JUDGMENT Gulab C. Gupta, J 1. This judgment shall also govern disposal of Criminal Appeal No. 700 of 83 filed by Biharilal Khanna against the same judgment of conviction and sentence as in this appeal. This judgment will also govern the disposal of Criminal Appeals No. 927 of 83 and 928 of 83 filed by the respondent-State Government against the acquittal of the appellants in the aforesaid two appeals and two others of certain charges and for enhancement of punishment imposed. All the 4 appeals arise out of judgment, dated 6-6-1983 of Shri R. C. Khare, Sessions Judge, Indore at Camp Rewa in Sessions Trial No. 38 of 1970 holding appellant Neeraj Jain and Biharilal Khanna guilty for offence punishable under sections 120-B, 411 and 413, IPC and sentencing them to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for each of the offences. Appellant Biharilal Khanna has also been found guilty under section 467, IPC and sentenced to fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of payment of fine both appellants Neeraj Jain and S. L. Khanna, have been sentenced to 6 months' R. I. The other two persons who have not appealed against the conviction and sentence but against whom the State has preferred appeal. The appellant State is aggrieved by the lenient sentence imposed on them and has preferred appeal for enhancement of sentence, Respondent Mahesh and Chundha have been held guilty under section 379. I. P. C. and section 30 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 but ha\'e been found not guilty of offence under section 413, I.P.C. Respondent Chundh has in addition, been held guilty of offence under section 467, I. P. C 'These two respondents have been found poor, illiterate and justice villager, and used as labourers by the appellants Neeraj Jain and Biharilal Khanna. They have, therefore, been sentenced to imprisonment till rising, of the Court for all offences. That is now, the entire matter is before this Court for re consideration in these appeals. 2. Prosecution case against the accused persons is that they have been excavating, stealing and carrying away ancient idols from Gorgi area of Rewa District and disposing them of for their personal gains. It was alleged that accused Mahesh and Chundha excavated those idols from the area and supplied them to Bilarilal Khanna and Neeraj Jain. 2. Prosecution case against the accused persons is that they have been excavating, stealing and carrying away ancient idols from Gorgi area of Rewa District and disposing them of for their personal gains. It was alleged that accused Mahesh and Chundha excavated those idols from the area and supplied them to Bilarilal Khanna and Neeraj Jain. They smuggled out these idols out of the country and sold them at exorbitant prices. They are, therefore alleged to have committed offences alleged against them. The appellants denied having committed any offence and were, therefore, put on trial where in they have been found guilty, as aforesaid. Since heir conviction and sentences are under challenge in these appeals, it is necessary to note some other details as well. 3. Gorgi is said to be an ancient city situate about 10 miles away from Rewa and flourished under Kalchuy dynesty between Samwat 900 and 1200. It appears that remains of monuments, buildings and temples remained burried in this area. These remains are said to be master pieces of Ka1chury art which because of the place, is also known as Gorgi art. The place was declared to be a protected area under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958. It is no longer in dispute that valuable ancient idols are found buried in this area. There is also no dispute now that 102 pieces of ancient idols were recovered from the premises of Biharilal Khanna on 144 1968, 6-5-1968 and 25-6-1968. It is also no longer in dispute that 127 antiquities were seized from the house of appellant Neeraj Jain between 23-2-1960 and 2-4-1960. It is also not disputed now that seized pieces represent Gorgi art, though there is dispute that they have been dug out and taken away from Gorgi village. On Yagnarayan (PW 89) was also put on trial along with the appellants. He was, however granted pardon and therefore, turned an approver. Evidence of this approver, PW 89 is the main evidence in this case. His evidence is said to be corroborated by evidence of Gajroop (PW 12), Narhar Prasad (PW 16), Gudb (PW 18), Adit Kumar (PW 47), Adit Pratap Singh (PW 15) Ganga Pd. Trivedi (PW 21), Ganga Prasad (PW 6), Shyamsunder (PW 21), Gama (PW 32), Baijnath (PW 33) and Kusumkali (PW 52). His evidence is said to be corroborated by evidence of Gajroop (PW 12), Narhar Prasad (PW 16), Gudb (PW 18), Adit Kumar (PW 47), Adit Pratap Singh (PW 15) Ganga Pd. Trivedi (PW 21), Ganga Prasad (PW 6), Shyamsunder (PW 21), Gama (PW 32), Baijnath (PW 33) and Kusumkali (PW 52). Learned Judge, therefore, held that the evidence of approver (PW 9) would be relied upon to convict and sentence the appellants in accordance with law. 4. Shri R. N. Singh, Advocate for Biharilal Khanna bas not argued his appeal (Criminal Appeal No.700 of 83). Biharilal Khanna personally appeared in this Court and filed an affidavit expressing regret and begging apology for all that bas been found against him. In his affidavit he has submitted that he was of 83 years of age and almost a crippled old man having no material expectation than to devote his remaining life in divine causes. He has, there fore, tendered apology and prayed for forgiveness for errors committed by him. He has also stated with grace that he accepts the verdit of the learned Sessions Judge. Under the circumstances, Criminal Appeal No. 700 of 83 filed by him would not require any serious consideration. In spite of it, it will require consideration if be can be awarded any higher punishment or found guilty of offences for which he has been acquitted. The appeal of appellant Neeraj Jain is, therefore, the only appeal against conviction. 