A. P. MISHRA, J. ( 1 ) THE aforesaid two revisions were filed by the defendant as against the impugned order dated 23rd July, 1987, by virtue of which his application for setting aside ex parte decree were rejected. Before the admission of the case this Court issued notice to the plaintiff/respondent and he having appeared and (filed) counter-affidavit to the affidavit accompanying stay application and rejoinder affidavit having been filed by the parties, it became desirable and accordingly the aforesaid two revisions are being disposed of finally after hearing learned counsel for the parties at the stage of admission. The impugned order dated 23rd July, 1987, disposed both the Misc. Case No. 4 of 1986 (J. S. C. C. Suit No. 12 of 1983) and Misc. Case No. 5 of 1986 (J. S. C. C. Suit No. 12 of 1983) by means of a common judgement. Since facts in the aforesaid two cases were identical, therefore, the appellate Court decided the case by a common judgement. Accordingly, the aforesaid two revisions are being disposed of by means of this order. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts in these revisions are : the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the applicant. The suit was contested denying plaint allegations with further averment that provisions of Act 13 of 1972 are applicable and the suit has been filed on incorrect facts. On 28th Oct. 1985, as per the order sheet filed by the respondent an application 48-C was made by the applicant for getting the map prepared by the Court Amin in order to effectively dispose of the present dispute. On this the court directed to file an objection and fixed for disposal 27th Nov. 1985. On that date the court ordered that that be put up for disposal after the evidence is over and fixed 20th Dec. 1985, for evidence. On an application of the applicant on 20th Dec. the case was fixed on 8th January, 1986. On this date, the case of the applicant is that since by inadvertence he noted down 18th Jan. instead of 8th January and thus did not come on that date. When the case was called the plaintiff along with his counsel was present but none was present on behalf of the respondent. the case was fixed on 8th January, 1986. On this date, the case of the applicant is that since by inadvertence he noted down 18th Jan. instead of 8th January and thus did not come on that date. When the case was called the plaintiff along with his counsel was present but none was present on behalf of the respondent. As per order sheet, it reveals that since counsel for the applicant came in that court in connection with some other case, on inquiry from the court, he stated that he has no instructions in this matter. It is thereafter the court proceeded with the recording of evidence of the plaintiff after lunch and after conclusing the same fixed 9th January for judgement. Since thereafter after receiving intimation the applicant on 9th contacted his counsel when he was informed that since the case is fixed for judgement nothing can be done and he has to apply thereafter for setting aside ex parte decree. Thus, on the advice of his counsel on that date no application was made under O. IX, R. 13, C. P. C. Ex parte judgement, however, was made on 22nd Jan. 1986. Thereafter, within limitation applicant examined the record of the case and made the application before the trial court for setting aside the ex parte decree, which was rejected by means of the impugned order, which is subject matter of present revisions. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant urged that the impugned order suffers from patent illegality as in rejecting the application of the applicant it did not properly look into the record before it and arrived at a conclusion contrary to the evidence on the record and its inferences were legally not sustainable in the eye of law and in doing so exercised its discretion not properly in accordance with law. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents at the outset urged that even application under O. IX, R. 13, C. P. C. was not maintainable as the decision was made in the presence of the counsel and in view of that it cannot be said that the decree is ex parte and it would not be covered under O. XVII, R. 3 (a) C. P. C. Counsels presence was relied on the basis of counsel statement in the case that he has no instructions. In the alternative, it was urged, when the counsel made the statement that he had no instructions he ceased to be counsel in that case and subsequently when he made application for setting aside ex parte decree he had no authority to sign such application on behalf of such client till a fresh Vakalatnama is filed and such application not having been signed by the defendant even the said application was not entertainable. ( 5 ) THE arguments were heard at great length mainly on two folds, firstly, legal, regarding the applicability of O. XVII, R. 3 and the scope of O. XVII, R. 2 and R. 3 and as to whether on the facts of this case under which rule the trial court proceeded, and, secondly, on the facts of this case whether the finding, there is no sufficient cause to restore the suit could be interfered. ( 6 ) SINCE last several decades the aforesaid Order has been subject matter of adjudication in catena of authorities. The aforesaid Rr. 2 and 3 of O. XVII, C. P. C. are quoted as follows :-"2. Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed.- Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf of O. IX or make such other order as it thinks fit. Explanation - Where the evidence or a substantial portion of the evidence of any party has already been recorded and such party fails to appear on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the court may, in its discretion, proceed with the case as if such party were present. High Court Amendment allahabad - Add the following : "where the evidence, or a substantial portion of the evidence, of any party has already been recorded and such party fails to appear on such day, the court may in its discretion proceed with the case as if such party were present and may dispose of it on the merits. Explanation - No party shall be deemed to have failed to appear if he is either present or represented in court by agent or pleader, though engaged only for the purpose of making an application. " (28-5-1943 ). 3. Explanation - No party shall be deemed to have failed to appear if he is either present or represented in court by agent or pleader, though engaged only for the purpose of making an application. " (28-5-1943 ). 3. Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence, etc. Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit for which time has been allowed, the court may, notwithstanding such default, - (a) if the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit forthwith; or (b) if the parties are, or any of them is absent, proceed under R. 2. High Court Amendment Allahabad allahabad - In R. 3, put a comma after the first word "where" and insert thereafter the words "in case to which R. 2 does not apply". (17-1-1953 ). " ( 7 ) THE main reliance was placed in the case of Faiyaz Khan v. Mithan, AIR 1954 All 222, wherein it was held :-"if the order granting the plaintiff a decree is actually made by the Court under O. 17, R. 3 an application by the defendant under O. 9, R. 13 will not lie and the defendants remedy is by way of appeal or review. . . . . . . . . . "it was further held in this case that if the Judge decides such suit and purports to act under O. 17, R. 3 he could have no jurisdiction under O. 9, R. 13 to set aside the decree which he has passed. ( 8 ) BEFORE dealing with further submissions and authorities in this regard one thing is clear that if an order has been passed under O. 17, R. 3 (a), which is the case of the respondents then an application under O. 9, R. 13 (will) not lie as under it the court proceeds to decide the suit in the presence of parties and this would not be treated to be ex parte. In the present case, the impugned order referred O. 17, R. 2 while as per order sheet it referred to proceed under O. 17, R. 3. There was some arguments by the contending parties in this regard. In the present case, the impugned order referred O. 17, R. 2 while as per order sheet it referred to proceed under O. 17, R. 3. There was some arguments by the contending parties in this regard. However, I am of the view, it is not necessary to go to the actual wordings in the order or in the order sheet whether it is under R. 2 or under R. 3. The Court has to come to the conclusion in the facts and circumstances of this case whether the court proceed, in fact, under R. 2 or under R. 3 of O. 17. ( 9 ) IN the aforesaid decision of Faiyaz Khan (supra) the court was confronted with conflicting views of earlier decisions, but the court relied on that set of decisions, which hold, no application under O. 9, R. 13 would lie. However, this decision was overruled by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Seth Munna Lal v. Seth Jai Prakash, AIR 1970 All 257 , wherein it was held : "it is permissible to entertain an application for restoration under O. 9 even when the court purports to act under O. 17, R. 3 if the circumstances set out by the Court are such that an order under O. 9 read with O. 17, R. 2 would be legally justified and the actual order passed is one which could be legally passed under O. 9, read with O. 17, R. 2. " it is relevant here to refer to the relevant portion of the facts of this case. In this case also an adjournment was granted to the defendant and on the adjournment date the defendant failed to appear and the suit thereafter was ordered to be heard under O. 17, R. 3 and the court proceeded to hear that suit under the said Order. Thereafter, the plaintiffs witnesses were examined and the next date was the date of judgement of the suit. Thus, the case even before the Full Bench is identical with one which is before me with the difference that in the present case on inquiry from the court learned counsel for the defendant made a statement that he had no instructions in the matter, the effect of which I would be dealin subsequently. Thus, the case even before the Full Bench is identical with one which is before me with the difference that in the present case on inquiry from the court learned counsel for the defendant made a statement that he had no instructions in the matter, the effect of which I would be dealin subsequently. In substance, the decision of the Full Bench is that the court has to examine facts and circumstances of each case to come to the conclusion whether it is a case which would be covered under O. 17, R. 3 or 2. If it falls under R. 3 the application under O. 9, R. 13, for setting aside ex parte decree would not lie, but if it falls under R. 2 it would lie. Thus in substance, not form of the order, which the court referred is to be seen from the actual fact existing. It is relevant to refer here to O. 9, C. P. C. which deals with "appearance of parties and consequence of nonappearance". Under R. 6, if the plaintiff appears and defendant does not appear, the court may proceed ex parte if it is proved that summons have been served. Under R. 8, the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear the court shall dismiss the suit subject to admission by the defendant under R. 13, the party could make an application for setting aside ex parte decree. O. 17, Rr. 2 and 3 is also relevant in this context. Under R. 2, where on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned the parties or any one of them fail to appear, the