JUDGMENT V. Ratnam, J. 1. The plaintiff in O.S.No. 7647 of 1973, VII Assistant City Civil Court, Madras is the appellant in this second appeal. That suit was laid against the respondent herein for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,883-95 comprised of Rs. 4,993-95 towards the value of goods short delivered and interest thereon at six per cent per annum from 24-10-1970 to 24-10-1973, amounting to Rs. 890 and for future interest at six per cent per annum from the date of plaint till the date of realisation. 2. The circumstances under which the appellant sought the recovery of the amounts as aforesaid are under: A consignment of 111 drums and 1 bag of sodium nitrate was entrusted by the State Trading Corporation of India with the railway at Wadi Bunder to be carried to Salt Cotaurs as per railway receipt No. 588574 dated 31-8-1970. When the appellant was the owner of the goods sought to obtain delivery, it was found that there was a shortage of 17 quintals and the appellant also obtained from the respondent herein a shortage certificate to that effect on 10-9-1970. Thereupon, a claim was lodged by the appellant with the respondent but the respondent did not accede to that claim, which resulted in the issue of a notice by the appellant on 9-8-1973, Under Section 80, C.P.C. Even thereafter, the respondent did not meet the claim of the appellant and subsequently, the appellant instituted the suit for the recovery of the amounts as stated earlier, charging the respondent with negligence resulting in loss caused to the goods belonging to the appellant. 3. In the written statement filed by the respondent herein, it resisted the claim of the appellant on the ground that the consignment was loaded by the consignor directly in the wagon and the condition of the drums was not known to the respondent at the time of loading. It was the further case of the respondent that the consignment was carried without any interference en route and that the leakage was due to the defective drums, which were old and dented and insecure packing and, therefore, it was not liable for damages as claimed by the appellant. The claim for interest made by the appellant was also refuted on the ground that such a claim is without any basis. The claim for interest made by the appellant was also refuted on the ground that such a claim is without any basis. In an additional written statement, the respondent put forth the plea that no valid notice Under Section 80, C.P.C. had been issued, and therefore the suit deserved to be dismissed. 4. Before the trial court, on behalf of the appellant, ExA1 to All were marked and P.W.1 gave evidence, while, on behalf of the respondent, Exs.B 1 to B3 were filed and D.W. 1 was examined. On a consideration to the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the learned VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, found that the loss suffered by the consignment was not on account of the defective condition of the drums or the insecure packing, that the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C. had been issued on behalf of Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals, while the suit had been instituted by Jaswantchand S. Mehta, as the sole proprietor of Madras Heavy Chemicals and, therefore, there was no identity between the person who issued the notice and instituted the suit rendering the notice defective and that the appellant, if at all, would be entitled to claim interest only from the date of suit. Upon the conclusion so arrived at regarding the validity of the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C., the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by that, the appellant preferred an appeal in A.S.332 of 1978 before the first Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. Before the lower appellate court, the respondent did not dispute the conclusion of the trial court regarding the manner in which the consignment sustained damages and the resulting loss as well as the value of the goods short delivered, Consequently, the only point debated before the lower appellate Court was the validity of the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C., and the lower appellate Court took the view that the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C., had been issued on behalf of Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals, which would suggest a partnership concern, but the suit had been instituted by an individual describing himself as the sole proprietor and, therefore, the principle laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in S.N. Dutt v. Union of India would govern the case rendering the notice issued Under Section 80, C.P.C., defective. Madras Heavy Chemicals, which would suggest a partnership concern, but the suit had been instituted by an individual describing himself as the sole proprietor and, therefore, the principle laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in S.N. Dutt v. Union of India would govern the case rendering the notice issued Under Section 80, C.P.C., defective. In view of the conclusion so arrived at, the lower appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit and dismissed the appeal. It is the correctness of the conclusion of the Courts below that the notice issued Under Section 80, C.P.C., is defective that is challenged in this second appeal. 