JUDGMENT B.L. YADAV, J. 1. BY the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have prayed for a writ of Certiorari quashing the levy of market fee by Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Ram Nagar, Nainital on the transaction of purchase of agricultural produce, i.e. wood (timber and fire wood) and rice etc. and for a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents not to realise the market fee and not to cancel their licence and to refund the entire amount realised from them since 1972 to November 1981. 2. THE portrayal of the essential facts are these. THE petitioners are forest contractors engaged in purchase and sale of woods and rice etc. keeping their business inside the market area of Ram Nagar. They are members of the Forest Contractors' Association, a registered body under the Societies Registration Act. THE commodities in which the petitioners are dealing, i. e. wood (timber and fire wood) and rice etc., have been notified as agricultural produce under the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, (for short the Adhiniyam). THE petitioners are licencees and the market fee has been levied and assessed on them on transaction of sale and purchase of specified agricultural produce in the relevant year. Sri S. P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that under Section 17 of the Adhiniyam as amended by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1976, the market fee could not be levied by the Samiti (the Market Committee) as no bye-laws have been framed to that effect nor the rate specified by the State Government has been adopted by any resolution passed by the Mandi Samiti as provided under Rule 66 of the Rules or Niyamavali, 1965, framed under the Adhiniyam. Reliance was placed on the following observations in a Division Bench decision of this Court in M/s, Nand Rice and Oil Mills, Ram Nagar v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 1987 AWC 1473 (hereinafter referred to as the II Division Bench), on page 1474:- "In view of the law laid down in the above case each Mandi Samiti has to frame bye-laws imposing market fee on the transactions of sale and purchase of the agricultural produce taking place within its area. The petitioners have specifically pleaded that Mandi Samiti has not framed any bye law under Section 17 of the Act for levying market fee. The petitioners have specifically pleaded that Mandi Samiti has not framed any bye law under Section 17 of the Act for levying market fee. On the other hand, the Mandi Samiti claimed that necessary resolution in this regard was duly passed on 14-7-1973. Now it has to be determined whether the resolution dated 14-7-1973 can be considered a valid resolution for levying market fee. The resolution has been passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kashipur in the capacity of the Chairman of the Mandi Samiti." 3. THE aforesaid observations were, in fact, based on earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 2358 of 1981 U. P. Forest Corporation v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, (hereinafter referred to as the 1st Division Bench) to the following effect:- "A perusal of amended and unamended section 17 leaves hardly any room for doubt that the power under the Act to levy and collect fee was and is of the Marketing Committee and not of the State Government. THE only change that has been effected is that the legislature itself has fixed the rate and four classes of ' mutually exclusive persons ' from whom it could be realised. But whether in a particular Mandi Samiti a Marketing Committee shall enforce these provisions in respect of specified agricultural produce is still left to be performed by the Committee itself. If the word, 'levy' used in the section as it stood prior to 1978 had to be understood in the sense of empowering Marketing Committee to impose and not assess only then there appears no reason to hold that after amendment imposition has been done by the State Government when it issued the notification and the Marketing Committees are now only to assess the fee. When the legislature while substituting section 17 (iii) did not choose to amend section 17 (iii) and continue the words ' levy and collect ' it has to be assumed that it intended that these words should be understood in the same sense in which they were understood earlier." 4. IN fact, the provisions of Section 17 of the Adhiniyam, as amended by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1976 was being interpreted by the 1st Division Bench. Ex-abundanti cautela the relevant statutory provisions of amended Section 17 of the Adhiniyam are set out below:- "17. IN fact, the provisions of Section 17 of the Adhiniyam, as amended by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1976 was being interpreted by the 1st Division Bench. Ex-abundanti cautela the relevant statutory provisions of amended Section 17 of the Adhiniyam are set out below:- "17. Power of the Committee-A Committee shall, for the purposes of this Act, have the power to- (i) issue or renew licenses under this Act ; (ii) suspend or cancel licenses issued or renewed under this Act; (iii) levy and collect: (a) such fee as may be prescribed for the issue or renewal of licenses; and (b) market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates, being not less than one per centum and not more than one and half per centum of the price of agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification, and such fee shall be realised in the following manner: (1) if the produce is sold through a commission, the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the committee; (2) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer, the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee; (3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee; and (4) in any other case of sale of such produce the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee." A bare reading of the aforesaid provision of Section 17 (iii) of the Act would make it manifest that the Committee shall have power to levy and collect the market fee which shall be payable on transaction of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rate as the State Government may specify by notification. This specification of the State Government would, however, not be less than one per centum and not more than one and half per centum of the price of agricultural produce so sold. This specification of the State Government would, however, not be less than one per centum and not more than one and half per centum of the price of agricultural produce so sold. The amended provision of Section 17 (iii) (b) is a deliberate departure from the earlier provision, by making change in the procedure as to how the market fee is to be levied and the rate of the same, it is better to quote the unamended provision of Section 17 (iii) (b) as follows:- "(b) Market fee on transaction of sale and purchase of specified agricultural produce in the principal market yard and sub-market yards from such persons and at such rate as may be prescribed but not exceeding one and half per centum of the price of specified agricultural produce sold or purchased therein; Provided that no market fee shall be levied or collected on the retail sale of any specified agricultural produce where such sale is made to the consumer." 