5. It is rather unfortunate that the matter, which according to the State, is of international importance deserving more serious punishment, bas been left to be argued by a Panel Lawyer, Kumari Alka Pandya. Though she has done her best, the Court could not help getting the impression that State by filing these appeals, bas only performed a ritual. If the matter was of any consequence and importance, there was no reason why these appeals could not have been assigned to a Government Advocate who would have prepared the matter to render substantial help to this Court. A Panel Lawyer, as is well known, is given the brief in the evening of the day before the case is listed for final hearing. The brief is usually incomplete. There is, therefore, neither an opportunity nor the facility for the Panel Lawyer to get ready with the matter and render any significant help to the Court. A Panel Lawyer, as is well known, is given the brief in the evening of the day before the case is listed for final hearing. The brief is usually incomplete. There is, therefore, neither an opportunity nor the facility for the Panel Lawyer to get ready with the matter and render any significant help to the Court. The amount that these Panel Lawyers receive is so shockingly low that it makes even an inference of serious study and effort, doubtful. Be that as it may, this Court has the obligation to go through the record of the case, consider submissions made before it and decide these appeals in accordance with law. The help received by the learned counsel representing the parties, coupled with Hs own efforts and research, makes this Court certain that justice will be done in the matter. 6. The submission of the learned counsel for Neeraj Jain, in the main is that though the seized idols represent Kalchury art or Gorgi art, evidence on record does not establish that they have been procured from Gorgi area to which the charge relates. Under the circumstances, it is submitted that the appellant has been illegally convicted and sentenced. Criticising the approver's evidence, it is submitted that no other witness supports him and therefore, his evidence is of no legal consequence. It is also submitted that there is no satisfactory evidence to establish that the idols which are alleged to have dug from Gorgi, are the idols seized from the possession of the appellant. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court should hold that the evidence against the appellant does not prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It is also submitted that the idols were not identified in the Court and therefore, it could not be held that they are the stolen properties. Lastly, it is submitted that in case this Court does not find any illegality in the conviction, it should hold that there is no case for enhancement of sentence. The appellant, therefore, prays that his appeal should be allowed and that he should be acquitted. In any case, it is submitted that the appeal filed by the State should be dismissed. Learned counsel for the State, however, supported the conviction and prayed for more serious punishment. The appellant, therefore, prays that his appeal should be allowed and that he should be acquitted. In any case, it is submitted that the appeal filed by the State should be dismissed. Learned counsel for the State, however, supported the conviction and prayed for more serious punishment. According to the learned counsel, the learned Judge has given the reduced punishment only because the trial had remained pending for long. This approach, according to the learned counsel is neither legal nor justified. It is submitted that the delay in the trial has taken place because the appellant has been approaching higher Courts and thereby causing unnecessary delay. It is therefore, prayed that more serious punishment should be awarded. 7. Since Yagnarayan (PW 89) is the most important witness for the prosecution and he is an accomplice turned approver the first question requiring consideration of this Court is whether his evidence can be relied upon? An approver, without doubt is a selfish person who has given up the company of other accused persons, having purchased his acquittal. The English Law regarding such witnesses is given in detail by the Supreme Court in Blawant Kaur v. Union Territory of Chandigarh AIR 1988 SC 139 . The Indian Law has, however, a statutory base. Section 114 (b) read with section 133 of the Evidence Act provide the structural frame of this law. A combined reading of these two provisions makes it clear that the Court is entitled to presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credence unless corroborated in material particulars but this does not mean that he is not a competent witness. A conviction is not illegal merely because it is founded upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. This is indeed a rule of practice which has acquired the sanctity of the rule of law under the circumstances. a Court of law must always remain alive to the danger of accepting an accomplice's uncorroborated evidence as he is a person earning pardon on the condition of giving evidence against others. Good deal of judicial guidance is, however, available