5. Mr. Udairaj Gulecha, learned Counsel for the appellant, strenuously contended relying on Exs.A2 to A5, that when a claim was made on behalf of Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals against the respondent Under Section 78-B of the Indian Railways Act, the respondent did not put forth any objection that the claim had been lodged not, by the owner of the goods, but by a wrong person and the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C., under Ex.B7 had also been issued by the very same person who lodged the claim and therefore, it is not open to the respondents to raise any objection regarding the validity of the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C. The further contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the object behind the issue of a notice Under Section 80, C.P.C., was to inform the respondent about the claim made with reference to a particular consignment and to afford an opportunity to the respondent to scrutinize the claim in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed, and if found to be a just claim, to take action avoiding unnecessary litigation and saving public time and money by settling the claim and that had been more than substantially fulfilled by the contents of the notice issued under ExA.7 in this case. In support of this contention, apart from referring to other decisions, learned Counsel placed very strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ghansyan Dass v. Dominion of India , overruling S.W. Dutt v. Union of India On the other hand, Mr. In support of this contention, apart from referring to other decisions, learned Counsel placed very strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ghansyan Dass v. Dominion of India , overruling S.W. Dutt v. Union of India On the other hand, Mr. P.B. Krishnamurthi, learned Counsel for the respondent, maintained that the person on whose behalf the claim was lodged and the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C., was issued, had not instituted the suit and the notice cannot, therefore, be considered as to have fulfilled the requirements of Section 80, C.P.C., as there is no identity between the person issuing the notice and instituting the suit. Learned Counsel pointed out that such lack of identity between the person issuing the notice and instituting the suit would render defective the notice. 6. Ex.P.7, dated 9.8.1973 is the notice issued prior to the institution of the suit. That notice purports to have been sent on behalf of Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals, Madras. Therein, after referring to the damage to the consignment and the resulting shortage and the lodging of a claim which was rejected, it has been stated that the damage has been caused only as a result of the negligence of the respondent and, therefore, the respondent should make a payment of the sum of Rs. 4,993-95 with interest. All relevant particulars with reference to the consignment, the damage sustained by the consignment owing to the negligence of the respondent, the resulting loss, the rejection of the claim and the erroneous grounds on which the claim had been rejected have been set out therein and the claim is reiterated and the respondent is called upon to pay the amount. It must be remembered that there is no particular form in which a notice Under Section 80, C.P.C., should be couched and a notice so issued should be considered and interpreted in a manner which accords with common-sense and not in a pedantic way. Though according to the earlier trend of decisions, the requirements of Section 80, C.P.C., were express, explicit, mandatory and admitted of no implications or exceptions, that view was considerably diluted by later decisions, which proceeded to accept substantial compliance with Section 80, C.P.C., as sufficient compliance. The question of substantial compliance has to be considered in the light of the contents of the notice. The question of substantial compliance has to be considered in the light of the contents of the notice. It has earlier been noticed how all the relevant particulars had been furnished by the appellant under ExA7, though it purported to have been issued on behalf of Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals, without indicating the nature of its constitution. The suit had also been instituted by Jaswantchand S. Mehta as sole proprietor of Madras Heavy Chemicals. From the contents of the notice Ex.A7, it is clear that the respondent had been put on notice of a claim with reference to the damage sustained in the carriage of goods under railway receipt No. 588574 dated 31-8-1970 from Wadi Bander to Salt Cotaurs on behalf of Madras Heavy Chemicals irrespective of whether it was a proprietary or a partnership business. In my view, the notice under ExA7 so issued by the appellant was sufficient to inform the respondent regarding the claim made with reference to a particular consignment in the name of Madras Heavy Chemicals, be it a proprietary or a partnership business. In setting out a claim in a notice Under Section 80, C.P.C., all that would be necessary is to set out the full particulars to inform the respondent about the circumstances giving rise to the claim and it is really unnecessary that the respondent should also be informed about the nature and the constitution of the business as such. Oftentimes, as in this case also, the notice even when properly given rigidly adhering to the requirements of Section 80, C.P.C., remains unanswered and has enabled in a large number of cases the Government as well as public officers, merely to raise hyper-technical defences, though such defences had succeeded in a large number of cases. It is thus seen that though Section 80, C.P.C., had been conceived as a means designed for the furtherance of justice by avoiding resort to costly and time consuming litigation it had been used to frustrate this object. As stated already, when the concerned authorities are put on notice of a claim by a person substantially complying with the requirements of Section 80, C.P.C., that would be sufficient compliance with Section 80 C.P.C. In this case, under ExA7, the notice had been sent on behalf of Messrs. As stated already, when the concerned authorities are put on notice of a claim by a person substantially