JUDGMENT 1. - This Civil Special Appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance read with Order 43, Rule 1, CPC has been filed against judgment of learned Single Judge, dated January 15, 1986, in SB. Civil Miscellaneous Restoration Application No. 61/1986, where by the application filed by the appellants Under Order 41, Rules 19 read with Section 151, CPC for re-admission of hearing of S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 8/1975 was dismissed in default. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the appellants filed first appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, Alwar, passed on November 30, 1974, which was dismissed in default of appearance of both parties on February 7, 1985. A restoration application was filed by the appellants, which was dismissed on January 15, 1986. The main ground, along with some other grounds on which the application for restoration was dismissed was that it was time barred by 258 days. 3. The contention of Shri R.M. Lodha, counsel for the appellants is that the appellants had engaged N.M. Kasliwal, as an Advocate, at the relevant time and is now adorning to the Bench as Judge. After his elevation in 1978, Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal was engaged as Advocate. Shri Dilip Singh appeared alongwith Shri N.M. Kasliwal and Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal as junior in the case. It is stated that even though the appeal was dismissed in default on February 7, 1985, an application for execution of decree was moved in trial court only on November 16, 1985. One Ramesh, clerk of Shri K.N. Bhargava, Advocate came to know of these execution proceedings and he could contact Ramavtar appellant only on February 20, 1985 and informed him regarding dismissal of the appeal and filing of the execution application. Immediately, thereafter appellant Ramavtar contacted Shri R.N. Lodha, Advocate and after obtaining certified copy of the order of dismissal of appeal on November 22, 1985, an application for restoration was filed on November 25, 1985. It is, therefore, asserted that the appellants did not delay in filing the restoration application, after they came to know about the fact of the dismissal of their appeal. It is, therefore, asserted that the appellants did not delay in filing the restoration application, after they came to know about the fact of the dismissal of their appeal. It is also pointed out that on the date on which the appeal was dismissed, none of the parties were present in the Court and, therefore, it is asserted that the respondents have no right to be heard regarding the restoration of the appeal. It is further pointed out that the remark of the learned Single Judge that the appellants did not care to ascertain about the progress of the case for about five years after engaging Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal and Shri Dilip Singh is uncalled for. It is also contended that even though an affidavit was filed in support of the restoration application by Ramavtar appellant, but still the learned Single Judge insisted that affidavits of Shri Dilip Singh, Advocate and Shri Ramesh, clerk of K.N. Bhargava, Advocate should have been filed and that specific date regarding the death of Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal should have been mentioned in the application. Shri Lodha also pointed out that in the cause list dated February 7, 1985, the title of the appeal was wrongly printed and, therefore, on this account also, it was not possible for the appellants to have come to know regarding listing of their appeal. 4. Shri R.S. Kejriwal, counsel for the respondents on the other hand has asserted that it was necessary for the appellants to have filed affidavits of Shri Dilip Singh, Advocate and Shri Ramesh, which was not done by the appellants. It is also asserted that late Shri R.V. Agarwal was not engaged as lawyer by the appellants but was given power to appear on behalf of the appellants by Shri Dilip Singh, Advocate. 5. It is also contended that the application for restoration was filed after delay of 258 days and that had been rightly rejected and no interference was called for. 6. We have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and have also perused the judgment of learned Single Judge. The proceedings of the appeal show that the case first of all came up for hearing on February 4, 1985, when no one appeared on behalf of both the parties. 6. We have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and have also perused the judgment of learned Single Judge. The proceedings of the appeal show that the case first of all came up for hearing on February 4, 1985, when no one appeared on behalf of both the parties. The matter was adjourned to February 5, 1985, when Shri R.S. Kejriwal counsel for the respondents appeared and the case was adjourned to February 6, 1985. On this date also Shri Kejriwal appeared on behalf of the respondents but no one appeared on behalf of the appellants. The case was there after put up on February 7, 1985 when none of the parties appeared in the Court and the appeal was dismissed in default of both the parties. It is, therefore, clear from the above proceedings that on the day, the appeal was dismissed no one appeared on behalf of either of the parties and the appeal was dismissed in default of both the parties. Affidavits of Shri Dilip Singh Advocate and Shri Ramesh, Clerk to Shri K.N. Bhargava Adv. have been now filed,in which date of the expiry of Shri R.V. Agarwal has been mentioned as 1st Jan., 1984. It is also mentioned, that reference was held in his memory. Apart from the two affidavits filed now it may be pointed out that no counter affidavit was filed by the respondents in reply to the restoration application. The respondents have now filed reply to the restoration application. It may also be pointed out that after admitting the appeal for bearing, a stay order was also passed by this Court, in compliance of which the appellants deposited amount of Rs. 30,000/- which has also been withdrawn by the respondents as given out by the learned Counsel for the appellants. 7. In the case of Rafiq and Anr. v. Munshi Lal and Anr. AIR 1981 SC 1400 , it was observed by the Apex Court that after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. v. Munshi Lal and Anr. AIR 1981 SC 1400 , it was observed by the Apex Court that after engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watch dog of the Advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. It was further pointed out that as per the present adversary legal system when a person selects his Advocate, brief him and pays his fees can supremely remain confident that his lawyer will look after his interest and such an innocent party who has done everything in his power and expected of him, should not suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission or mis-demeanour of his counsel. 8. In Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1353 , the Apex Court while considering an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, whether could condone or not to condone the delay, laid down following six principles, which may be kept in view while dealing with such matters. (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; (3) "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; (3) "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense and pragmatic manner; (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferted for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay; (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk; (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and its expected to do so. 9. In the present case the facts clearly reveal that the appellants did not come to know about the death of Shri Radha Vallabh Agarwal and therefore consequently also they did not come to know regarding listing of their case before this Court. It may be pointed out that when an appeal is put up for hearing in due course, it is not possible nor expected of the litigant to keep on inquiring from his lawyer regarding the date on which the same is likely to come up for hearing. In fact, what is expected is that when the case appears in monthly /weekly/daily cause list, the counsel has to inform his client regarding the the same. Therefore it cannot be said that the appellants were careless not to have inquired regarding the appeal from their lawyer for number of years when it was to come for hearing in due course. The expression "sufficient cause" implied by the legislature is quite elastic, which enables the Court to comply the law in meaningful manner to serve the ends of justice. This is very purpose for which the institution of courts exists. Apart from the above reasons, even the title of the appeal was not correctly printed in the cause list as has been rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants. This is very purpose for which the institution of courts exists. Apart from the above reasons, even the title of the appeal was not correctly printed in the cause list as has been rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants. The appellants in compliance of the order of this Court while granting stay, have already deposited an amount of Rs. 30,000/-, which has also been withdrawn by the respondents. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal was called on for hearing. This appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, dated January 15, 1986, under appeal is set aside, the S.B. Civil First appeal No. 8/1975, dismissed in default on February 7,1995, is restored and shall be heard and decided on merits in accordance with law. 10. No order as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******