JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioner S.S. Verma, who was holding the post of Chief Engineer in the U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Ltd. (opposite party no. 1), has directed this petition against the order dated 31st March, 1987 (annexure6) whereby he has been dismissed from service after domestic inquiry. 2. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Chief Engineer on 19.10.1982. In pursuance of the appointment he joined the post on 20th November, 1982. He was confirmed with effect from 20th November, 1983. By order dated 20th March, 1986 (annexure1) he was placed under suspension. According to the petitioner he was paid subsistence allowance from 20th March, 1986 to 10th May, 1986 and thereafter no suspension allowance has been paid to him. Charge sheet was issued to him on 30th May, 1986 (annexure4). This charge sheet was issued by the Joint Managing Director who had been appointed inquiry officer. The petitioner was required to submit his reply by 30th July, 1986. He, however, submitted his reply on 6th September, 1986 (annexure5). The petitioner's case is that after he had submitted his reply no hearing took place and the enquiry officer submitted his report on the basis of which the impugned order of dismissal from service was passed on 31st March, 1987. 3. The petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal from service on the following grounds: (1) The petitioner had claimed personal hearing which was not afforded to him and thereby Regulation 85 (b) of U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 was violated; (2) The petitioner did not have reasonable opportunity to defend himself as he was not paid any subsistence allowance after 10th May, 1986; (3) In view of Regulation 84 (iii), the petitioner was entitled to a notice to show cause against the proposed punishment which was not given to him ; and (4) The impugned order of dismissal is nonspeaking. 4. The petition had been contested by opposite parties No. 1 and 2 on whose behalf counter affidavit has been filed by Sri J.P. Gupta, Legal Adviser. The deponent of the counter affidavit has traversed the pleas raised by the petitioner. According to him the order of dismissal from service does not suffer from any infirmity. However, there are certain facts about which there is no denial. The deponent of the counter affidavit has traversed the pleas raised by the petitioner. According to him the order of dismissal from service does not suffer from any infirmity. However, there are certain facts about which there is no denial. There facts are (i) No suspension allowance was paid to the petitioner after 10th May, 1986 ; (ii) No open inquiry was held and (iii) Annexure5 is true copy of the reply to the charge sheet. Whether the order of dismissal from service is speaking or nonspeaking is a question of law which can be decided on the basis of perusal of the order. It is on the basis of these premises that the petitioner's grounds of challenge have to be considered. Ground No. 1 : 5. In para 24 of the writ petition the petitioner has specifically stated that after submission of his reply to the charge sheet no inquiry was held, no witness was examined in his presence, no document was examined by the inquiry officer in his presence, and no personal hearing was given to the petitioner. The opposite parties' reply to this para is contained in para 18 of the counter affidavit. The petitioner's averments are vaguely denied, but there is no assertion that a date was fixed for hearing the petitioner personally and that the petitioner was informed about the said date. Therefore, the petitioner's assertion that he was not given opportunity of personal hearing remains unrebutted. We have now to consider the consequence of the omission to give personal hearing, Regulation 85 (b) reads as follows: (b) Such an employee shall also be given an opportunity to produce at his own cost or to crossexamine witnesses in his defence and shall also be given an opportunity of being heard in person if he so desires. (Emphasised). 6. From the emphasised portion it is apparent that once the charged official demands personal hearing it will have to be given. There is no discretion left to the inquiry officer to refuse such hearing. If, despite demand, such hearing is not provided, there will be breach of a mandatory requirement prescribed by statutory service regulations and the resultant action will be bad in law. 7. Copy of the petitioner's reply to the charge sheet is Annexure 5. After giving his reply to each charge separately, the petitioner states. If, despite demand, such hearing is not provided, there will be breach of a mandatory requirement prescribed by statutory service regulations and the resultant action will be bad in law. 7. Copy of the petitioner's reply to the charge sheet is Annexure 5. After giving his reply to each charge separately, the petitioner states. Uprokta spastikaran he pashchat Yadi Sriman Ji meri vyaktigat sunwayee ki agyan pradan karen to ati kripa hogi. This, in our opinion, was a clear desire, politely expressed by the petitioner for personal hearing. This personal hearing was not afforded. There was thus breach of mandatory requirement which renders the order of punishment illegal and invalid. 