JUDGMENT : L. Rath, J. - The Appellant having been convicted u/s 161 IPC, and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and sentenced to R.I. for one year u/s 161 IPC and also R.I. for one year and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to undergo R.I. for three months more u/s 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, with direction for the substantive sentences to run concurrently, has preferred this appeal. 2. The accusation against the Appellant for which he has been found guilty is that he was the Additional Commercial Tax Officer attached to Kereda Check Gate in the border between Andhra Pradesh and Orissa and that he was demanding a bribe of Rs. 30 per each trip of truck passing through the check gate. P.W. 1 who owned truck No. ORK 3033 had a contract for transport of hume pipes from a factory at Vizianagaram for delivery to the Government of Orissa at Muniguda and for the purpose the transportation work started in the last week of January, 1981 extending to the month of February. P.W. 3 was the driver of the truck and he complained before P.W. 1 of the illegal demand by the Appellant for each trip. Faced with such harassment P.W. 1 along with P.W. 3 went to meet P.W. 4, the Secretary of the Jeypore Lorry Owners' Association and, reported him about the matter requesting him to contact the Appellant. P.W. 4 met P.W. 3 again on 10th February, 1981 and learning from him that the illegal exaction was continuing went the same day and met the Appellant at the Kereda Check Gate to dissuade him from enforcing such demand, but his request fell on deaf ears of the Appellant who replied that it was his practice which could not be altered. The Appellant is further stated to have demanded Rs. 50/- from P.W. 4 as also a diary since he had come as the representative of the association. P.W. 4 while reminding the Appellant that the demand was unlawful, promised him to pay the money and give the diary on the next day, but having felt irritated at his conduct, went to the Vigilance Office at Rayagada learning that the Dy. S.P. was camping there and lodged information (Ext. P.W. 4 while reminding the Appellant that the demand was unlawful, promised him to pay the money and give the diary on the next day, but having felt irritated at his conduct, went to the Vigilance Office at Rayagada learning that the Dy. S.P. was camping there and lodged information (Ext. 4) which was treated as the F.I.R. He was directed to come to the Vigilance Office next day at about 9 to 10 a.m. On the next day P.W. 4 met P.W. 3 at the Octroi Gate at Rayagada and both of them went to the Vigilance Office. He had carried an executive diary which he had purchased for Rs. 40/- and had also taken a, currency note of Rs. 50/. He was met there by the Dy. S.P. (Vigilance); P.W. 8 the Vigilance Inspector and the I.O. and P.W. 2, a Sub-Inspector. Two other witnesses, the S.D.P.O. Rayagada and the Tahsildar, Rayagada who was an Executive Magistrate, respectively P.Ws. 5 and 6 came there after 12 noon. P.Ws. 3 and 4 were introduced to P.Ws. 5 and 6 and a personal search was taken of them which yielded only one fifty rupee note in the shirt pocket of P.W. 4 and nothing so far as P.W. 3 was concerned. The number of the fifty-rupees note was noted down by P.Ws. 5 and 6 in different pieces of paper and the number was also noted by P.W. 8. A demonstration was made by P.W. 2 in which P.W. 4 being asked, dipped his finger in sodium carbonate solution which gave no reaction. Thereafter his finger was again dipped in the solution after touching phenolphthalein powder on which the solution turned pink. Both the solutions were kept in separate sealed bottles. The currency note was smeared with phenolphthalein powder. The powder and the sealed bottles of solutions were kept back while the sodium carbonate solution was taken. The entire party proceeded to Kereda Check Gate in a jeep with instructions to P.W. 4 to hand over the currency note to the Appellant on demand The jeep halted, at the point the road leads to the quarters of the Appellant and P.Ws. 3 and 4 proceeded towards the quarters of the Appellant with the Constable remaining in between the jeep and the quarters of the Appellant. 3 and 4 proceeded towards the quarters of the Appellant with the Constable remaining in between the jeep and the quarters of the Appellant. The Appellant was coming out of his quarters with a shirt on and enquired from P.W. 4 whether he had brought the diary and the money to which replying in the affirmative P.W. 4 handed over the diary and the note to him who kept the note in his left side, chest pocket. P.W. 3 gave signal by spitting and the other members of the raiding party immediately rushed towards the quarters and: accosted the Appellant. P.W. 8 challenged the Appellant having accepted the diary and the sum of Rs. 50/- which was denied by him. P.W. 8 then prepared sodium carbonate solution in a pot and asked the Appellant to dip his finger which being done, the solution turned pink. The solution was preserved in a bottle and sealed. The Appellant than was asked to produce the contents of his pocket which he did. The contents contained currency notes of a total sum of Rs. 308/- amongst which the tainted note was found the number of which was compared by the raiding party and found tallying with the number previously noted. The shirt pocket of the Appellant was also washed with freshly prepared solution of sodium carbonate and the same also turned pink which was preserved in a sealed bottle. The tainted note and the shirt of the Appellant were seized while the remaining amount was returned to the Appellant. Thereafter they proceeded to the check gate where the detection report Ext. 6 was written out. At that place personal search of P.Ws. 3 and 4 was again made, but nothing was found. 