JUDGMENT - P.S. SHAH, J. :---The facts giving rise to this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution are these. On December 20, 1985, general elections of Deolali Cantonment Board respondent No. 2 herein were held. The first respondent Nissar Khan Ibrahim Khan was one of the contesting candidates and he was elected. The election of the first respondent was challenged by the defeated candidate by filing Election Petition No. 12 of 1985 before the District Judge, Nasik, provided under Rule 43 of the Election Rules framed under the Cantonments Acts, 1924. The challenge to the election of the first respondent was on the ground that he was disqualified for being choosen as a member of the Board since he had incurred prior to the election a disqualification under section 28(2)(h) of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (hereinafter called 'the said Act'). The alleged disqualification is on the ground that the first respondent had failed to pay his dues of the Board prior to his filling of the nomination and was thus a defaulter. The dues were in respect of lease rent of a garden taken on lease by the first respondent from the Board as also for non-payment of electricity charges to the Board. The Joint District Judge upheld the contention and declared that the first respondent was disqualified to contest the election on the date of election and therefore, his nomination is null and void. Consequently, his election was set aside. 2. The first respondent challenged the decision of the Joint District Judge in Writ Petition No. 1418 of 1987 filed by him in this Court. The writ petition was summarily rejected on March 7, 1987, by a Single Judge of this Court. This decision was challenged in the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3691 of 1987. By judgment and order dated December 4, 1987, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Joint District Judge as well as of the High Court and dismissed the election petition. This decision of the Supreme Court is reported in (Nishar Ahmed Ibrahim Khan v. Deolali Cantonment Board)1, 1987 (Supp.) Supreme Court Cases, 562. By judgment and order dated December 4, 1987, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Joint District Judge as well as of the High Court and dismissed the election petition. This decision of the Supreme Court is reported in (Nishar Ahmed Ibrahim Khan v. Deolali Cantonment Board)1, 1987 (Supp.) Supreme Court Cases, 562. It appears that after the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court the Cantonment Board issued four notices dated April 13, 1987, April 27, July 19, 1987, and July 9, 1987 to the first respondent to pay the amounts due to the Board from him. The notices were served within a day or two of the aforesaid dates of the notices Complying with the demand made by the Board, on November 6, 1987, the first respondent paid the dues amounting to Rs. 27,640.09 to the Board. It may also be mentioned that in view of the setting aside of the election of first respondent by the Joint District Judge and the rejection of his writ petition by-election was ordered by the Central Government some time in October, 1987. The petitioner filed his nomination papers at the by-election. On November 10, 1987 the scrutiny of papers was held by the Returning Officer. At the time of the scrutiny the petitioner who is a voter objected to the nomination of the first respondent on the ground that he was disqualified under the same provisions i.e. section 28(2)(h) of the Act. This objection was upheld by the Returning Officer. The by-election was scheduled to take place on December 6, 1987. However, a couple of days earlier i.e on December 4, 1987, as mentioned above the Supreme Court allowed the first respondents appeal and set aside the orders of the Joint District Judge and the High Court while directing the dismissal of the election petition. 3. Therefore, on March 2, 1988, the petitioner filed the present writ petition contending that the first respondent was not qualified for being a member of the Board as he failed to pay the arrears due by him to the Board within 30 days after the service of the notice on him. 3. Therefore, on March 2, 1988, the petitioner filed the present writ petition contending that the first respondent was not qualified for being a member of the Board as he failed to pay the arrears due by him to the Board within 30 days after the service of the notice on him. It is to be borne in mind that the four notices were admittedly served on the first respondent in the months of April and July, 1987, and the payment of the dues was made on November 6, 1987, i.e after a lapse of a period of 30 days as prescribed in section 28(2)(h) of the Act. 4. It is urged by Mr. Phadkar , the learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court the first respondent never ceased to be a member of the Board and notwithstanding the decisions of the Joint District Judge and the High Court, he continued to be a member of the Board. In other words, he submitted that the effect of the Supreme Court decision is that the first respondent is restored to his original position as on the date of the order passed by the Joint District Judge setting aside his election and he continued to be a member of the Board. On this foundation, it was submitted that since admittedly the notices issued by the Cantonment Board for payment of the dues remained to be complied with for more than 30 days after the service of the notice on the first respondent, the first respondent was not qualified for being a member of the Board as provided in section 28(2)(h) of the Act. Section 28 of the Act deals with the qualifications for being a member of the Board. Sub-section (2) of section 28 enumerates the various disqualifications. We are concerned with the disqualification mentioned in Clause (h) of section 28(2). As per this provision, no person shall be qualified for being chosen (whether by election or nomination) as, and for being a member of the Board, if he fails to pay any arrears of any kind due by him otherwise than as an agent, receiver, trustee or an executor, to the Board within thirty days after the notice in this behalf has been served upon him. This provision regarding disqualification obviously deals with two contingencies. This provision regarding disqualification obviously deals with two contingencies. Firstly it deals with the disqualification prior to the election and also deals with a disqualification being incurred during his continuance as a member of the Board. What we are now concerned with is whether by reason of the first respondent's failure to clear up the arrears claimed by the Board within a period of thirty days, he becomes disqualified for being a member of the Board. The expression for being used in the provision obviously