on the subject, the more recent being Balwant Kaur's case (supra). In Ranjit Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1988 SC 672. Good deal of judicial guidance is, however, available on the subject, the more recent being Balwant Kaur's case (supra). In Ranjit Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1988 SC 672. The Supreme Court has quoted with approval the following observations in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1969 SC 961 , which represent the case law on the subject :- "An accomplice is undoubtedly a competent witness under the Indian Evidence Act. There can be, however, no doubt that the very fact that he has participated in the commission of the offence introduces a serious taint in his evidence and Courts are naturally reluctant to' act on such tainted evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. It would not, however be right to expect that such independent corroboration should Cover the whole of the prosecution case or even all the material particulars of the prosecution case. If such a view is adopted it will render the evidence of the accomplice wholly superfluous. On the other hand, it will not be safe to act upon such evidence merely because it is corroborated in minor particulars or incidental details because in such a case, corroboration does not afford the necessary assurance that the main story disclosed by the approver can be reasonably and safely accepted as true." The growing awareness among our masses towards their duties and obligations and a sense of responsibility are additional reasons for accepting the testimony of the approver provided it meets the aforesaid corroborative test. Yagnarayan has, of course, been granted pardon, but from his evidence it appears that be was an employee and had agreed to work to satisfy his economic needs. He is certainly not a criminal. Cases are not wanting when otherwise an innocent person, is forced by economic necessities to accept employment with persons engaged in illegal activities. Such persons when learn about illegality, get an opportunity to weigh balance of convenience and answer the call of conscience by, becoming approver. There should, therefore be little more credibility attached to the evidence of such persons turning approver than a person otherwise 'engaged' in illegal activities with no compelling necessity. Be that as it may, the law is clear and does not entitle this Court to reject the evidence of such a witness. There should, therefore be little more credibility attached to the evidence of such persons turning approver than a person otherwise 'engaged' in illegal activities with no compelling necessity. Be that as it may, the law is clear and does not entitle this Court to reject the evidence of such a witness. In spite of it, Yagnarayan cannot be assigned any special privilege and therefore, his evidence must be found acceptable as the evidence of any other Witness. He has deposed that he knows Neeraj Jain (Para 1). He has not been cross-examined on this point and therefore, there appears to be difficulty in accepting his statement that he is known to appellant Neeraj Jain. According to him, he has gone to appellant Biharilal Khanna seeking employment as a conductor. That appellant Biharilal Khanna was engaged in running a bus service is apparent from, the record and therefore, is not unlikely that he had gone to him seeking employment. He instead of being employed as a conductor was employed for transporting idols from Gorgi. According to him chundha and Sudharahan, were engaged in digging out, idols and he joined them (Para 1). He further deposes that Neeraj Jain and deceased Kapur were subsequently introduced to him by Khanna as his partners. Several Americans had been to the spot with Neeraj Jain to purchase idols and carried those idols in their cars (Para 5). He further stated that Khanna's bus was plying between Satna and Gudh and he carried several idols to the house of Neeraj Jain in that bus (Para 6). In Para 11 of his deposition he deposed that the idols were dug from the area which was fenced by barbed wire and stones. According to him not only the State but also Neeraj Jain had stored idols at that place from which they were subsequently taken the either Biharilal Khanna or Neeraj Jain’s house. He has also deposed that Neeraj Jain had given him a printed book (Para 27) to understand the modality of sale of that ancient idols (Para 17). In crosse-examination he admitted that 8 idols were seized by the Police from his own house (Para 4). He denied that he was giving any false statement under pressure of the Police. He was confronted with his statement before the - Tahsildar Ex. D-17, recorded under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure and admitted having given the statement. In crosse-examination he admitted that 8 idols were seized by the Police from his own house (Para 4). He denied that he was giving any false statement under pressure of the Police. He was confronted with his statement before the - Tahsildar Ex. D-17, recorded under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure and admitted having given the statement. He further admitted that Tahsildar had informed that the statement would be used against him and therefore, he was free not to give any statement. He has been cross-examined about the house of appellant Neeraj Jain and has given fairly good decription there of in Para 35 of his statement. He has asserted that he had carried at least 7-8 idols from Gorgi to appellant Neeraj Jain’s house. He was further