Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was an employee of the first respondent. He was appointed on probation by letter dated 22-1-1975. That letter says that the petitioner was to be on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining service. It further says: " If your work and conduct during this period are found to be unsatisfactory in any way, your services will be terminated without notice, or assigning any reason for the same." Subsequently by letter dated 31-1-1976 the petitioner was told by the management: "I regret that you have been found unsuitable for the post of an Assistant Conductor and as per the second paragraph of the above mentioned letter, your services are being terminated with immediate effect." 2. As a result of the action of the management terminating the services of the petitioner, an industrial dispute arose and the dispute was referred to the Labour Court, Quilon, which by the award in I. D. No. 56 of 1978 found that the termination of the services of the petitioner was on "bona fide grounds". It was further found that the petitioner was not entitled to reinstatement. Nevertheless the court found that the services of the petitioner bad not been validly terminated as there was no proper retrenchment in terms of S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. This award came into force 30 days after the date of its publication which was on 28-2-1984. 3. The award is challenged by the employee-petitioner on the ground that the Labour Court was not justified in refusing reinstatement with full backwages when the court found that there was no valid retrenchment of the petitioner in terms of S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Counsel for the Petitioner Shri. P. V. Abraham contends that until the petitioner is validly retrenched he is deemed to continue in service of the employer and is therefore entitled to all the benefits, which be would have received had he not been kept out of service, including the financial benefits arising from the time-scale. Counsel submits that, in the absence of any order of confirmation, the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed and is thus entitled to be treated as a working member of the staff for the purpose of seniority and financial benefits. 4. Counsel submits that, in the absence of any order of confirmation, the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed and is thus entitled to be treated as a working member of the staff for the purpose of seniority and financial benefits. 4. What the Labour Court in the operative part of the award ordered was: "In the result an award is passed holding that the petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement as his retrenchment was on bona fide grounds. In lieu of reinstatement he will be paid seven months salary at the rate he was drawing at the time of his discharge as compensation in addition to retrenchment compensation, notice pay, and one month's wages in lieu of bis leave entitlement, as provided under S.25F and Ext. M11 respectively. Parties will suffer costs." 5. Counsel for the first" respondent-employer Shri. K. A. Nayar submits that what the court did was to give to the petitioner seven months' salary in lieu of reinstatement in addition to the benefits which be would get under S.25P, namely, compensation and notice pay. Further-more wages in lieu of leave entitlement also would be paid to him. The Labour Court has thus moulded the relief by refusing reinstatement and the petitioner cannot, therefore, contend that he was entitled to be treated as if he was still in the service of the employer. Shri. Nayar further points out that, at the time when the petitioner was appointed and when his services were terminated, the law was understood to be what it is now clarified by the legislature by amending S.2 of the Industrial Disputes Act to insert sub-clause (bb) to S.2(oo). The decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Sundaramoney, (1976)1 LLJ 478 declaring the law was rendered subsequent to the orders in question had been made. It is only in the light of what the Supreme Court subsequently stated in that and other cases that the Labour Court held that, in the absence of an order in terms of S.25F, as employee appointed on probation, subject to the condition contract of service was liable to be terminated, was still entitled to be treated as if he continued to be in service. That Counsel says, is no longer good law. 6. That Counsel says, is no longer good law. 6. In the light of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Sundaramoney (1975) 1 LLJ. 478 and subsequent decisions, the Labour Court was right in say ing that the employee had not been retrenched in terms of S 25F. That finding is final in so far as the management is concerned, for it has not been challenged. Having come to that finding, the Labour Court was not justified in denying the employee full backwages until be bad been properly retrenched. 7. The question, however, is can the employee be treated as if he is still in service because the management has not so far made an order under S.25F? 8. Shri. Nayar contends that in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Indl. Trib., (1981) 1 LLJ 386, it was not necessary in all cases to pay backwages even when an employee had not been retrenched in terms of S.25F. 9. In Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Indl. Trib. (1981) 1 LLJ. 386, the Supreme Court stated: "Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workman must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court to make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The Court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the Court ma v mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment is the way of awarding the, relief is clearly shown. In such and other exceptional cases the Court ma v mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment is the way of awarding the, relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted." (emphasis supplied) As stated by the Supreme Court, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, an employee would be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. In the present case, no exceptional circumstances were pleaded by the management. Accordingly the employee was entitled to be reinstated with full backwages until his services were terminated by a valid order. 10. Can the employee be still regarded as if he continues to be in service? S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act says: "2(oo) 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workmen concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or If this sub-clause was on the statute book at the relevant time, the employee's services would be liable to be terminated otherwise than by retrenchment, for admittedly be was appointed only on probation, subject to his appointment being terminated on his failure to satisfactorily complete the probation. But the insertion of the sub-clause by the amendment of 18-8-1984 was not with retrospective effect and it was inserted to overcome the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Sunderamoney, (1976) I LLJ 478 and other cases to the effect that, even when a person was appointed only for a specific period or where the order of appointment specifically stated that at the end of a specific period his appointment was liable to be terminated, be was entitled to be retained in service until duly retrenched in terms of S.25f. That principle was negatived, though prospectively, by the statutory amendment which came into force from 18-8-1984. In the circumstances, although the services of the employee had been for bona fide reasons terminated by the management by an order which, as the law was then understood, was an invalid order, and, therefore, the employee was therefore entitled to be treated as if he was notionally in service, that position could validly continue only until the legislature finally clarified the law so as to negative the principle laid down by the Supreme Court. Accordingly the order of termination, which had until the date of insertion of sub-clause (bb) to S. (oo) remained ineffective, revived itself in full force, although prospectively, as from 18-8-1984. In the circumstances, the order dated 31-1-1976 is deemed to have come into effect as from 18-8-1984 and the services of the employee are deemed to have been terminated as from that date, subject to payment of benefits under S.25-F and backwages until then on the basis that he remained a probationer during the relevant period. 11. In the circumstances, the operative part of the impugned award is modified to read that the employer is liable to pay to the employee retrenchment benefits under S.2SF together with full backwages payable to a probationer as if the services of the employee as a probationer terminated on 18-8-1984: The Original Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.