JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---As will be presently pointed out, the question arising out of this petition betrays a picture of a battle between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee. A meaningless Appeal was filed by the present respondent to the Deputy Collector almost 12 years after the order by which he was aggrieved. He need not have filed the appeal at all. The question could have been well agitated by him in the suit which, I am told, he has already filed, because the question which was urged by him in the proposed appeal filed long after the expiration of the limitation was a neat question of jurisdiction of the trial Court which could have been and can be agitated in a civil suit. Without considering the question of limitation the Deputy Collector entertained and allowed the Appeal for a meaningless exercise of remanding the matter back to the Tahsildar. The same order is passed by the Revenue Tribunal purporting to make a slight modification which is more apparent than real. The original respondent before the Dy. Collector has filed the present writ petition. For the reasons which will be presently mentioned, I am inclined to allow the writ petition partially, but mainly because the question sought to be urged in theses proceedings is essentially meant for the suit which is already pending between the parties and not because any particular prejudice is caused to present petitioner. 2. The relevant facts are very simple. The property in question, extensive piece of property, situate at Dahisar, which is now within the Municipal limits of Greater Bombay, belonged at one time to one Mr. Haji. He died in 1946 and Administration suit came to be filed by the persons claiming to be his heirs on the Original side of this High Court, Suit No. 3415 of 1947. The suit is still pending. In that suit, a Receiver was appointed. The suit property forms part of the entire property left by deceased Haji. The Receiver purported to auction the suit property to respondent No. 1, M/s.Veekaylal Investment Company Pvt. Ltd. However, admittedly, a Sale Certificate has not been issued in favour of present respondent No. 1. In that sense he is not a legal owner of the property. He may possible be the equitable owner. The Receiver purported to auction the suit property to respondent No. 1, M/s.Veekaylal Investment Company Pvt. Ltd. However, admittedly, a Sale Certificate has not been issued in favour of present respondent No. 1. In that sense he is not a legal owner of the property. He may possible be the equitable owner. After the auction in favour of present respondent No. 1 was made, one Bhatia Raval made an application to the Tenancy Court, viz., the Tahsildar, at Borivali, for relief under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Land Act. He contended that he was a tenant of the said suit land and hence he asked for declaration under section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act to that effect. He also claimed that, as such tenant, he had become owner of the sane under section 32 of the Tenancy Act and by the same application asked for fixation of the price to be paid by him to the landlord. To that application, the Court Receiver was made a party. Likewise, present respondent No. 1 was also made a party defendant to that application. The Receiver, when he received the summons of the proceedings, informed the tenancy Court by a letter that he had already sold the suit land to present respondent No. 1 and had, veritably, washed his hands of the entire matter. On behalf of present respondent No. 1, one Churi, who was in the employment of respondent No. 1's Company was examined. He stated the fact that Bhatia claimed to be the tenant of the land in the suit. But from the evidence given by him it does not appear that the had admitted Bhatia's contention that he had become owner of the suit land under section 32 of Tenancy Act. By his order dated 5-4-1967 Tahsildar held that Bhatia was a tenant of the suit land and that he had to become owner of the same under section 32 of the Tenancy Act. The purchase price was therefore fixed by him and the instalments by him were determined. I am told across the bar that Bhatia had in fact deposited the entire amount in the Tenancy Court. A plea is raised before me by Mr. Naik, the learned Council for the petitioner, that that amount had been even withdrawn by and on behalf of present respondent No. 1. I am told across the bar that Bhatia had in fact deposited the entire amount in the Tenancy Court. A plea is raised before me by Mr. Naik, the learned Council for the petitioner, that that amount had been even withdrawn by and on behalf of present respondent No. 1. However, there is no agreement on this point and hence, the entire question shall have to be gone into in appropriate proceedings. 