3. The Appellant does not deny the recovery of the currency note from him and so also of the diary. His explanation as appears from the statement u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, is that P.W. 4 was a person unknown to him and while on the date of occurrence he was talking with his friends, P.W. 4 approached him stating that one of the friends of the Appellant, Mr. Dhal, had sent a diary to him. On being asked about his identity, P.W. 4 said that he was the owner of a truck and that he had met Mr. Dhal at Rayagada who gave him the diary. Dhal, had sent a diary to him. On being asked about his identity, P.W. 4 said that he was the owner of a truck and that he had met Mr. Dhal at Rayagada who gave him the diary. The Appellant accepted the diary believing the same to have been sent by a friend. As they were coming out of the house, P.W. 4 asked for change of a fifty-rupee note which he gave keeping the fifty rupee note in his pocket. He insisted the I.O. to check the pocket of P.W. 4, but he did not do so at the spot, and did it only at the check gate which was about a kilometre-apart and that he believes that on the way P.W. 4 had handed over the change to somebody and that such explanation given by him had been deliberately omitted from the detection report, Ext. 6, He also examined four witnesses in defence of whom D.W. I was the Inspector of Sales Tax at Kereda who stated regarding the entries in the register of incoming vehicles at the check gate, D.W. 2 produced a letter of the Appellant addressed to the C.T.O. on 11.2.81, D.W. 3 was a Junior Engineer who was a neighbour of the Appellant and stated regarding the request for change of a fifty-rupee note by P.W. 4. and D.W. 4 proved the handwriting of the Appellant in the letter Ext, A produced by D.W. 2. 4. Since the Appellant has not disputed the recovery of the tainted note and the diary from his possession, a presumption would arise u/s 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act of he having accepted the same for one of the purposes as mentioned u/s 161 IPC but the presumption, in terms of Section 4(1), would not be available so far as the charge u/s 5(1)(d) is concerned. It is of course true that though the presumption shifts the onus upon the Appellant to establish his innocence by rebutting the same, yet the onus is not as heavy as that on the prosecution. 5. It is the submission of Mr. It is of course true that though the presumption shifts the onus upon the Appellant to establish his innocence by rebutting the same, yet the onus is not as heavy as that on the prosecution. 5. It is the submission of Mr. Panda, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, that the presumption is not available to be drawn for which reliance is placed on AIR 1975 S.C. 1932 (Sita Ram v. The State of Rajasthan) wherein an observation was made that merely on recovery of certain money from the person of an accused without proof of its payment by or on behalf of some person to whom official favour is to be shown the presumption cannot arise. In that decision the High Court on an analysis of the evidence reached the conclusion of the illegal gratification not to have been accepted by the officer. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that on the proof of the charge of acceptance of gratification from the complainant, unless the contrary was proved, it could have been held against the Appellant as had been done by the courts below that the gratification was accepted as bribe within the meaning of Section 161 of the Penal Code, but however on reversal against the prosecution of the finding by the High Court on the question of acceptance of money by the officer, the rule of presumption could not be pressed into service. The question whether mere recovery of money from the person of the accused would shift the burden u/s 4(1) came directly to be considered in C.I. Emden Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh a decision of five Judges, where an amount of Rs. 375/- had been recovered from the Appellant there. Expounding the law, it was held that what the prosecution had to prove before it asks the court to raise a presumption u/s 4(1) against the accused is that he had received a "gratification other than legal remuneration" and if it is shown that the accused had received the stated amount and that it was not his legal remuneration, the condition, prescribed by the Section is satisfied. The ward "gratification" is not to be given its literal dictionary meaning and it is not to be proved that money was paid by way of bribe since assigning such a meaning would render the presumption futile or superfluous. The ward "gratification" is not to be given its literal dictionary meaning and it is not to be