court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by O. 9, or make such other order as it thinks fit. Under R. 3, where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the court may, notwithstanding such default proceed in two ways, firstly, under (a) of the aforesaid rule, if the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit forthwith, or (b) if the parties are, or any of them is, absent, proceed under R. 2. This splitting up under R. 3 in sub-rules (a) and (b) is very significant. It is rather clarificatory to what has been held in the aforesaid Full Bench. It carves out exclusive jurisdiction for the Court to act under Rr. 2 and 3 in case of party being present in the court could proceed to decide the suit under R. 3 while if the parties are absent the court could proceed under R. 2. Now the only thing open for the court is to test whether the court should proceed under Rr. 2 and 3 to decide whether on the adjourned date the parties are present or not. If in a case it could be treated that parties are present it would be a case of falling under R. 3. If the parties or any one of them is absent the Court is to proceed under R. 2. ( 10 ) IT is significant here to mention about the earlier Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court reported in Lalta Prasad v. Nand Kishore, (1899) ILR 22 All 66 which has been relied on in the aforesaid case Seth Munna Lal, ( AIR 1970 All 257 ) (FB) (supra ). The earlier Full Bench based its decision on a case arising under the old C. P. C. 1882. The question for interpretation was Ss. 102, 103 and 157 which are pari materia with O. 9, R. 8 O. 9, R. 9 and O. 17, R. 2 respectively of the present Civil P. C. 1908. An application in that case under S. 103 was made for restoration. The application was disallowed on the ground that the order dismissing the suit was not, in effect, an order under S. 102 (equivalent to O. 9, R. 8) and that it was a dismissal for want of proof (merit ). Therefore, the plaintiffs remedy was by way of appeal and not by such an application. It was this question which came up for consideration in the said Full Bench. It was held the application was maintainable as the dismissal of suit was under S. 102 (equivalent to O. 9, R. 8 ). It further held that "the mere naming of the Section is not conclusive though, no doubt, it may be a useful piece of evidence in construing the order, which must be read and construed as a whole. It was held the application was maintainable as the dismissal of suit was under S. 102 (equivalent to O. 9, R. 8 ). It further held that "the mere naming of the Section is not conclusive though, no doubt, it may be a useful piece of evidence in construing the order, which must be read and construed as a whole. " It further held : "the court may describe an order of dismissal as being made under S. 102, the order, taken as a whole, may show that the description is an error, and that the court was not really dismissing the suit on the view that the plaintiff was appearing. " ( 11 ) THUS, we have to look in the present case in view of the aforesaid Full Bench decision and in view of the language of Rr. 2 and 3 whether on the relevant date, viz. , 8th Jan. 1986, the defendant was present or not. In this case, on the relevant date which is also evident from the order sheet, neither the defendant nor his counsel was present when the case was called. However, in connection with another case when the counsel for the defendant came in the court then on asking by the court he informed that he had no instructions in the matter, and then the court recorded as per order sheet to proceed with the case under O. 17, R. 3. In this case, in the impugned order the Court referred that it proceeded under O. 17, R. 2. If it is under R. 2 as recorded in the impugned order itself as per legal position emerging from the settled principle of law the application for setting aside would be maintainable, but if the court proceeded as is evident from order sheet dated 8th Jan. 1986, to be under O. 17, R. 3 such application would not lie. Then the only remedy is by way of preferring an appeal against that. Even though there are two different recordings by the Court, one in the order sheet and the other in the impugned order, but that would not make any difference as since the court has to see from the facts of each case whether it could be a case falling under R. 2 or R. 3 and not what it actually recording. ( 12 ) FROM the aforesaid facts it is clear that when the case was called upon neither the defendant nor his counsel was present. Even subsequently on inquiry the counsel for the defendant stated that he had no instructions in the matter. Therefore, none appeared for the defendant and in the absence of a party, after lunch, the case was again taken up. The court proceeded to record evidence of plaintiff and after its conclusion, fixed for judgement on the next date. On the bare facts as stated above, it is not in dispute, prima facie it would be a case of absence of defendant or his counsel when the case is taken up for recording evidence after lunch. 12-A. Reliance has also been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent in another case M. S. Khalsa v. Chiranji Lal, AIR 1976 All 290 (FB) paras. 