3. Now we come to the crucial aspect of the facts. Present respondent No. 1 sat pretty for a period exceeding 11 years and thereafter filed an Appeal to the Deputy Collector as late as on 23rd March 1978 questioning the validity and legality of the impugned order of the Tahsildar dated 5-4-1967. The Deputy Collector did not apply his mind to the question as to whether the appeal should be entertrained at such a late stage. He gave Notice to the parties concerned and proceeded to hear the appeal. He set out the arguments advanced on behalf of the Appellant in that Appeal (present respondent No. 1). The arguments were that since the suit land was in the possession of the Receiver on the date of the impugned order of the Tahsildar (5-4-1967), the provisions of sections 30 to 32 did not apply to the land having regard to the provisions of section 88-B(1)(d) and that, hence the declaration of tenancy in favour of the tenant, Bhatia, and the statutory sale to him was void ab initio and bad in law. The substance of this argument has been set out by the Deputy Collector in his order. But he has not given any indication whether he was accepting that contention. He simply set out the arguments and straightaway proceeded to set aside the order of the Tahsildar passed more than 11 previous years before the date of the Appeal and to remand the case to the trial Court. The order passed by him in this behalf is as follows:--- "The order passed by the Mamlatdar and A.L.T. is therefore ab initio void. The order is therefore set aside. The Tahsildar Borivali is directed to inquire whether the regular conveyance deed has been executed between the appellant No. 1 and 2. After this deed is executed between the appellant Nos. The order is therefore set aside. The Tahsildar Borivali is directed to inquire whether the regular conveyance deed has been executed between the appellant No. 1 and 2. After this deed is executed between the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 title of this land will pass on to the appellant No. 1 M/s. Veekaylal Investment Co. and then the provision of section 32-G to 32-R will apply. The Tahsilder can, therefore, take action to sell this land to the recorded tenant. The appellant can also take objection to the tenancy of respondent No. 1 before the Tahsildar. The amount of purchase price deposited with the Tahsildar should be returned to the respondent No. 1." 4. The order displays endless confusion of legal process and legal provisions. One cannot make out from the order whether the purported statutory sale by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal in favour of Bhatia was held by him to be bad or not. The legal position was and is simple; either the Tenancy Act applied to the land or did not apply to it. In particular, either sections 32 to 32-R of the Tenancy Act applied to the land or did not apply. If those provisions applied to the land, then the only question that would remain would be whether said Bhatia Raval was a tenant of the suit land or not. If the provisions of section 70(b) applied to the land, the declaration of tenancy was a valid declaration because there was next to no challenge to it on the basis of any evidence as such. A glance at section 88-B of the Tenancy Act shows that if the provisions of section 32 to 32-R did not apply, likewise the provision of section 70(b) of the Act also would not apply. On the other hand, if the other provisions of section 32 to 32-R applied due to some reasons, the provisions of section 70(b) also would apply. This means that both the declarations that Bhatia was a tenant and that he had become a statutory owner would be valid if the Tahsildar had jurisdiction and would be invalid if the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction. But the point is that the order of remand was meaningless, because there was no question of adducing of any evidence on that point. The facts were all admitted facts. A Receiver was appointed by this Court in an Administration Suit. But the point is that the order of remand was meaningless, because there was no question of adducing of any evidence on that point. The facts were all admitted facts. A Receiver was appointed by this Court in an Administration Suit. An argument has been advanced before me by Mr. Naik, the learned Council for the petitioner, that the Administration Suit was not a suit on title. Since there is a litigation pending between the parties, I do not wish to express any final opinion on this submission. But I must express my prime facie reaction that I am not impressed by this argument at all. However, I make it clear, once again, that whether because of the Receiver appointed in an Administration Suit, the land which is the subject matter of the suit would come out of the purview of the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act or not will have to be agitated by the parties in the suit which is already pending in this Court. This point to be noted at this stage is that the order of remand made by the Deputy Collector was a meaningless order. Such order reflects upon the desire of the bureaucratic officer to wash his hands of all responsible decisions by passing the buck to the lower Court and thus making the parties to go from pillar to post for no reasons whatsoever. In my opinion,, the order of remand was hopelessly unjustified and it should have never been passed by the Deputy Collector. If the Deputy Collector felt that the provisions of section 32 to 32-R did not apply to the land in question, that is to say if the Deputy Collector was satisfied that the argument advanced on behalf of present Respondent No. 1 were correct, he should have recorded the finding to that effect and should have passed an appropriate order in that behalf which order should have been of the final nature. He should have passed an order condoning the delay in filing the Appeal and should have thereafter entertained the Appeal and should have set aside the order passed by the Tahsildar. The exercise of remanding the matter back to the Tahsildar is a meaning-less exercise resulting in unnecessary inundation of litigation. 5. Being aggrieved by that order, a Revision Application was filed by the present petitioner to the Tribunal. The exercise of remanding the matter back to the Tahsildar is a meaning-less exercise resulting in unnecessary inundation of litigation. 