JUDGMENT Virendra Kumar, J. 1. The petitioner is seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 2.5.1987 passed by District Magistrate, Unnao (opposite party no, 2) contained in Annexure1 to the Writ Petition by which the petitioner's licence for rifle was suspended with immediate effect issuing a notice to the petitioners to show cause why the licence be not revoked. 2. On 2.5.1987 District Magistrate, Unnao, as arms licence Issuing Authority passed an order mentioning therein that the petitioner alongwith one Rameshwar had forcibly taken possession of a plot of land which was allotted to one Basant, When the Government employees of the Tahsil Head Quarter went to restore the possession of the plot to the allottee, the embloyees as well as the allottee were threatened by the petitioner and frightened with his licenced rifle. The concerned SubDivisional Magistrate recommended the suspension of the licence. The District Magistrate laid down in the order that it would not be in public interest to let the licence of the arm continue in favour of the petitioner. Thereupon the licensing authority under the same order suspended the licence of the petitioner with immediate effect and further asked the petitioner to show cause within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice why the licence be not revoked. It was further provided that in case no explanation was received from the petitioner it would be deemed that he had nothing to say and accepted the averments and orders would be passed, accordingly, thereafter. 3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that suspension of the arms licence of the petitioner by the impugned order dated 2.5.87 pending the enquiry into cancellation is unwarranted and illegal. In this connection reference has been made to section 17 of the Arms Act as well as to the following cases: 1. AIR 1986 Allahabad 142 (FB) Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of U.P. & others. 2. AIR 1985 Allahabad 291 (FB) Kailash Nath and others v. State of U.P. & another. 3. 1986 All Law Journal 1442 Raghuvir Sahai and another v. D.M., Jhansi. 4. The relevant provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are as under: 17. 2. AIR 1985 Allahabad 291 (FB) Kailash Nath and others v. State of U.P. & another. 3. 1986 All Law Journal 1442 Raghuvir Sahai and another v. D.M., Jhansi. 4. The relevant provisions of section 17 of the Arms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are as under: 17. Variation, suspension and revocation of licences : (1) The licensing authority may vary the conditions subject to which a licence has been granted except such of them as have been prescribed and may for that purpose require the licence holder by notice in writing to deliver up the licence to it within such time as may be specified in the notice. (2) The licensing authority may, on the application of the holder of a licence, also vary the conditions of the licence except such of them as have been prescribed. (3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence: (a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or (c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or (d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or (e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under subsection (1) requiring him to deliver up the licence. (4) The licensing authority may also revoke a liceiice on the application of the holder thereof. (4) The licensing authority may also revoke a liceiice on the application of the holder thereof. (5) Where the licensing authority makes an order varying a licence under subsection (1) or an order suspending or revoking a licence under subsection (3), it shall record in writing the reasons therefore and furnish to the holder of the licence on demand a brief statement of the same unless in any case the licensing authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interest to furnish such statement. 5. Section 17 (3) (b) clearly provides that suspension of the licence may be made by the licensing authority for such period as it thinks fit, if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of public peace or public safety. 6. The impugned order signifies that the licensing authority has first considered the facts (already mentioned above) and thus made an objective satisfaction. Then it arrived at the conclusion of suspending the licence as it seemed to him that it was not in public interest to allow continuance of the licence of the petitioner. The licence was suspended with immediate effect and simultaneously under the same order show cause notice was issued to the petitioner as to why the licence be not revoked. It is thus obvious that the suspension was for the period intervening the passing of the impugned order and issuing of orders for or against revocation on the enquiry ordered. Section 17(3)(b) authorises the licensing authority on the ground of public peace or public safety to suspend licence for such period as it thinks for that is to say that period of suspension can be the same for which enquiry into revocation is madethe enquiry commencing with issue of show cause notice to the licensee. 7. But as laid down by the Bench of five Judges in the case of Kailash Nath (supra) it is incumbent upon the licensing authority to afford opportunity to the aggrieved petitioner to file objections and show cause before attaching finality to the impugned order. In the instant case opportunity to show cause why the licence be not cancelled has clearly been afforded under the impugned order. In the instant case opportunity to show cause why the licence be not cancelled has clearly been afforded under the impugned order. It follows that in the event of objections of the petitioner on show cause notice being allowed, the suspension of the arms licence was to come to end and the licence was to get restored to the licence holder. It is not necessary to give to the licence holder any opportunity to show cause, prior to the taking of provisional action of immediate remedial nature like suspension or surrender of licence. 