ORDER R.P. Singh, J. - By means of the present writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by respondents 1 and 2 allowing the application of the landlord respondent 3 for the release of the accommodation under S. 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and has raised an interesting question whether the compromise between the parties in the earlier S.C.C. suit No. 123 of 1975 which provided that so long as the petitioner-tenant continues to pay the rent of the accommodation in dispute, the landlord would not be entitled to evict him, gave complete immunity to the tenant from being evicted under the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, from the accommodation in dispute. 2. The facts of the case briefly are that the petitioner is a tenant of the accommodation in dispute on the ground floor of house No. J-27/28 Jainpura, Varanasi, where he has been carrying on his business. The respondent 3 who is the landlord filed an application for the release of the accommodation in dispute under section 21(1)(a) of the Act on the ground that he had pressing and genuine need for the accommodation in dispute for carrying on his business on the ground floor and that the landlord is compelled to carry on the business on the first floor in his residential portion because of lack of any alternative accommodation as a result on which he has to suffer great loss and that, he has also to support his divorced daughter who is living with her children with the respondent 3: and that he has genuine and bona fide need for the accommodation on the ground floor in order to carry on his business so that he could support his family and that greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation is not released in his favour. The application was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the need of the landlord-respondent was neither bona fide nor genuine and further that the landlord had earlier filed suit No. 123 of 1975 before the Judge Small Cause Court for ejectment and arrears of rent against the petitioner in which a compromise was arrived at between the parties and one of the terms of the compromise provided that if the petitioner continues to pay the rent of the accommodation in dispute, then the landlord will have no right to evict the petitioner from the same and this compromise between the parties gave complete immunity and protection to the petitioner from being evicted from the premises in dispute so long as he continues to pay the rent and hence the landlord respondent 3 is precluded from filing the present application for the release of the accommodation under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act even on the ground of his need for the same being bona fide, genuine and pressing. 3. The prescribed authority, on appraisal of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the need of the landlord for the accommodation in dispute is bona fide and genuine and that the landlord respondent 3 has no other alternative accommodation available to him to carry on his business on the ground floor and further held that it is open to the petitioner to shift his business in his own house and carry on his business there and hence greater hardship would be caused to the landlord respondent if the accommodation in dispute is not released in his favour. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner went up in appeal before the VIIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi who also dismissed the appeal upholding the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority that the need of the landlord respondent 3 for the accommodation in dispute is bona fide and genuine who has to support his family including his divorced daughter and her children and that greater hardship would be caused to him if the accommodation is not released in his favour for carrying on his business. It is this order which is in challenge., in the present writ petition. 4. It is this order which is in challenge., in the present writ petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly contended that U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is a piece of beneficial legislation conferring protection to the tenants against their eviction as a matter of public policy and it is open to a landlord to waive his rights conferred on him by Sections 20 and 21 of the Act for eviction of the tenant. The learned counsel contended that prior to the present proceedings the landlord had already filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the petitioner before the Judge, Small Cause Court in the year 1975 and the parties entered into an agreement in that suit on 15-9-75 and a copy of the compromise entered into between the parties has been annexed as annexure 1' to the writ petition. He invited my attention to clause 'Wav' of the compromise which runs as follows : "Yah ki agar Muddalah Kiraya ada karta rahega to Muddai ko dukan kirayedari se muddalah ko bedakhal karene ka hak hasil na hoga." In view of this term of the compromise entered into by the parties in the earlier suit, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the present proceedings under S. 21(2)(a) of the Act are barred so long as the petitioner continues to pay the rent. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the Division Bench case of Raj Narain Jain v. Firm Sukhanand Ram Narain, reported in AIR 1980 All 78 where it was held that since the lease deed provided that the tenant shall not be liable to ejectment except on the ground of arrears of rent for one year, the application for eviction from the premises in dispute on the ground of landlord's need cannot succeed. The facts of that case are that the landlord had leased out the premises to the tenant and one of the terms of the registered lease was that the tenant shall not be liable to ejectment at the instance of the landlord except on the ground that they were in arrears of rent for full one year. Subsequently when the landlord applied for the release of the accommodation in dispute under S. 21 of the Act on the ground that his need for the same was bona fide and genuine. Subsequently when the landlord applied for the release of the accommodation in dispute under S. 21 of the Act on the ground that his need for the same was bona fide and genuine. The application was contested by the tenant on the ground that the provision in lease deed which give immunity to the tenant from being evicted from the premises leased to him except on the ground of default in payment of rent for a year was a covenent running with the land and the landlord was bound by the terms contained therein. In that case it was held that the Act places restriction on the rights of the landlord to obtain eviction of tenant on the grounds mentioned in S. 20 or 21 of the Act and there is nothing