5. THE unamended provision was to the effect that the market fee could be levied by the Committee in connection with the transaction of sale or purchase of specified agricultural produce at such rates as may be prescribed. THE word 'prescribe' is a defined term 'under Section 2 (n). 'Prescribe' means prescribed by rules framed under the Act known as U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Niyamawali, 1965. THE relevant rule 66, framed under Chapter VI and Section 17 which was on the statute book even after 1976 Amendment, is extracted below:- "66. Market Fee.-[Section 17 (iii) (1)].-THE Market Committee shall have power to levy and collect fees on specified agricultural produce purchased and sold in the market yards at such rates as may be specified in bye-laws, but not exceeding one and half per centum of the price of the specified agricultural produce, provided that the market fee shall be payable by the consumer." 6. RELIANCE was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the aforesaid rule with a view that the market fee has to be levied in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Rule 66 which was to the aforesaid effect even after amendment. But it appears that by oversight Rule 66 was not brought in tune with the amended provision of Section 17 (iii) (a) (b) rather it was in conflict with it. But it appears that by oversight Rule 66 was not brought in tune with the amended provision of Section 17 (iii) (a) (b) rather it was in conflict with it. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand, urged that Section 17 (iii) as amended by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1976 was the relevant statutory provision which enjoins that levy or imposition has to be made by State Government as specified by the notification. The Rule 66 of the Niyamavali was contrary and inconsistent with Section 17 as amended by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1976. The II (Second) Division Bench has placed reliance on the observations of First Division Bench. The controversy involved in this petition may be decided in view of the observations of the First Division Bench and the law laid down in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State of U. P., AIR 1980 SC 1124 . 7. THE Second Division Bench after quoting the observations of the First Division Bench decided not exactly following the First Division Bench, rather it interpreted Section 17 (iii) differently than First Division Bench. In fact, the amended provision of Section 17 (iii) (added by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1976) has already been interpreted in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. (supra). We must, however, confess that we are in a dilemma as we are faced with two conflicting Division Bench decisions of this Court. We can call it a complete fag of authorities as Lord Godderd C.J. described in Younghusband v. Luftiq, (1949) 2 KB 372; or what Up John J. called as a "rough sea of contradictory authorities" in Sneaton v. IIford Corpn., (1954) Ch. 450 at 478. 8. AFTER perusing both Division Bench decisions we are of the opinion, what Scrutton, C.J. observed in Mourton v. Poulter, (1930) 2 KB 188 as "not very difficult to reconcile." There are two points for our determination. 450 at 478. 8. AFTER perusing both Division Bench decisions we are of the opinion, what Scrutton, C.J. observed in Mourton v. Poulter, (1930) 2 KB 188 as "not very difficult to reconcile." There are two points for our determination. The first point is as to whether after amendment of Section 17 (iii) by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1976, is it necessary for levy and collection or in other words imposition and collection of market fee, that it must be in accordance with Rule 66, which provides for adoption of resolution and Bye-laws, even though Rule 66 is not consistent with amended Section 17 (iii), and the second question emanating from the first is as to how to reconcile conflicting observations in the two Division Bench decisions. 9. AS regards the first question, amended Section 17 is quite explicit and it provides that the market fee shall be levied by the Committee and the same shall be payable on the transaction of sale of specified agricultural produce. The rate of such market fee shall be not less than one per centum and not more than one and half per centum of the price of agricultural produce so sold. This rate of market fee has to be specified by the State Government by a notification. Here is a departure from the unamended provision, where the provision was that the market fee could be levied on the purchase of specified agricultural produce on the rate as may be prescribed. 'Prescribed' means as prescribed by rules. It was, in fact, pertinent for the unamended provision of Section 17 to ascertain whether the Committee has framed certain Bye-laws consistent with the rules or the Niyamavali as framed under the Adhiniyam, and whether those Bye-laws have been adopted or the rates as prescribed have been adopted by a resolution of the Marketing Committee. But under the amended Section 17 (iii) the legislature has brought a deliberate departure from the earlier provision by amending that the rate of market fee shall not be less than one per centum and not more than one and half per centum. This rate has to be specified by the State Government in the Gazette Notification. Rule 66 providing for imposition of market fee as specified in the Bye-laws is in accordance with unamended Section 17 (iii). This rate has to be specified by the State Government in the Gazette Notification. Rule 66 providing for imposition of market fee as specified in the Bye-laws is in accordance with unamended Section 17 (iii). The State Government has not amended Rule 66 so as to bring it in tune with amended Section 17 (iii). The learned counsel for the petitioner made Rule 66 as the sheet anchor of his statement. But this rule 66 was in conflict with Section 17 (iii). 