8. In support of his contention that the licensing authority had no authority to suspend the licence pending enquiry, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the case of C.P. Sahu (supra) which was decided by a Bench of three Judges of this Court giving rise subsequently, to the formation of a larger Bench of five Judges, for the decision of the case of Kailash Nath (supra). In the case of C.P. Sahu (supra) the following two questions of law were referred to the Bench for opinion: (1) Whether there is power to suspend an arms licence pending enquiry into its cancellation or suspension ? (2) Whether in view of statutory provisions is it incumbent upon the authorities to afford an opportunity of hearing prior to suspension pending enquiry? H.N. Seth, J., (as he then was) spoke for the Full Bench of the three Hon'ble Judges. First question was answered in negative and about the second question it was held that it did not arise for consideration and hence it was not necessary to answer the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended on the basis of this decision that in the instant case the suspension of the arms licence of the petitioner having been made pending enquiry into its cancellation, such order is invalid and illegal and deserves to be struck down. In the case of C.P. Sahu (Supra) the first question was considered on two grounds. Firstly, whether the suspension of the arms licence during the pendency of the enquiry was a power essential to be exercised in order to achieve the very object of the Act which could otherwise be defeated and secondly, whether such a power is to be regarded as inherent/incidental power of the licensing authority. Firstly, whether the suspension of the arms licence during the pendency of the enquiry was a power essential to be exercised in order to achieve the very object of the Act which could otherwise be defeated and secondly, whether such a power is to be regarded as inherent/incidental power of the licensing authority. It was held : So far as the first ground mentioned above is concerned, learned counsel for the State contended that one of the main objectives sought to be achieved by revocation/suspension of an arms licence is to secure public peace and safety. In case the licensing authority is not enabled to suspend the licence during pendency of the enquiry, public peace and safery may, during such enquiry, get disturbed. It would, in the circumstances, be reasonable to recognise a power in the licensing authority to suspend an arms licence pending enquiry. We are unable to accept this submission. As already explained, if there already is material before the licensing authority and it becomes apparent to it that possession of arms by the licensee is going to endanger public peace and safety, it can straightway and without holding any enquiry proceed to revoke f suspend the arms licence after recording reasons, therefore and if the licensee is aggrieved by such orders, he will have a right to ventilate his grievance before the appellate authority. However, if there is no such material before the licensing authority and it is not apparent to it that there is an immediate danger to public peace and safety and it, on some information being laid before it, proceeds to find out whether there is any likelihood of public peace and safety being affected at some future date, it cannot be said that there is any such urgency so as to justify the revocation/cancellation of the licences even before the licensing authority gets so satisfied. In the circumstances, considering the nature and the object of the enquiry which a licensing authority is required to make for finding out if the facts justifying passing of an order for revocation/suspension of licence exists, it cannot be said that nonconferment of the power to suspend an arms licence pending enquiry has the effect of defeating the object for which such a power has been conferred upon the licensing authority. (Emphasis supplied by us.). 9. (Emphasis supplied by us.). 9. In the case of Kailash Nath (supra) the same view expressed in the underlined sentence (above) was reiterated under para 20 of the separate judgment given by Hon'ble H. N. Seth, J. as a member of the five Judge's Bench. 10. In the instant case the facts (as detailed above) contained in the impugned order clearly, make out that before passing the order of suspension, there was available before the licensing authority such material which satisfied it that any further continuance of the possession of the arm by licensee would not be in public interest, therefore, it straightway without holding any enquiry about suspension of the arms licence, suspended it after recording reasons though opportunity to show cause was given to the petitioner before passing any order of final nature like cancellation or revocation. According to the last two sentences of the above quoted paragraph from C.P. Sahu's case, in a case in which sufficient material is not before the licensing authority to satisfy him of immediate danger to public peace and safety and so he first proceeds to enquire whether there is likelihood of danger to public peace and safety being affected at some future date, suspension/cancellation of the licence is not warranted. 11. 11. With regard to second ground whether the licensing authority had inherent, implied or incidental power of suspending licence during the pendency of the enquiry the answer in the case of C.P. Sahu (supra) was given in negative, But in the subsequent case in Kailash Nath (supra) M.N. Shukla, C.J., speaking on his own behalf and on behalf of three other Hon'ble Judges of the Bench held: This being the legal aspect of the case I am of the opinion that the law laid down in para 16 in Chhanga Prasad Sahu's case (1984 All WC 145) (FB) (supra) extracted in the earlier part of this judgment must be supplemented by the further observations that after taking the provisional action of immediate revocation of the licence the licensing authority must issue notice to the licence holder giving him an opportunity to file objections that after taking the provisional action of immediate revocation of the licence the licensing authority must issue notice to the licence holder giving him an opportunity to file objections against preliminary order and after hearing him proceed to pass the final order which may either affirm or revoke the provisional order. In other words, it is incumbent upon the licensing authority to refrain from attaching finality to the order of cancellation until the aggrieved petitioner has been heard by such authority and his objections have been adjudicated. The licensing authority can also for the furtherance of his immediate remedial action exercise the incidental power of directing the licence holder to surrender his licence until the objections have been decided. It follows that in the event of the objections being allowed the licence as well as the firearm must be restored to the licence holder. 