under the Act to prevent the landlord from waiving such rights. Since the Act is a piece of beneficial legislation conferring protection to the tenants against their eviction as a matter of public policy and in case a tenant surrenders any protection provided to him under the Act, it could possibly be successfully contended that such covenant was against public policy and consequently void by reason of S. 23 of the Contract Act but there is no public policy involved in S. 21 of the Act as far as it restricts the rights of a landlord to obtain an order of eviction of his tenant on certain grounds specified therein. It was held that there was no bar in the way of the landlord waiving or giving up or abandoning the advantage or the benefit contemplated by the provisions of the Act and hence it was held that the terms of the lease deed providing that the tenant shall not be liable to ejectment except on ground of arrears of rent for one year, clearly barred the application moved by the landlord for his eviction under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act. Placing reliance on this case the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the law laid down in that case, the application moved by the landlord in the present case also under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act is barred in view of the terms of the compromise entered into between the parties on 15-9-75 which provided that the landlord will have no right to evict the tenant so long as the tenant continues to pay the rent. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent strenuously urged that such an agreement as referred to above does not provide complete immunity to the petitioner from being evicted under any condition and no contract can be made outside the statute. The learned counsel contended that in the first instance the term of the compromise which was entered into between the parties in the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent merely provided that the tenant shall not be liable to ejectment so long as he pays the rent and this is only a general statement under the law but does not provide complete immunity from ejectment to the tenant if the tenant is liable to ejectment on other grounds as contemplated by the Statute. He also contended that if this agreement is interpreted to give complete immunity to the tenant from eviction from the premises in dispute under any condition, such an agreement between the parties would be against public policy and hence void under S. 23 of the Contract Act. 6. A perusal of S. 20 of the Act reveals that suit for eviction of the tenant from a building can be instituted on one of the grounds mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 of the Act. One of the grounds mentioned therein is if the tenant wilfully causes or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the building. Therefore, the question arises that if the tenant causes substantial damage to the building and demolishes substantial part of it, is the landlord precluded from filing a suit for his ejectment simply because he has agreed not to eject him from the premises in dispute till he continues to pay the rent. Therefore, the question arises that if the tenant causes substantial damage to the building and demolishes substantial part of it, is the landlord precluded from filing a suit for his ejectment simply because he has agreed not to eject him from the premises in dispute till he continues to pay the rent. The protection given to the tenant from eviction could never entitle or give a licence to the tenant to damage or demolish the building and in such a situation it could not be said that in view of the agreement between the parties that till the tenant continues to pay the refit, the landlord would still be precluded from instituting a suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground contemplated by Cl. (b) of sub- sec. (2) of S. 20 of the Act. Another ground mentioned for the eviction of the tenant as contemplated by Cl. (d) of sub-s.(2) of S. 20 of the Act is that if the tenant has sub-let, in contravention of the provisions of S. 25 or as the case may be, of the old Act the whole or any part of the building. In case the, tenant sublets the accommodation in dispute on a very high rent but continues to pay the rent to the landlord, and thus makes a profit out of it, could he still claim immunity from ejectment on the ground of public policy simply because he continues to pay the rent to the landlord? Thus situation may arise where the tenant may not have complete immunity from ejectment from the premises in dispute simply because he continues to pay the rent to the landlord. Public policy does not remain static and it may vary from time to time. Public policy would not remain in fixed moulds for all times and the courts have to consider the social consequence of the rule propounded specially in the light of factual evidence available as to its probable results. Section 20 sub-sec. Public policy does not remain static and it may vary from time to time. Public policy would not remain in fixed moulds for all times and the courts have to consider the social consequence of the rule propounded specially in the light of factual evidence available as to its probable results. Section 20 sub-sec. (2)(a) no doubt provides that the suit for ejectment of the tenant cannot be instituted unless the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of the notice of demand but apart from this, other grounds have also been provided for ejectment of a tanant from the premises in dispute. The law has been framed keeping in view the public policy and the interest of the society and has to be so interpreted as to make it harmonious and advance the object with which it has been framed. The view expressed in the case of Raj Narain Jain v. Firm Sukhanand Ram Narain (supra) is being sought to be interpreted by the petitioner's counsel as giving complete immunity to the tenant from ejectment so long as he pays the rent. With profound respect, in my opinion, the law laid down in the case of Raj Narain Jain (supra) requires reconsideration and hence, let the case be laid before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for referring the case to a larger Bench for consideration of the following question : 1. Whether the agreement between the parties that the landlord will have no right to evict the tenant from the premises in dispute so long as he continues to pay rent provides a complete immunity to the tenant from being evicted from the premises under any condition and precludes the landlord from pressing his application for release of the accommodation under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act even though the need of the landlord may be found to be very pressing, bona fide and genuine?