5. Being aggrieved by that order, a Revision Application was filed by the present petitioner to the Tribunal. In that application, a specific grievance was made about the entertainment of the Appeal after such inordinate delay. The Revenue Tribunal entertained the Revision Application. But even the Revenue Tribunal did not apply its mind to the question as to why the Appeal should have been entertained after so much of delay. Moreover, the Tribunal appears to have refused to apply its mind to the question whether in such a case for certain statutory reasons the order passed by the trial Court would be without jurisdiction and whether a remand should be made for deciding the question. The Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of remand, but passed another order of remand giving some further direction for the Tahsildar's consideration. 6. This order of remand betrays another process of confused reasoning. Even the Tribunal has not applied its mind to the basic question as to whether this is a matter which calls for any remand at all. A simple question that is posed before the Court is as to whether the provisions of section 32 to 32-R in particular of the Tenancy Act applied to the suit land in view of the admitted fact that the property was in the possession of the Receiver at the relevant time and whether the provisions from section 1 to section 88-B (excepting section 4, 4-A, 4-B, 8, 9, 9-A, 9-B, 9-C, 10, 10-A, 11, 13 27 and the provisions of Chapters 6 8) of the Bombay Tenancy Act in general applied to the suit land. If they applied, a declaration under section 70(b) and the order passed in the proceedings under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act would be deemed to have been given by a Court of competent jurisdiction. If not, they would be deemed to have been given by the Court having no jurisdiction to give those decisions and to pass those orders. The further point is that this entire question requires no fresh evidence or, for the matter of that, any evidence at all because all facts are admitted facts. If not, they would be deemed to have been given by the Court having no jurisdiction to give those decisions and to pass those orders. The further point is that this entire question requires no fresh evidence or, for the matter of that, any evidence at all because all facts are admitted facts. The Deputy Collector should have applied his mind to the provisions of law and should have proceeded to verify whether the suit lands were governed at the relevant time by the said provisions or not. But instead of giving decision on this point, these two authorities, the Dy. Collector and the Tribunal, have tried to pass on the buck to the Tahsildar, which could not but give rise to multiplicity of proceeding for no justification whatsoever. It is this order of the Tribunal that has given rise to this petition. 7. I have already indicated my opinion while stating the facts which is that the order passed by the Dy. Collector as well as the Tribunal are meaningless orders revealing reluctance to decide the question raised before themselves. Before the Dy. Collector, the 1st question was whether the Appeal was within limitation and the 2nd question was as to whether the above mentioned relevant provision applied to the suit land or not. The 1st question has been ignored by him and the 2nd question has been shelved by him. Likewise, the Tribunal has done the same thing. The 1st question was whether the Appeal to the Deputy Collector was within limitation and the 2nd question was whether there was any justification for him to remand the matter. The 1st question has been ignored by the Tribunal and on the 2nd question fresh order of remand has been passed, forgetting that the entire question, viz. the question of the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to pass the impugned order, could be decided by the Tribunal itself. 8. In these matters the Courts and other judicial authorities must have their face set to cope up with the situation viz that the Civil and other Courts are being flooded with work and the Courts and these other authorities are panting for breath while they try to cope up with this inflow and inundation of litigations. 8. In these matters the Courts and other judicial authorities must have their face set to cope up with the situation viz that the Civil and other Courts are being flooded with work and the Courts and these other authorities are panting for breath while they try to cope up with this inflow and inundation of litigations. Instead of doing something so that this position is remedied, these authorities under the Tenancy Act, including the Revenue Tribunal, are often seen indulging in the pastime of passing the buck to the Tahsildar, giving rise to the legitimate suspicion that this entire exercise aims at avoiding the judicial decision making process. 9. In the instant case, the Deputy Collector should have first of all decided whether there exists any ground for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal which was filed admitted after more that 11 years. If the Dy. Collector found some justification for condonation of the delay, he could have embarked upon the next question as to whether the Tahsildar's order dated 5-4-1967 was the order of a Court with competent jurisdiction in the context of the provisions of section 88-B(1)(d) of the Tenancy Act. All this could have been done by him just by throwing a glance at the relevant provisions of the statute. No question of any further evidence was required at all, because all the relevant facts were admitted facts. The order of remand passed by him was, therefore, an order totally unjustified, on the fact of it. The Tribunal could have set aside that order or remand and could have directed the Deputy Collector, if the Tribunal found so doing to be necessary, for decision of the question as to whether the suit lands were governed by the provisions of section 32 to 32-R in particular and by the other provisions in general in fact the Tribunal could have been also advised to decide that question itself. Instead of doing so, the Tribunal found the 3rd way. It has set aside the order of the Dy. Collector but has, by the next stroke of pen, passed a similar buck-passing order, sending the matter to the Tahsildar, once again, with some fresh directions. 