12. Instead of surrender of licence pending enquiry, as was the situation in the case of Kailash Nath (supra), in the instant case there has been suspension of the licence pending enquiry into matter of it's revocation. But the ratio of the decision of the case of Kailash Nath (supra) is that the licensing authority has the power to exercise incidental power for immediate remedial action, that immediate remedial action can be to the effect of surrender or suspension of the licence pending enquiry, as is considered necessary by the licensing authority in view of the facts and circumstances of a case. Consequently the view of the three Judges Bench taken in the case of C.P. Sahu (supra) that the licensing authority had no incidental power to suspend the licence pending enquiry no more holds good, after the decision of the larger Bench in the case of Kailash Nath (supra). 13. In the case of Raghuvir Sahai (supra) decided by a Division Bench of this Court the question whether suspension of licence could be ordered pending enquiry into revocation of arm licence again cropped up. The Division Bench answered the question in negative saying in paragraph 7 of it's Judgment. The opinion in C.P. Sahu's case (1986 All L J 328) (FB) in so far as it ruled that the enactment did not envisage suspension pending an enquiry was, however, not disapproved by the larger Full Bench in the case of Kailash Nath (supra). 14. Towards the end of it's judgment, the Division Bench said: We, however, wish to make it clear that if on the basis of the material which was brought to the notice of the District Magistrate before passing of the impugned order or subsequently thereto, the District Magistrate is satisfied that the licenses of the petitioners ought to be revoked or suspended for any specified period, he can pass such an order straight way subject to the condition that he shall immediately after passing of the order allow the petitioners reasonable time to submit their representations against that order and thereafter dispose of the representations or objections within three weeks of the receipt of the representation or objection. 15. In making the observation in paragraph 7 of it's judgment the Division Bench appears to have overlooked the ratio of the decision of the larger Bench in the case of Kailash Nath (supra) that the licensing authority has the power and authority to exercise incidental power of immediate remedial action; and this action of provisional nature can be taken before passing a final order, i.e., relating to cancellation, after affording opportunity to the licenceholder to show cause against cancellation. Surrender/suspension pf the licence pending enquiry into the matter of revocation which is a subsequent action and of final nature, is an immediate remedial action which could legally be taken by the licensing authority on being satisfied from the facts/circumstances already before him at the time of passing the order of suspension/ surrender that likelihood of immediate danger to public peace and safety exists. All such actions having been taken by the licensing authority Binder the impugned order it is held to ba valid and legal. It is not necessary to give to the petitioner as licence holder any opportunity of hearing or to show cause for taking immediate remedial action of provisional nature sutish as suspension or surrender of licence. 16. We are fortified in taking the above view by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Awadhesh Kumar Misra v. District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar and others, (1988 (14) Allahabad Law Reporter 37) wherein, after taking into consideration the above cited case law and also the relevant statutory provisions, it has been held: Power of suspension is a necessary concomitant of power of cancellation for effective control and regulation. It was necessary and expedient that the licensing authority should be clothed with power to suspend a licence when it detects or finds it to be in the interest of law and order. Otherwise, a licenceholder can commit breach of the terms and conditions of his licence with impunity, without any check or control. What appeal to us to be flowing from Section 17(3) of the Arms Act is that the power of suspension is a necessary adjunct to the power to grant a licence, Subsection (3) of Section 17 when it empowers the licensing authority may, by order in writing, suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit. It obviously means that it implies within itself the power of suspension pending enquiry. 17. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in Awadhesh Kumar's case (supra) and find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the licensing authority has got no power of suspending Arm's licence pending enquiry. The impugned order, in our opinion, does not suffer from any lack of authority or wrong exercise of power in suspending arm licence of the petitioner so as to call for any interference by this Court. 18. The impugned order, in our opinion, does not suffer from any lack of authority or wrong exercise of power in suspending arm licence of the petitioner so as to call for any interference by this Court. 18. The result is that this writ petition has no force and is liable to fail. 19. The writ petition is dismissed. No order is made as to costs.