JUDGMENT V. K. Mehrotra, A. C. J.—This and the connected revisions (being Civil Revision Nos. 153, 154, 155 of 1982 and 102 of 1981) under section 21 (5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, (Act No. 23 of 1971) (for brief, "the Act") raise a common question of law. They were hear together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. For convenience, the facts of the case giving rise to Civil Revision No. 224 of 1982 are being mentioned. 2. The premises in dispute is the upper storey of house No. 39/1, J.C. Building (Kuthiala building) Middle Bazar, Simla. Applicant Gauri Shankar is its tenant. Respondent, Tilak Raj Sharma, purchased the building on June 15, 1972. He was living in the lower portion of house No. 39/1 from before as a tenant. On March 18, 1975 a petition under section 14 of the Act was filed by Tilak Raj Sharma seeking ejectment of Gauri Shankar, inter alia, on the ground that he needed the upper storey of the house in the tenancy of Gauri Shankar for his personal occupation. Section 14 (3) (a) (i) permits the landlord to apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, in the case of a residential building, on the ground that he requires it for his own occupation. Evidence was partly recorded before the Controller in November 1976. Recording of evidence on behalf of the landlord was concluded in November, 1979. In January 1980, the evidence on behalf of the tenant was recorded. The Controller made an order on November 29, 1980 allowing the application and directing ejectment of the tenant. The appeal, which the tenant filed before the Appellate Authority, also failed. The Appellate Authority upheld the direction for ejectment made by the Controller, on August 13, 1982. The present revision was filed in this Court on September 7/8,1982. The tenant seeks the setting aside of the order passed by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority (Addl. District Judge, Simla). During the pendency of the revision the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (Act No. 25 of 1987) was enacted. It received the assent of the President on October 10, 1987. By section 1 (3), the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on November 17, 1971. District Judge, Simla). During the pendency of the revision the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (Act No. 25 of 1987) was enacted. It received the assent of the President on October 10, 1987. By section 1 (3), the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on November 17, 1971. This is the date with effect wherefrom the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, was enforced on account of its publication in the Extra-ordinary Gazette of that date. 3. Section 14 (3) underwent a change. In the 1987 Act it reads thus: "14(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession — (a) in the case of a residential building, if— (i) he requires it for his own occupation : Provided that he is not occupying another residential building owned by him, in the urban area concerned: Provided further that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application, in the said urban area; (ii).................................................................................. (iii).................................................................................. (iv).................................................................................. (4)............................................................................................... (5)............................................................................................... Sub-section (6) was added: (6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall be made under this section on the ground specified in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of such acquisition. (7)............................................................................................... 4. Section 34 then provides thus:— “34. Repeal and Savings.—(1) The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (3), all suits, appeals and other proceedings, including execution proceedings, under the said Act pending, before any court or appellate or revisional authority, on the day shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as if the provisions contained in this Act were at the relevant time, in force. (3) Nothing contained herein shall authorise any court or authority or tribunal to reopen any suit or proceedings in which the orders passed here already become final and executed." 5. By virtue of the aforesaid, the provision contained in sub-section (6) of section 14 became applicable to the instant case as well. 6. (3) Nothing contained herein shall authorise any court or authority or tribunal to reopen any suit or proceedings in which the orders passed here already become final and executed." 