proved that money was paid by way of bribe since assigning such a meaning would render the presumption futile or superfluous. It was observed that the plain meaning of Section 4(1) was that it undoubtedly requires a presumption to be raised, whenever it is shown that the valuable thing has been received by the accused without anything mare and that if this is the construction, then it would be unreasonable to hold that the ward "gratification" imparts the necessity to prove not only the payment of money but also the incriminating character of the payment. The question again came to be considered in another five Judge decision of the Supreme Court in Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai Vs. State of Maharashtra, wherein it was observed that in order to raise a presumption u/s 4(1) of the Act what the prosecution is to prove is that the accused had received gratification other than legal remuneration and when it is shown that he had received certain sum of money which was not his legal remuneration, then the condition of Section 4(1) is satisfied and presumption must be raised. The position was also reiterated in several other decisions of the Supreme Court. Man Singh Vs. The State of Haryana, was a case where marked currency notes were recovered from the pocket of the shirt of the accused which he was wearing and it was held that it was clearly incumbent under the law on the Appellant to show how he came into possession of that money. In The State of Assam Vs. Krishna Rao, the whole law on the subject was re-discussed and it was held that once moneys were recovered from the pockets of the two accused persons which were not their legal remuneration, then on the materials on record there can be no further question of showing that the moneys had been consciously received by them because the defence that those money had been thrust into their pockets was on the face of it wholly unsatisfactory and unbelievable if not flimsy. It was further held that the presumption u/s 4(1) of the Act, is an obligatory function of the court, inasmuch as the command of the section is that once it is shown that' money has been recovered from the person of the accused, the presumption has to be mandatorily drawn. Negativing such a plea as is raised by Mr. Panda, the position as stated above was reaffirmed in AIR 1974 S.C. 773 (Mahesh Prasad Gupta v. State of Rajasthan) holding: ...it is plain that if the presumption proves the acceptance of the amount by the accused and the amount does not represent legal remuneration in any form or of any kind, the accused must establish that the amount was not accepted such is mentioned in by him as a motive or reward Section 161, Penal Code. In Hazari Lal Vs. State (Delhi Administration), the facts were that the accused on seeing the Inspector took out some currency notes from his pocket and threw them across the partition wall into the adjoining room. The handkerchief which was taken from the very same pocket yielded the result of the bicarbonate solution turning pink having coming in contact with phenolphthalein powder. Since no explanation was given by the accused as to how the phenolphthalein powder came into the handkerchief in his pocket and instead he denied knowledge of it, the irresistible conclusion drawn was that the as currency notes had been obtained by the accused as illegal gratification and not only the presumption u/s 4(1) of the Act was raised but also Section 114 of the Evidence Act was applied to presume the existence of the fact, which had most likely happened, that the accused had taken the money from the decoy witness a few minutes earlier and had flung them across the wall. In the decision, Sita Ram Vs. The State of Rajasthan, was considered and it was held that in the said case the Court had not considered the further question whether recovery of money along with other circumstances could establish that the accused had obtained gratification from any person. Another decision, Suraj Mal Vs. In the decision, Sita Ram Vs. The State of Rajasthan, was considered and it was held that in the said case the Court had not considered the further question whether recovery of money along with other circumstances could establish that the accused had obtained gratification from any person. Another decision, Suraj Mal Vs. State (Delhi Administration), was also distinguished in the same decision likewise and the principle deduced was that where recovery of money coupled with other circumstances leads to the conclusion that the accused had received the gratification from, some person, the court would certainly be entitled to draw the presumption u/s 4(1) of the Act. 6. From the discussions the clear principle that emerges is that where recovery of the tainted notes from the accused is shown and he offers no explanation as to how he obtained their possession, then in the background of the circumstances, the presumption is to be raised that the amount had been received by him as bribe or reward for one of the objects as specified in Section 161 IPC, Such a presumption under the circumstances is not optional but is a mandate to the court that the presumption shall be made since the very wordings of Section 4 of the Act demand that the court "shall presume" the fact unless the contrary is proved. 