complying with the requirements of Section 80, C.P.C., that would be sufficient compliance with Section 80 C.P.C. In this case, under ExA7, the notice had been sent on behalf of Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals and the claim has also been made only on its behalf, though the suit had been instituted by Jaswantchand S. Mehta, who as per Ex.A9 to All is the sole proprietor of Madras Heavy Chemicals. If the suit had been brought in the name of Madras Heavy Chemicals without anything more, the respondent could not have raised any valid or tenable objection. The mere circumstance that Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals is described as a proprietary business, in my view, would not make any difference for, what the Railway Administration is concerned with is the justness and correctness of a claim made on behalf of a consignee with reference to the damage stated to have been caused to a consignment and not with the constitution of the consignee or the method and the manner in which the consignee carries on business. So long as the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C. informs the respondent about the damage sustained by the consignment in relation to the goods carried by the Railway Administration at the instance of or for the benefit of the consignee, that would be sufficient and substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 80, C.P.C. Under ExA2 to A5 Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals had lodged a claim Under Section 78B of the Indian Railways Act, and no objection was raised by the respondent that the claim was not maintainable at the instance of Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals. The notice Under Section 80, C.P.C. had also been issued only on behalf of Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals, though the suit had been instituted describing Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals as a proprietary business. Thus, in this case, it cannot be stated that there is total lack of identity between the person who issued the notice under Ex A7 and the person who finally instituted the suit, for, Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals, though the suit had been instituted describing Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals as a proprietary business. Thus, in this case, it cannot be stated that there is total lack of identity between the person who issued the notice under Ex A7 and the person who finally instituted the suit, for, Messrs. Madras Heavy Chemicals is the entity on whose behalf a claim had been made earlier and the notice under ExA7 had also been issued and the consignment which sustained damage was the property of Madras Heavy Chemicals, whether it was a partnership concern or a proprietary business. 7. It would be necessary at this stage to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas v. Dominion of India. In terms of an escalation clause in a contract for the supply of charcoal, the contractor made a demand for payment at the enhanced rate, which was refused by the military authorities and the contractor served a notice Under Section 80, C.P.C. Before the suit could be instituted, the contractor died and his three sons brought the suit claiming escalated amounts and an objection was raised that the notice given by the father would not ensure to the benefit of the sons. Though the trial court did not accept this objection and granted a decree, the High Court held that the notice given by the father was not sufficient compliance with Section 80, C.P.C. and dismissed the suit. However, the Supreme Court pointed out that Section 80, C.P.C. is but a part of the procedure and must be interpreted in a manner so as to sub-serve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it and that the whole object of Section 80, C.P.C. is to give the Government sufficient warning of the case to be instituted against it and to enable the Government if it so wished, to settle the claim without litigation and if that requirement is fulfilled, that would suffice. In so holding, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 22 of its judgment, overruled the prior decision in S.N. Dutt v. Union of India. Apart from this, the Supreme Court has also taken into consideration the legislative acceptance of the concept of substantial compliance as embodied in Section 80(3), C.P.C. inserted by Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Apart from this, the Supreme Court has also taken into consideration the legislative acceptance of the concept of substantial compliance as embodied in Section 80(3), C.P.C. inserted by Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. The Supreme Court was aware that Section 80(3), C.P.C. would apply only to suits instituted after 1-2-1977 and that suits which were pending on that day had to be dealt with, as if the amendment Under Section 80(3) was not made and despite that, the legislative acceptance was relied upon as justifying the conclusion that substantial compliance would suffice and the notice Under Section 80, C.P.C. must be construed with regard to commonsense in the background of the object with which that section had been enacted. On the facts of this case, it is clearly seen that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas v. Dominion of India would apply and the Courts below were, therefore, in error in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that the notice issued under ExA7 Under Section 80, C.P.C. was invalid. No other point was urged. 8. Consequently, the second appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the appellant will be entitled to recover from the respondent a sum of Rs. 4,993-95 with interest at six per cent per annum from the date of plaint, namely, 10-10-1973 till realisation with costs throughout.