10. IN Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State of U. P. (supra), -it was observed on page 1129 by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as follows:- "The Act has been amended several times. But we were distressed to find that Rules were not accordingly amended as and when required to make them up to date in accordance with the amended Act.........We do hope that no further time will be lost by State Government in amending the Rules and making them upto date to fit in with the latest amendments in the Act." The ratio and observations of the First Division Bench are in confirmity with the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar v. State of U. P. (supra) to the effect that Rule 66 has not been amended in view of the amendment of Section 17 (iii) of the Act. Section 17 (iii) (b) was the only relevant provision which enjoins that the rate of the market fee shall be specified by the State Government by issuing a notification, the same was just to be assessed and collected by the Committee and there was no necessity to look for the procedure prescribed by Bye-laws or the Rules or Niyamavali, which was not consistent with Section 17 (iii), as amended by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1976. The procedure for imposition and collection of market fee under Section 17 (iii) was sufficient. 11. REVERTING to the question as to when there appears some conflict in two earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court, which of them has got persuasive force, before the Third Division Bench. The procedure for imposition and collection of market fee under Section 17 (iii) was sufficient. 11. REVERTING to the question as to when there appears some conflict in two earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court, which of them has got persuasive force, before the Third Division Bench. It would not be out of place to refer to the nature of precedent and its judicial authority, as pointed out in "Law in the Making" by Sir C. K. Allen (Sixth Edition) page 199 as follows:- "The whole conception of heirarchy of judicial authority and the binding force of the case on all fours is comparatively modern notion which took centuries to develop into its present form." 12. FOR our present purpose it is better to take similar view of precedent as was taken by Lord Mansfield and Coke (vide page 207, who had a deep impatience of the unintelligent and mechanical use of precedent merely for its own sake and without any true relevance to the underlying principles involved in a legal issue. FOR this reason they frequently insisted, as many Judges have done before and since, that the only proper use of precedent was to illustrate and ascertain pertinent principles, not to regard them, as a machine which will deliver convenient decisions by the mere turning of a handle. To explain the scope of precedent a reference may be made to some very old English cases. In Fisher v. Prince, 1962 3 Burr 1363 it was pointed out that "the reason and spirit of cases make law and not letter of particular precedent ". In Russ v. Cooper, 1777 Cow p. 629 it was observed that "Law does not consist in particular cases, but in general principles, which run through the cases and govern the decision of them. "In R. v. Bembridge, 1783; 3 Dong 327 it was ruled that "Law does not consist of particular cases, but of general principles which are illustrated and explained by these cases. A oldworth in History of English Law XII, 156, has made reference to Gorton v. Hancock, Harg, M.S.S. 353 where following observations were made about scope of stare decisis or precedent to the following effect:- "Neither law nor equity consists merely of casual precedents, but the general rules and principles by reason of which several cases coming before the courts of justice are to be governed." 13. JUDGMENTS of particular courts or the observations made therein or the inference drawn, are not to be construed as Acts of Parliament. In this connection it is better to quote an observation in Gasket Radiators Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1985 SC 790 to the following effect : "JUDGMENTS of Courts are not to be construed as Acts of Parliament nor can we read a judgment on a particular aspect of a question as the whole context gather all aspect of every question. Generally such questions or facts of such questions arises for consideration or not in that case." 14. WE are conscious that stare decisis is in fact, ordinarily rule of action, but not universal act. The adherence to precedence is a rule of practice adopted by the courts for the purposes of bringing uniformity and stability in law. There must not be blind observance of the rule of stare-decisis, as the same would dwarf and stultify the growth of law. See Bechan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1325 . We are of the opinion that from the Second Division Bench M/s. Nand Rice and Oil Mills v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (supra) the underlying principles of law are to be ascertained and it has not to be taken just in its form and letters. In other words the reason and spirit of the Second Division Bench has to be ascertained and it need not be interpreted just like statute, as the law does not consist of particular cases but the general principles governing it. The Second Division Bench placed reliance on the First Division Bench which has interpreted Section 17 (iii) of the Act. The First Division Bench interpreted Section 17 (iii) in view of the ratio laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State of U. P. (supra), hence for our practical purposes the observations in First Division Bench are material. The Second Division Bench appears not to have noticed that Rule 66 was not amended in conformity with amendment of Section 17 (iii) as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State of U. P. (supra). The Second Division Bench appears not to have noticed that Rule 66 was not amended in conformity with amendment of Section 17 (iii) as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State of U. P. (supra). In view of Sec. 17 (iii) which is material for our purpose, the Marketing Committee has to levy and assess and collect the Market fee as specified by the State Govt. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law delared by the Supreme Court was binding on the High Court. The law has already been explained and declared by the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State of U. P. (supra) and the First Division Bench interpreted Section 17 (iii) in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, hence it is the First Division Bench which has got persuasive value. 15. IN the premises aforesaid, we don't find any merit in the present petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.