Judgment :- 1. A suit that had to be filed before the Munsiff's Court, Thodupuzha was filed by the first respondent against respondents 2 and 3 and the C. M. Appellant (3rd defendant) during vacation before the nominated District Judge, Thodupuzha under S.19(2) of Kerala Civil Courts Act as amended by Act 33 of 1986. In that suit the plaintiff filed I. A. 194/88 praying for temporary injunction restraining the appellant from conducting a toddy shop in the plaint property which was sanctioned by the third respondent after suit. No provisional order was passed. After issuing a commission and hearing both sides, the nominated District Judge by order dated 20-5-1988 finally disposed of the I. A. on the merits by allowing the same with costs. The order is challenged by the third defendant. 2. I am not going into the merits of the matter fearing that any discussion is likely to embarass the Munsiff who will have to pass order on the application. Any how there was no dispute that the nominated District Judge acted illegally and without jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. S.19 (1) of the Civil Courts Act authorises the High Court to permit the civil courts under its control to adjourn from time to time for periods not exceeding in the aggregate sixty days in each year. During such adjournment, when judicial work cannot be transacted, in order to meet urgent situations, under S.19 (2), the High Court shall nominate a District Judge for each District, who shall have the power to make provisional orders on all urgent matters and for such purpose, receive plaints, appeals, petitions and other matters which would ordinarily be presented before the District Court or such other Civil courts subordinate to it which were so adjourned. Except on matters that could ordinarily be presented in the District Court, the order passed by the nominated District Judge could only be provisional on urgent matters and such orders could remain in force only until such matter has been heard and decided by the court having jurisdiction on it being seized of the matter after the, reopening. Except on matters that could ordinarily be presented in the District Court, the order passed by the nominated District Judge could only be provisional on urgent matters and such orders could remain in force only until such matter has been heard and decided by the court having jurisdiction on it being seized of the matter after the, reopening. But regarding matters to be presented before the District Court itself, irrespective of the fact that the District Court is also adjourned and the District Judge is acting only as the nominated District Judge under S.19 (2), he can pass such orders as could be passed by a court having jurisdiction. That means in other matters to be presented before other courts which; stand adjourned, his orders, except those that are provisional and on urgent matters, are without jurisdiction. This provision is intended to obviate the statements that is likely during vacation on account of the impossibility of getting provisional orders on urgent matters. An urgent-provisional -order is a temporary order on an urgent matter provided for the present need or for the occasion as distinguished from a considered final order on the merits after hearing the parties or otherwise. When once such an order is passed the nominated District Judge cannot go on passing orders on the merits which will have to be passed by the regular courts. I do not mean to say that he cannot vacate the provisional order or pass other orders as the exigencies of the situation needs. But all the orders could only be provisional on urgent matters leaving the normal court to pass regular orders on the merits. Anything beyond that is without jurisdiction and illegal because of the jurisdictional impairment on account of the circumspection to the powers. (See Ramankutty v. Ayissakunhi (1987 (2) KLT 895). Even if both sides agree the nominal District Judge cannot exceed his powers under S.19 (2) because consent of parties will not invest him with the jurisdiction which he is not having. 3. Before the amendment this jurisdiction vested under the provision only in the High Court. At that time the provision came up for consideration in Kolavan v. Allu Acha Menon (ILR 1961 (2) Kerala 224) and Appu v. Muthuvelu (1962 KLT 344). 3. Before the amendment this jurisdiction vested under the provision only in the High Court. At that time the provision came up for consideration in Kolavan v. Allu Acha Menon (ILR 1961 (2) Kerala 224) and Appu v. Muthuvelu (1962 KLT 344). Both the decisions said that the plain effect is to confer on the High Court, during the adjournment of the Subordinate Civil Courts, the power to pass provisional orders of an urgent nature in all cases instituted, or to be instituted, in such courts and such provisional orders will remain in force only until the matter has been heard and decided by the courts concerned. Such orders are of an ad interim nature and they will not be treated as orders passed by the High Court or the District Judge but only by the concerned court for all practical purposes. 4. The question whether the District Judge or the High Court is also having jurisdiction to entertain the matter does not at all arise for consideration in view of S.15 of the Code of Civil Procedure which says that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. This is also necessary to safeguard the right of appeal and revision to the litigants. S.8 of the High Court Act is complimentary to S.19 of the Civil Courts Act. Conferment of the original jurisdiction at the initial stage is only on the lowest court and it cannot be usurped by a higher court except where the case is got transferred on proper grounds. Jurisdiction under S.19 (2) has its own circumspection under that provision and it could be exercised only for the purpose contemplated. Idicheria v. Chacko (1973 KLT 536) dealt with a case where the High Court entertained a suit and passed an interim order on account of the N.G.O. strike. Evert in such a case it was held that the High Court had no jurisdiction and S.24 or even S.151, Code of Civil Procedure, cannot help and it is for the concerned authorities to fill up the lacuna by making appropriate provisions. While passing the impugned order the District Judge overlooked these provisions and thereby exercised a jurisdiction which he did not have and committed an illegality. While passing the impugned order the District Judge overlooked these provisions and thereby exercised a jurisdiction which he did not have and committed an illegality. As argued on behalf of the 1st respondent/ plaintiff it is not possible for me to justify the order as a provisional one where as in fact it is not. 5. The attempt of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent was to get the C.M. Appeal dismissed on the ground that it will lie only to the District Court and not this Court under S.12 read with S.13 of the Civil Courts Act. That argument may be correct only if the order is treated as provisional order passed by a nominated District Judge with jurisdiction under S.19 (2) of the Civil Courts Act. As this Court has recognised, even an ad interim order of injunction is liable to be challenged in appeal before the competent court. If the order is treated as a provisional order it must