7. The question which legitimately arises is what are the circumstances to be taken into consideration along with recovery of the tainted money to show acceptance of the same by the accused. It is to be remembered that such circumstances have nothing to do with a prior demand and proof of the same by the prosecution since as was pointed out in C.I. Emden Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, and Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai Vs. State of Maharashtra, such a conclusion would render the very provision for presumption ineffective. The circumstances that can be taken into consideration are thus only those which are immediately connected to the recovery of money from the accused and for such purpose, the facts of preparation for the trap, execution of the trap and the immediate behaviour of the accused on recovery as also his explanation are all circumstances which might enter into consideration though it is not necessary that each one of such facts must be pieced together to arrive at the finding, In Bhim Singh Rup Singh Vs. State of Maharashtra, the conviction was upheld only on the basis of the evidence of the trap witnesses even though their evidence was not free from blemish, since the recovery of the note from the pocket of the accused was not disputed and the explanation offered by him was found to be not believable. In Hazari Lal Vs. State (Delhi Administration), many of the witnesses including P. W. 3., the person who was supposed to have paid the money to the accused, had turned volte face and of the two Panch witnesses one had not been examined as he was mentally deranged and the other P.W. 4 though supported the prosecution case to some extent yet had not done so with regard to the rest of it and had to be declared hostile and cross-examined and thus the only effective evidence was that of P.W. 8, the Inspector of the Anti-Corruption Department, whose evidence to some extent was corroborated by P.W. 4. The court ruled that the evidence of the Inspector was entirely trustworthy and there was no need to seek any corroboration. It was laid down that there is no rule of prudence which has crystallized into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of prudence, which requires that the evidence of such officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices with insistence on corroboration. Thus where the evidence of the officer conducting the raid is such which is acceptable, the court may unhesitatingly, rely upon the same to sustain the conviction. Again in State of U.P. Vs. Dr. G.K. Ghosh, the conclusion was reached that if the evidence of the complainant and that of the police officer are believable, that may well serve the basis of the conviction even though the trap witnesses turn hostile or are found not to be independent. In a decision of this Court Jadunath Khatua Vs. The State it was held by Hon'ble Justice S.K. Behera that the court can, upon the uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness alone base the conviction if it is satisfied that the witness is a witness of truth. 8. In this backdrop of law, the evidence regarding acceptance of gratification by the Appellant may be examined. Apart from P.Ws. 3 and 4, the witnesses to the trap are P.Ws. 8. In this backdrop of law, the evidence regarding acceptance of gratification by the Appellant may be examined. Apart from P.Ws. 3 and 4, the witnesses to the trap are P.Ws. 5 and 6, the two independent witnesses who accompanied the party and P.W. 8, the Inspector of Vigilance. Though P.Ws. 5 and 6 have been declared hostile and have been cross-examined, yet their evidence is of great import so far as preparation of the trap and recovery of the money from the Appellant is concerned in which facts they completely corroborate the version of the prosecution. Both of them were also respectable persons. It is their consistent evidence that they were apprised by the Dy. S.P. and P.W. 8 of the demand of illegal gratification by the Appellant at the Kereda Check Gate from P.Ws. 3 and 4, that a demonstration was given by the vigilance staff of the use of phenolphthalein powder and sodium carbonate solution and there was production of a fifty-rupee currency note by P.W. 4, the number of which was noted down by them, the note was smeared with phenol phthalein powder and they also spoke in detail of the other facts relating to the preparation. Both of them saw that while the Inspector and the party went to accost the Appellant, he was holding an executive diary. Their identity was disclosed to the Appellant and he was confronted of, having accepted the illegal gratification of Rs. 50/- which he denied. The hand of the Appellant was dipped into the sodium carbonate solution which turned pink. Then he was asked to bring out the money and out of the currency notes produced by him the tainted note was identified by the witnesses comparing its number with the number previously noted down by them. The pocket wash of the shirt of the Appellant was also taken which turned pink. They signed on the sealed bottles. P.W. 5 had been declared hostile since he did not confirm in court his previous statement before the I.O. that the Appellant had first told of P.W. 4 is having taken a loan of Rs. 50/- from him and after a few minutes having again said that he had paid Rs. 60/- to P.W. 4 for purchase of a diary and that P.W. 4 had handed over to him a new diary and a fifty-rupee note prior to the detection. 