Judgment :- 1. Sarasamma, a woman aged thirty seven and mother of three children, complained that the accused had misbehaved towards her, showed some gesticulations with intent to outrage her modesty and assaulted her by holding her hand in his grip. The trial magistrate convicted the accused for the offences under S.354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to different terms of imprisonment under each count. On appeal the Sessions Court set aside the conviction and sentence and hence the State has preferred this appeal with special leave granted. 2. Sarasamma, on the date of occurrence, was a member of the staff attached to the Iritty Branch of M/s. Aditya Finance and Investments Limited. When the office work was over on the day, she went to the Iritty bus stand to catch bus to go home. While she was talking with the manager of her office (who too came there to board the bus) the accused went near her and winked his eyes at her and beckoned her with hands and also exhibited some prankish gesticulations. (The evidence shows that the accused bad displayed such prankishness to some other ladies at the same bus station on earlier occasions). Sarasamma got stunned and she remonstrated with him and told him to stop doing such vulgar exhibitions. The undaunted accused then blurted out that even her father cannot do anything against him. So saying he caught bold on her right hand. Sarasamma struggled to squirm out of his grip. When she became free she reported the matter to a police constable who was standing a little away at the same station. At the instance of the said police constable, she went to the nearest police station and lodged the First Information Statement. The police arrested the accused on the same day. 3. The evidence of Sarasamma was fully supported by pw. 2 who is a headload worker of Iritty Bus stand. pw. 4 is the local manager of Aditya Finance Investments Limited. He was treated by the prosecution as hostile since be did not speak to all the full details as per the case diary statement. But a reading of his testimony gives assurance of the truth of the incident. pw. 3 is the doctor who examined Sarasamma since the police directed her to go to the government hospital. pw. He was treated by the prosecution as hostile since be did not speak to all the full details as per the case diary statement. But a reading of his testimony gives assurance of the truth of the incident. pw. 3 is the doctor who examined Sarasamma since the police directed her to go to the government hospital. pw. 3 did not see any external injury on that part of her hand which was caught hold of by the accused. The trial magistrate was very much impressed by the evidence of Sarasamma and also the testimony of the headload worker (Pw. 2). Learned Magistrate found that pw. 4 also substantially supported the prosecution case. On a consideration of the entire evidence he concluded that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the case against the accused. 4. The lower appellate court traced out some minor discrepancies and highlighted them. Learned Sessions Judge took a serious view of the evidence regarding the scene of occurrence as Iritty bus stand because the exact place described in the scene mahazar is the waiting shed and not the bus stand as such. According to the learned Sessions Judge the prosecution failed "to Drove the place of incident itself". A reading of the entire evidence shows that there is no justification for the said comment since the waiting shed is only a part of Iritty bus stand. Witnesses have used the expression "bus stand" not for denoting the precise spot where the bus is stationed. Sessions Court's reasoning on this score cannot but be dismissed as perverse. The evidence of pw. 2 was not acceptable to the Sessions Judge since pw. 2 did not rush to the rescue of Sarasamma despite his bold claim that he would not flinch away when a woman is in jeopardy. But the Sessions Judge overlooked that part of the evidence which shows that it was pw. 2 who helped the police constable to overpower the accused when the latter offered physical resistance to the police constable. Perhaps the incident would have swelled into uglier limits bad the police constable failed to catch the wrong doer then and there. There was only one police constable available in the bus stand and when he tried to intercept the assailant, force was used by the accused to get extricated from bis grip. It was the timely help of pw. Perhaps the incident would have swelled into uglier limits bad the police constable failed to catch the wrong doer then and there. There was only one police constable available in the bus stand and when he tried to intercept the assailant, force was used by the accused to get extricated from bis grip. It was the timely help of pw. 2 which emboldened the police constable to physically overpower the accused. The Sessions Judge was critical of Sarasamma for mentioning the name of the accused in the first information statement since she admitted that she did not know his name earlier When an incident of this type happens in such a public place as the bus stand, it does not require much effort to know the name of the wrong doer. Accused is not a stranger in the said bus stand. Evidence of pw. 2 would even suggest that the accused would have been a regular menace to lady passengers who wait in that bus stand to board the bus. If Sarasamma happened to know the name of such a person before reaching the police station, there is nothing improbable in it. Learned Sessions Judge has also referred to certain insignificant discrepancies relating to some inessential details of the incident and unleashed bis criticism on them. However, the lower appellate court did not meet the broad question posed by the trial court-if the basic fabric of the story is untrue why should Sarasamma (a widow and mother of three children, earning her livelihood by working) come out with this serious accusation against the accused? The trial court which beard the evidence of pw. 2 was intensely impressed by it and placed absolute reliance on his testimony. The Sessions Court's criticism of pw. 2's evidence is unsatisfactory as well as unreasonable if not uncharitable also. The lower appellate court has seriously erred in jettisoning the whole case on the strength of some trivial reasons which were given disproportionate importance in the judgment of the Sessions Court. 