51 and 52. In para 51 it is recorded : "a case where a party appears but does not produce evidence or participate in the hearing is not covered by R. 2. Since the party is present the court will proceed with the hearing and dispose of the suit on whatever evidence is brought on record. That is the effect of S. 33 and O. IX, R. 1. " Paragraph 53 refers to an explanation added by the Allahabad High Court to R. 2. By this amendment in explanation by fiction a party is deemed to be present even if an application for adjournment is made by a pleader or his agent in the court for adjournment purposes only. Learned counsel for the respondent tried to extend this deeming fiction by arguing that since the pleader engaged only for making an application for adjournment deems presence of party then a counsel making statement that he has no instructions would also by deeming fiction make the defendant present in Court. This argument is unsustainable. A deeming clause cannot be extended by inference, if, in fact, a person is not present it would be treated to be a person not present and if by amendment a deeming clause is introduced then such a deeming clause would be confined to the extent it has been made applicable and nothing more. A deeming clause is restrictive to the extent it is mentioned. A deeming clause is restrictive to the extent it is mentioned. Since the amendment to the aforesaid explanation added by the Allahabad High Court only brings amendment in such cases where counsel is solely engaged for adjournment of a case on the date fixed to make a party present cannot be extended to a case where neither the defendant nor the counsel is present when the case is called upon and even on inquiry subsequently the counsel said he has no instructions in the matter. In this Full Bench it was held that in case in which the defendant obtained an adjournment on the date of final hearing of the suit and fails to appear on the adjourned date it would be a case covered under O. 17, R. 2 and an application under O. 9, R. 13 will lie. It further settled that O. 17, R. 3 only applies when a party is present or is deemed to be present and has defaulted in doing the acts mentioned in R. 3. This later portion deemed to be present was only confined to the amendment of the Allahabad High Court, as aforesaid. This contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent is thus not sustainable. ( 13 ) IT was next contended, relying on Juggi Lal Kamla Pat v. Ram Janki Gupta, AIR 1962 All 407 that when a statement is made by a counsel he has no instructions in the matter he ceases to be the counsel and thus he had no authority subsequently to make an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. His such application thus made subsequently cannot be legally entertainable since he ceased to be the counsel of his client. This argument also is not tenable. It has been brought to my notice and which has also been annexed as an annexure along with the affidavit filed by the defendant-applicant that the terms of his vakalatnama specifically mentioned that he is also entrusted to make an application for setting aside ex parte order. Thus, the vakalatnama not only authorised to proceed with the suit but even if it is dismissed for default the counsel has authority to make such an application. Thus, in view of this it cannot be said making of such an application would be barred in law. Thus, the vakalatnama not only authorised to proceed with the suit but even if it is dismissed for default the counsel has authority to make such an application. Thus, in view of this it cannot be said making of such an application would be barred in law. It was also contended that since he ceased to be the counsel and no application being made by the defendant it should not have been entertained. I have perused the various annexures annexed by the parties in applications in the aforesaid revisions which reveal that the said application moved by the counsel was supported by an affidavit which is sworn by the defendant himself. This affidavit which the defendant sworn and which was filed in the courts below has not been denied by the plaintiff-respondent. So even if the application is only signed by the counsel since the affidavit itself was sworn by the defendant-applicant it cannot be said that such an application would not be entertainable. In fact, in the aforesaid Juggi Lals case (supra) the court specifically held that in a case where the counsel stated that he has no instructions to proceed in the matter and the case was subsequently taken up would be a case not falling under R. 3 of O. 17. ( 14 ) RELIANCE was placed also on Nawabganj Sugar Mills Co. v. Union of India, 1979 0 Allcj 386. It was stated that before a Vakalatnama is withdrawn an application should be made in writing that permission be granted by the court. This was a case in which counsel stated that the client cannot withdraw a counsel from the case without settling down his fees and since in that case the Food Corporation of India did not pay counsel the settled fee withdrawal without there being an application in writing cannot be allowed. In this context, it was held in that case that before moving for discharge of counsel party must pay settled fee and it is the duty of the court to ensure justice. It was further held that there is an implied obligation on the court to ensure that no injustice is done either to a party or, its counsel before granting leave. ( 15 ) THE facts in the case before us are entirely different from the aforesaid case in Nawabganj Sugar Mills Co. It was further held that there is an implied obligation on the court to ensure that no injustice is done either to a party or, its counsel before granting leave. ( 15 ) THE facts in the case before us are entirely different from the aforesaid case in Nawabganj Sugar Mills Co. (supra) and also the principles laid down in that case. Therefore, this case does not help the respondents. ( 16 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts and the facts of the present case admittedly when the case was called upon on the relevant date neither the defendant nor his counsel were present and even subsequently on being asked by the court the counsel for the defendant made a statement that he had no instructions in the matter and did not