50/- from him and after a few minutes having again said that he had paid Rs. 60/- to P.W. 4 for purchase of a diary and that P.W. 4 had handed over to him a new diary and a fifty-rupee note prior to the detection. P.W. 6 had been declared hostile also for not confirming similar statement before the I.O. with only the variation of the Appellant having stated to have paid P.W. 4 a sum of Rs. 100/- for purchase of a diary and that way having handed over Rs. 50/- and a diary to him. P.W. 6 stated in the Court that the Appellant offered no explanation. Even if such facts are excluded from consideration, yet their statements; otherwise completely corroborate the evidence of P.W. 8 who stated regarding preparation of the trap, the acceptance of money by the Appellant and when confronted, of his denial of the acceptance, recovery of the money from his person and the number of the note having tallied as also all other facts relating to the execution of the trap. From these circumstances, disclosed by the evidence of these witnesses, there can be least doubt that the Appellant had accepted the tainted note and the diary. The evidence in that regard is overwhelmingly consistent and hence a presumption u/s 4(1) is necessary to be drawn against the Appellant of having accepted the gratification as a bribe for securing the end or ends as mentioned in Section 161 IPC. 9. So far as charge u/s 5(1)(d) is concerned, it of course goes without question that the presumption u/s 4(1) of the Act is not available to be drawn in respect of such charge, but where a tainted currency note is found on the person of the accused without any credible explanation, the fact would speak for itself and the courts would be also at liberty to rely upon natural inference from such fact by application of the principle of res ipsa loquilar. It Was held in Raghubir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, where an Assistant Station Master was not able to furnish any satisfactory explanation of the presence of a marked currency note in his hand with which he was caught red-handed and which had been made over to him by a passenger whose bedding had been detained by him, the principle of the circumstances speaking for itself was made applicable. This is so since once the incriminating fact is established from which a logical inference of a culpable conduct is a necessary conclusion, then it is only the charged person who can explain the circumstances to establish some other conclusion which extricates as it will be matter within his own special knowledge. 10. It is also now settled law that the presumption so raised u/s 4(1) is not discharged by a mere offering of an explanation or a reasonable explanation by the accused, but that he has the duty to prove the contrary, it being the requirement that the presumption shall be drawn unless the contrary is proved. But however the "proof", necessary is not that of beyond reasonable doubt, but can be discharged by such proof which makes the explanation preponderantly probable.- The question was considered by the Supreme Court in Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai Vs. State of Maharashtra, holding that the presumption raised u/s 4(1) is unlike the one raised u/s 114 of the Evidence Act under which a discretion is left with the court to raise the presumption or not, but no such choice is available to the court not to draw the presumption if the facts showing acceptance of the illegal gratification by the accused is proved and that such presumption does not stand discharged by more furnishing of an explanation which is reasonable and probable, but that it must further be shown that the explanation is a true one. The wordings "unless the contrary is proved" were explained as requiring the presumption to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. In a later case, V.D. Jhangan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh it was held, though the earlier case Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai Vs. State of Maharashtra, was not referred to in this aspect, that the burden on the accused would be satisfied if he establishes his case by a preponderance of probability and is not required to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt as is required of the prosecution Both the cases were considered in AIR 1968 SC 1292 (Sailendranath Bose v. The State of Bihar) to reach the conclusion that the burden resting on the accused is satisfied if he establishes his case by preponderance of probability but however the same is not discharged by merely offering an explanation which is reasonable and probable. The decision was followed by this Court in 1985 (1) OLR 504 (Sashibhusan Kar v. State of Orissa). It is needless to say that such proof has to be established by the accused by evidence, direct or circumstantial, either gleaned from the prosecution evidence itself or may be independently led by the accused, but however evidently it is a matter which should be entirely his choice without an element of compulsion. 