be notionally considered only as an order passed by the Munsiff whose functions alone the nominated District Judge is discharging and under S.13 of the Civil Courts Act the appeal may lie before the District Court and not the High Court. But that question itself need not be decided here because it is not a provisional order. In this case the courts were to reopen on 23-5-1988 and the order was passed just three days before on 20-5-1988. The learned counsel for the appellant says that even ignoring his request and without hearing him the order was passed in a hurry. I am not at that question. If it is treated as a provisional order especially when there was only three days for the regular court being seized of the matter, there may not be any reason for refusing a right of appeal on the ground that it is only a special category of provisional order which will be in force only till a particular period and hence not appealable. Such a course will be without the backing of any statutory provision. If it is treated as an order of the Munsiff for all practical purposes there may not be any reason to differentiate it for the purpose of appeal alone. Such a course will be without the backing of any statutory provision. If it is treated as an order of the Munsiff for all practical purposes there may not be any reason to differentiate it for the purpose of appeal alone. There is legally nothing wrong in the District Judge himself entertaining and disposing of the appeal treating it as an order of the Munsiff because it is not an order on the merits. The District Judge, as the Munsiff or the Subordinate Judge, is entitled to come to a different conclusion when the matter is heard and decided on the merits. Even if there is any embarassment it can be made over to an additional District Judge and disposed of by him. None of these questions will arise in this case. 6. Guru Ammal and another v. Dr. Subramania Iyer (1972 KLR 551) cited at the Bar regarding pecuniary jurisdiction under S.13 of the Civil Courts Act in the matter of appeal is not applicable for our purpose. Narayana Panicker v. Kunjupennu (1978 KLT 311) deals with appeals from orders passed by courts exercising insolvency jurisdiction to which S.13 of the Civil Courts Act is not applicable. That decision and the decisions referred to therein are therefore not applicable for pur purpose in spite of the provisions for appeal to the District Court referred to therein even from the orders of an additional District Judge. 7. Antony v. Lukose (1960 KLJ 757) is also not strictly applicable. That decision dealt with the power of the High Court to vary its provisional order passed in exercise of the powers under S.19 (2) of the Civil Courts Act once when the court having the jurisdiction to make necessary orders, reopens. In that case the party who obtained the provisional order was trying to take undue advantage and there was no time to the opposite party to get the order vacated from the regular court resulting in injustice to him. In that context the court held that the act of court shall prejudice no man and a person wrongly taking advantage of an order of court could be prevented from doing so by exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to adjust the order with a view to fairly administer justice by vacating the interim order. In that context the court held that the act of court shall prejudice no man and a person wrongly taking advantage of an order of court could be prevented from doing so by exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to adjust the order with a view to fairly administer justice by vacating the interim order. In a way if the appeal is considered not maintainable and if the appellant is found to have suffered injustice on account of the order which the first respondent wants to maintain without a decision on the merits until the regular court is seized of the matter, this Court may be entitled to invoke the inherent powers for vacating the same as was done in Antony's case (1960 KLJ 757). But I do not think it necessary to resort such a course. 8. Now the position is that we are having an order passed without inherent jurisdiction. It is non est in the eye of law and nobody could be allowed to take advantage of it irrespective of the question whether or not the court having jurisdiction also will pass a similar order or not. If this Court does not interfere there is the possibility of the Munsiff treating it as a final order which is not in the nature of a provisional ad interim order and declining to consider the matter on the merits obviously for the reason that the order does not fall within the ambit of S.19(2) Civil Courts Act and therefore beyond his powers to hear and decide. If the order is treated by this Court as a provisional order under S.19 (2) of the Civil Courts Act. this Court would not entertain the appeal on the ground that the appeal will lie only to the District Court under S.13 of the Civil Courts Act. In fact it is not such a provisional order appealable before the District Court. It was actually filed before the District Court and presented before this Court only when it was returned on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The result is that virtually a stalemate is created rendering the party feeling aggrieved, without a remedy by way of right to appeal. It was actually filed before the District Court and presented before this Court only when it was returned on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The result is that virtually a stalemate is created rendering the party feeling aggrieved, without a remedy by way of right to appeal. In such a situation, as held in Kinhanna Moolya v. Sadasiva Bhat (1976 (1) ILR 384) by a Division Bench of this Court, this Court would be justified in entertaining the appeal treating the order as one passed by the District Judge in exercise of his original jurisdiction even though the fact is otherwise. The order passed without jurisdiction is liable to be set aside on the merits or in appropriate cases without going into the merits. If such a course is not adopted the order is not liable to challenge under S.115 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that an appeal will lie. 9. It presents really an unhappy situation. Under Art.227 of the Constitution also, this Court is having the power of interference in seeing that the Courts and Tribunals function within the limits of their authority. Art.227 confers supervisory jurisdiction and at any rate that jurisdiction extends to see whether the limits of authority is exceeded This Court can act even suo mote under Art.227. The order under challenge exceeded the limits of authority under S.19 (2) of the Civil Courts Act and the District Judge had no other authority to pass the order. It is a final order passed without authority and as such a nullity justifying interference for the purpose of quashing the same. The C.M. Appeal is allowed and the impugned order is quashed as being without jurisdiction. The interlocutory application along with the record's will be forwarded to the Munsiff for being dealt with according to law as if no order was passed. No costs. Such a course is necessary for the added reason that before passing the impugned final order the nominated District Judge did not not issue any provisional order. Allowed.