Judgment :- 1. The simple question to be considered in this second appeal filed by the defendants is whether a right of way acquired as a grant of easement by the provisions of a partition deed, which was also absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement at the time of the grant, could be taken as an easement of necessity and treated as extinguished when the absolute necessity ceased by the owner of the dominant tenement acquiring an adjacent property having road access. 2. Plaint B-schedule property was allotted to the share of defendants as per ExtA.partition deed and A-schedule property lying to the south of it was allotted to the assignor of the plaintiff. There is a road running east-west just on the northern side of B-schedule property. C-schedule is the pathway from the road leading to A-schedule property without which A-schedule had no access at the time of partition. It is part of B-schedule property on its western extremity running north-south. In Ext.A.partition deed a pathway was provided to A-schedule through C-schedule. The case of the appellants is that after the plaintiff purchased A-schedule property he has also acquired the land lying immediately on the eastern side of A and B-schedule properties touching the northern road and hence through that property he is having access from the road to A-schedule property without using C-schedule property. 3. Purchase of the eastern property was denied by the plaintiff. Ext. B1 produced by the appellants as one of the sale deeds of the eastern property was contended by the plaintiff to be not in his name. Appellants have another grievance that they were not permitted to prove two other sale deeds in this respect. They also contended that the pathway provided in Ext.A.is not C-schedule property but on the eastern side of B-schedule and the description in Ext.A1 is a mistake. Further contention was that the pathway was in disuse and the right is lost by limitation and adverse possession also. All these contentions were found against by both the courts on the evidence and those factual findings have become final and not liable to be reconsidered in second appeal. On the merits also no consideration is called for. The prayer for remand is also not justified to any extent. Appellants had enough opportunities to adduce evidence. All these contentions were found against by both the courts on the evidence and those factual findings have become final and not liable to be reconsidered in second appeal. On the merits also no consideration is called for. The prayer for remand is also not justified to any extent. Appellants had enough opportunities to adduce evidence. Even if their contention regarding acquisition of the eastern property based on Ext. B1 and two other documents is correct, it cannot extinguish the grant under Ext. A. as an easement of necessity. 4. The question whether an easement is one acquired by grant or as of necessity is not to be decided on the absolute necessity of it. It is the nature of the acquisition that counts. Many easements acquired by grant may be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenement in the sense that it cannot be enjoyed at all without it. That may be the reason for the grant also. But easement of grant is a matter of contract between the parties and it may have its own consideration in some form or other. In the matter of grant the parties are governed by the terms of the grant and not anything else. The grant may be express or even by necessary implication. In either case it will not amount to an easement of necessity under S.13 of the Easements Act even though it may also be an absolute necessity for the person in whose favour the grant is made. On principle it is clear that if a person acquires a grant expressly or by necessary implication, it will usually be on payment and there is no reason why such an easement which is paid for should be extinguished for the reason that the acquirer came by another access. Limit of the easement acquired by grant is controlled only by the terms of the contract. If the terms of the grant restrict its user subject to any condition the parties will be governed by those conditions. Any how the scope of the grant could be determined by the terms of the grant between the parties alone. Limit of the easement acquired by grant is controlled only by the terms of the contract. If the terms of the grant restrict its user subject to any condition the parties will be governed by those conditions. Any how the scope of the grant could be determined by the terms of the grant between the parties alone. When there is nothing in the term of the grant that it was to continue only until such time as the necessity was absolute and there is no evidence to support such an agreement it must be held that the grant was not limited till the necessity for it existed. If it is a permanent arrangement uncontrolled by any condition, that permanency in user must be recognised and the servient tenement will be permanently burdened with that disability. Such a right does not arise under the legal implication of S.13 and it is not extinguished by the statutory provision under S.41 of the Easements Act which is applicable only to easements of necessity arising under S.13 (See Hirajee and another v. Suraj Bali AIR. 1929 Oudh 351- and JR. Sivanandan and others v. Rajammal and another-1915 (1) MLJ. 251). 