11. Having reached such conclusion, it is to be seen as to how far the Appellant has been able to replace the presumption. Mr. Panda for the purpose has relied upon, besides the explanation furnished by the Appellant in his statement u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, on Ext. 4, a letter written by the Appellant on the date of occurrence to the C.T.O., Rayagada; the evidence of D.Ws. 2 and 4 who respectively produced the letter and proved the same; the evidence of P.W. 5 that the person of P.W., was searched at the Appellant's insistence as also the fact that such search was not carried out at the place of the occurrence, but at the Check Gate which was one K.M. away and the evidence of D.W. 3 regarding asking for change of the currency note by P.W. 4. 12. In Ext. 4, the Appellant had intimated the C.T.O. the facts regarding the raid and had stated that on challenge by the vigilance staff of his having accepted illegal gratification, he had denied the same and having explained that he had taken a fifty-rupee note from P.W. 4 at his request for exchange of notes of smaller denominations which he had given him in good faith. From this it is argued that it being a contemporaneous document written by the Appellant to his superior, should be taken as substantiating his defence. Admittedly the letter was written some time after the raid and was sent through a messenger. The letter by itself would not be proof of the facts pleaded by the Appellant being a self-created document. That apart, there are two important features in the letter which rather make the stand taken by the Appellant inconsistent. Admittedly the letter was written some time after the raid and was sent through a messenger. The letter by itself would not be proof of the facts pleaded by the Appellant being a self-created document. That apart, there are two important features in the letter which rather make the stand taken by the Appellant inconsistent. Firstly, whereas in the letter it is stated that when P.W. 4 offered him the diary at his residence, he had told him to keep the diary with him and to come to the Check Gate, yet in his statement u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure his specific statement was that on being offered the diary while they were coming out of his house, he accepted it believing the same to have been sent by his friend. The other feature which is even more important is that even though at the stage of the trial the defence adopted by him was that the person of P.W. 4 was not searched at the spot as demanded by him and that the notes of lesser denominations given by him in exchange was possibly done away with by P.W. 4 while coming to the check gate, yet no such stand was taken by him in the letter Ext.4, The other evidence relied upon by him for the purpose is that of D.W. 3 and P.W. 5. D.W. 3 is a neighbour of the Appellant who has been examined to state that he had been to the quarters of the Appellant to gate some clarification about T.A. Rules and while they were coming out of the quarters, a person met the Appellant and told him that one of his friends Mr. Dhal had sent him a diary and he also disclosed his identity on the Appellant's query as being the owner of a truck. While they were proceeding, that person asked the Appellant if he could give him some change. After hearing such request by the person, D.W. 3 had come away to his quarters since by then he was in the front of his house. The statement of this witness would have been entitled to some weight had not been a fact that his presence at the time stated by him was never put to either P.W. 3 or P.W. 4 and thus he is a surprise witness sprung upon the prosecution. The statement of this witness would have been entitled to some weight had not been a fact that his presence at the time stated by him was never put to either P.W. 3 or P.W. 4 and thus he is a surprise witness sprung upon the prosecution. The presence of such witness is also not disclosed even - in Ext. 4. It is also evident that the Appellant had not disclosed the presence of this witness earlier to anybody and in view of such fact it is not possible to place any reliance upon him. The only other circumstance relied upon by the Appellant is that on his request to search the person of P.W. 4 at the spot, the same was carried out only at the check gate. It is of course appears from the evidence of P.W. 5 that the person of P.W. 4 was searched at the insistence of the Appellant and P.W. 4 admitted that the search was made at the check gate which according to P.W. 3 is about one kilometre away. But merely from such fact it is not probable to infer that P.W. 4 had done away with some currency notes on the way, P.Ws. 5 and 6 are both witnesses who were declared hostile by the prosecution, but as has been observed before, they are found to be respectable and independent witnesses. P.W. 5's evidence is that on being challenged the Appellant denied the acceptance of the money. Though he stated regarding search of P.W. 4, as desired by the Appellant yet he also further testified that on such search nothing was found. There is no evidence that the Appellant had made any complaint than of the possibility of P.W. 4 having done away with the exchanged notes. P.W. 6 is specific in his statement that a copy of the detection report, Ext. 6, was supplied to the