8. In para 1 8 of the counter affidavit it has been tried to be asserted that the charges were based on documentary evidence and, therefore, personal hearing was not necessary to be given. The exact manner in which the statement has been made is thus: Since the charges are based on documentary evidence, it was not necessary to call the witnesses, which were in fact not cited in the charge sheet. It may be that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proveable from documents, but even documents are explainable and the petitioner could point out to the inquiry officer that the inference which his employer is drawing from the documents cannot in fact be drawn. Be that as it may, Regulation 85 (b) does not leave any discretion in the hands of the inquiry officer to reject the demand for personal hearing once the same has been made. The impugned order, therefore, does not acquire validity on the ground that the allegations in the charge sheet were made on the basis of documents. Ground No. 2 9. From the suspension order, annexure 1, it appears that at the time the petitioner was placed under suspension, he was posted at Ghosi in the district of Azamgarh. By order dated 5th April, 1986 (annexure 2), the petitioner was undisputedly transferred to the headquarter office at Lucknow. The petitioner has stated in para 14 of the writ petition that he was relieved at Ghosi on 10th May, 1986 and in para 15 he has stated that he submitted his joining report at Lucknow on 19tb May, 1986, There is no denial of these assertions in the counter affidavit. Therefore, it is established that the petitioner complied with the transfer order. Therefore, it is established that the petitioner complied with the transfer order. In paragraph 16, the petitioner has made specific allegation to the effect that after 10th May, 1986 no subsistence allowance was paid to him. The reply to this paragraph contained in paragraph II of the counter affidavit reads thus The contents of paragraph 16 of the writ petition as stated are not admitted, The subsistence allowance has been allowed in accordance with rules. This does not amount to saying that subsistence allowance was paid after 10th May, 1986 also till the date of passing the impugned order of dismissal from service. Therefore, it becomes the undisputed case between the parties that no subsistence allowance was paid to the petitioner after 10th May, 1986. Neither the counter affidavit contains any justification for nonpayment of allowance after 10th May, 1986 nor the learned counsel for the opposite parties could offer any justification during the course of oral arguments. No rule has been cited under which the subsistence allowance could cease to be payable after transfer to the head quarter office. 10. Relying upon AIR 1973 SC 1183 Ghyanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, their lordships of the Supreme Court observed in State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, (1984 UPLBEC 722) that 'Any departmental enquiry made without payment of subsistence allowance contrary to the provisions for its payment, is violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The petitioner is not a public servant, but is an employee of a Cooperative Society and therefore Article 311 is not applicable to him. But what is contained in Article 311 is contained also in the Service Regulations governing the petitioner which contemplate an opportunity of hearing to be afforded to the employee charged with allegation of misconduct (See Regulation 85). Therefore the principle laid down by their Lordships will be applicable to the present case also. In view of this position the order of punishment will have to be quashed as undisputedly no subsistence allowance was paid to the petitioner after 1051985, although the disciplinary proceedings continued even after this date. In fact the charge sheet itself was issued after l0th May, 1986. to be precise it was issued on 30th May, 1986. Ground No. 3 : 11. In fact the charge sheet itself was issued after l0th May, 1986. to be precise it was issued on 30th May, 1986. Ground No. 3 : 11. Regulation 84 (iii) reads as follows: No penalty except censure shall be imposed unless a show cause notice has been given to the employee and he has either failed to reply within the specified time or his reply has been found to be unsatisfactory by the punishing authority. 12. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the above provision contemplates notice to show cause against the proposed punishment which was admittedly not given in the present case. The learned counsel for the opposite parties, however, contends that the above provision does not contemplate any such notice but contemplates only opportunity of hearing. It is submitted, that this opportunity was afforded to the petitioner by serving upon him the charge sheet dated 30th May, 1985 and calling for the petitioner's reply. 13. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced from either side and in our opinion the submission of the petitioner's learned counsel deserves to be sustained. 