JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - The order passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhadrak, dated 30.7.1983 taking cognisance of an offence punishable u/s 16(1-A)(i) read with Section 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Act for short) against the Petitioner and opposite parties 2 and 3 is under challenge. 2. According to the prosecution report submitted by the Food Inspector, opposite party No. 2 is a partner of a firm named M/s Om Prakash Ramkumar of Charampa Bazar, Bhadrak, carrying on business in grocery goods. Opposite party No. 3 is a wholeseller of such goods at malgodown, Cuttack. Petitioner is a manufacturer of Vanaspati in the brand name of 'Yanasada'. On 19.1.1983, the Food Inspector purchased 1.500 grams of Banaspati from a sealed tin of Vanasaga manufactured by the Petitioner from opposite party No. 2 by observing all formalities on suspicion that the same was adulterated. The sample of Vanaspati, was examined by the Public Analyst according to whose report it did not conform to the standard prescribed for Vanaspati and, so it was adulterated. As the goods had been purchased from opposite party No. 3 which had been manufactured by the Petitioner, after obtaining sanction for prosecution, prosecution report was submitted against the Petitioner and opposite parties 2 and 3. 3. Item 'A. 19' of Appendix 'B' of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') prescribes the standard of Vanaspati. According to sub Clause (v) thereof the melting point as determined by capillary slip method in respect of Vanaspati shall be from 31?C to 37?C, both inclusive. The Public Analyst found that the melting point of the sample collected from opposite party No. 2 as determined by the capillary slip method was 39.05?C. In view of the analvssis, he formed the opinion that the sample Vanaspati was adulterated. 4. Mr. S.C. Lal, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, urged that during the year 1983 one of the standards prescribed for Vanaspati in item A. 19 Clause (v) was that the melting point as determined by capillar slip method should be form 31?C to 37?C. both inclusive. But the said item was amended by notification No. G.S.R. 744(E) dated 27.10.1984 by which 37?C. was deleted and in its place 41?C was substituted. But the said item was amended by notification No. G.S.R. 744(E) dated 27.10.1984 by which 37?C. was deleted and in its place 41?C was substituted. Therefore, with effect from 27.10 1984, the melting point of Vanaspati as determined by capillary slip method shall be from 31?C to 41?C both inclusive instead 31?C to 37?C. both Inclusive. This amendment was brought in item 'A.19' of Appendix, 'B' of the Rules before judgment in the case was delivered and as the fact stands as present, the sample seized from opposite party No. 2 conformed to the prescribed standard. The Petitioner and for that matter the other accused persons namely opposite parties 2 and 3 did not commit the alleged offence. Prosecution is, therefore, liable to be quashed. He placed reliance on three decisions reported in Shyam Lal Vs. State Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mai Ram alias Bhaya Ram and 1974 F.A.C. 21, Sundar Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi. 5. In the case of Shyam Lal v. State (supra) a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court quoting Crewford's "Construction of Statute" (1940 Edition) at page 599, observed: the above rule of construction is based on principle that until the proceedings have reached final judgment in the Court of last resort, that Court, when it comes to announce its decision, must conform to the law then existing. It was further held: It seems to us clear that the true rule of construction of a penal statute is that where the legislature evinces its intention to modify the law, in favour of the accused, so as to reduce the rigors of the law in the light of past experience and changed special conditions, so long as prosecution of the accused has not concluded by a judgment of conviction, the proceedings against him are regarded as inchoate and the law applicable to him would be the law as amended by the legislature. The Court trying an accused person has to take into consideration the law as it exists on the date of the judgment, It seams reasonable that an accused person cannot render himself liable to a higher punishment under a statute which has ceased to exist and has been substituted to be a new which favours him. Where the question as to the interpretation of a penal statute is concerned, the Court must construe its provisions beneficially. Where the question as to the interpretation of a penal statute is concerned, the Court must construe its provisions beneficially. In regard to their applicability to the accused. It would be violating the spirit of the law and the will of the Legislature as expressed in the amending statue to sentence an accused persons on the basis of the original Act which has been considered by the Legislature to be harmful and harsh against public interest. In the case of Sundar Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), the standard of compounded Hing came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. When sample of the compounded Hing was taken in 1962, item 'A. 04' of Appendix 'B' of the Rules prescribed a particular specification of purity, according to which the Public Analyst had reported that the sample of the compounded Hing was adulterated. In the year 1966 e new standard was prescribed for compounded Hing, according to which the sample compounded Hing could not be said to have been adulterated. So the most point before the Court was whether the new standard was applicable, in which case the Petitioner of that case was entitled to acquittal since the sample did not fall below the standard The learned Judges agreed with the view expressed by the division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case referred to above and held that the new standard of compounded Hing, as it stood on the date of judgment, should be given effect to and the notification which substituted the new standard in place of the old must be given retrospective operation. The principle laid down in the Case of Sundar Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Supra) was followed by another Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mai Ram alias Bhaya Ram (Supra). In this case, purity of the sample of Haldi power was in dispute. According to item 'A.O5.20.01 of Appendix 'B' of the Rules the sample of the Haldi power was adulterated. But subsequently a new standard in place of the old was prescribed, according to which the sample of Haldi power could not be said to have been adulterated. The Division Bench held that the notification which substituted a new standard in place of the old must be given retrospective operation. 6. But subsequently a new standard in place of the old was prescribed, according to which the sample of Haldi power could not be said to have been adulterated. The Division Bench held that the notification which substituted a new standard in place of the old must be given retrospective operation. 6. In the present case, as said already been referred to above, the sample of Vanaspati according to the old standard could be said to have been adulterated in view of the report of the Public Analyst, but according to the new standard which substituted the c Id, the sample of Vanaspati could not be said to have been adulterated. The new standard must be given retrospective operation and as the case against the Petitioner and opposite parties 2 and 3 was at the initial stage, it is liable to be quashed, otherwise any further proceeding thereof will be abuse of the process of the Court. 7. For the reasons stated above, the proceeding of 2(c) C.C. Case No. 39 of 1983 of the Court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhadrak, against the Petitioner and opposite parties 2 and 3 is quashed.