5. As held in Govinda Bhatta and others v. Maruvala Rama Bhatta (AIR. 1927 Madras 963) it is a question of fact from the circumstances of each case as to whether an easement is one of necessity or grant. In this case it arises only under the grant made in Ext.A.and not otherwise and both the courts have held so. There is no case even for the appellants that it arose under S.13 of the Easements Act as one of necessity by implication of law. Their only case is that since it was an absolute necessity and arose on severance of tenements on partition it must be treated as one of necessity ignoring the grant. But for the grant the argument would have been alright. But when the parties committed themselves by the terms of the partition deed and bargained and crystallised the otherwise available right of necessity to one of grant specifying the extent, location and user, the question of necessity is not there and it got converted into one of contract by grant. The mere statement in the plaint that it is also one of absolute necessity will not convert it into one of necessity ignoring the grant or contract. The mere statement in the plaint that it is also one of absolute necessity will not convert it into one of necessity ignoring the grant or contract. What is claimed in the plaint and contested by the parties is only as one of grant. 6. Easements of necessity are dealt with in Clauses (a), (c) and (e) of S.13 of the Easements Act. It is an easement arising upon a grant by implication of law and not by any contractor concession of the parties. Easement of necessity arises only upon severance of tenements either by transfer or by bequest or by partition. It is true that easement by grant also could be bad by these methods but it could be had in other cases also whereas easement of necessity cannot. Easement of necessity can arise in favour of the transferee or legatee or the separated co-sharer. It can also arise in favour of the transferor or legal representative of the testator or the other separated co-sharer. Anyhow it can arise only upon severance when a person in one of these groups finds it absolutely impossible to enjoy his tenement without exercising a right of easement over the tenement of the person from whom he has separated. Land is intended for enjoyment and the owner or bolder has the right to enjoy it. He can usefully enjoy it only if be can reach it. It cannot be allowed to be land locked. When the tenements remained as joint any portion of it could have been used by the owner or owners for access to the other portions. When they are separated and access to a separated portion becomes impossible except through the other separated portion, a doctrine of implied grant is created by the legal fiction under S.13 of the Easements Act to meet the absolute necessity of a particular case. 7. It is an easement which is not merely necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tenement, but it is one without which that tenement cannot be used at all. The burden of the servient owner in such a case is not on the basis of any concession or grant made by him for consideration or otherwise, but it is by way of a legal obligation enabling the dominant owner to have bare use of his land. The burden of the servient owner in such a case is not on the basis of any concession or grant made by him for consideration or otherwise, but it is by way of a legal obligation enabling the dominant owner to have bare use of his land. It is limited to the barest necessity however inconvenient it is irrespective of the question whether a better access could be given by the servient owner or not. When an alternate access, however inconvenient, arises the legal necessity of burdening the servient owner ceases and the grant of necessity by implication of law is legally withdrawn or extinguished as statutorily recognised in S.41. Such an easement will last only so long as the absolute necessity exists. Such a legal extinction cannot apply to an acquisition by grant and S.41 is not applicable in such case. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants brought my attention to a pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ramachandra v. Jagannath (1969 (1) SCWR. 97) in order to contend that an easement by grant which was also an easement of necessity was treated by the Supreme Court as one of necessity and held to have extinguished when the necessity ceased. The Supreme Court did not say so and I am afraid the counsel has not understood the decision fully. It is true that the decision mentioned about an easement by grant in a sale deed of 1911 of the right to use two doors of the remaining portion of seller's building by the purchaser. The dispute between the purchaser and the subsequent mortgagees of the remaining portion from the seller which resulted in that litigation was relating to the user of a narrow strip of land belonging to the seller not covered by the grant but subsequently used as an easement of necessity. It was in relation to that easement of necessity that the Supreme Court said that it extinguished when a public lane was constructed through the side of his property giving access to him. An easement acquired by grant cannot be treated as an easement of necessity for the purpose of extinguishment as argued. Irrespective of the question whether the absolute necessity ceased or not the unrestricted grant under the partition deed will continue and both the courts are correct in decreeing the suit. The second appeal is therefore dismissed, in the circumstances without costs.