5. By virtue of the aforesaid, the provision contained in sub-section (6) of section 14 became applicable to the instant case as well. 6. The submission on behalf of the tenant is that the application which the landlord had made for an order of eviction against him had been made within a period of 5 years of the date of the acquisition of the property in suit by transfer. As such, it was incompetent and no order of eviction founded upon such an application could be upheld. Reliance, in this respect, was placed on behalf of the tenant upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, The first of these was in the case of B. Banerjee v. Smt Anita Pan, AIR 1975 SC 1146, and the second in the case of Anandilal Bhanuarlal and another v. Smt. Kasturi Devi Generiwala and another, AIR 1985 SC 376, Reliance was also placed upon a decision of the Madras High Court in Thangammal and another v. Narayanaswami Iyer and another, (1956)1 Madras Law Journal 474, and that of the Kerala High Court in Hameed Ittoop, 1970 Kerala Law Times 501. 7. The language in which sub-section (6) of section 14 is couched is in imperative terms. It says that no application for the recovery of possession of the premises shall be made unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of acquisition of the premises by transfer. It is clear that the prohibition enjoined by this sub-section is upon the competence of the Controller to entertain an application for recovery of possession of premises, which have been acquired by the landlord by transfer, till such time that a period of 5 years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition of the premises by transfer by him. The Rent Controller is clearly precluded from entertaining an application for eviction of the tenant by a landlord, on the ground that he required it for his own occupation, for a period of 5 years from the date of acquisition of the premises by the landlord by transfer. The Rent Controller is clearly precluded from entertaining an application for eviction of the tenant by a landlord, on the ground that he required it for his own occupation, for a period of 5 years from the date of acquisition of the premises by the landlord by transfer. If an application on that ground is made before the expiry of the period of 5 years, it is bound to be rejected forthwith without going into its merit. On the language used by the Legislature this intendment is unmistakable. 8. In Thangammal, (1956) 1 Madras Law Journal 474, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court was concerned with a case under the Malabar Tenancy Act (XIV of 1930). Section 25 of the Act enabled the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement. An amendment was made in this provision by the Malabar Tenancy Act (VII of 1954) wherein an assignee of a landlords rights could institute proceedings for recovery of possession only after the expiry of two years from the date of the assignment. The provision was retrospective in operation and applied to the pending proceedings as well. The question was whether a suit for eviction, which had been instituted before the expiry of two years from the date of assignment, was maintainable. Relying upon several earlier decisions of the Court, the Division Bench took the view that at the time the suit was instituted the court was incompetent to take its cognizance. To borrow the words of the Bench "........What is contemplated is that the Court would have no jurisdiction or right to take cognizance of a matter like this. Applying that principle to the present case, it is clear that at the time the suit was instituted the court was incompetent to take cognizance of the suit..............." The suit was dismissed. In V. N. Sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai and another, AIR 1966 SC 432, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was dealing with section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958). Sub-section (6) of section 14 provided that where a landlord had acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises would lie under sub-section (1) on the ground that he needed the premises bona fide as provided by section 14 (1) (e). Sub-section (6) of section 14 provided that where a landlord had acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises would lie under sub-section (1) on the ground that he needed the premises bona fide as provided by section 14 (1) (e). It was observed by the Supreme Court (in paragraph 8 of the Report) that if sub-section (6) was applicable, the application made by the landlord would be barred because a period of 5 years had not elapsed from the date of acquisition of the property by him when the application was made. However, on the facts of that case their lordships took the view that the allotment of a parcel of property belonging to an undivided Hindu family to an individual coparcener, as a result of partition, did not amount to acquisition of the property by that coparcener under section 14 (6). 9. Relying upon the principle laid down by the Supreme Court and the decision of the Madras High Court in Thangammal a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court ruled in Hameed, 1970 Kerala Law Times 501, that where the application for eviction was made prior to the expiry of the time during which it could not be made by the landlord who had obtained the property by assignment, the application would be barred. No order of eviction could be made on its basis even though the period during which the prohibition was to operate may have expired by the time the Rent Control Court ordered the eviction of the tenant. The proviso to section 11 (3) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Kerala, 1965) said that no landlord, whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos would be entitled to be put in possession until after the expiry of one year of the date of the instrument. In the opinion of the Court, the terms of the relevant proviso placed an absolute bar against the filing of an application for eviction on the ground of the landlords bona fide requirement before the expiry of period of one year from the date of the transfer inter vivos. 