14. Clause (a) of Regulation 84 enumerates the penalties that may be imposed upon an employee. The penalties enumerated are (a) censure (b) withholding of increments, (c) fine on an employee of category IV (peon, chaukidar, etc.), (d) recovery from pay, or security deposit to compensate in whole or in part for any pecuniary loss caused to the cooperative society by the employee's conduct, (e) reduction in rank or grade held substantively by the employee, (f) removal from service, or (g) dismissal from service. For the purposes of the present case clause (ii) is not material. Claus (iii) has already been reproduced herein above. Subclause (a) of clause (iv) provides that the charged employee shall be awarded punishment by the appropriate authority according to the seriousness of the offence. It has a proviso which lays down that no penalty under subclauses (e), (f) or (g) of clause (i) i.e. reduction in rank or grade and removal or dismissal from service, shall be imposed without recourse to disciplinary proceedings. Subclause (b) mentions the authority which may impose the penalty of removal or dismissal from service. Clause (v) makes some provision relating to the punishment of stoppage of increments. Subclause (b) mentions the authority which may impose the penalty of removal or dismissal from service. Clause (v) makes some provision relating to the punishment of stoppage of increments. It requires the punishing authority to state the period for which the increment is stopped and whether it shall have the effect of postponing future increments or promotion. 15. Then comes Regulation 85 which bears the marginal heading Disciplinary proceedings. The marginal heading of Regulation 84 is Penalties. Clause (i) of Regulation 85 provides that the disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted by the Inquiry Officer appointed under clause (iv). It then provides that the proceedings shall be conducted with due observance of the principles of natural justice. In subclause (a) lo|(c) are provided matters which are considered necessary for the observance; of the principles of natural justice. Clause (ii) mentions the circumstances under which an employee may by dismissed or removed from service without' taking or continuing disciplinary proceedings. Clause (iv) provides for appointment of and clause (vii) with payment of subsistence allowance. Other clauses are not material for the purposes of the present case. 16. If the argument of the learned counsel for the opposite parties is accepted, the show cause notice referred to in clause (iii) of Regulation 84 will have to be equated with the charge sheet mentioned in Regulation 85 (i) (a). If this is done neither the charge sheet nor show cause notice will be necessary to be issued for imposing the punishment of censure. This would be violative of principles of natural justice and Regulations 84 and 85, insofar as they permit imposition of the punishment of censure without affording opportunity to the concerned employee to defend himself, will have to be held invalid. The validity of the rule can be saved by giving distinct meanings to the terms show cause notice and charge sheet. Therefore, the former term cannot be equated with the latter term. 17. The above inference flows also from the nature of the proceedings contemplated by Regulation 84 and Regulation 85. All the clauses of Regulation 84 deal with the punishment and punishment is to be awarded by the punishing authority. In clause (iii) of regulation 84 the terms penalty and punishing authority have been used. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that clause (iii) refers to the obligation of the punishing authority. All the clauses of Regulation 84 deal with the punishment and punishment is to be awarded by the punishing authority. In clause (iii) of regulation 84 the terms penalty and punishing authority have been used. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that clause (iii) refers to the obligation of the punishing authority. The role of the punishing authority comes after the inquiry officer has conducted disciplinary proceedings in accordance with Regulation 85; After the inquiry officer has conducted the proceedings and submitted his report, there is no question of the punishing authority issuing any charge sheet. At this stage only the notice to show cause against the proposed punishment can be issued and that is what appears to be contemplated by clause (ii) of the Regulation 84. 18. Further if the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties is accepted and it is further held that in order to comply with the principles of natural justice opportunity to defend will have to be given even when the punishment of censure is imposed, clause (iii) of Regulation 84 becomes redundant. The legislature or a rule making authority is presumed not to make any redundant provision. By applying this rule of interpretation also we are led to the conclusion that Regulation 84 (iii) and Regulation 85 (i)(a) do not refer to one and the same thing In view of the above we hold that an employee who is proposed to be punished with any of the punishments, mentioned in Regulation 84(i) except censure, is entitled to notice to show cause against the proposed punishment. Admittedly no such notice was given to the petitioner. This again is a breach of a statutory provision which renders the impugned order invalid. Ground No. 4. 19. The last ground of challenge is that the impugned order is nonspeaking. In support of the plea that the order was required to be speaking, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited (1980) (1) SLR 541 (Allahabad) Hari Om Govil v. Deputy Director of Education, Bareilly and another. 20. Ground No. 4. 19. The last ground of challenge is that the impugned order is nonspeaking. In support of the plea that the order was required to be speaking, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited (1980) (1) SLR 541 (Allahabad) Hari Om Govil v. Deputy Director of Education, Bareilly and another. 