shri Chittaranjan Mal as head master was 60 year's with an extension upto the age of 65 years in cases like this granted as a matter of course, subject to physical fitness. It has also been disclosed by evidence on record that the deceased was keeping very good health and we can reasonably expect that he would have also received such extension upto the age of 65 years had his life not been prematurely terminated by this accident. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Corporation that the Tribunal Judge was not justified in taking into consideration such extension upto the age of 65 years awarding compensation as based on wrong presumption cannot be accepted at all. The finding of the learned Tribunal Judge is based on sound reasoning and evidence on record particularly that of P. W. 1 Shri Mihir Kumar Ray according to whom such extension was to be granted as a matter of course, and as such it cannot be said that the same finding is an outcome of any hypothetical conjecture having no relation either to fact or the realities of the situation. In other words such finding has a reasonable basis and cannot be said to be a speculative one. We also find from evidence on record that the deceased would have been entitled to the benefit of pay revision which became effective on and from 1st April, 1981, raising his total emoluments to sum of Rs. 2100 per month. In other words such finding has a reasonable basis and cannot be said to be a speculative one. We also find from evidence on record that the deceased would have been entitled to the benefit of pay revision which became effective on and from 1st April, 1981, raising his total emoluments to sum of Rs. 2100 per month. This is the prospective income, we should also take note of, which the deceased was reasonably expected to earn had his life not been cut short on account of the accident 90 C. W. N. page 624 (supra) Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. We cannot agree with the finding of the learned Tribunal Judge who did not look into this question seriously and ignored such claim of the applicants without assigning any good reason whatsoever. ( 17 ) IT has been nextly urged by Shri Bhunia, learned Advocate for the claimant/applicants that the learned Tribunal Judge was not justified in deducting 1/3rd of the total salary of the victim as his personal expenses for the purpose of calculating the loss sustained by the applicants and assessing the quantum of compensation thereby. In calculating the actual extent of loss to the dependants or far the matter of that to the dependant members of the family, on account of the death of the deceased, the only earning member of the family, money which was expected to be spent by the deceased for himself as his personal expenses should not be taken into consideration. The approach to such question should be what sum the deceased would probably have applied out of his income, or reasonable provision he would have made for the maintenance of his wife and family if he had not been killed but eked out a full span of life to which he could have looked forward. Such a view finds support in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1962 S. C. P. 1 - Gobald Motor Service vs. Veluswami and the Court in coming to such decision followed a series of English decisions, viz. , Davies vs. Pawell Duffryn Associated Colleries 1942 A. C 601; Nancy vs. British Columbia Electric Rly, Co. Ltd. 1951 AC 601. , Davies vs. Pawell Duffryn Associated Colleries 1942 A. C 601; Nancy vs. British Columbia Electric Rly, Co. Ltd. 1951 AC 601. There is series of Judicial decisions enunciating such view and that a fixed sum of 1/3rd of the total emoluments has been taken to be the standard and deemed to have been spent by the deceased in maintaining himself A. I. R. 1986, Rajasthan, Page 1966; Krishnanna vs. Alice Veigas, 1966 A. C. J. 366 (M. Y. S.), Gargi Devi vs. State of Punjab, 1968, A. C. J. 30 (PH); 1977, ACJ, 526 (531/1) (All) - Neelima Arora vs. U. I. ( 18 ) IT has been further contended by Shri Bhunia on behalf of the applicants that such deduction of 1/3rd, though supported by some such decisions as mentioned above is not based on the legal principle of "just" compensation under Section 110b of the Motor Vehicle Act, and that most of such decisions relate to cases coming under the Fatal Accidents Act which speaks of damages, "proportional" to the loss resulting from such death as distinguished from "just" compensation in M. V. Act. But no such distinction can strictly be drawn between the two Acts as the rationale behind the granting of compensation under both the Acts is the extent of pecuniary loss caused to the dependants by the death of the person concerned and the amount he was spending food his family out of his annual earning at the time of accident will be the determining factor. ( 19 ) THE claimants have further claimed a sum of Rs. 10,000 under the head mental shock arising out of the accident in question and the mental and physical agony