10. In my opinion, the entire exercise is an exercise in futility. Instead of doing so, the Tribunal found the 3rd way. It has set aside the order of the Dy. Collector but has, by the next stroke of pen, passed a similar buck-passing order, sending the matter to the Tahsildar, once again, with some fresh directions. 10. In my opinion, the entire exercise is an exercise in futility. I find scant justification for an order remanding the matter to the trial Court for no rhyme or reason when the Appeal Court can itself decide the question once for all. In this connection, it is to be noted that by directing the matter back to be remanded to Tahsildar, the Deputy Collector has given no particular benefit for either of the parties. Whatever the Tahsildar would have decided pursuant to that order was bound to be brought back to the Dy. Collector once again in Appeal. This means that the Dy. Collector could not have avoided the adjudication of the question at all. If the adjudication could not be avoided, then it would be sheer futility to remand the matter to the Tahsildar just for the fun of it. The above observation applies with equal force to the order of the Tribunal. 11. I have observed at the very outset that the battle appears to be one between TWEEDLE-DUM TWEEDLE-DEE. Let me expound this position. The fact is that only one of the two positions are likely to emerge:--- (a) That the provisions of sections 1 to 88 A and particularly section 32 to 32-R and section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act did apply to the suit land. If, they did apply, the declaration granted by the Tahsildar dt. 5-4-1967 declaring Bhatia to be the tenant in respect of the suit land would partkake the character of a valid declaration. Likewise, in that event the declaration of the statutory ownership of Bhatia would be also a declaration by a Court of competent jurisdiction. (b) If on the other hand, it was proved that because of the appointment of the Receiver, the tenancy Court's jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act or to entertain proceedings under section 32 to 32-R of the Tenancy Act was and stood ousted, the declaration was bad illegal. A 3rd possibility could not exist. In either of the cases the order of remand would be unjustified. A 3rd possibility could not exist. In either of the cases the order of remand would be unjustified. The remand order is not passed by the Court for the fun of it. Things which could be legitimately and without any difficulty such as of absence of evidence be decided by the Appeal Court with reference to the facts and evidence already on record, it is the bounden duty of the Appeal Court to dispose of the matter one way or the other. The order of remand can hardly be said to be a valid substitue for such a requisite order. I am, therefore, inclined to set aside both the orders, the one passed by the Deputy Collector and the other passed by the Tribunal. 12. The question then arises as to whether the proceedings should be sent back to the Deputy Collector for examining the questions arising before him. The 1st question that arises is as to whether the Appeal was within limitation and, if not, whether exist any reasons for condonation of delay. The second question is if the Appeal was entertained in spite of such delay, to decide whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of sections 32 to 32-R and to give declaration under section 70(b) of the Tenancy Act when at the time of passing of the Tahsildar's ,order the property was already with the receiver. The Dy. Collector, as it were, has shied from or has avoided deciding the real issue in the matter. Question then arises as to what order I should pass whether I should set aside the orders of remand passed by both the Courts below and direct the Dy. Collector to decide all the relevant questions himself, or whether I should decide the points in issue here itself. 13. In my opinion, this is a case where the delay in filing the Appeal cannot be condoned. Mr. Naik was right in pointing out that during the eleven years' period of delay on the part of the 1st respondent, the vested rights have come into being in favour of innocent third parties/transferees and those vested rights are likely to be upset if the matter is now remained back. Mr. Naik was right in pointing out that during the eleven years' period of delay on the part of the 1st respondent, the vested rights have come into being in favour of innocent third parties/transferees and those vested rights are likely to be upset if the matter is now remained back. He rightly pointed out that 3rd party's right had come into being during the said period of 11 years from the date of the Tahsildar's order till the date of the Appeal to the Deputy Collector. He pointed out that since no ground was given for condonation of delay the Court would not be justified in condoning the delay just for the fun of it, as it were, because the Court was, in effect, unsettling the vested rights claims that had engendered themselves after the expiry of the period of limitation over the period of 11 years. I find that there is no ground given for condonation of delay at all, let apart any plausible or acceptable ground for condonation of 11 years' delay. 