Judgment :- 1. 614 acres of private forest belonged to the plaintiff. In the year 1111 he gave a licence extending for 11 years to one Unnikamma Sahib for clear-felling the timber. The licence was to expire in 1122 by which time the licensee was to cat and remove the entire trees. In the year 1119 when the licence was continuing plaintiff gave Ext. Al lease of the land to the defendants for a term of 24 years for converting into a plantation. The lease was to take effect and lessees to take possession only in 1122 after the licence period and the clear-felling were over. Lessees were authorised to clear the bushes, converting the land into a plantation and surrender possession after 24 years. Clear-felling was over and they took possession. The land was converted into a plantation. The term is over. Plaintiff seeks to recover the rent and other amounts due under the lease on the allegation that the defendants are not entitled to fixity of tenure for the reasons that it is a lease of private forest and a plantation lease exempted under S.3 (1) (vii) and (viii) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Defendants denied availability of these two exemptions, claimed fixity of tenure and contended that the suit is not maintainable by reason of S.26 (4) of the Act. 2. Accepting the finding of the Land Tribunal on reference that defendants are tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Act 1 of 1964, the suit was dismissed. But in appeal the District Judge found that though clear-felling was done by the licensee, the property continued to be a private forest. On the grounds that it is a lease of private forest and a plantation lease it was found that the lease is exempted as claimed and the suit was decreed. Hence this second appeal by the defendants. 3. The contention that Ext. Al is a plantation lease exempted under S.3(1) (viii) of Act 1 of 1964 was rightly given up by the respondent at the time of argument. It is true that the property covers more than 30 acres which is one of the requisite conditions for the applicability of clause (viii). Nobody has any case that the lease is covered by sub-clause (c) of clause (44) of S.2 in order to attract the proviso appearing after clause (viii) of S 3(1). It is true that the property covers more than 30 acres which is one of the requisite conditions for the applicability of clause (viii). Nobody has any case that the lease is covered by sub-clause (c) of clause (44) of S.2 in order to attract the proviso appearing after clause (viii) of S 3(1). If so in order to attract the exemption under S.3(1) (viii) the property at the time of the tenancy must be a plantation as defined in S.2(44). Nobody has any case that was so. It is admitted and it was also found by the District Judge that though at the time of Ext. Al in 1119 clear-felling was not over, it was completed when the lessees took over under the provisions of Ext. Al in 1122. The view taken by the District Judge was only that even in spite of the clear-felling the land continued to be a private forest when the lease took effect. Nobody has a case that at that time it was a plantation either under S.2 (44) or under clause (c) thereof. It is admitted on all sides that conversion into plantation was by the defendants and it was only thereafter. Therefore at the time of lease it was not a tenancy in respect of a plantation and hence the exemption under S.3 (1) (viii) is not attracted. Tenancy of lands for the purpose of being converted into plantation is not prohibited or taken out of the provisions for fixity under the Act. In fact the lease of a fullfledged plantation coming within the definition of S.2 (44) itself is given fixity except when it exceeds 30 acres. Conversion into plantation is one way of putting the property to agricultural use. Authorisation for that purpose in the lease deed or the subsequent conversion into plantation will not take the transaction out of the purview of tenancy. Transactions of lands satisfying the definition of plantation in S. (44) as on the date of lease having an extent of more than 30 acres alone will be covered by the exemption in clause (viii). Authorisation for that purpose in the lease deed or the subsequent conversion into plantation will not take the transaction out of the purview of tenancy. Transactions of lands satisfying the definition of plantation in S. (44) as on the date of lease having an extent of more than 30 acres alone will be covered by the exemption in clause (viii). Regarding tenancies of plantations coming under S.2 (44) (c), as seen from the proviso appearing after clause (viii) of S.3 (1), the legislature thought that it will not be fair or proper to deny the benefit of fixity to lessees who might have in course of time by their bard work developed the land into plantation. Any bow the scope of exemption is limited only to lands which were already plantations on the date of transaction. (See the Full Bench decision in Rt. Rev. Dr. Jerome Fernandez v. Be-Be Rubber Estate Ltd. (1972 KLT. 613). 