10. In B. Banerjee, AIR 1975 SC 1146, the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 10. In B. Banerjee, AIR 1975 SC 1146, the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Section 13 of the Act provided for recovery of possession by a landlord of premises let out by him on several grounds. One of such grounds mentioned in clause (f) was where the premises were reasonably required by the landlord, inter alia, for his own occupation. The Act was retrospectively amended in the year 1969 by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act. The contents of clause (f) were spliting in two separate clauses (f) and (ff). Sub-section (3-A) was added to section 13 saying that where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned clause (f) or clause (ff) could be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest. The basic question which was agitated before the Supreme Court was whether the amendment was retrospective in character and would apply to pending proceedings as well. The Supreme Court held that it was so and would apply also to pending proceedings. Taking into consideration the fact that clauses (f) and (ff), as brought in by the Amending Act, were not in existence when the proceedings which ultimately went before the Supreme Court were instituted, the Court permitted the landlord to amend the pleadings, in the light of the requirement of these two clauses, and directed the matter to be tried afresh in respect of those pleas, instead of dismissing the claim of the landlord on account of the bar brought about by sub-section (3-A) of section 13. To borrow the words of their lordships of the Supreme Court (in paragraphs 27 to 30 of the report) "the bigger roadblock in the way of the plaintiff in a pending action lies in the prohibition of the institution of the suit within three years of the transfer from the landlord............................The prohibition clamped down by sub-section (2-A), carefully read is on suits for recovery of possession by transferee landlords on any of the grounds mentioned in Cl. (f) or Cl. (ff) of sub-section (1). Obviously the suits with which we are concerned are not for recovery on grounds contained in Cls. (f) and (ff). (f) or Cl. (ff) of sub-section (1). Obviously the suits with which we are concerned are not for recovery on grounds contained in Cls. (f) and (ff). They were based on the repealed Cl (f) of section 13 of the basic Act............................Since the new Cls. (f) and (ff) are included by the Amendment Act in section 13 of the basic Act and since the suits we are concerned with, as they now stand, do not seek eviction on those grounds, they will have to be dismissed on account of the omnibus inhibition on recovery of possession contained in section 13 itself........................We are satisfied that as far as possible courts must avoid multiplicity of litigation...................On this footing we are prepared to interpret section 13 of the Amendment Act and give effect to section 4 of that Act................We do it by directing the plaintiffs in the two cases to file fresh pleadings setting out their grounds under Cls. (f) and/or (ff) of sub section (1) if they so wish. On such pleading being filed we may legitimately hold that the transferee landlord institutes his suit on grounds mentioned in Cls. (f) or (ff) of subsection (I) on that date...........................................We are conscious that to shorten litigation we are straining language to the little extent of interpreting the expression "institution of the suit" as amounting to filing of fresh pleading..............................By this construction................we promote public justice................without in the least imperilling the protection conferred by the Amendment Act....................We save the tenant by applying it to pending cases and save him also from litigative waste." 11. It is clear that the amendment in pleadings was permitted by the Supreme Court in the peculiar circumstances of the case where it found that the two grounds contained in clauses (f) and (ff), in relation to which prohibition contained in sub-section (3-A) was applicable, had been introduced by the Amending Act. 12. In Anandilal Bhanwarlah AIR 1985 SC 376, again the Supreme Court was concerned with a case under the West .Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, as amended. The first question to be considered was in regard to the prohibition contained in sub-section (3-A) in respect of a claim for occupation on the basis of personal requirement for three years where property was acquired by transfer. The first question to be considered was in regard to the prohibition contained in sub-section (3-A) in respect of a claim for occupation on the basis of personal requirement for three years where property was acquired by transfer. The Supreme Court (in paragraph 4 of the report) observed that "the building in which the suit premises are situated was purchased by the respondent-landlord on March 13,1963. The suit for eviction giving rise to the present appeal was instituted on June 23, 1964. Admittedly, the suit was instituted within the period of three years from the date of the purchase. Under the circumstances the suit was incompetent at the point of time when it was instituted. The decree for eviction on the ground of requirement for personal occupation could not therefore have been lawfully passed against the appellants. The appellants should have succeeded on this ground in the High Court itself but for the fact that the High Court was of the opinion that section 13(3-A) introduced by the second amending Act in 1969 to the extent that it was given retrospective effect was ultra vires, being violative of Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution of India. In Barterjee v. Anita Pawar, AIR 1975 SC 1146, this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the said provision even in so far as its retrospective operation is concerned. The appellant must therefore succeed and the decree for eviction..........................beset aside." In the same paragraph their lordships considered the question whether they should remand the matter to the trial court or permit the landlord to file a fresh plaint claiming eviction under section 13(1) (ff) of the amended Act. They decided against the remand accorded liberty to the landlord to file a fresh suit on the ground envisioned by section 13(1) (ff) of the Act. 13. The main submission, on behalf of the landlord, has been that the bar introduced by section 14(6), though retrospectively brought on the statute book in the 1987 Act, was only with a view to obviate a situation where unscrupulous landlords might try to get their tenants evicted by transferring the property, having themselves failed to seek their eviction on a permissible ground, and the transferee setting up the plea that he required it for his own occupation. Where, during the pendency of the proceedings, the period of five years elapses between the date of acquisition of the property by transfer and the actual stage for passing an order of recovery of possession in favour of the transferee landlord is reached, the object of the statute would stand satisfied. As such, the proceedings need not be invalidated on the ground that the application for seeking recovery of possession was made before the expiry of a period of five years from the date of acquisition of the property by the transferee. Instead, the need of the landlord should be considered on its merits and if he was found entitled, on facts to an order in his favour, it should be permitted to be passed instead of driving the landlord to the necessity of initiating proceedings afresh. The principle which the learned Counsel for the landlord invoked was that during the pendency of the proceedings before the Controller or the Appellate Authority the cause of action became available to the landlord the moment a period of five years elapsed from the date when he acquired the property by transfer. The Court, should, therefore, take the view that the embargo of five years having got lifted during the pendency of the proceedings it was equitable to take into consideration this subsequent fact, occurring after the institution of the proceedings, and permit passing of an order in favour of the landlord, if the facts on record so justify, beyond a period of five years from the date of acquisition by him of the property by transfer. 14. The submissions aforesaid were sought to be supported by Shri G. C. Gupta, learned Counsel leading the arguments on behalf of the landlords, by some precedents, 15. In Subbaraya Chetty v. Nachiar Ammal, AIR 1918 Madras 143, a Division Bench said that on the finding of the District Judge it was clear that the defendant had received the money though he found that the suit was premature because of the terms of the unregistered mortgage bond. In Subbaraya Chetty v. Nachiar Ammal, AIR 1918 Madras 143, a Division Bench said that on the finding of the District Judge it was clear that the defendant had received the money though he found that the suit was premature because of the terms of the unregistered mortgage bond. The Division Bench observed that "having regard to the fact that immediately after the suit the money became payable, it was undesirable that the plaintiff should be compelled to institute another suit for the money.5 Relying upon the principle that the courts have power to grant a decree when a cause of action arose subsequent to the suit, the Bench decreed the suit, reversing the decree passed by the District Judge. The same principle was applied by a single Judge of the Madras High Court in Butchiraju and others v. Doddi Seetharamayya and others, AIR 1926 Madras 377. it was held that even though the sum of money had not become payable on the date of the suit, which was premature when filed as the mortgage deed allowed 15 years for payment, since the money had become payable thereafter, the court could pass a decree for its recovery. 16. In Labhu Ram v. Charnu Fauju and others, AIR 1929 Lahore 409, The suit was premature when filed. During the pendency thereof, however, the cause of action arose. It was observed (at page 415 of the report) that "there is ample authority, however, that, where a cause of action arises only after the suit has been instituted, still the suit may be decreed in certain circumstances................” 