confronted with his case diary statement, Ex. P-16, which does not contain description of the idol but he asserted that he had given the details to the Police and cannot say why it was not mentioned therein. He has asserted that appellant Neeraj Jain had supervised the work of digging idols (Para 38). He has also stated that it was Biharilal Khanna who told him that Neeraj Jain was his partner but he had not seen any paper about it. It would, therefore, appear that this witness had treated appellant Neeraj Jain as a partner of appellant B. L. Khanna and had carried idols from Gorgi to his place. There appears some omissions or variations between his Court statement and earlier statements, Exs. D-15 and D-17. This Court had the advantage of reading specific portions of his evidence, Ex. D-15, and finds nothing material to doubt his Court statement. As far as Ex. D-15 is concerned, portions marked 'B' to 'B' and 'C' to 'C' are the only portions relatable to appellant Neeraj Jain. These portions deal with relationship between Neeraj Jain and this witness and supervision by Neeraj Jain of digging work. His Court statement read in proper perspective is not different than the statement at 'B' to 'B' and 'C' to 'C'. He was not directly employed by appellant Neeraj Jain and therefore, his statement about relationship of employer and employee is understandable. He has also not stated that appellant Neeraj Jain was regularly supervising digging operations and therefore, his statement at 'C' to 'C' is also understandable. He was not directly employed by appellant Neeraj Jain and therefore, his statement about relationship of employer and employee is understandable. He has also not stated that appellant Neeraj Jain was regularly supervising digging operations and therefore, his statement at 'C' to 'C' is also understandable. It would, therefore, appear that evidence of Yagnarayan (PW 89) is otherwise clear and cogent and would by itself, be sufficient to justify conviction of the appellant. However, in view of section 114, illustration (b) of the Evidence Act, it would be proper to find corroboration, if any, from other evidence on record. In spite of it, it is not proper to expect corroboration of the whole of the prosecution case or even of all the material of the prosecution case. The corroboration as prescribed by Supreme Court in Ranjeet Singh's case (supra) is really the corroboration needed. The broad spectrum of the Yagnarayan's version is already ascertained as aforesaid and the corroboration from other evidence is required to ensure that the aforesaid version is true and therefore, reliable. Idols seized from the houses of appellant Neeraj Jain are those mentioned in Exs. P-121 and P-122, proved by Chhotelal (PW 81). This witness has identified idols Nos. 88, 90, 91 92 and 93 seized specifically from appellant Neeraj Jain's house. Prof K. D. Bajpai (PW13) has given his opinion that the idols belonged to Gorgi area. That these idols are the idols belonged to Gorgi area. That these idols are the idols of Kalchury area and represent "Gorgi art" is not disputed now. That Yagnarayan was engaged in digging with the idols from this area is the statement of Parashotam Tiwari (PW 23), Govind Prasad (PW 24), Satnarayan (PW 25), Awhdh Saran (PW 26), Ramlal (PW 27); Ramdhani (PW 3), Gama (PW 32), and Ramchandra (PW 34). It is true that some of these witnesses have turned hostile and have been cross-examined. But that, by itself is not sufficient to discard their evidence. In spite of their being declared hostile they have stated enough to indicate that Yagnarayan Was the person involved in the deal. Rampratap (PW 30) and Brijnandan Singh (PW 40) support his story that the idols were being carried from Gorgi in the bus operated by Biharilal Khanna. But that, by itself is not sufficient to discard their evidence. In spite of their being declared hostile they have stated enough to indicate that Yagnarayan Was the person involved in the deal. Rampratap (PW 30) and Brijnandan Singh (PW 40) support his story that the idols were being carried from Gorgi in the bus operated by Biharilal Khanna. Brijnandan Singh (PW 4) has deposed that he had seen appellant Neeraj Jain and other at the village and had also seen Sudarshan, keeping some idols in the car used by them. He has also identified some idols vide, Ex. P-21. He has proved that idol Nos. 88, 90, 94 and 93 belonged to the Gorgi area. Idol No. 90 is the idol admittedly seized from Neeraj Jain. Naththolal (PW 4) is the Choukidar of Parwati Mandir at Nachna and has deposed that some idols from that Mandir had been stolen. He had seen those idols in the Court's store. Krishna (PW 41) has examined seized idols and opined that they belonged to the Kalchuri area. Kusumkali (PW 52) is the wife of Sudarshan who was engaged in selling idols. She has identified Biharilal Khanna as the person who used to, obtain idols from her husband. It would, therefore, appear that idols were seized from the house of appellant Neeraj Jain, these idols were old and represent Gorgi art, that they were obtained through Yagnarayan and that appellant Neeraj Jain was working as a partner of Biharilal Khanna is proved from other evidence on record and to that extent evidence of Yagnarayan finds corroboration. As held earlier, it is not necessary that every part of Yagnarayan's evidence should be corroborated. The aforesaid corroboration, in the opinion of this Court, leaves no possibility of Yagnarayan falsely accusing appellant Neeraj Jain. Under the circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in affirming the conclusion that appellant Neeraj Jain was engaged in obtaining stolen idols from Gorgi area and is, therefore guilty of the of• fence as found by the learned Sessions Judge. 