5. The next question is-Do the proved acts (attributed to the accused) amount to the two offences charged against him? The offence under S.354 and 509 of the Penal Code are cognate offences. The pivot of both the offences is infringement of the modesty of a woman. 5. The next question is-Do the proved acts (attributed to the accused) amount to the two offences charged against him? The offence under S.354 and 509 of the Penal Code are cognate offences. The pivot of both the offences is infringement of the modesty of a woman. The former is a more aggravated offence as it involves either assault or use of criminal force on the part of the accused. The other offence is apparently lesser in degree since even uttering any word, or making any sound or gesture or exhibiting any object with intent to insult the modesty of a woman, would amount to the latter offence. A gesture will amount to an assault when it is made with the intention or knowledge that such gesture shall cause apprehension in the mind of another that the maker is about to me criminal force against the other. If any such assault is made with intent to outrage the modesty of a woman he commits the offence under S.354. Though the word "modesty" is not defined in the Penal Code, it has relation to the sense of propriety of behaviour in relation to a woman against whom the offence is committed. In the Oxford English Dictionary one of the meanings given for the word "modesty" is "womanly propriety of behaviour". What the legislature had in mind when it used the word modesty in S.354 and 509 of the Penal Code was protection of an attribute which is peculiar to woman, as a virtue which attaches to a female on account of her sex. Modesty is the attribute of female sex and she possesses it irrespective of her age. The two offences were created not only in the interest of the woman concerned, but in the interest of public morality as well. The question of infringing the modesty of a woman would of course depend upon the customs and habits of the people. Acts which are outrageous to morality would be outrageous to modesty of women. No particular yardstick of universal application can be made for measuring the amplitude of modesty of woman, as it may vary from country to country or society to society. 6. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh (AIR. 1967 SC. 63), Bachawat, J. has observed that young or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping the woman possesses a modesty capable of being outraged. 6. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh (AIR. 1967 SC. 63), Bachawat, J. has observed that young or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping the woman possesses a modesty capable of being outraged. The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. Though the reaction of the woman concerned is very relevant, its absence is not always decisive. Eg. When the accused with a corrupt mind stealthily touches the flesh of a sleeping woman, he commits the offence. In the same decision, Sarkar C. J. has observed thus: "The test of the outrage of modesty must, therefore, be whether a reasonable man will think that the act of the offender was intended to or was known to be likely to outrage the modesty of the woman. In considering the question, he must imagine the woman to be a reasonable woman and keep in view all circumstances concerning her, such as, her station and way of life and the known notions of modesty of such a woman". 7. In a very early decision, (MIHLASO v. NGA THAN, (1912) 13 Crl. Law Journal 53), it was held that "the fact that a person is in love with a woman does not authorise to pull that woman by her hand and hair in the presence of others, and such an act would amount to an outrage of her modesty". 8. The accused in this case by winking bis eye at Saradamma in public and by beckoning her to the notice of others bad insulted her modesty. Even if those gesticulations were done without being noticed by others except the woman those acts would amount to insult to her modesty since she had no idea to reciprocate those gestures. By doing such acts the accused bad committed the offence under S.509 of the Penal Code. But the accused did not stop with that. He caught hold of her arm which is an obvious act of assault to outrage her modesty. Thereby be committed the offence under. S.354 as well. For the aforesaid reasons the order of acquittal is set aside and the conviction for the two offences is restored. 9. The trial court passed the maximum sentence (rigorous imprisonment for two years) for the offence under S.354 whereas he awarded rigorous imprisonment for six months for the other offence and directed that the sentences shall run consecutively. For the aforesaid reasons the order of acquittal is set aside and the conviction for the two offences is restored. 9. The trial court passed the maximum sentence (rigorous imprisonment for two years) for the offence under S.354 whereas he awarded rigorous imprisonment for six months for the other offence and directed that the sentences shall run consecutively. The reasons for awarding such a severe sentence have been stated by the trial magistrate thus: "The accused bad committed the offences in a private bus stand where large number of people including ladies are assembling for the purpose of catching buses. An illegal act which had taken place at such a place and that too against a lady who waited there for catching a bus cannot be treated lightly. Moreover the accused is not a first offender. The nature and circumstances of this case called for a deterrent sentence. The accused deserves even no leniency with regard to the sentence to be imposed on him". Although the extent of the sentence is usually a matter of discretion of the court and such a discretion has been exercised by the trial magistrate with reasons, I am of the view that the case does not warrant awarding of the maximum sentence for the offence. I, therefore, sentence the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months for the offence under S.354 and rigorous imprisonment for three months for the offence under S.509 of the Penal Code. The direction passed by the trial magistrate that the two sentences shall run "consecutively" has justification in the peculiar facts of this case and hence T do not interfere with that direction. The appeal is allowed to the above extent. Partly Allowed.