or pain suffered by them on account of the death of the deceased. It is not a case where the claimants himself is not involved in accident and demanding compensation for the injury or mental pain arising out of the same. As such I am not inclined to grant compensation on that account. Similarly no separate compensation is required to be awarded under the head medical expenses in view of granting suitable amount of compensation on account of the pecuniary loss suffered by the claimants. As such I am not inclined to grant compensation on that account. Similarly no separate compensation is required to be awarded under the head medical expenses in view of granting suitable amount of compensation on account of the pecuniary loss suffered by the claimants. ( 20 ) WITH regard to payment of interest it has been urged by Shri Bhunia on behalf of the claimant/applicants that the learned Tribunal Judge went wrong in not granting interest on the sum awarded with effect from the date of application that is, since 9. 1. 80. He has also referred to the decision reported in A. I. R. 1986 S. C. page 1191, in support of his contention. Payment of interest according to the provisions laid down under Section 110cc of the Motor Vehicle Acts 1939, is a matter of discretion for the Court where any claim is allowed. In exercise of such discretion conferred by the statute the Court can direct payment of such interest in the sum awarded from any date, but not before the date of application. In other words, interest on sum awarded can be granted either from the date of application or from the date of award or judgment. It is true that such discretion should be exercised judiciously on the basis of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In the instant case the learned Tribunal Judge directed payment of the sum awarded within a period of two months from the date of award failing which the corporation was made liable to pay interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum till realization of such amount. So it is not true that no interest was granted on the sum awarded but that the Tribunal Judge made a conditional Order granting such interest in the event of failure on the part of the Corporation to pay the sum awarded within that stipulated period. The Corporation instead of complying with the Order of the Tribunal Judge and making quick payment of compensation has indulged in this prolonged litigation for years, resulting in delayed and deferred payment to the helpless members of the family of the deceased. The Corporation instead of complying with the Order of the Tribunal Judge and making quick payment of compensation has indulged in this prolonged litigation for years, resulting in delayed and deferred payment to the helpless members of the family of the deceased. We consider it necessary, in the interest of Justice, therefore, that interest, on the entire sum awarded by way of compensation, should bear interest from the date of application rather than from the date of award as ordered by the Tribunal Judge. ( 21 ) THE only other point urged by Shri Bhunia is regarding the payment of compensatory cost which was not granted by the learned Tribunal Judge. Section 110cc of M. V Act provides for awarding compensatory cost in certain cases. As in the case of granting of interest under Section 110cc, so also in the case of granting of cost it is entirely a judicial discretion of the Court concerned whether to grant cost or not. We find no reason to saddle the Corporation further with compensatory cost. A prayer for granting of compensatory cost is, therefore, rejected. ( 22 ) IN view of the discussion as made above the amount of compensation to be awarded in this case is worked out as follows: 13. 8. 79 to 31. 3. 81 @ Rs. 1407 per month Rs. 27,577. 00 1. 4. 81 to 13. 8. 88 @ Rs. 2100 per month Rs. 185,640. 00 The total amount of compensation Rs. 213,217. 00 Deduction of 1/3rd from the said amount on account of personal expenses Rs. 142,144. 67 Rs. 71,072. 33 Interest from 9. 1. 80 to 6. 6. 88 @ 6% Rs. 213. 927. 73 Rs. 71,783. 06 Less the sum already paid to the claimants by way of compensation Rs. 173,927. 73 Rs. 40,000. 00 Less interest on 40,000/- from 1. 11. 84 To 6. 6. 88 @ 6% Rs. 8,600. 73 Rs. 1,65,327. 00 ( 23 ) THE appeal preferred by the claimants is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Tribunal Judge are hereby modified in terms as stated in the body of the judgment - The State Transport Corporation is directed to deposit the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1. 65,327 less any other sum already deposited in this regard before the Registrar, Appellate Side, High Court, Calcutta within 4 months from the date of the Order. 1. 65,327 less any other sum already deposited in this regard before the Registrar, Appellate Side, High Court, Calcutta within 4 months from the date of the Order. Both the appeals 302 and 541 are disposed of accordingly without costs. A. M. Bhattacharjee, J. , I agree. Claimants appeal allowed.