20. The learned counsel for the opposite parties had, on the other hand, cited AIR 1987 SC 2043 Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, for submitting that since the punishing authority in the present case agreed with the findings of the inquiry officer and accepted the reasons for the findings, it was not necessary for it to discuss the evidence for coming to the same conclusion. 21. The opposite parties have filed copy of the inquiry report as Annexure 4 to the counter affidavit. A perusal of the report shows that the petitioner was charged with as many as eight charges. The inquiry officer exonerated the petitioner completely of charge no. 3 and 5 and partly of charge no. 7 and found the rest of the charges proved against the petitioner. 22. The punishment order served upon the petitioner is Annexure 6 to the writ petition. In this the punishing authority has reproduced the eight charges and then mentioned that the Enquiry Officer has found charges Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 proved. Thereafter he has observed that the charges proved against the petitioner relate mainly to financial, administrative and purchase irregularities and are of grave nature. He has mentioned that he has considered the charges sheet served upon the petitioner, the reply submitted by the petitioner and the documents on record. He has indeed nor discussed each charge & the evidence in support thereof but a perusal of the order shows that the punishing authority did not act mechanically. It is apparent from the discussion made by him in respect of charge no. 5 (Da). While discussing this charge he has exonerated the petitioner of the charge of unauthorisedly making air journey. In para 27 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that the punishing authority did not apply its mind to the facts and the circumstances of the case. After perusing the impugned order we are unable to sustain the plea. 23. While discussing this charge he has exonerated the petitioner of the charge of unauthorisedly making air journey. In para 27 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that the punishing authority did not apply its mind to the facts and the circumstances of the case. After perusing the impugned order we are unable to sustain the plea. 23. In Ram Kumar's case (supra) their lordships have observed in para of the report as follows : ......In our opinion, when the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the inquiry officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the inquiry officer and give the same reasons for the findings.. On applying this principle the impugned order cannot be faulted either on the ground that it is nonspeaking or on the ground that punishing authority did not apply its mind. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to distinguish the above authority by inviting our attention to para 7 of the report wherein it is mentioned that the order impugned before their lordships was a detailed one which referred also to the deposition of the witnesses & the pleas raised by the charged employee. From the observations contained in para 7 it does appear that as compared to the order impugned in the present case, the order dealt with by their lordships was more detailed one. That however does not direct from the proposition of law laid down by their lordships. 25. In Hari Om Govil (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the position was entirely different. In that case the Management of an Educational Institution had held domestic inquiryagainst the Principal levelling against him twenty charges. The Inquiry Committee found the Principal guilty and the Committee of Management resolved to terminate his services. The District Inspector of Schools dealt with each charge separately and gave detailed reasons for disapproving the proposal of termination of service. In appeal fie Deputy Director setaside the order of the District Inspector of schools without indicating any flaw therein and vaguely asserting that although the charges of corruption were doubtful, yet irregularities were proved. He did not indicate which of the several alleged irregularities stood proved. In appeal fie Deputy Director setaside the order of the District Inspector of schools without indicating any flaw therein and vaguely asserting that although the charges of corruption were doubtful, yet irregularities were proved. He did not indicate which of the several alleged irregularities stood proved. It was in this context that the Division Bench of this Court observed in para 4 of the report that it was well settled that the authority acting quasijudicially was bound to give reasons in support of its order and the absence of reasons vitiated the order. Indeed in the present case if the punishing authority had disagreed with the finding of the inquiry officer it would have become necessary for it to give reasons. In respect of charges 5 (Da) the punishing authority differed from the finding recorded by the inquiry officer and it gave reasons thereof. 26. For the discussion hereinabove we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is nonspeaking and shows nonapplication of mind by the punishing authority. However, despite this finding, the petition will have to be allowed on the findings recorded under ground nos. 1, 2 and 3. 27. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of dismissal from service dated 3'si March, 1987 (annexure 4) is hereby quashed. It will be open to the appropriate authority to pass fresh order in accordance with law taking into account the observations made hereinabove. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.