14. But the reason why I call it as a battle between TWEEDLE-DUM TWEEDLE-DEE is that whatever may be the result of the Dy. Collector's order, the matter is bound to be taken to the precincts of the Civil Court. This is because the question as to whether the particular previous order of any Court or authority was with jurisdiction or not and whether the order passed on the same was passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction or not can always be agitated in a Civil Court. As a matter of fact, in the instant case Mr. Rege's client, respondent No. 1, has in fact filed a suit against the present petitioner. The suit is filed no doubt for possession on the ground that the petitioners are in unlawful possession of the same, because the Sale Deed in their favour was given by a person having no title to the land. But the position is that in that suit all that is required to be established by present Respondent No. 1 is that the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act did not apply to the suit lands at all on 5-4-1967 with the result that the order passed by the Tahsildar on that date was without jurisdiction. But the position is that in that suit all that is required to be established by present Respondent No. 1 is that the relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act did not apply to the suit lands at all on 5-4-1967 with the result that the order passed by the Tahsildar on that date was without jurisdiction. If such decision is given, the result would be that the same made by Bhatia Raval in favour of respondent No. 1 would be, at least prima facie, a void sale. In this connection, It is to be noted that the order passed by the Tahsildar in the earlier proceedings dated 5-4-1967 cannot constitute res judicata in the suit filed by present respondent No. 1, because no decision given by a Court without competent jurisdiction can constitute res judicata. I make it clear that it is open even for the present petitioner to file a suit for similar kind of relief of a declaration that the order passed by the Tahsildar dated 5-4-1967 was an order of a Court with competent jurisdiction. Point is that whosoever files such suit, such a suit will be perfectly within the Civil Court's jurisdiction. I make it clear that it would be always open for present respondent No. 1 to agitate the question of competency of the Tenancy Court in passing the order dated 5-4-1967 in appropriate Civil Court. I make It clear further, that the fact that I am quashing the order-of remand passed by both the Courts below will not come in the way of respondent No. 1 in establishing that the order dt. 5-4-1967 was a nullity because it was an order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction to pass such an order. 15. The Appeal, therefore, succeeds. The order of remand passed by both the Courts below are hereby set aside. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 16. Let me observe once again that merely because I have quashed the order passed by the Dy. Collector as well as of the Tribunal, the order of the Tahsildar is not held by me as an order of the Court with competent jurisdiction. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 16. Let me observe once again that merely because I have quashed the order passed by the Dy. Collector as well as of the Tribunal, the order of the Tahsildar is not held by me as an order of the Court with competent jurisdiction. The question of the competence of jurisdiction of the Tahsildar's order shall be no doubt gone into by the Court in the suit already filed by present respondent No. 1 for possession of the suit land or by such Court in, which appropriate suit will be filed by either of the parties for adjudication upon the competence of the Tahsildar's order dated 5-4 1967 in the context of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1947. Mr. Rege made a statement that he had already filed the relevant suit for possession of the suit land on the ground that the impugned order of the Tahsildar dated 5-4-1967 was without jurisdiction. Mr. Shastri points out that in that suit respondent No. 1 has- in fact asked for a declaration, that the impugned order was without jurisdiction and for setting aside of the said impugned order. Mr. Rege states that he should be given time for making appropriate motion in the suit with a view to injunct the petitioner from parting with possession of the suit land. He pointed out that injunction to that effect has already been given by this Court pursuant to the application made by respondent No. 1 which is the subject matter of Civil Application No. 4783 of 1987. Since by the present order the injunction is to stand dissolved, contends Mr. Rege, it will be necessary for him to move the Court in the suit for getting such injunction afresh. 2 months' time is given to respondent No. 1 for taking appropriate proceedings in this behalf. The injunction granted by this Court in Civil Application No. 4783 of 1987 will continue for the said period of 2 months. 17. Subject to the above observations, the Rule is made absolute. The orders of remand passed by both the Courts below, the Dy. Collector and the Tribunal, are hereby set aside. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----