4. In order to attract the exemption under S.3(1) (vii) the lease must be of private forest. The view expressed by the District Judge that "though clear-felling was done by Unnikamma, it still continued as private forest" does not have any rhyme or reason behind it. Probably in order to find support for this conclusion the District Judge relied on the direction in Ext. Al to the lessee to remove the bushes for facilitating plantation and the description of the property in the subsequent documents. The licensee for tree-felling was interested only in exploiting the timber wealth which alone is sufficient for deforestation. Bushes, the removal of which may be necessary for plantation, may still remain and that will not be sufficient to retain the nature of property as forest without trees. Still its removal may be necessary for plantation and that is why the lessees were directed to remove the bushes remaining. The description of the property in the subsequent records as unsurveyed forest could only be taken as a wrong copying from the earlier records. This is quite so in view of the admitted and proved fact that by 1122 the trees were completely cut and removed and what remained was only land with valueless bushes. The question is whether such a land which the lessees got on the lease coming into operation could be deemed to be forest in order to treat the transaction as a lease of forest. The question is whether such a land which the lessees got on the lease coming into operation could be deemed to be forest in order to treat the transaction as a lease of forest. The District Judge was not correct in his view that the nature of the land as forest on the date of execution of the lease is relevant. What is relevant is only the nature of the property when the lease was intended to be operative and actually became operative. On that day it was admittedly land without trees and hence not forest. Therefore it cannot be said to be lease of private forest. 5. When clear-felling of the trees was over in 1122 the land ceased to be private forest. In that respect there are two views. One is that irrespective of the intention with which clear-felling was made, the land ceases to be private forest when it is deprived of the trees and made into barren land and the subsequent use of the land or subsequent growth of trees is immaterial. The other view accepted in Aleykutty John v. Taluk Land Board (1981 KLT 731) on the basis of some previous decisions and approved in some later decision is that the intention with which clear-felling was done will have a bearing on the decision of such question. Clear-felling under all circumstances will not make the land cease to be private forest. If felling was done only with the intention of exploiting the forest wealth and to leave it for regeneration as forest, the land will not cease to be forest. If it was also with the intention of making the land) nilam or garden or plantation the land cannot be treated as continuing to be private forest. It is immaterial for this case which view is to prevail. Either way it cannot help the plaintiff. 6. I do not find any force in the argument on behalf of the plaintiff that giving licence for timber felling and receiving the amount is the only way of enjoying the forest for exploiting the forest wealth and it is not indicative of any intention of deforestation for conversion. Decision on that question also must depend upon the intention which, in this case, is evidenced by the subsequent conduct of the plaintiff. Even before the licence period and clear-felling were over the plaintiff gave Ext. Decision on that question also must depend upon the intention which, in this case, is evidenced by the subsequent conduct of the plaintiff. Even before the licence period and clear-felling were over the plaintiff gave Ext. Al lease, operative from the date of expiry of the licence when clear-felling is over to convert the land into plantation. That indicates that deforestation was not merely for exploiting the forest wealth, but also to convert the land into a plantation without the forest being allowed to regenerate. In such a situation if exploitation of forest wealth is also one of the considerations, (normally that will also be there) that by itself is not sufficient in view of the other intention. That is why I said that either view is immaterial in this case. At any rate it is difficult to support the view of the District Judge that it is a lease of private forest. 7. The transaction is evidently a tenancy attracting the general provision for fixity of tenure contained in S.13. It is not a plantation lease coming under the exemption in S.3(1)(viii) and it is also not a lease of private forest attracting exception in S.3 (1) (vii). No other claim for exemption was put forward or established. If so, the appellants are entitled to fixity of tenure and under S.26(4) the Land Tribunal alone is having jurisdiction to entertain a claim for arrears of rent. Jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted and the suit is not maintainable. Second appeal is allowed and the decree under appeal is set aside. The decree of the Munsiff dismissing the suit is restored, but in the circumstances without costs.