participate in hearing of that case at any time. In fact, evidence was recorded after lunch admittedly in the absence of defendant and his counsel and in view of this fact it could not be treated that the party was present as referred under O. 17, R. 3 (a) and thus the ex parte decree passed by the trial court would be one under O. 17, R. 2 and not R. 3. Thus, the application for setting aside ex parte decree would be maintainable. ( 17 ) NOW coming to the second contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that on the facts of this case the trial court has exercised its jurisdiction illegally in not properly appreciating the application, affidavit and in not properly applying law in coming to the conclusion that the approach of the defendant-applicant was mala fide and there was no sufficient ground which had prevented him from appearing before the court on 8th Jan. 1986. ( 18 ) THE trial court in the impugned order recorded that it was admitted before it that the defendant came to court on 9th Jan. 1986, and remains busy in making inquiries about the progress of the suit but no application was moved before the court. On this basis an inference was drawn that this speaks that the defendant had adopted the aforesaid game with the only purpose to delay the disposal of the suit and thereby avoid the passing of the decree of eviction in the suit. On this basis an inference was drawn that this speaks that the defendant had adopted the aforesaid game with the only purpose to delay the disposal of the suit and thereby avoid the passing of the decree of eviction in the suit. In this regard the trial court has not taken into consideration the facts stated in the application and the affidavit filed before it for setting aside ex parte decree that when he reached the court on that date his counsel advised and since it is fixed for judgement no application for setting aside could be made and that would be made after the judgement. It is not in dispute that the case was fixed for judgement on the 9th January. This part of affidavit has not been considered at all for coming to the aforesaid conclusion. Similarly, finding is recorded that the restoration application was not signed by the defendant-applicant and was only signed by the counsel but he had filed no vakalatnama. Again, the court has not examined firstly that since his vakalatnama also empowered him to appear and to make an application for setting aside ex parte decree it was not necessary to file another vakalatnama, and, secondly, the said application was supported by an affidavit which was sworn by the defendant himself, and, therefore, every word of that application was supported by the applicant-defendant and that by itself cannot defeat the claim of the applicant of it being considered by the court. Finding to the contrary arrived at in view of this is not sustainable. The finding that unless he files his vakalatnama he had no authority would not be justified and thus holding that the application was not maintainable is also erroneous. Finally in the last paragraph of the order it has been held that the approach of the applicant was mala fide and there is no sufficient ground which has prevented him from appearing before the court on 8th Jan. 1986. This finding was arrived at by non-application of mind without perusing the affidavit and the application made and recording thereon. It was the case of the applicant that when on 20th Dec. 1985, next date was fixed he inadvertently noted 18th Jan. 1986 instead of 8th Jan. 1986 from the clerk of his counsel and it is on this account he did not appear on the date fixed. It was the case of the applicant that when on 20th Dec. 1985, next date was fixed he inadvertently noted 18th Jan. 1986 instead of 8th Jan. 1986 from the clerk of his counsel and it is on this account he did not appear on the date fixed. There has been some argument on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent that in the stay application filed before this Court along with the revision it had been stated that it is the clerk and the counsel who noted the wrong date while before the trial court it was stated that he took down wrong date. This discrepancy, however, was clarified in the rejoinder affidavit that by mistake it has been written in the stay application while the fact remained what was stated before the court below was the correct fact. It was pointed out that there was no intention to give a different fact than what was stated in the trial court as along with the stay application, the affidavit and application themselves have been annexed which were filed before the trial court showing the correct statement. Thus, it was merely by inadvertence this discrepancy crept in. The explanation given on behalf of the applicant seems to be justified. This discrepancy makes no difference. However, on the basis of what has been stated here this court examined the order, but on the basis of the affidavit and the application made before the trial court it cannot be doubted that the impugned order does not show the application of mind on various facts stated in the affidavit. Thus, the findings of mala fide and no sufficient ground being recorded by the trial court against the applicant cannot be sustained. ( 19 ) IN view of the aforesaid findings I am of the view that the impugned order dated 23rd July, 1987, in the aforesaid two revisions cannot be sustained. ( 20 ) IN the result, both the revisions are allowed, the order dated 23rd July, 1987, is hereby quashed and the case is remanded back before the trial court to decide afresh after giving fresh opportunity to the learned counsel for the parties treating the application to be one under O. 17, R. 2 in the light of the observations made above. Costs on parties. Petitions allowed. w