8. It is true that all idols seized from the possession of appellant Neeraj Jain have not been proved to be the idols from Gorgi area. Yagnarayan (PW 89) has proved only 7 of them being delivered to this appellant. Under the circumstances, relying upon his evidence appellant Neeraj Jain would at the most be held responsible for 7 idols only. It is true that all idols seized from the possession of appellant Neeraj Jain have not been proved to be the idols from Gorgi area. Yagnarayan (PW 89) has proved only 7 of them being delivered to this appellant. Under the circumstances, relying upon his evidence appellant Neeraj Jain would at the most be held responsible for 7 idols only. The other idols found in his possession even according to him, are the idols of Kalchuri area and represent Gogri art. The fact that such idols are found in other places in Gorgi area is, by itself not sufficient to give him any benefit of doubt. That ancient idols were stolen from Gorgi area is proved by Naththolal (PW 4). The fact that idols seized from the appellant could be the idols of the said area should be sufficient to hold him guilty. This Court would be entitled to presume that they are stolen idols. There is nothing on record to explain how appellant Neeraj Jain came in lawful possession thereof. Appellant is really not charged for stealing those idols, he is charged for receiving the stolen property and habitually dealing with them and for that purpose being a part of conspiracy. In such a situation it is not necessary to prove that each idol found in his possession was personally brought by him from Gorgi area. Similarly the fact that each and every idol has not been identified as being brought from that area would not give any benefit to the appellant as the evidence suggests that the seized idols are the Idols from that area and in the absence of and thing else, the Court would be justified in holding that they are stolen from that area. If appellant had lawfully obtained these idols from any other place, it was his obligation to place necessary material for consideration of the Court. Under the circumstances, this Court finds nothing illegal in the conviction of the appellant. The appellant's conviction is, therefore, upheld. 9. As regards the appeal of Biharilal Khanna it is not considered necessary to deal with its merits in view of the affidavit tendering apology for the same. His conviction is also maintained. 10. This brings the appeal of the state for enhancement of sentence, for consideration. As far as Bharilal Khanna is concerned he is a person of advance age of 83 years. His conviction is also maintained. 10. This brings the appeal of the state for enhancement of sentence, for consideration. As far as Bharilal Khanna is concerned he is a person of advance age of 83 years. He personally appeared in this Court and, therefore this court has no hesitation in accepting his statement that be was aged 83 years. The manner in which he has accepted the verdict of the learned Sessions Court prompts this Court to deal with him sympathetically. Not only the age but also the fact, that the appellant-State has not been very serious in prosecuting its own appeal makes this Court feel that there is no case for enhancement of sentence. This is so in spite of the fact the State is not responsible for prolonging trial. Under the circumstances, the sentence imposed on Biharilal Khanna is also affirmed. As far as Neeraj Jain is concerned, he is also an aged person and a responsible citizen. Possibility of his dealing with antiquities on wrong legal assumptions cannot be ruled out. Under the circumstances, his case cannot be taken to be in any way different from the case of Biharilal Khanna. The sentence imposed on him is consequently affirmed. As regards respondents Chundha and Mahesh, learned Sessions Judge has given good and cogent reasons for their being involved in the matter. For rustic villagers like them employment opportunities and means of earning livelihood are much more important. Under the circumstances, their involvement in the case cannot be held to be intentional. The sentence imposed upon them is, no doubt lenient but it is not so shockingly low as to justify an interference at this stage. 11. In view of the discussion aforesaid, all four appeals are held to be without merit and dismissed. 12. From the impugned Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge it appears that a direction has been given to hand over seized idols to the Collector, Rewa. This court would not like these rare antiquities to remain lying unattended in a Government godown and would, therefore, like to modify the aforesaid direction. It is directed that the seized idols shall be handed over to the Collector, Rewa on the undertaking that he will get them displayed in a public museum at Rewa, if there be one. This court would not like these rare antiquities to remain lying unattended in a Government godown and would, therefore, like to modify the aforesaid direction. It is directed that the seized idols shall be handed over to the Collector, Rewa on the undertaking that he will get them displayed in a public museum at Rewa, if there be one. In case there be no museum at Rewa and the Collector is not able to make arrangement for public display of these idols within six months, he shall hand them over to the Rani Durgavati Museum at Jabalpur for the purpose.