17. In Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and others v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and others, AIR 1941 Federal Court 5, the provisions of section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act (3 of 1938) were held to be ultra vires by the High Court. In Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and others v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and others, AIR 1941 Federal Court 5, the provisions of section 11 of the Bihar Money-lenders Act (3 of 1938) were held to be ultra vires by the High Court. While the matter was pending in appeal before the Federal Court the aforesaid Act was repealed and re-enacted as Act 7 of 1939 It was observed by the Federal Court that "the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of India is in the nature of re-hearing and therefore in moulding the relief to be granted, in a case on appeal, the appellate Court is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against." It took into consideration section 7 of the new Act which had replaced section 11 of the old Act. 18. In Ramdayal v. Maji Devdiji, AIR 1956 Rajasthan 12, a Division Bench observed that "even though the general rule was that the rights of parties to a suit must be regulated with reference to their state at the date of the institution of the suit and a suit must be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as existed on the date of its commencement, it was open to the court, in exceptional cases to take into consideration events which may have taken place subsequent to the filing of the suit and grant relief on their basis." In Surinder Kumar and others v. Gian Chand and others, AIR 1957 SC 875, while considering an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Punjab High Court, the Supreme Court permitted additional evidence about the fact of grant of probate, which had supervened pending decision of the appeal, being brought on the record and after taking it into consideration decided the appeal. It noticed the decision of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul, AIR 1941 Federal Court 5 in which the observations made by the Chief Justice Hughes in Patterson v. State of Alabama, to the effect that in determining what justice required, the court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which had supervened were quoted with approval. Relying upon the same principle, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed in Krishna Chandra Pramanik and others v. Hari Sadan Sahana and another, AIR 1981 Calcutta 435, that the application for pre-emption was premature on the date when it was made, it must be treated as one, made on the date when the applicants right did mature, and upheld the pre-emptors right. 19. The principles which have been recognised in the decisions cited by Shri Gupta are unexceptionable. The question, however, is whether they are attracted in a case like the present where the Legislature mandates in imperative terms that the proceedings shall not be instituted for a period of five years from the date of acquisition of the property by transfer by the landlord 1 he prohibition is absolute and impinges upon the competence of the Rent Controller to entertain the proceedings. It touches his jurisdiction. It cannot be equated with a case where the cause of action may be said to have arisen later during the pendency of the proceedings. Nor can the expiry of a period of 5 years from the date of acquisition of the property by transfer be said to be an event taking place subsequent to the date of the institution of the proceedings which can be taken into account while recording a decision on the merits of the claim of the landlord. The applicability of the two principles canvassed by the learned Counsel for the landlord is ruled out by the language which the Legislature has used in subsection (6) of section 14 of the Act. This sub-section robs the Rent Controller of Jurisdiction to entertain any application for a period of five years from the date of acquisition by the landlord of the property by transfer for being put in possession of that property on the ground of his personal need. Any application made before the expiry of the period prescribed by sub-section (6) of section 14 is bound to be dismissed on this ground alone as has clearly been observed by the Supreme Court in Anadilal Bhanwarlal and another v. Smt, Kasturi Devi Generiwala and another, AIR 1985 SC 376. 20. Any application made before the expiry of the period prescribed by sub-section (6) of section 14 is bound to be dismissed on this ground alone as has clearly been observed by the Supreme Court in Anadilal Bhanwarlal and another v. Smt, Kasturi Devi Generiwala and another, AIR 1985 SC 376. 20. In sum, it must be held that the entire proceedings, giving rise to the present revision, which were initiated by an application made before expiry of a period of 5 years from the date of acquisition by the landlord of the premises by transfer are void. The revision by the tenant deserves to be and is allowed. The landlords application shall stand dismissed. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. Order accordingly. -