refers to a disqualification incurred during the continuance of the person as a member of the Board during the period during which the person said to have incurred the disqualification. Undoubtedly, but for the fact that the Joint District Judge had by judgment and order dated February 9, 1987, set aside the election of the first respondent and the said decision was confirmed by this Court by order dated March 17, 1987, the first respondent ceased to be a member of the Board till December 4, 1987, when the Supreme Court gave a verdict in his favour and restored his status as a member of the Board by dismissing the election petition filed against him. It is common ground that the order of the Joint District Judge was not stayed. In other words, right from February 9, 1987, till December 4, 1987 the first respondent could not serve as a councillor nor could he exercise any of the rights or powers as a councillor. The Supreme Court by dismissing the election petition only notionally restored the status of the first respondent as a member of the Board. However that does not mean that during the interregnum the first respondent could regain the status of the member of the Board so as to incur a disqualification under section 28(2). Since the order of the Joint District Judge was not stayed the first respondent could not by any stretch of imagination act as a member of the Board. The notional restoration of his status as a member from the date of his election by reason of the order of the Supreme Court cannot bring into its fold a disqualification incurred during this period. The notional restoration of his status as a member from the date of his election by reason of the order of the Supreme Court cannot bring into its fold a disqualification incurred during this period. As a matter of fact in the very first notice dated April 13, 1987, it has been mentioned the arrears could not be recovered were during the pendency of the election petition and that since the petition has been decided the position of arrears against the first respondent was made clear. The notice, therefore clearly treated the first respondent as not being a member of the Board for the purpose of the demand. This position adopted by the Board is obviously correct because so long as the order of the Joint District Judge was not set aside the first respondent ceased to function in any manner as a member of the Board. 5. As a proposition of law it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Phadkar that the revival of the status is restrospective in the sense that the revival of the status of the first respondent as a member would have the effect of the first respondent incurring a disqualification under section 28(2) of the Act as if he was a member of the Board. The position would have been different, if the order of the Joint District Judge was stayed during this period. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel. 6. Mr. Sawant urged two more contentions on behalf of the first respondent. It was submitted that in order to attract a disqualification under section 28(2) a strict compliance of the provisions thereof is required in the sense that the notice of demand served on the member must mention the provisions of disqualification and also that if the amount is not paid within thirty days, he would be disqualified. Undoubtedly, the provisions as to disqualification must be strictly construed. Undoubtedly, the provisions as to disqualification must be strictly construed. However, according to the provisions a person becomes disqualified for being a member of the Board if he fails to pay any arrears.......to the Board within thirty days after the notice in this behalf has been served upon him.' The expression in his behalf' read in the context of the provisions must have reference to a notice to pay the amount specified in the notice and it is not necessary to mention that the amount should be paid within the specified period of thirty days nor is it necessary to inform the member that the failure to pay the dues within the prescribed time of 30 days would have the effect of disqualification. In this connection we may refer to the provisions of section 253 of the Act regarding the requirements of a valid notice that may be served by the Board. The said provision in so far as material provides that a notice issued by the Board must be either by the President of the Board or by the Executive Officer or by the members of any committee especially authorised by the Board in this behalf. A reference was also made to section 252. However, in our opinion, that provision is not relevant. It only deals with a notice made under the Act for which no time is fixed in the Act or the rules or bye-laws and it is provided in such a case the notice must specify a reasonable time for doing the same. As far as section 28(2) (h) is concerned, it provides a specific period of 30 days for compliance and, therefore, the question of fixing any reasonable time in the notice does not arise. All the same what can be observed on a plain reading of the provisions is that the notice must specify the amount. It is only the compliance on the part of the member which has to be made within the specified period of 30 days. There is no requirement that the notice must mention the said period of 30 days nor is there any requirement that the notice should mention that failure to pay the amount would result in disqualification. It was also submitted by Mr. There is no requirement that the notice must mention the said period of 30 days nor is there any requirement that the notice should mention that failure to pay the amount would result in disqualification. It was also submitted by Mr. Sawant that as far as the provisions of Cantonments Act or rules are concerned, there is no provision which provides for a remedy to a voter or to any one to non-seat a member on the ground that during the continuance of his membership he has incurred a disqualification. It was submitted that the election law is codified in the Act and in the absence of any provision for some remedy in the Act itself, the petition under Article 226 would not lie. There is no merit in the contention. The powers which the High Court can exercise under Article 226 are wide and are not curtailed merely because an Election Law does not provide for any specific remedy like an appeal to some authority. Indeed, the very absence of such a remedy like an appeal to some authority. Indeed, the very absence of such a remedy being provided in the Act or the rules would be a ground for exercise of powers by the High Court Article 226. 7. In the view that we have taken on the interpretation of section 28(2) and the effect of the order of the Supreme Court, this petition must fail. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Rule discharged. -----