Appellant and that the Appellant was neither examined by the I.O. nor did he offer any explanation. In view of such statements; the plea appears to be a mere after-thought and it cannot be said that the Appellant has in any Nay succeeded in adducing proof for the defence adopted by him. 6, was supplied to the Appellant and that the Appellant was neither examined by the I.O. nor did he offer any explanation. In view of such statements; the plea appears to be a mere after-thought and it cannot be said that the Appellant has in any Nay succeeded in adducing proof for the defence adopted by him. The explanation offered by him has also not been made probable from the prosecution evidence or by those led in defence so as to avoid the charge u/s 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 13. Mr. Panda has extensively commented upon the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 as being unworthy of acceptance and I am inclined to agree with him that in certain respects the evidence of these witnesses cannot be said to be without blemish. It was the statement of P.W. 1 that P.W. 3 reported to him in the first week of February of the harassment by the Appellant demanding money for each trip, but as Ext. 3, the register maintained at the check gate, shows P.W. 3 was not the driver of the vehicle during the month of February at all and by then the vehicle was being driven by a driver named Ramanna. P.W. 1 had also stated of P.W. 3 being the driver of the vehicle plying it regularly but it could not be a fact. It was his statement that the transportation work had started in the last week of January and P.W. 3 stated to have been paying money to the Appellant for each trip for fifteen days. But Ext. 2, the register maintained at the check gate, shows the vehicle to have plied only on six occasions during the period from 21.1.81 to 29.1.81 with P.W. 3 as driver and thereafter, as Ext. 3 shows, the vehicle had passed through the check gate only five times from 31.1.81 to 7.2.81 with Ramanna as the driver, but not P. W. 3, From such fact, it would appear that P.W. 3 was not driver the vehicle in the month of February at all. 3 shows, the vehicle had passed through the check gate only five times from 31.1.81 to 7.2.81 with Ramanna as the driver, but not P. W. 3, From such fact, it would appear that P.W. 3 was not driver the vehicle in the month of February at all. That apart, it was the statement of P.W. 4 that he met P.W. 3 on 10th February at Vizianagaram, where he had gone to purchase spare parts for his truck, while P.W. 3 was loading hume pipes and on enquiry from him learnt that the harassment by the Appellant was still continuing and hence he decided to meet the Appellant and asked P.W. 3 to meet him the next day. Such statement is also not believable since as has been seen earlier, P.W. 3 then was not the driver of the vehicle. It was the further statement of P.W. 4 that on 11.2.81 he had been to the Octroi Check Gate at Rayagada and had waited for P.W. 3 since he was informed that the vehicle of P.W. 1 had passed through that road with P.W. 3 as the driver and hence he remained there till P.W. 3 returned from Muniguda. Such statement would also not be believable for the very same reason that P.W. 3 was not the driver of the vehicle on 11th February. A further comment has been made that P.W. 4 actually did not meet the Appellant on 10th February as stated by him since no such meeting was possible taking the time factor into consideration as P.W. 3 has stated that he met P.W. 4 at Vizianagaram at 8 to 10 a.m. that day and P.W. 4 in his statement before the police had stated to have met the Appellant at Kereda Check Gate at 11 a.m. The distance from Vizianagaram to Kereda is about 130 to 140 Kms. as deposed to by D.W. 1 and it is the evidence of P.W. 4 that from Vizianagaram he came to Parbatipuram in a bus from where he came in a truck to the check gate. It was thus submitted that to avoid such impossibility, P.W. 4 in his statement in court shifted the time of his meeting the Appellant to 12 noon to 1 p.m. as otherwise it would not have been possible to travel from Vizianagaram to Kereda within one or two hours. 14. It was thus submitted that to avoid such impossibility, P.W. 4 in his statement in court shifted the time of his meeting the Appellant to 12 noon to 1 p.m. as otherwise it would not have been possible to travel from Vizianagaram to Kereda within one or two hours. 14. These factors even though would raise a doubt regarding the earlier demands by the Appellant as narrated by the three witnesses, yet would not have the effect of nullifying the evidence regarding acceptance of the gratification by the Appellant in the shape of the tainted currency note and the diary. As has been discussed above the evidence of P.Ws. 5 to 8 being absolutely believable would fully support and corroborate the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 regarding acceptance of the money and diary by the Appellant which fact would establish his guilt in the circumstances discussed heretobefore. The evidence in that regard being found to be wholly believable, the conviction of the Appellant cannot be found fault with. 15. In the result the appeal has no merit and is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed